List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta held that clarified that the bar under Order XXI Rule 102 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) does not apply to transferees from third parties (not the judgment-debtor), allowing them to object to decree execution under Rules 97-101 CPC. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar (2025).

What was the Background of Tahir V. Isani v. Madan Waman Chodankar (2025) Case? 

• Mrs. Maria Eduardo Apolina Gonsalves Misquita owned a 477 square meter plot with a two-floor building in Goa, leasing a ground floor portion to Madan Waman Chodankar in February 1977.  
• Chodankar subsequently partnered with Dyaneshwar Keshav Malik and others ('Maliks') in March 1977 to operate a hardware business from the leased premises whilst retaining tenancy in his name. 
• In January 1988, Mrs. Misquita sold the entire property to M/s. Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., followed by an April 1988 agreement between Rizvi Estate and the Maliks for possession surrender to enable building reconstruction.  
• Rizvi Estate filed eviction proceedings in 1989 alleging unauthorised sub-letting by Chodankar to the Maliks, whilst Chodankar filed an injunction suit in 1988 to prevent demolition. 
• Chodankar's injunction suit was decreed in his favour in 1999 and upheld on appeal in 2001, restraining demolition activities.  
• In 1996, Chodankar initiated Special Civil Suit No.97/1996/B against the Maliks seeking partnership dissolution, profit recovery, and ejectment, with the Maliks acknowledging in their written statement that all parties had surrendered rights to Rizvi Estate in April 1988. 
• Rizvi Estate sold the property to Tahir v. Isani (the Appellant) through a registered sale deed in April 2007, followed by the Maliks executing a surrender deed in favour of the Appellant for Rs.10 lakhs in October 2007. The partnership dissolution suit was decreed ex-parte in Chodankar's favour in April 2008 as the Maliks ceased contesting the proceedings. 
• Chodankar's legal representatives initiated execution proceedings for the 2008 decree, prompting the Appellant to file objections under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC in February 2009.  
• After prolonged proceedings spanning over ten years with evidence recording, Chodankar's legal heirs applied in 2019 to discontinue the enquiry based on the doctrine of lis pendens. 
• The Executing Court dismissed the 2019 application to discontinue enquiry in September 2021, leading Chodankar's legal heirs to file a writ petition before the High Court.  
• The High Court allowed the writ petition and discontinued the enquiry, prompting the Appellant to approach the Supreme Court challenging this decision.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Supreme Court emphasised that Order XXI Rule 102 intends to preserve the idea of achieving finality of judicial decisions, embodying the principle of "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation). The provision ensures that decisions bind not only litigating parties but also those who derive title under them through alienations made whilst the suit was pending, irrespective of whether such transferees had notice of the proceedings. 
• The Court observed that Rule 102 protects decree-holders' interests against unscrupulous judgment-debtors and their subsequent transferees who engage in activities to deprive decree-holders from reaping the benefits of decrees granted in their favour. The Rule, being equitable in nature, estops further creation of rights by explicitly stating that nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction by transferees pendente lite of judgment-debtors. 
• The Court delineated four condition precedents for Rule 102 application: 

(1) Existence of a decree for possession of immovable property. 

(2) Resistance or obstruction in executing said decree. 

(3) Such obstruction by a person to whom the judgment-debtor transferred the property. 

(4) Such transfer occurring after institution of the original suit in which the decree was passed. 

• The Court clarified that Rule 102 applies only to persons to whom judgment-debtors have transferred immovable property that was the subject matter of pending suits. If the person resisting execution does not trace title from the judgment-debtor, the bar of Rule 102 does not apply. Such persons are competent to gain benefits under Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI, even if they acquired the property pendente lite. 
• The Court determined that the Appellant did not trace his title from judgment-debtors (the Maliks) and therefore was not a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. The Appellant was a bona fide buyer who purchased the suit property from M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., who traced their title from the original owner Mrs. Misquita. Since the transferor was not a party to the suit and was a third party having received ownership rights from the original owner in 1988, the bar of Rule 102 did not prohibit the Appellant from raising objections. 
• The Court noted the belated and mala fide nature of the respondent's 2019 application to close the enquiry, filed ten years after the Appellant's original objection in 2009, despite all relevant facts including sale and surrender deeds being disclosed from the beginning.  
• The Court observed that the respondent participated in the enquiry for years without objection, making their subsequent application untenable. 

What Order XXI Rule 102 of CPC? 

• Scope and Application: Order XXI Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes that the protective provisions of Rules 98 and 100 shall not apply to any resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for possession of immovable property by specific categories of transferees. 
• Primary Restriction: The rule specifically excludes protection for persons to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, thereby preventing such transferees from claiming benefits under the general execution provisions. 
• Dispossession Protection Exclusion: Rule 102 also denies protection to transferees pendente lite in cases involving their dispossession, ensuring that such persons cannot seek relief under the standard execution procedures available to legitimate parties. 
• Temporal Element: The crucial temporal requirement is that the transfer must have occurred after the institution of the original suit in which the decree was passed, making the timing of transfer the determining factor for applicability of this restriction. 
• Inclusive Definition of Transfer: The Explanation to Rule 102 clarifies that "transfer" includes transfers by operation of law, thereby encompassing both voluntary transfers and those occurring through legal processes or court orders. 
• Underlying Policy: The rule embodies the principle of preventing judgment-debtors from frustrating decree execution by transferring property to third parties during litigation, thereby protecting the interests of decree-holders and ensuring finality of judicial decisions. 
• Exception Limitation: Rule 102 applies exclusively to transferees from judgment-debtors and does not extend to persons who derive title from third parties who were not parties to the original suit, maintaining a balance between preventing abuse and protecting legitimate property rights. 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justice Manish Kumar Nigam in the case of Sunil Dubey v. Minakshi (2025) allowed a petition challenging the Family Court's refusal to waive the filing of marriage registration certificate in divorce proceedings, Hindu marriage does not become invalid merely because it is not registered, and therefore, a Family Court cannot insist on the production of a marriage registration certificate in a mutual divorce petition.

What was the Background of Sunil Dubey v. Minakshi (2025) Case?

• The husband-petitioner and defendant-wife filed an application under Section 13(B) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) for divorce by mutual consent on 23rd October 2024. 
• The Family Court Judge ordered filing of marriage certificate by 29th July 2025 during the pendency of the petition. 
• The petitioner filed an application seeking exemption from filing the Registration Certificate, stating it was not available and there was no compulsory requirement for marriage registration under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
• The application was supported by the opposite party (wife), indicating mutual agreement. 
• The Family Court rejected the application on 31st July 2025, relying on Rule 3(a) of Hindu Marriage and Divorce Rules, 1956, which requires marriage certificate to be annexed in every proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act. 
• The marriage was solemnized on 27th June 2010, before the commencement of Uttar Pradesh Marriage Registration Rules, 2017. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On Marriage Registration Under Section 8: The Court noted that Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for registration of marriage but marriage is not invalidated for want of registration. Registration is only meant to "facilitate proof of Hindu marriages" and serves as convenient evidence, not a prerequisite for validity.  
• On Procedural vs Substantive Rights: The Court emphasized that procedural rules should facilitate justice, not create technical hurdles, citing the Supreme Court's observation that "procedure is the handmaid to substantial rights." 
• On Rule 3(a) of Hindu Marriage and Divorce Rules, 1956: The Court clarified that Rule 3(a) requires marriage certificate only "where the marriage has been registered under this Act." 
• On Uttar Pradesh Marriage Registration Rules, 2017: The Court noted that these rules make registration compulsory for marriages after their commencement, but marriages solemnized before remain unaffected. 

Legal Precedents Cited: 

• Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal (2024): Registration only confirms valid marriage ceremony under Section 7; cannot legitimize invalid marriages. 
• Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal (1955): Procedural laws should facilitate justice, not create technical traps. 

Court's Directions: 

The Allahabad High Court: 

• Allowed the petition and set aside the Family Court's order dated 31st July 2025. 
• Directed the Family Court to proceed with the mutual divorce case without requiring marriage registration certificate. 
• Ordered expeditious disposal of the pending divorce proceeding since 2024, with proper opportunity for hearing. 
• Emphasized compliance with Section 21-B of the Hindu Marriage Act regarding statutory timelines. 

What are the Provisions Regarding Registration of Marriage? 

Hindu Law: 

• Section 8(1) of HMA enables the State Governments to make rules for the purpose of registration of marriage. 
• Section 8(2) mentions that regardless of what is stated in sub-section (1), the State Government can, if it deems necessary or appropriate, mandate the submission of the details mentioned in sub-section (1) within the entire state or specific regions, either universally or for specific cases.  
• In instances where such directives are issued, anyone who violates any such regulation established in this regard may face a fine of up to twenty-five rupees. 

Muslim Law: 

• Registration of marriage in Muslims is compulsory and mandatory, as a Muslim marriage is treated as a civil contract.  
• Every marriage contracted between Muslims after the commencement of this Act, shall be registered as hereinafter provided, within thirty days from the conclusion of the Nikah Ceremony. 
• Nikah Nama is a type of legal document in Muslim marriages which contains the essential conditions/details of the marriage.

Christan Law:

• Sections 27-37 form Part IV of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, specifically addressing the registration process for marriages conducted under this Act among Indian Christians.  
  • Marriages must adhere to the prescribed regulations, and they are typically officiated by clergymen affiliated with the Church of England.  

What is the Consequence of Non- Registration of Marriage? 

• The consequences of non-registration of marriage in India can vary depending on the context and legal requirements. Here are some general implications: 
  • Legal Recognition: While registration of marriage is not mandatory for its validity in most cases, it serves as conclusive evidence of the marriage having taken place. Without a registered marriage certificate, proving the existence of the marriage may be challenging, especially in legal proceedings. 
  • Rights and Benefits: A registered marriage certificate is often required for availing various rights and benefits provided by the government, such as inheritance rights, spousal benefits, and social security schemes. Non-registration may therefore result in the denial of these entitlements. 
  • Legal Proceedings: In case of disputes related to marital status, property rights, or divorce, a registered marriage certificate can simplify legal proceedings by providing clear documentation of the marriage. Non-registration may complicate such matters and prolong legal processes. 
  • Visa and Immigration: In certain cases, a registered marriage certificate may be required for visa applications and immigration purposes, especially for spouses intending to join their partners in another country. Non-registration could therefore hinder such processes.

What are the Landmark Cases for Registration of Marriage? 

• Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2007): 
  • In this case, the Supreme Court noted that under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, registration of marriages is left to the discretion of the parties, they can either solemnize the marriage before the Sub-Registrar or register it after performing the marriage ceremony according to customary beliefs.
• Abdul Kadir v. Salima and Anr.(1886): 
  • Justice Mahmood observed the nature of Muslim marriage as purely a civil contract rather than a sacrament. 

Source:  Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Manish Kumar Nigam issued a contempt notice to the Director of Horticulture, U.P., for repeatedly rejecting a woman employee’s maternity leave on the invalid ground of a two-year gap between pregnancies, despite prior court rulings stating such a condition is not mandatory. 

• The Allahabad High Court held this in the matter of Sushila Patel v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And 3 Others (2025). 

What was the Background of Sushila Patel v. State of Uttar Pradesh And 3 Others (2025) Case? 

• Sushila Patel, a government employee working under the Director, Horticulture and Food Processing Department, Uttar Pradesh, filed a petition before the Allahabad High Court challenging the repeated rejection of her maternity leave application. 
• The petitioner had applied for maternity leave but faced rejection from the Director on the ground that a mandatory gap of two years had not elapsed between her first and second maternity leave. This rejection was based on an alleged departmental requirement imposing a minimum waiting period between successive pregnancies for availing maternity leave benefits. 
• Previously, in November 2024, the Allahabad High Court had already set aside two rejection orders dated September 2024 issued by the same Director on identical grounds. The Court had specifically relied upon the precedent established in Guddi v. State of U.P. and Others (April 2022), which categorically declared that insisting on a minimum gap of 180 days or two years between pregnancies was not mandatory for sanctioning maternity leave in government service. 
• Despite the Court's clear directions and the binding nature of its earlier order, when the petitioner submitted a fresh application on 7th December 2024, enclosing a copy of the High Court's order, the Director once again rejected her application citing the same ground that had been previously quashed by the Court. 
• This repeated rejection prompted the petitioner to approach the High Court again, alleging willful disobedience of the Court's earlier directions and seeking appropriate relief for the grant of maternity leave. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Allahabad High Court, presided over by Justice Ajit Kumar, expressed serious displeasure over the conduct of the Director, Horticulture and Food Processing Department, Uttar Pradesh. 
• The Court observed that it was "unfortunate" that the Director had ignored the binding directions of the Court and had repeated the very same ground for rejection that had already been quashed in the earlier proceedings. 
• The Court specifically noted that despite clear directions issued in numerous petitions establishing that the requirement of a minimum two-year period between pregnancies was not mandatory for availing maternity leave benefits, the Director had failed to appreciate the legal position and rejected the application without justified reasons. 
• The Court characterised the Director's conduct as constituting a clear case of contempt of the High Court's order, noting the deliberate disregard for judicial directions that were binding in nature. 
• The Court observed that such wilful disobedience of judicial orders undermines the authority of the Court and amounts to an offence under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 
• Consequently, the Court directed the Director, Horticulture and Food Processing Department, U.P. to appear in person before the Court on September 1 and show cause as to why proceedings for contempt of court should not be initiated against him under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 
• The Court noted that such conduct warranted serious consideration for framing formal charges and initiating contempt proceedings against the errant official for his persistent failure to comply with judicial directions. 

What was Legal Provisions Referenced? 

Primary Legal Issue: Maternity Leave Requirements 

The Central Legal Question: Whether a mandatory waiting period of two years between pregnancies is required for government employees to avail a second maternity leave benefit. 

Court's Legal Position 

The Allahabad High Court has established that: 

1. 180-day gap requirement is NOT mandatory - The court ruled that the controversy regarding a 180-day gap between pregnancies "was no more res integra" (no longer an open question) as this provision has been held to be non-mandatory in government service matters. 
2. Two-year waiting period is NOT required - The court has consistently held in multiple cases that there is no mandatory minimum two-year period that must pass between two pregnancies for availing maternity leave benefits. 

Precedent Cases 

• Smt. Guddi v. State of U.P. and 2 Others (Writ A No. 4996 of 2022, decided April 8, 2022) - This appears to be the landmark judgment establishing that the waiting period requirements are not mandatory. 

Legal Framework 

While the specific statutory provisions aren't detailed in this order, this case involves: 

• Maternity leave provisions under government service rules 
• Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - for non-compliance with court orders 
• Administrative law principles regarding compliance with judicial directions