List of Current Affairs

Source: Punjab and Haryana High Court 

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, comprising Justice Mandeep Pannu, suspended the sentence of a POCSO convict during the pendency of his appeal, holding that non-compliance with the mandatory reformative-assessment procedure under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) constitutes a relevant circumstance for grant of suspension.  

What was the Background of the Case? 

• The applicant-appellant was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Special Court, Hoshiarpur, on 16th March 2023, under Section 376 of the IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, and Sections 363 (kidnapping), 366, 354 (outraging modesty) and 452 (trespass) of the IPC. 
• He was sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act, with the sentences under all counts directed to run concurrently. 
• The applicant was a child in conflict with law at the time of commission of the offence but was tried as an adult. 
• He sought suspension of sentence pending appeal, contending that he had already undergone actual custody, including remissions, of about 3 years, 3 months and 8 days. 
• It was further argued that the mandatory procedure under Sections 19 and 20 of the JJ Act, read with Rule 13 of the JJ Model Rules, 2016, had not been complied with by the Children's Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Statutory Obligation Under the JJ Act: The Court held that Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the JJ Act, read with Rule 13 of the JJ Model Rules, 2016, show that where a child in conflict with law is tried as an adult and kept in a place of safety till attaining the age of 21 years, the Children's Court is under a statutory obligation, after the child turns 21 and before completing the prescribed period of stay, to undertake a fresh evaluation of his reformative progress and assess whether he is capable of becoming a contributing member of society. 
• On Non-Compliance in the Present Case: The Court found that the record did not indicate that this mandatory exercise under Section 20 of the JJ Act, read with Rule 13(8)(vi) of the JJ Model Rules, 2016, had been undertaken by the Children's Court after the applicant attained the age of 21 years. 
• On the Effect of Non-Compliance: The Court held that since the statute confers valuable rights upon a child in conflict with law at that stage, non-compliance with this mandatory procedure is a relevant circumstance while considering a prayer for suspension of sentence pending appeal. 
• On Relief Granted: Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the conviction, and having regard to the custody already undergone, the applicant's status as a child in conflict with law, and the apparent non-compliance with the statutory procedure, the Court allowed the application and suspended the substantive sentence during pendency of the appeal, subject to furnishing adequate bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Duty Magistrate concerned. 
• Directions to Children's Courts: The Court directed the Registry to circulate the order to all Presiding Officers of Children's Courts/Special POCSO Courts in Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh, and to the Chandigarh Judicial Academy, emphasising that strict compliance with Sections 19 and 20 of the JJ Act and Rule 13 of the Model Rules is essential to achieve the reformative object of the legislation. 

What is the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015? 

About: 

• The JJ Act, 2015 consolidates and amends the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law, and children in need of care and protection. 
• It provides for their basic needs through proper care, protection, development, treatment and social re-integration, adopting a child-friendly approach in adjudication and disposal of matters in their best interest. 
• It also provides for a special approach in the case of a "child in conflict with law" who is alleged or found to have committed an offence, keeping the reformative and rehabilitative objective central to the framework. 

Key Provisions Relevant to this Case: 

• Section 19 – Empowers the Children's Court to pass orders in respect of a child in conflict with law tried as an adult, including orders for placement in a place of safety till the child completes 21 years of age, followed by a fresh assessment. 
• Section 20 – Mandates a periodic follow-up by the Children's Court to evaluate whether a child in a place of safety has undergone reformative changes and is fit to be reintegrated into society, on attaining 21 years of age. 
• Section 21 – Bars the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of release on a child in conflict with law. 
• Rule 13 of the JJ Model Rules, 2016 – Prescribes the procedure for the periodic follow-up and reformative assessment of a child in a place of safety, including the specific evaluation required under Rule 13(8)(vi) upon the child attaining 21 years of age. 

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh of the Bombay High Court, while hearing an Appeal From Order in Rahul Ganesh Mehta v. Narayan Ganpat Gaikwad (2026), held that a development agreement involving development of an entire plot with retention of a share by the developer is not a pure construction contract, and that Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 could not be applied to bar specific performance of such an agreement. The Court set aside the Trial Court's rejection of the plaintiffs' application for temporary injunction and allowed the same. 

What was the Background of Rahul Ganesh Mehta v. Narayan Ganpat Gaikwad (2026) Case? 

• The Plaintiffs entered into a development agreement under which they were to develop the entire suit plot and transfer 50% of the constructed built-up area to Defendant No. 1, while the remaining 50% of the plot was to be transferred in favour of the Plaintiffs through a tripartite agreement. 
• Clause 7 of the agreement provided that once physical possession of the plot was handed over by CIDCO, Defendant No. 1 would execute the tripartite agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs or their nominees. 
• The Plaintiffs had already paid Rs. 70,80,000 towards the agreement. 
• It was alleged that the Defendants attempted to transfer the property to a third party (Defendant No. 3), prompting the Plaintiffs to file a suit for specific performance along with an application for temporary injunction. 
• The Trial Court rejected the injunction application on the ground that the Plaintiffs had not produced any document showing that they were developers or had carried out any development work, and treated the agreement as a pure construction contract attracting Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 
• The Trial Court also did not accept the contention that Defendant No. 3 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. 
• Aggrieved, the Plaintiffs preferred an Appeal From Order before the Bombay High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Nature of the Agreement: The Court held that the contract between the parties was for development of the entire suit plot, with 50% of the constructed area to be handed over by the Plaintiffs to Defendant No. 1, while the Plaintiffs retained the balance 50%. It held that the Plaintiffs were not merely contractors engaged to carry out construction, and that the Trial Court had erred in construing the agreement as a pure construction contract and applying Section 14(3)(c). 
• On Proof of Developer Credentials: The Court observed that there was no clause in the agreement requiring the Plaintiffs to satisfy any credentials as a developer, and that it would have been open to the Plaintiffs to engage a contractor to carry out the actual construction. It held that the Plaintiffs were therefore not required to prove that they were developers or had undertaken prior development work. 
• On Clause 7 and the Tripartite Agreement: The Court noted that the Trial Court had failed to notice Clause 7 of the development agreement, which provided for execution of the tripartite agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs or their nominees once possession was handed over by CIDCO. 
• On the Scope of Development Agreements: Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Sushil Kumar Agarwal v. Meenakshi Sadhu (2019), the Court observed that a development agreement may describe a wide range of arrangements and cannot mechanically be equated with a construction contract. 
• On Effect of the Retention Clause: The Court held that the Plaintiffs' right to develop the entire plot could not be curtailed merely on the basis of the covenant that 50% of the land would subsequently be conveyed in their favour. 
• On Bona Fide Purchaser: The Court noted that the Trial Court itself had not accepted the contention that Defendant No. 3 was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, which weighed in favour of granting injunctive relief. 
• Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 19th June 2024 and allowed the Plaintiffs' application for temporary injunction. 

What is Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? 

Section 14, Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Contracts Not Specifically Enforceable: 

Sub-section (1) — Bars specific performance of four categories of contracts: 

• (a) Contracts where monetary compensation is adequate relief. 
• (b) Contracts too minute, numerous in detail, or dependent on personal qualifications/volition of parties to be enforced by the court. 
• (c) Contracts that are determinable in nature. 
• (d) Contracts involving a continuous duty that the court cannot supervise. 

Sub-section (2) — Bars specific enforcement of agreements to refer present or future disputes to arbitration (except as provided under the Arbitration Act, 1940). However, if a party who made such an agreement refuses to perform it and sues on the subject matter covered by the arbitration clause, the existence of that contract operates as a bar to the suit. 

Sub-section (3) — Creates exceptions to clauses (a), (c), and (d) of sub-section (1), allowing specific performance in three situations: 

• (a) Contracts to execute a mortgage or furnish security for repayment of a loan the borrower is unwilling to repay immediately (provided the lender is willing to advance any remaining part of the loan). 
• (b) Contracts for (i) execution of a formal partnership deed where the partnership business has already commenced, or (ii) purchase of a partner's share in a firm. 
• (c) Contracts for construction of a building or execution of other work on land, subject to three conditions being satisfied:  
• The work is described precisely enough for the court to determine its exact nature; 
• The plaintiff has a substantial interest in performance such that monetary compensation would not be adequate relief; and 
• The defendant has, pursuant to the contract, obtained possession of the whole or part of the land on which the work is to be carried out.