List of Current Affairs

Source: Andhra Pradesh High Court

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, comprising Justice Ravi Cheemalapati, in X v. Y (2026), set aside an order of the trial Court that had refused to permit the marking of electronic records — including WhatsApp status screenshots, email prints, digital photographs, and bank statements — on the ground that the petitioner had not produced a certificate from a "proper authority." 

• The Court held that a self-certificate issued by a party who is in lawful control and possession of the device is legally valid and admissible under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), provided it satisfies the statutory requirements prescribed under the provision.

What was the Background of X v.  Y (2026) Case? 

• The matter arose out of divorce proceedings instituted by the husband under the Hindu Marriage Act, wherein the petitioner sought to mark several electronic records as exhibits during trial. 
• The petitioner filed a self-certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act along with an application to mark WhatsApp status screenshots, email prints, digital photographs, an HP DVD, bank statements, and other electronic records as exhibits. 
• While the trial Court allowed the applications to receive and mark additional documents, it refused to permit the marking of the electronic records, holding that a certificate under Section 65B must be issued by a "proper authority" and not by the party themselves. 
• The petitioner challenged this order before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, contending that the trial Court had proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the provision and that a self-certificate by a person in lawful possession of the device is expressly recognised under Section 65B(4).

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Validity of Self-Certification: The Court held that a self-certificate furnished by the petitioner under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (now Section 63 BSA) is legally admissible and generally sufficient for WhatsApp messages or call recordings present on the party's own phone, provided it complies with the statutory requirements under the provision. 
• On the Error of the Trial Court: The Court held that the trial Court had proceeded on an erroneous assumption that Section 65B mandates a certificate only from a "proper authority" and not from the person possessing or operating the device. The Court clarified that such a certificate can also be issued by a person in lawful control of the device, including a mobile phone. 
• On the Requirements of the Certificate: The Court held that the self-certificate must — identify the electronic record being produced (such as an email, video, or document); describe the manner in which the electronic record was produced; provide details of the device involved in the production of the record; and state that the device was operating properly, or that any malfunction did not affect the accuracy of the record. 
• On the Precedent in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar: The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020), which affirmed that a certificate under Section 65B(4) is mandatory for the admissibility of secondary electronic evidence, but that such a certificate may be issued by a person in "lawful control" of the device — not exclusively by an official authority. 
• On the Directions to the Trial Court: The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the trial Court to examine the self-certificate filed by the petitioner and permit the marking of the electronic records if it satisfied the requirements under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act.

What is Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023? 

About: 

• Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 is the successor to Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It governs the conditions under which electronic records are admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. 

Key Sub-sections: 

• Section 63(1) — Any computer output (information printed, stored, recorded, or copied in any electronic form) is deemed a document and is admissible without production of the original, if the prescribed conditions are satisfied. BSA expands this to include semiconductor memory, communication devices, and any electronic form of storage — broader than the IEA's reference to only optical/magnetic media produced by a computer. 
• Section 63(2) — Lays down four conditions: the output was produced during regular use of the device; information was regularly fed in the ordinary course of activities; the device was operating properly throughout; and the information in the record is derived from data fed in the ordinary course. 
• Section 63(3) — Where multiple devices are used over a period, they are treated as a single computer. BSA replaces the IEA's formulation (combinations/succession of computers) with a more modern framework covering standalone mode, computer systems, networks, cloud resources, and intermediaries. 
• Section 63(4) — A certificate must be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance of admission. It must identify the record, describe its production, give device particulars, and be signed by the person in charge of the device or relevant activities. BSA adds two changes: the certificate must now be submitted at each instance of admission (not just once), and an expert's certificate is also recognised — unlike the IEA which only recognised a person in responsible official position. 

Source: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh 

Why in News? 

A Single Bench of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, comprising Justice Sanjay Dhar, in Manish Kumar Bharti v. Union of India & Ors. (2026), dismissed a review petition filed against an order of the learned Single Judge whereby a writ petition challenging the petitioner's seniority fixation in the CRPF had been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 

• The Court held that representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation cannot cure delay and laches in filing a writ petition, and that rejection of such representations does not furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a dead claim.

What was the Background of Manish Kumar Bharti v. Union of India & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner had appeared in a competitive examination in 1997 for selection to the post of CPO (Assistant Commandant) and was selected in the 30th Batch of CPOs-1996. However, his appointment order was delayed as the department could not obtain the verification/antecedent report from the relevant authorities in time, and consequently he could not undergo training with the 30th Batch. 
• By the time the police verification report was received, both the 30th and 31st Batches had already commenced training. He was offered appointment with the 32nd Batch. On account of his mother's ailment, he sought and was granted a six-month extension. Thereafter, he was asked to undergo training with the 33rd Batch and upon successful completion, made representations seeking reckoning of seniority along with the 30th Batch. His representations were rejected. 
• The respondents contended that the petitioner's seniority had been fixed in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 read with DOP&P OM dated 09.08.1995, and that he had been allowed to join training with the 33rd Batch subject to the condition that his seniority would be assigned as per letter dated 15.03.2000. His inter se seniority was fixed above the 33rd Batch. 
• The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, which was dismissed as withdrawn, and thereafter filed the present writ petition before the J&K High Court in 2017. The learned Writ Court dismissed it primarily on the ground of delay and laches, noting that the petitioner had entered the department in 2000 but challenged his seniority only in 2017, during which period inter se rights had crystallised. 
• The review petitioner sought review on the grounds that inaction in fixing seniority gives rise to a perpetual cause of action, and that the Writ Court had erroneously ignored his earlier approach to the Jharkhand High Court in 2011.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Scope of Review Jurisdiction: The Court noted that under Rule 65 of the High Court Rules read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, the power of review can be exercised only where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important matter of evidence, or any sufficient reason akin to the aforesaid two grounds. 
• On Representations Not Curing Delay: The Court held that the law on this aspect is well settled. Relying on C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining (2008) , it observed that representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation can be rejected on that ground alone without examining the merits, and that rejection of such representations cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a dead claim. 
• On Cause of Action in Seniority Matters: Referring to State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (2013), the Court noted that the cause of action in seniority disputes arises when the junior employee is promoted, not when the representation is rejected. Making representations that fall on deaf ears does not cure delay. 
• On Delay and Laches under Article 226: Relying on State of Tamil Nadu v. Seshachalam (2007), the Court reiterated that delay and laches is a relevant factor for a court to determine when entertaining discretionary writ jurisdiction. A writ court cannot brush aside delay lightly, particularly when the rights of third parties have crystallised during the interregnum. 
• On the Facts of the Case: The Court found that even assuming the petitioner had approached the Jharkhand High Court in 2011, this was approximately nine years after his seniority was fixed and was still grossly belated. Furthermore, the petitioner had not impleaded officers whose seniority had been fixed above him as parties to the writ petition, making it procedurally unsustainable. No error apparent on the face of the record was found in the order of the Writ Court

What is Cause of Action? 

• The term “cause of action” has been explained in several case laws as follows:   
  • Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India & Anr. (2006):  
    • The Supreme Court defined cause of action as "every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court."    
    • In other words, it's the bundle of facts necessary for the plaintiff to establish to succeed in their suit.   
  • Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai (1994):  
    • This case established that cause of action refers to the collection of facts that a plaintiff must prove to obtain a favorable judgment.   
  • Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998):  
    • The court held that in a broad sense (as used in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code), cause of action means every fact necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment.   
  • South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. (1996):  
    • This case clarified that cause of action consists of facts that give cause to enforce legal inquiry for redress. Importantly, it must include some act done by the defendant, as without such an act, no cause of action would arise.   
  • Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India (2001):  
    • The court distinguished between the restricted and wider meanings of cause of action:   
      • In the restricted sense: the circumstances forming the infraction of the right   
      • In the wider sense: necessary conditions for maintaining the suit, including both the infraction and the right itself   
    • The judgment also distinguished between facts necessary to be proved (which comprise the cause of action) and pieces of evidence needed to prove those facts (which are not part of the cause of action).  
  • Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh (1977):  
    • This case emphasized the two interpretations of cause of action:   
      • Restricted view: facts constituting the infringement or basis of a right.  
      • Comprehensive view: the entire bundle of material facts a plaintiff must prove to succeed