List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court

Why in News? 

Dr. Justice Kauser Edappagath of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Aboobacker Siddique and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2026), held that an accused is entitled to default bail if the final report is e-filed by the police after 5 PM on the last day of the prescribed statutory period. The Court reasoned that under the Electronic Filing Rules for Courts (Kerala), 2021, e-filings made after 5 PM are deemed to have been instituted on the next working day, meaning the final report would be treated as filed beyond the statutory period.

What was the Background of Aboobacker Siddique and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioners were arrested on 30.12.2025 and were accused of offences under Section 22(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act — punishable with a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment — for allegedly being found in possession of 4.22 grams of MDMA kept for personal use and sale. 
• The final report was electronically filed by the police on 28.02.2026 at 6:02 PM — that is, after 5 PM on the 60th day from the date of remand — and its physical copy was forwarded to the trial court only on 02.03.2026. 
• The petitioners filed a bail application contending that since the e-filing was made after 5 PM on the 60th day, it would be deemed filed on the next working day under the Electronic Filing Rules, thus falling beyond the statutory period and entitling them to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the effect of e-filing after 5 PM: The Court held that a conjoint reading of Rules 13(1) and 13(2) of the Electronic Filing Rules for Courts (Kerala), 2021 with Rules 4 and 5 of the Criminal Rules of Practice makes it clear that for the purpose of computing limitation, electronic filings received up to 5 PM are treated as instituted on that day, while filings made after 5 PM are deemed instituted only on the next working day. Since the final report was e-filed at 6:02 PM on the 60th day, it was deemed filed on the 61st day — beyond the statutory period — entitling the petitioners to default bail. 
• On the applicable statutory period — 60 days or 90 days: The Court rejected the prosecution's contention that the applicable period was 90 days on the ground that the offence was punishable with imprisonment extending to 10 years. Interpreting Section 187(3)(i) of the BNSS alongside its predecessor provision under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, the Court held that the 90-day period applies only where the offence carries the death penalty, life imprisonment, or a minimum sentence of 10 years. Offences punishable with imprisonment that may extend up to 10 years but without a minimum threshold fall within the 60-day category. 
• On the rationale behind the distinction: The Court explained that the distinction between the 60-day and 90-day periods reflects the recognition that graver offences necessitate more comprehensive investigation. A longer period enables the investigating agency to gather adequate evidence without undue pressure, whereas offences punishable with up to 10 years are presumed to involve comparatively simpler inquiries. This classification seeks to balance the liberty of the accused with the State's interest in effective law enforcement. 
• On alignment between CrPC and BNSS: The Court clarified that proviso (a)(i) to Section 167(2) CrPC and Section 187(3)(i) BNSS are substantially aligned, with only minor changes in phraseology. The 60-day and 90-day framework remains intact, reflecting legislative adherence to the same underlying rationale, and the principle that default bail is linked to the seriousness of the offence stands unchanged. 
• Since Section 22(b) of the NDPS Act carries a maximum punishment of 10 years with fine but prescribes no minimum term, the Court held that the 60-day period applied. As the final report was e-filed after 5 PM on the 60th day, it was deemed filed beyond the statutory period, and the petitioners were accordingly entitled to statutory bail. The bail application was allowed subject to conditions.

What is Default Bail? 

Section 187 BNSS — Default Bail: 

• Default bail (also called statutory bail, compulsive bail, or indefeasible right to release) is granted when the investigating agency fails to file the chargesheet within the prescribed statutory period. 
• At this stage, the court does not weigh evidence or consider gravity of offence or flight risk — expiry of the prosecution's deadline is the sole trigger.

Statutory Position: 

• Section 187 BNSS replaced Section 167 CrPC with effect from 1 July 2024, when BNSS commenced. 
• It falls under Chapter XII of the BNSS (Information to Police and Powers to Investigate). 
• Two sub-sections drive practitioner practice:  
  • Section 187(2): Caps police custody at 15 days within a wider window. 
  • Section 187(3): Sets the 60- and 90-day chargesheet filing deadlines; missing either triggers default bail. 

60 vs. 90 Days: 

• 60-day period applies to offences punishable with up to 10 years (with no minimum 10-year threshold); default bail accrues if chargesheet is not filed within 60 days of first remand; police custody of 15 days must be utilised within the first 40 days. 
• 90-day period applies to offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or a minimum sentence of 10 years; default bail accrues if chargesheet is not filed within 90 days of first remand; police custody of 15 days must be utilised within the first 60 days. 
• The 60/90-day split is a deliberate legislative calibration, treating gravity of offence as a proxy for the time investigators reasonably need. 

New "Spread-Within" Mechanism under BNSS: 

• Under the old CrPC, the 15-day police custody window had to be availed upfront in one contiguous block. 
• BNSS now allows this 15-day custody to be split into segments — a few days now, a few days later — as long as:  
  • Total custody does not exceed 15 days; and 
  • All segments fall within the first 40 days (for 60-day offences) or first 60 days (for 90-day offences). 
• This changes how investigators plan custody requests and how defence counsel argue against them.

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh of the Supreme Court, in the case of State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya & Anr. (2026), held that a public servant need not personally demand or receive a bribe to attract liability under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court set aside a Karnataka High Court judgment that had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector accused of indirectly seeking a bribe through his subordinate officials, and restored the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused.

What was the Background of State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from a complaint filed against Rangayya, a Sub-Inspector posted at the Siruguppa Police Station in Karnataka, who along with other police officials threatened the complainant for allegedly selling ration rice illegally, seized his vehicle, and registered a case against him. 
• Subsequently, through a third person acting on the instructions of the Sub-Inspector, a bribe of Rs. 50,000 was demanded from the complainant. The Sub-Inspector also allegedly told the complainant to "do something for the other police officials" or "make those boys happy." 
• Based on the complaint, the Karnataka Lokayukta Police registered an FIR under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the Sub-Inspector, a constable, and a private individual. The Karnataka High Court, however, quashed the FIR on the ground that there was neither a direct demand nor acceptance of money by the Sub-Inspector himself.

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On scope of Section 7 read with Explanation 2: The Court held that the High Court failed to correctly interpret Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Explanation 2 expressly covers situations where a public servant seeks or accepts a bribe through another person, including through a subordinate public servant, making indirect corruption equally punishable. 
• On "veiled demand" as sufficient: The Court held that the Sub-Inspector's direction to the complainant to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate officials constituted a "veiled demand" for an undue advantage, falling squarely within the meaning of "attempt to obtain" under Section 7(a). The actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential requirement for prosecution under the PC Act. 
• On rejection of the High Court's narrow interpretation: The Court held that the High Court erroneously imported a requirement of a direct, personal, and express demand by the public servant himself — a standard not warranted by the broad statutory language of Section 7 read with Explanation 2. The PC Act does not limit liability to acts of demand and acceptance by the official personally. 
• On the purpose of Explanation 2: The Court observed that if the High Court's narrow interpretation were permitted to stand, it would create a dangerous loophole in anti-corruption law, allowing senior public officials to orchestrate the collection of bribes through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability. Such a construction would render Explanation 2 redundant and subvert the manifest purpose of the PC Act. 
• On immateriality of personal benefit: The Court held that the fact that the Sub-Inspector may not have personally received or intended to receive any part of the bribe is entirely immaterial at the stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express statutory language of Explanation 2 to Section 7. 
• Accordingly, the Court restored the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused, leaving all questions of guilt or innocence to be determined at trial. 

What is the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 

• About:  
  • The PC Act is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and connected matters in India.  
• Important Sections:  
  • Section 3: "Power to appoint special Judges"  
    • Allows Central/State Government to appoint special Judges for trying corruption cases.  
  • Section 7: "Offence relating to public servant being bribed"  
    • Deals with public servants obtaining undue advantage to influence public duty.  
    • Punishment: 3-7 years imprisonment plus fine.  
  • Section 8: "Offence relating to bribing of a public servant"  
    • Covers giving undue advantage to public servants.  
    • Punishment: Up to 7 years imprisonment or fine or both.  
  • Section 9: "Offence relating to bribing a public servant by a commercial organization"  
    • Addresses corruption involving commercial organizations.  
    • Includes provisions for corporate liability.  
  • Section 13: "Criminal misconduct by a public servant"  
    • Defines criminal misconduct by public servants.  
    • Includes misappropriation and illicit enrichment.  
    • Punishment: 4-10 years imprisonment plus fine.  
  • Section 17: "Persons authorised to investigate"  
    • Specifies minimum rank of police officers authorized to investigate.  
    • Requires approval from specified authorities.  
  • Section 19: "Previous sanction necessary for prosecution"  
    • Makes prior sanction mandatory for prosecuting public servants.  
    • Details authorities competent to grant sanction.  
  • Section 20: "Presumption where public servant accepts any undue advantage"  
    • Creates legal presumption of corruption when undue advantage is proven.  
  • Section 23: "Particulars in a charge in relation to an offence under section 13(1)(a)"  
    • Specifies requirements for framing charges in corruption cases.