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Criminal Law
Authorised Signatory Who Signs Cheque on Organisation's Behalf is 'Drawer'
08-Jun-2026
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria of the Supreme Court, in the case of K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana & Ors. (2026), held that an individual specifically authorised by an organisation to sign and issue cheques and make payments on its behalf qualifies as the 'drawer' of the cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
- The court upheld the conviction of an NGO's Treasurer who had been designated as the authorised signatory under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), while partly allowing the appeal to the extent of modifying the sentence awarded.
What was the Background of K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana & Ors. (2026) Case?
- The appellant was the Treasurer of an NGO named TIMES and had been appointed as its authorised signatory for the purpose of signing and issuing cheques, as well as making payments to the respondent company — APCPDCL (now Telangana CPDCL, presently Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana Limited/TSSPDCL) — under an MoU executed between the parties.
- The cheque issued by the appellant on behalf of the NGO was dishonoured, leading to a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.
- The appellant was convicted by the trial court, and the conviction was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court.
- The appellant relied on the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors., (2024), contending that the mere designation of a person as an authorised signatory of a company or organisation does not render him personally liable for the organisation's acts.
- The respondent contended that the MoU specifically cast all responsibility for signing instruments and making payments upon the appellant alone, with no liability cast on any other office bearer of the NGO.
What were the Court's Observations?
- On the concept of 'drawer' under Section 138 NI Act: The court held that when a company or organisation specifically authorises an individual to sign and issue cheques on its behalf and to discharge the responsibility of making payments, that individual assumes the position of a 'drawer' of the cheque within the meaning of Section 138 of the NI Act, attracting personal liability upon dishonour.
- On the appellant being the 'front face' of the NGO: The court observed that the NGO had made the appellant its front face for all financial transactions with the respondent. Since the MoU cast no liability on any other office bearer of the NGO except the appellant, it necessarily followed that the appellant alone was responsible for all consequences arising from the dishonour of the cheque.
- On the rejection of the precedent relied upon: The court rejected the appellant's reliance on Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. as misplaced, clarifying that even authorised signatories of a company may be categorised as 'drawers' of a cheque when the conditions stipulated under Section 141 of the NI Act are fulfilled. The earlier judgment did not lay down a blanket rule immunising all authorised signatories from personal liability.
- On modification of sentence: Taking into account that the appellant was only the Treasurer of the society — and not a principal office bearer — the court modified the sentence. It directed the appellant to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to TSSPDCL within two months. In default of such payment, the appellant would be required to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
What is Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
About:
- Section 138 creates a statutory offence for dishonour of cheques due to insufficient funds or exceeding the arranged amount.
- The essential elements that must be satisfied for constituting an offence under this section are:
- Primary Requirement: A cheque drawn by a person on his account with a banker for payment of money to another person must be returned unpaid by the bank due to insufficient funds or exceeding the arranged overdraft limit.
Three Mandatory Conditions under the Proviso:
- The cheque must be presented to the bank within six months from the date it was drawn or within its validity period, whichever is earlier.
- The payee or holder in due course must issue a written demand notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving information from the bank about the cheque being returned unpaid.
- The drawer must fail to make payment of the cheque amount within fifteen days of receiving the demand notice.
- Penalty Provision: Upon satisfaction of these conditions, the drawer commits an offence punishable with imprisonment up to two years, or fine up to twice the cheque amount, or both.
- Scope Limitation: The debt or liability must be legally enforceable as clarified in the Explanation to the section.
Mercantile Law
Creditors of Co-operative Societies Can Invoke Consumer Protection Act for Deposit Recovery
08-Jun-2026
Source: Kerala High Court
Why in News?
A Division Bench of Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Preeta A.K. of the Kerala High Court, in the case of Puthur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sethumadhavan & Anr. (2026), held that depositors and creditors of a co-operative society are not confined to the dispute resolution mechanism under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and may independently invoke the Consumer Protection Act for recovery of deposits.
- The Court reaffirmed that the remedies under consumer law are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law in force. The writ appeal filed by the co-operative bank against the orders of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was accordingly dismissed.
What was the Background of Puthur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sethumadhavan & Anr. (2026) Case?
- The first respondent had made fixed deposits amounting to ₹5 lakh with the appellant co-operative bank, which matured on June 2, 2015.
- Despite maturity, the bank failed to return the deposited amount, prompting the depositor to file a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Thrissur.
- The District Commission directed the bank to pay ₹5 lakh with interest at 12% per annum, along with ₹10,000 towards costs and compensation.
- The bank did not challenge this order promptly; it approached the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission only in October 2024, seeking condonation of a delay of 825 days.
- The State Commission declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal.
- The bank then approached the High Court by way of a writ petition, which was dismissed by the Single Judge who found no illegality or perversity in the State Commission's reasoning.
- In the writ appeal, the bank contended that the depositor ought to have invoked the remedy under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, and that the consumer forum lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
What were the Court's Observations?
- On jurisdiction of consumer fora: The Court held that the Consumer Protection Act is a special legislation enacted to safeguard consumer interests, and the jurisdiction conferred on consumer fora cannot be displaced merely because another statute provides an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
- On the Consumer Protection Act as later legislation: The Court observed that even if the Consumer Protection Act were treated as a general law, it would still prevail over an earlier special enactment in the event of any inconsistency, as it is the later legislation.
- On supplementary nature of consumer remedies: Referring to Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (corresponding to Section 100 of the 2019 Act), the Court reiterated that consumer remedies are supplementary and not exclusive, and the existence of an alternative forum under the Co-operative Societies Act does not oust the jurisdiction of consumer commissions.
- On the bank's conduct: The Court expressed disapproval of the bank's attempt to resist repayment of admittedly due deposits through technical objections, emphasising that a co-operative bank handling public money owes a duty to promptly return deposits upon maturity. When the liability was not in dispute, attempts to thwart the claim on technical grounds were held deserving of condemnation.
- On relief: While dismissing the writ appeal, the Court, taking note of a request made on behalf of the appellant bank, granted six months' time to comply with the order of repayment.
What is Section 100 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019?
About:
- The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was enacted to provide better protection of the interests of consumers and for matters connected therewith.
- The Act established a three-tier quasi-judicial machinery at the district, state, and national levels for speedy and simple redressal of consumer disputes.
- The Act was subsequently replaced by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which came into force on July 20, 2020.
Section 100:
- Section 100 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is the successor to Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It lays down the non-obstante and additive character of consumer law remedies, ensuring that the Act supplements rather than supplants existing legal frameworks.
Key Provisions:
- Supplementary Remedy: The provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 are in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
- Effect on Other Laws: The Act does not curtail, abridge, or override any right or remedy that a consumer may otherwise possess under any other statute, rule, or legal provision.
- Non-Exclusivity of Consumer Forum: The existence of any other forum, tribunal, or mechanism for dispute resolution under a separate enactment does not exclude the jurisdiction of consumer commissions constituted under this Act.
- Legislative Continuity: Section 100 retains the exact intent of Section 3 of the 1986 Act, preserving the settled legal position that consumer protection remedies are concurrent and independent.
