List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal, in Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal v. State of UP (2026), held that a man whose second marriage is void owing to the subsistence of his first marriage cannot ordinarily be treated as a "husband" for the purposes of Sections 80 and 85 BNS, while carving out exceptions where the validity of the first marriage is doubtful, where the second wife was induced by concealment of the subsisting marriage, or where the marriages are valid under Muslim Personal Law. 

What was the Background of Sarvesh Alias Chhotu Alias Chhotelal v. State of UP (2026) Case? 

• The applicant's second wife had allegedly died by suicide, and he was charged under Section 80(2) BNS (dowry death), Section 85 BNS (cruelty), and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 
• The applicant sought bail, contending that the deceased was his second wife, that his second marriage had been performed while his first marriage was still subsisting, that the second marriage was therefore void, and that he could accordingly not be treated as a "husband" for the purposes of the above penal provisions. 
• The Court framed the legal question of whether a person who performed a second marriage during the lifetime of his first wife would fall within the definition of "husband" for the purposes of Sections 80 and 85 BNS with regard to the second wife. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the scope of Sections 80 and 85 BNS: The Court examined the provisions alongside the definition of "dowry" under the Dowry Prohibition Act and the Supreme Court's rulings in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004), Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2002), and P. Sivakumar v. State (2023). 
• On the conflict in precedent: The Court noted that while Reema Aggarwal had adopted a purposive interpretation to bring women in void marriages within the protective ambit of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, a later three-Judge Bench decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma, followed in P. Sivakumar, held that prosecution under Section 498-A IPC is not maintainable where the marriage itself is null and void. 
• On strict interpretation of penal provisions: Relying on Shivcharan Lal Verma and the Allahabad High Court's decision in Akhilesh Kesari v. State of U.P., the Court held that Sections 80 and 85 BNS are penal provisions requiring strict interpretation, and that the presumption of dowry death under Section 80 BNS (corresponding to Section 304-B IPC), read with Section 118 BSA, must be construed in a manner favourable to the accused. 
• On the meaning of "husband": The Court accordingly held that "husband" under Sections 80 and 85 BNS covers a person only where he is legally married to the woman, and not a person whose marriage with her is itself void. 
• On the exceptions carved out: The Court clarified that the above principle would not apply in two situations — first, where there is doubt about the validity of the first marriage, a person living as "husband" in the alleged second marriage would still be covered; and second, where a person contracted a second marriage without disclosing his subsisting valid marriage and continued living with the second wife as her husband, with the second wife unaware of the concealment till commission of the offence, he would still be deemed a "husband" since he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. 
• On personal law variations: The Court noted that a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage is void under the Special Marriage Act, the Foreign Marriage Act, the Christian Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, and the Hindu Marriage Act. It distinguished marriages under Muslim Personal Law, observing that where a marriage is performed as per Sharia law, a second, third, or fourth marriage is also valid, and a Muslim man living as husband with any such wife would fall within the definition of "husband" under Sections 80 and 85 BNS. 
• On relief granted: Noting that the applicant's second marriage was void owing to the subsistence of his first marriage, the Court granted him bail. 

What are Sections 80 and 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023? 

Section 80 BNS – Dowry Death: 

Provision: 

• Where a woman's death is caused by burns, bodily injury, or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry — such death is termed "dowry death," and the husband or relative concerned is deemed to have caused her death. 
• Explanation: "Dowry" carries the same meaning as under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
• Punishment: Imprisonment for not less than 7 years, extendable to imprisonment for life. 

BNSS Classification: 

• Cognizable 
• Non-bailable 
• Triable by Court of Session 

Section 85 BNS – Cruelty by Husband or Relative of Husband: 

Provision: 

• Whoever, being the husband or relative of the husband of a woman, subjects her to cruelty shall be punished. 
• Punishment: Imprisonment up to 3 years, along with fine. 

BNSS Classification: 

• Cognizable, but only if information is given to the officer in charge of a police station by the aggrieved woman herself, or by a relative of hers by blood, marriage, or adoption, or, in absence of such relative, by a public servant of a notified class/category. 
• Non-bailable 
• Triable by Magistrate of the First Class 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, in Vijayalakshmi R. v. C. L. Balaji (2026), dismissed a wife's plea invoking Article 142 of the Constitution to recast a divorce settlement and create an additional corpus of about Rupees Six Crore to Six Crore Fifty Lakh for her son's higher education, holding that such jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen a settlement that stood fully performed and discharged. 

What was the Background of Vijayalakshmi R. v. C. L. Balaji (2026) Case? 

• The husband and wife's marriage was dissolved by mutual consent in 2015 pursuant to a divorce settlement executed between them. 
• Under the settlement, the husband agreed to pay ₹2.20 crore as a lump sum towards the maintenance of their minor son, and also to pay 20% of his annual income towards the child's maintenance. 
• Another clause in the settlement provided that once ₹1 crore had been paid, the husband would not be liable to pay any further maintenance, though the remaining ₹1.20 crore was still payable under the settlement. 
• The husband paid the entire ₹2.20 crore by July 2017. 
• Nearly five years later, the wife filed an execution petition seeking enforcement of the clause requiring payment of 20% of the husband's annual income. 
• Both the Family Court and the High Court rejected her plea, holding that the settlement had been fully discharged. 
• Aggrieved, the wife approached the Supreme Court, also seeking creation of a corpus for the son's higher education by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the scope of Article 142 jurisdiction: The Court held that its inherent jurisdiction under Article 142, though wide, cannot be employed to supplant the concluded and acted-upon terms of a consensual arrangement between parties. 
• On recasting a settlement: The Court observed that issuing a direction to create a corpus for the son's higher education would, in substance, amount to recasting a settlement that stood performed and discharged, and would require a fresh determination of the quantum of maintenance, a course not open in execution proceedings. 
• On the discharge of the settlement: The Court noted that the husband had paid the entire ₹2.20 crore by July 2017, and that the settlement stood fully and finally discharged upon such payment. 
• On relief granted: The Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Family Court and High Court, refused to accede to the wife's demand for creation of an additional corpus, and dismissed the appeal. 

What is Article 142 of the Constitution of India? 

About: 

• The power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) is an inherent power exercisable by the Supreme Court to do complete justice.  
• Its object is to enable the Court to declare the law and issue such directions or orders as are necessary to achieve complete justice in a cause or matter before it. 

Article 142 of the COI: 

Article 142 provides for the enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court, and for orders as to discovery. 

• Article 142(1): The Supreme Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, may pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Such a decree or order is enforceable throughout India in the manner prescribed by Parliament, or, until such law is made, in the manner the President may prescribe. 
• Article 142(2): Subject to any law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court has all powers to make orders for securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of documents, or the investigation or punishment of contempt of itself. 

Over the years, this provision has primarily been invoked for two purposes: first, to do "complete justice" in a given case, and second, to fill perceived legislative gaps. 

Landmark Case Laws Evolving Article 142: 

• Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. (1963): A Constitution Bench considered whether the Supreme Court could frame a rule or issue an order inconsistent with fundamental rights. Justice Gajendragadkar held that although powers under Article 142 are wide, the Court cannot make an order plainly inconsistent with any constitutional provision. The Court adopted a restrictive interpretation of the provision. 
• I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab and Another (1967): While invoking the doctrine of prospective overruling, the Court held that the power under Article 142 is wide and elastic, enabling it to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. 
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991): The Court held that limitations or prohibitions in ordinary laws do not ipso facto restrict the exercise of power under Article 142. The Supreme Court upheld the settlement between the Central Government and Union Carbide and quashed all civil and criminal proceedings against UCC pending before any court, in order to do complete justice in the matter. 
• Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat (1991): The Court held that its inherent power under Article 142, coupled with powers under Articles 32 and 136, empowers it to quash proceedings before any court to do complete justice in the matter before it. 
• Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998): The Court held that the plenary powers under Article 142 are inherent and complementary to powers specifically conferred by various statutes, and are not limited by those statutes. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are supplementary in nature. This plenary jurisdiction is a residual source of power that the Supreme Court may draw upon whenever it is just and equitable to do so, particularly to ensure due process of law and complete justice between parties while administering justice according to law.