List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, in X v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026), issued guidelines on the factors to be considered by the Juvenile Justice Board while conducting preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, while dismissing an appeal challenging the Patna High Court's ruling that the appellant be tried as an adult. 

What was the Background of X v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from the alleged murder of a boy in Bihar in May 2022, where the victim's throat was allegedly slit with a knife. 
• The appellant, aged 16 years and four months at the time of the incident, was accused of the offence and was apprehended while attempting to flee. 
• The Juvenile Justice Board held that the appellant lacked the mental and physical capacity to commit the offence and decided to try him as a juvenile. 
• On an appeal filed by the complainant, the Sessions Court set aside the Board's order and directed that the juvenile be tried as an adult. 
• The Patna High Court affirmed the Sessions Court's ruling. 
• Aggrieved, the juvenile approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Board's duty to independently assess all material: The Court held that the Juvenile Justice Board must apply its mind to all the materials available before it independently, and that the four parameters laid down under Section 15 of the JJ Act are distinct and must be considered both independently and collectively. 
• On preventing the assessment from becoming a mini-trial: The Court emphasised that the right to fair trial and the principle of presumption of innocence under the JJ Act must be balanced, and no inference should be made regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused while conducting the preliminary assessment. 
• On "mental capacity": The Court described mental capacity as a child's ability to make social decisions and judgments, extending it to cognitive abilities, developmental disability, comprehension, decision-making and reasoning, including the child's understanding of conflict and of the consequences of his actions. 
• On "physical capacity": The Court held that physical capacity is not restricted to the child's locomotor abilities, but must be assessed with regard to the nature of the act involved in the alleged offence, including whether the child, given his age and physical development, was physically capable of committing the offence in the manner alleged. 
• On "consequences" under Section 15: Relying on its earlier decision in Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu, the Court held that "consequences" must be read expansively to cover psychological and long-term effects on the victim, the child, and both families, and not merely the immediate physical harm. It noted that a child's intellectual awareness of risk does not necessarily translate into an ability to control impulsive behaviour, given the role of peer influence and emotional impulse at that age. 
• On expert opinion not being the sole criterion: The Court found that the Juvenile Justice Board had erred in basing its conclusion solely on expert opinion under Section 15(1), without any consideration of the Social Investigation Report (SIR) or Social Background Report (SBR), including the antecedents and recommendations of the Probation Officer and the Child Welfare Police Officer. It clarified that while Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu dealt with the significance of expert assistance, expert opinion cannot be the sole consideration in the Board's decision. 
• On additional factors for assessment: The Court referred to the Gujarat High Court's ruling in Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, which listed eleven additional factors to be considered besides the SIR and SBR, including the child's antecedents and school and education records. 
• On the requirement of a reasoned decision: The Court made it mandatory for the Juvenile Justice Board to record a reasoned decision on whether the juvenile should be tried as an adult, including its reasons for accepting or rejecting the observations and recommendations in the SIR and SBR, assessing all material together in light of the four parameters under Section 15. 
• On Rule 10A of the JJ Model Rules, 2016: The Court reiterated the significance of Rule 10A, which authorises the Board to take the assistance of psychologists and psychosocial workers experienced in working with children in difficult circumstances, and which mandates that the Board assign reasons if it concludes that the juvenile be tried as an adult, observing that this requirement is not a mere procedural formality but a safeguard ensuring the Board's decision is capable of judicial scrutiny. 
• On relief granted: The Court upheld the findings of the Sessions Court and the Patna High Court and dismissed the appeal. 

What is Preliminary Assessment under Section 15 of the JJ Act? 

Section 15– Preliminary Assessment into Heinous Offences by Board 

Section 15(1): 

• Where a heinous offence is alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed, or is above, the age of sixteen years, the Board must conduct a preliminary assessment covering:  
  • the child's mental and physical capacity to commit the offence; 
  • his ability to understand the consequences of the offence; and 
  • the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. 
• Based on this assessment, the Board may pass an order in accordance with Section 18(3). 
• Proviso: For conducting such assessment, the Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists, psycho-social workers, or other experts. 
• Explanation: Preliminary assessment is clarified to not be a trial, but only an assessment of the child's capacity to commit, and understand the consequences of, the alleged offence. 

Section 15(2): 

• If the Board is satisfied, on preliminary assessment, that the matter should be disposed of by the Board itself, it must follow the procedure for trial in a summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as far as may be. 
• First proviso: The Board's order to dispose of the matter is appealable under Section 101(2). 
• Second proviso: The assessment under this section must be completed within the period specified in Section 14. 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Subhash Vidyarthi, in X Complainant of Complaint Case No. 65/2026 v. State of U.P. and Others (2026), held that the Allahabad High Court can invoke its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) suo motu to quash criminal proceedings even while hearing an appeal filed by the complainant herself, clarifying that filing a separate petition under Section 528 BNSS is not a precondition for exercising such powers. 

What was the Background of the Case? 

• The complainant, a Scheduled Caste woman working as an Instructor in an Upper Primary School, alleged that she resided as a tenant in the house of opposite party no. 2, from whom her husband had purchased a plot of land. 
• It later emerged that the seller was not the actual owner of the plot, and although part of the sale consideration was recovered after the plot was resold, some amount allegedly remained unpaid. 
• She further alleged that opposite party no. 2, taking advantage of her husband's absence due to work, sexually exploited her on the pretext of helping her recover the unpaid amount, and on this basis sought registration of an FIR. 
• When the police did not act on her complaint, she approached the Special Judge under Section 173(4) BNSS. The Special Judge, instead of directing registration of an FIR, treated her application as a complaint. 
• Aggrieved by this order, she filed an appeal before the Allahabad High Court, challenging only the refusal to direct registration of an FIR. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the nature of the dispute: The Court noted that the dispute essentially arose out of a monetary transaction involving the complainant's husband, who had neither disclosed the alleged unpaid amount nor initiated any civil or criminal proceedings for its recovery. 
• On the improbability of the allegations: The Court observed that the allegations were "wholly improbable," noting that a married woman working as an instructor had claimed she allowed herself to be sexually exploited under the allurement of recovering her husband's undisclosed dues, even though her husband himself had taken no steps to recover the money. 
• On misuse of criminal process: The Court held that even if the allegation were assumed true, it did not disclose commission of any offence by opposite party no. 2, and that the complainant appeared to be abusing the criminal justice system to pressure the opposite parties into paying an undisclosed sum. Relying on Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021), the Court reiterated that criminal proceedings cannot be used as a tool for recovery of disputed civil dues. 
• On the scope of Section 528 BNSS: The Court held that Section 528 BNSS merely recognises the High Court's inherent powers, which exist to give effect to orders under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or to secure the ends of justice. 
• On exercising the power suo motu in an appeal: Relying on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977), State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1990), Som Mittal v. State of Karnataka (2008), and Popular Muthiah v. State (2006), the Court held that the High Court is not powerless merely because no petition under Section 528 BNSS has been filed, and that it may exercise its inherent powers suo motu even while exercising appellate jurisdiction, including in an appeal filed by the complainant herself. 
• On relief granted: The Court set aside the Special Judge's order treating the application under Section 173(4) BNSS as a complaint, and quashed the entire complaint proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers. 

What is Section 528 BNSS? 

Section 528 BNSS: Saving of Inherent Powers of High Court 

Bare Text: 

"Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 

Key Points: 

• Section 528 of BNSS replaces the former Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preserving the High Court's inherent powers to prevent abuse of court process and secure justice. 
• This is a saving provision — it does not confer new powers but merely recognises the High Court's pre-existing inherent powers to make necessary orders to give effect to any order under the Sanhita. 
• Inherent powers under Section 528 cannot be invoked to quash police investigations following a cognizable FIR, interfere with statutory investigation rights, or question the reliability of FIR allegations at the threshold. 
• These powers can be exercised to quash proceedings where there is a legal bar to their continuation, where the allegations even if taken at face value don't disclose commission of an offence, or where the evidence on record fails to support the charges. 
• Courts are cautioned against entertaining Section 528 petitions where alternative remedies have not first been pursued, and a second petition is barred on grounds that were available at the time of filing the first petition. 
• As a saving provision, Section 528 preserves the High Court's discretionary power to intervene in exceptional circumstances where ordinary remedies are inadequate to secure complete justice. 
• Exercise of this power requires judicial restraint, particularly where the investigation is at a nascent stage. 
• Courts must balance protecting individuals from unwarranted prosecution against allowing legitimate investigation to proceed, especially in cases involving economic offences. 
• The power can be used to prevent abuse where criminal proceedings have been initiated with mala fide intent or an ulterior motive stemming from private grudges rather than genuine grievance. 
• Courts adopt a more cautious approach to quashing proceedings in economic offence cases under Section 528, given the distinct nature of such offences and their wider impact on the financial system.