List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, in Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026), dismissed a batch of writ petitions challenging the constitutionality of sentences directing imprisonment for the remainder of a convict's natural life without remission, holding that the point was already settled by a Constitution Bench and that raising it again before a two-judge Bench amounted to an abuse of process. 

What was the Background of the Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026) Case? 

• The petitions were filed by four sets of convicts, including death row prisoners whose sentences had either been commuted by constitutional authorities or modified by courts to imprisonment for the remainder of their natural lives. 
• The petitioners contended that Section 302 of the IPC recognised only two punishments for murder — death and life imprisonment — and did not contemplate a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission. 
• It was further argued that such sentences defeated the statutory remission power available to the appropriate government under Section 432 of the CrPC. 
• The petitioners accordingly sought a declaration that such sentences were unconstitutional, invoking the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the validity of such sentences: The Court held that the issue stood conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), which had approved the "special category" of sentence evolved in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008). This category permits constitutional courts, in appropriate cases, to direct imprisonment for the remainder of a convict's natural life instead of the death penalty, placing such sentences beyond the ordinary remission regime. 
• On raising a settled issue before a smaller Bench: The Court found the petitions to be a misuse of process, since a coordinate or larger Bench issue could not be reagitated before a two-judge Bench once conclusively decided by a Constitution Bench. 
• On the continuing applicability of Section 432 CrPC (473 of BNSS): The Court clarified that where a sentence of life imprisonment is awarded without the specific addition of "without remission," the power of the appropriate government under Section 432 CrPC remains unaffected, and an application for remission under that provision would be maintainable. 
• On Article 32 not being a shortcut: The Court held that while Article 32 remains the "heart and soul" of the Constitution, it cannot be used to bypass the constitutional remedies of remission and clemency available under Articles 72 and 161. Since some petitioners had not exhausted these remedies, invoking the Supreme Court's extraordinary jurisdiction directly was unjustified. 
• On the scope of judicial review over clemency powers: The Court observed that the executive powers of the President and Governor under Articles 72 and 161 are unencumbered by other constitutional provisions, and that accepting the petitioners' argument would require the Court to sit in appeal — rather than judicial review — over an exercise of executive power, which is impermissible. 
• On relief granted: The Court dismissed the batch of petitions, holding the sentences of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission to be constitutionally valid. 

What is the "Special Category" Sentence of Imprisonment for Remainder of Natural Life? 

About: 

• It is a sentencing option, distinct from the ordinary sentence of life imprisonment, under which a convict is directed to undergo imprisonment for the rest of their natural life, in some cases without the benefit of remission or parole. 
• It was judicially evolved to bridge the gap between the death penalty and ordinary life imprisonment in cases where the death sentence is considered excessive but ordinary life imprisonment (subject to remission) is considered inadequate. 

Origin and Constitutional Basis: 

• The category traces its origin to Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008), where the Supreme Court held that constitutional courts could impose a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term exceeding 14 years, or for the remainder of natural life, in place of death. 
• Its constitutional validity was affirmed by a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), which held that such sentences do not offend Article 20 or the sentencing scheme under the IPC. 

Interplay with Section 473 of BNSS: 

• This Section empowers the appropriate government to suspend or remit a sentence, in whole or in part. 
• Where a court specifically directs that a sentence be served "without remission," the ordinary remission power under this section stands excluded for that sentence. 
• Where no such specific bar is imposed, the government's power under Section 432 CrPC continues to operate even on a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. 

Interplay with Articles 72 and 161: 

• Articles 72 and 161 vest the President and the Governor, respectively, with power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment. 
• These powers operate independently of statutory remission under Section 432 CrPC and are not curtailed by a court's direction restricting statutory remission. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula, in Sajjan Kaur v. Union of India and Anr. (2026), dismissed a plea seeking to restrain the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) from constructing a boundary wall that would block a petitioner's access to her land adjoining the Dwarka Expressway, holding that Article 300A does not confer a vested right to access property through any particular State-owned road. 

What was the Background of Sajjan Kaur v. Union of India and Anr. (2026) Case? 

• Sajjan Kaur approached the Delhi High Court seeking to restrain NHAI from constructing a boundary wall that would block access to her residual parcel of land adjoining the Dwarka Expressway in Village Bijwasan. 
• She contended that a paved road running within the right of way of the expressway was the only practical means of ingress and egress to her property. 
• NHAI opposed the plea, stating that the road was not a service road but an internal operational road, constructed exclusively to provide access to buildings housing the Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS). 
• NHAI further submitted that the road was located immediately beyond a toll plaza on an access-controlled expressway, and that opening it to private vehicular use would create serious traffic safety concerns. 
• The matter came up before Justice Sanjeev Narula for adjudication, along with the question of whether interim protection earlier granted to the petitioner should continue. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the character of the disputed road: The Court held that the nomenclature given to a road is not decisive, and its true character must be determined from the sanctioned project documents, design features, connectivity with the main carriageway, and the purpose for which it was constructed. 
• On the absence of service road features: The Court found that the road had no identified entry or exit ramp, nor any acceleration or deceleration lane, and noted that the sanctioned project record did not identify it as a service road meant to carry local or access traffic. 
• On use by officials and emergency vehicles: The Court clarified that use of the road by authorised officials and emergency vehicles did not confer on it the character of a service road available for access to adjoining private properties. 
• On security and safety concerns: The Court accepted NHAI's submission that private access could compromise the security of ATMS installations and interfere with unobstructed use of the road by police and emergency vehicles, holding these to be relevant considerations for restricting the road's use. 
• On the scope of Article 300A: The Court held that while effective access is integral to the beneficial enjoyment of property, this right cannot be translated into a right to obtain vehicular access through NHAI's operational infrastructure, especially where the competent authority has found such access inconsistent with the sanctioned highway design and road safety requirements. 
• On relief granted: Finding no violation of the statutory framework, mala fides, patent irrationality, or contrary technical material, the Court vacated the interim protection earlier granted to the petitioner and dismissed the plea, while clarifying that the judgment would not affect any pending compensation proceedings or independent claims of easementary rights over adjoining private lands. 

What is Article 300A of the Constitution of India? 

Current Position:  

The right to property is protected under Article 300A of the Constitution, which states that no person shall be deprived of their property save by authority of law. It is now a constitutional right, not a Fundamental Right. 

Historical Evolution: 

• Originally, property was protected as a Fundamental Right under Article 19(1)(f) (right to acquire, hold, dispose of property) and Article 31 (protection against arbitrary deprivation, with mandatory compensation for acquisition). 
• The 1st Amendment (1951) inserted Article 31A to protect agrarian reform laws from challenge. 
• The 4th Amendment (1955) made the adequacy of compensation non-justiciable, limiting judicial review. 
• The 25th Amendment (1971) replaced the word "compensation" with "amount," further weakening the right. 
• The 44th Amendment (1978) removed property entirely from Part III, repealing Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, and inserted Article 300A in Part XII — converting it from a Fundamental Right into a mere constitutional/legal right. 

Judicial Interpretation: 

• Justice K.K. Mathew (dissenting in Kesavananda Bharati) argued property rights were integral to civilisation and shouldn't have been excluded from constitutional protection. 
• Despite losing Fundamental Right status, the Supreme Court held in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986) that any law depriving a person of property must still be just, fair, and reasonable, satisfying Articles 14, 19, and 21. 
• In B.K. Ravichandra v. Union of India (2020), the Court noted Article 300A's similarity to Articles 21 and 265, holding that this guarantee cannot be diluted. 

Current Legal Framework: 

• Property can be acquired by Central/State laws or any statutory authority with legal backing. 
• No mandatory requirement of public purpose or compensation. 
• Cannot be acquired via executive order alone; must follow due legal procedure and not violate other constitutional provisions.

Remedies:  

• Only Article 226 (High Courts) is available for challenging illegal deprivation — direct recourse to the Supreme Court under Article 32 is no longer available, and inadequate compensation alone cannot be challenged. 

Landmark Cases: 

• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) – Upheld State power to take possession of property for public order. 
• Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) – Established the basic structure doctrine, indirectly shaping later property law reforms. 
• Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) – Upheld removal of property as a Fundamental Right, while affirming its survival as a constitutional right. 
• Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995) – Held that the right to property is not part of the basic structure doctrine.