List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice A. Badharudeen, in Joshy K.J. v. State of Kerala (2026), upheld the conviction of an appellant for raping a 17-year-old girl, holding that placing a vibrating instrument on the victim's vaginal opening in vibrating mode amounts to penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act as well as rape under the Indian Penal Code. 

What was the Background of Joshy K.J. v. State of Kerala (2026) Case? 

• The appellant, who managed a Cosmetology centre run by the 2nd accused, was alleged to have forcefully laid the 17-year-old victim on a treatment bed, removed her undergarment, and placed a penis-like instrument fitted with a vibrator on her vagina in vibrating mode. 
• He allegedly threatened the victim to prevent her from disclosing the incident to anyone. 
• Though the victim disclosed the incident to the 2nd accused, he dismissed it as a joke; the 2nd accused was separately arrayed for failing to report the incident as statutorily required, but was acquitted by the trial court. 
• The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 376(1), 375(b), 354B, and 506(i) IPC, and under Section 4(1) read with Section 3(b) of the POCSO Act. 
• The appellant challenged the conviction before the Kerala High Court, raising grounds including delay of two years in lodging the FIR, absence of medical or scientific evidence, and the victim's impending attainment of majority at the time of the incident. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the definition of penetrative sexual assault: The Court held that placing a vibrating instrument on the labia majora or vulva itself constitutes sufficient insertion to attract Section 3(b) of the POCSO Act, punishable under Section 4, and correspondingly amounts to rape under Section 375(b) IPC. 
• On the victim's age: The Court rejected the contention regarding the victim nearing majority, holding it irrelevant since she was proved to be below 18 years — and thus a 'child' under the Act — through her SSLC book and birth certificate. 
• On delay in lodging the FIR: The Court found the delay adequately explained, noting the victim had been under threat and could only disclose the incident after the 2nd accused's arrest in an unrelated case. 
• On reliability of the victim's testimony: The Court noted that the victim was subjected to voir dire examination and found competent to testify, and that her statement remained consistent despite minor contradictions, including her explanation for not immediately disclosing the duration of the assault or her discomfort. 
• On sentencing: Since the statutory minimum sentence had already been imposed, the Court held that no further reduction was permissible in law. 
• On relief granted: Finding no infirmity in the trial court's appreciation of evidence, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. 

What is Penetrative Sexual Assault under the POCSO Act? 

Section 3 – Penetrative Sexual Assault: 

A person commits penetrative sexual assault if he: 

• Penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a child, or makes the child do so with him or any other person; 
• Inserts, to any extent, any object or body part (other than the penis) into the vagina, urethra, or anus of the child, or makes the child do so with him or any other person; 
• Manipulates any part of the child's body so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus, or any part of the child's body, or makes the child do so with him or any other person; or 
• Applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, or urethra of the child, or makes the child do so to himself or any other person. 

Section 4 – Punishment for Penetrative Sexual Assault: 

• Sub-section (1): Punishable with rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10 years, extendable to imprisonment for life, along with fine. 
• Sub-section (2): Where the victim is below 16 years of age, punishment is imprisonment of not less than 20 years, extendable to imprisonment for life — meaning imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life — along with fine. 
• Sub-section (3): Fine imposed under sub-section (1) must be just and reasonable, and is to be paid to the victim to cover medical expenses and rehabilitation. 

Reference Table: 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Prasanna B Varale held that no statutory appeal under Section 374 CrPC (corresponding to Section 415 BNSS) is maintainable before the High Court against a conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing a trial court's order of acquittal. The Court clarified that in such a situation, the only remedy available to the convicted person is to file a revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC (corresponding to Section 438 read with Section 442 BNSS). 

What was the Background of Vishnu Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2026) Case? 

• The appellant was initially acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class. 
• The complainant challenged the acquittal by filing an appeal before the Sessions Court under Section 378 CrPC (corresponding to Section 419 BNSS). 
• The Sessions Court, exercising its appellate jurisdiction, reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant for the first time. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant filed a further appeal before the High Court under Section 374 CrPC (corresponding to Section 415 BNSS), challenging the Sessions Court's conviction. 
• The High Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, holding that no second statutory appeal is contemplated against a conviction recorded by a Sessions Court in appellate jurisdiction, and that the appropriate remedy was a revision. 
• The appellant then approached the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision. 
• The question before the Supreme Court was whether an appeal under Section 374 CrPC/Section 415 BNSS is maintainable against a conviction recorded by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and reversing a trial court's acquittal. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the scope of Section 374 CrPC: The Court explained that Section 374 contemplates an appeal only from a court that has itself conducted the trial — that is, the court before which proceedings begin with the framing of charges and conclude with the judgment of conviction and sentence. A Sessions Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 378 CrPC does not fall within this description, since it has not itself "held" the trial. 
• On the distinction between trial and appellate jurisdiction: The Bench reasoned that since the Sessions Court's reversal of acquittal was passed in exercise of appellate powers and not "on a trial," the statutory appeal mechanism under Section 374 CrPC could not be invoked against such an order. 
• On the doctrine of continuation of proceedings: The Court rejected the appellant's argument that an appeal is merely a continuation of trial proceedings, and that this doctrine converts an appellate court into a trial court for the purposes of Section 374(2). The Bench observed that this doctrine explains procedural continuity between trial and appeal, but does not by itself convert an appellate court into one exercising trial jurisdiction. 
• On the correctness of Arun Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2019): The Court disapproved of the Himachal Pradesh High Court's reasoning in this case, noting that it had proceeded from the premise of continuation of proceedings to the conclusion that an appellate conviction is a conviction "on a trial," without adequately demonstrating why the latter follows from the former. The Court held this reasoning to be legally unsound. 
• On the correct remedy: The Court held that since no provision under the CrPC or BNSS permits a statutory appeal against a Sessions Court's appellate reversal of acquittal, the only available remedy is a revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC (Section 438 read with Section 442 BNSS). 
• On the outcome: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision, but granted the appellant liberty to pursue the revisional remedy against the Sessions Court's conviction. 

What is the Statutory Framework Governing Appeals and Revisions in Such Cases? 

Section 374 CrPC / Section 415 BNSS (Appeals from convictions): 

• Provides a statutory right of appeal against a judgment of conviction passed by a court that has itself conducted the trial. 
• An appeal under this provision lies to a superior court from the trial court that framed charges, recorded evidence, and passed the judgment of conviction and sentence. 

Section 378 CrPC / Section 419 BNSS (Appeal against acquittal): 

• Allows the State or, with leave, a complainant to file an appeal before the Sessions Court or High Court against an order of acquittal passed by a trial court. 

Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC / Section 438 read with Section 442 BNSS (Revisional jurisdiction): 

• Confers supervisory power on the High Court (or Sessions Court) to examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of an order passed by an inferior criminal court. 
• Unlike an appeal, revision is a discretionary remedy and does not involve a full rehearing on facts and law. 
• This is the remedy available to a person convicted for the first time by a Sessions Court while exercising appellate powers over an acquittal.