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Civil Law

Probationer is Also 'Employee' Under RPwD Act

04-Aug-2026

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Sanjay Choudhary v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors.

"It is incomprehensible as to why the petitioner, who had been appointed after a regular recruitment process, would not be termed to be governed by Section 20 of the Act of 2016."

Justice Rekha Borana

Source: Rajasthan High Court

Why in News?

A Bench of Justice Rekha Borana, in Sanjay Choudhary v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2026), held that a probationary employee who acquires a disability during service is protected under Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and set aside the termination of a police constable who was removed from service after acquiring 100% disability while on probation.

What was the Background of Sanjay Choudhary v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2026) Case?

The petitioner was appointed as a constable on June 3, 2013, and was on probation when he met with an accident on June 29, 2014.
He was subsequently certified to have suffered 100% disability, and his services were terminated on the ground that he had become incapable of discharging the duties of a constable.
The petitioner contended before the High Court that under the second proviso to Section 20(4) of the RPwD Act, 2016, an employee who acquires a disability during service cannot be removed from service and must either be adjusted against any other suitable post, or be deemed to be in service till the age of superannuation.
The State opposed the plea, arguing that since the petitioner was a probationer-trainee at the time of the incident and had not been confirmed in service, he was not entitled to claim the benefit of Section 20 of the Act.

What were the Court's Observations?

On the meaning of "employee" under the Act: The Court held that since the petitioner was appointed after a regular process of selection, he fell within the category of "employee," and Section 20(4) of the Act did not restrict the term "employee" to any particular confirmed class of service.
On the status of a probationer: The Court observed that it could not be said that a probationer was not an "employee" until confirmed in service, and held that the State's conclusion to the contrary was in total contravention of law.
On reliance on precedent: The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors., which held that a probationer is also entitled to certain protections and that his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily without complying with the principles of natural justice.
On the validity of the termination order: The Court held that the termination order was violative of Section 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016, and accordingly set it aside.
On relief granted: The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to all benefits under Section 20 of the Act, and directed the State to consider him deemed to be in service and to reinstate him with immediate effect.

What is Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016?

About the Act:

The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was enacted on 27th December 2016, replacing the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.
The Act came into force on 19th April 2017, marking a shift toward a rights-based framework for persons with disabilities (PwDs) in India.
It expands the scope of recognised disabilities from 7 categories under the 1995 Act to 21 conditions, covering physical, intellectual, mental, and sensory impairments.
The Act mandates reservation of seats and positions for persons with disabilities in educational institutions and government establishments, ensuring access to education and employment.
It emphasises the creation of barrier-free environments in public spaces, transportation, and information and communication technologies to enable greater accessibility.
The Act obligates the appropriate Government to formulate schemes and programmes for the social security, healthcare, and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities.
It mandates the formulation of guidelines and standards for public buildings to ensure universal accessibility.

Section 20 – Non-Discrimination in Employment:

Section 20(1) provides that no Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment, though the appropriate Government may, by notification and subject to conditions, exempt any establishment from this provision having regard to the type of work carried on.
Section 20(2) casts an obligation on every Government establishment to provide reasonable accommodation and an appropriate barrier-free and conducive environment to employees with disability.
Section 20(3) provides that no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability.
Section 20(4) provides that no Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service.
The first proviso to Section 20(4) provides that if an employee, after acquiring a disability, is not suitable for the post he was holding, he shall be shifted to another post with the same pay scale and service benefits.
The second proviso to Section 20(4) provides that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he shall be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
Section 20(5) empowers the appropriate Government to frame policies for the posting and transfer of employees with disabilities.

Civil Law

Specific Performance Can Be Denied if There is Long Delay

04-Aug-2026

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA)

V.N.A.S Chandran v. S Venila and Others

"Readiness and willingness must exist continuously from the date of the agreement till the decree."

Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra & Justice Anjaria

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Anjaria, in V.N.A.S Chandran v. S Venila and Others (2026), allowed a property owner's appeals against a Madras High Court judgment directing specific performance of a 2004 agreement to sell, holding that the purchasers had failed to establish continuous readiness and willingness and that the long delay in adjudication independently disentitled them to the equitable relief.

What was the Background of V.N.A.S Chandran v S Venila and Others (2026) Case?

The parties entered into an agreement to sell dated April 1, 2004, under which the appellant agreed to sell a property in Udhagamandalam for ₹2.25 crore.
The purchasers paid an advance of ₹85 lakh, as found by the trial court.
The trial court declined to grant the discretionary relief of specific performance despite recording payment of the advance.
On appeal, the Madras High Court reversed this finding and directed execution of the sale deed in favour of the purchasers.
The property owner challenged the High Court's judgment before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations?

On continuous readiness and willingness: The Court held that a plaintiff seeking specific performance must demonstrate the availability of funds and a continuing readiness and willingness to perform the contract at every material stage, beginning soon after the agreement and running through to execution of the decree, and not merely at isolated points in the litigation.
On the demand draft produced during appeal: The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on a demand draft for ₹1.40 crore produced by the purchasers only during appellate proceedings in 2011, holding that funds arranged years after the suit could not retrospectively establish continuous financial readiness.
On the purchasers' financial position: The Bench found that the purchasers had not proved possession of sufficient funds at the time the suit was filed, noting that the Memorandum of Understanding they relied upon for raising money was mentioned in neither their legal notice nor the plaint.
On dishonoured cheques: The Court noted that two cheques issued by the purchasers toward the sale consideration, for ₹25 lakh and ₹5 lakh respectively, were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, undermining their claim of financial readiness.
On the timing of the purchasers' own property sale: The Bench observed that the purchasers sold their Chennai properties only in May 2006, after the suit had already been filed in September 2005, indicating that they lacked the necessary funds when the suit was instituted.
On reliance on precedent: The Court relied on N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agarwalla (2024) to reiterate that continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent for specific performance, to be assessed from the conduct of the plaintiff throughout the period between the agreement and the decree.
On inconsistent conduct of the purchasers: The Court held that one purchaser's pursuit of a criminal complaint for recovery of the advance amount, while simultaneously seeking specific performance in the civil suit, along with contradictory stands taken on assignment of contractual rights to a third party, further disentitled the purchasers to equitable relief.
On delay as an independent ground: The Bench held that the passage of more than two decades since the agreement was, by itself, a factor weighing against grant of specific performance, referring to its earlier decisions in Saradamani Kandappan and Nanjappan, and noted that hardship to the defendant — one party being of advanced age and another having passed away during the litigation — is a recognised consideration under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
On relief granted: The Supreme Court restored the trial court's decree directing refund of ₹85 lakh with interest and permitted the purchasers to withdraw the ₹1.40 crore already deposited pursuant to the High Court's decree, along with accrued interest.

What is Specific Performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

About:

Specific performance constitutes an equitable remedy granted by a court to uphold the contractual commitments among the parties.
Unlike a claim of damages, which involves compensation for not fulfilling the contractual stipulations, specific performance operates as a remedy that enforces the terms agreed between the parties.
It is governed by the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA).
Section 10 of SRA deals with specific performance in respect of contracts. It states that:
- The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 16.
The Supreme Court in Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. (2023) held that the relief of specific performance of a contract can only be granted when the party claiming such relief shows its readiness and willingness to perform its obligations under the contract.

Landmark Judgments:

His Holiness Acharya Swamy Ganeshdasji v. Seetharam Apar (1996):
- The Supreme Court explained the difference between 'readiness' and 'willingness' in this judgment.
- 'Readiness' refers to the plaintiff's financial capacity and ability to perform the contract, while 'willingness' relates to the plaintiff's conduct and intention to fulfill the contractual obligations.
Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010):
- In this case, the Supreme Court held that even if the defendant has committed breach of contract, the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree for specific performance if the plaintiff fails to aver and prove their continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contractual obligations.
Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011):
- In this important judgment, the Supreme Court observed that with the steep rise in real estate prices, it becomes inequitable to grant specific performance if the purchaser delays payment without justification from the vendor's side.
- The courts need to apply greater scrutiny in such cases.
Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar (2024):
- This recent Supreme Court judgment dealt with the evidentiary value of the testimony given by a power of attorney holder.
- It held that a power of attorney holder cannot become a witness on behalf of the party and depose to prove that party's readiness and willingness to perform the contract.