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Source: Chhattisgarh High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court, comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, in Monali Baghmare & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (2026) quashed an FIR registered under Sections 318(4) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, holding that where police had initially treated a complaint as a non-cognizable case, subsequent registration of an FIR on identical allegations, absent any fresh material, lent support to the conclusion that a purely commercial dispute had been given a criminal colour. 

What was the Background of Monali Baghmare & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioners were alleged to have induced the complainant and his associates to deposit a total sum of Rs. 1,02,480/- on the assurance of appointment as Salesmen/Agents carrying a monthly salary of Rs. 22,000/-. 
• The complainant alleged that the promised benefits were never provided, giving rise to allegations of cheating. 
• On the complaint submitted on 18th September 2025, the police had initially treated the matter as a non-cognizable dispute and recorded proceedings under Section 155 CrPC (corresponding to Section 174 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), advising the complainant to approach the competent Court. 
• Within two days, and without any fresh material or change in circumstances, the police registered the impugned FIR on 20th September 2025 under Sections 318(4) and 3(5) BNS. 
• The petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, contending that the dispute was purely commercial in nature. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Nature of the Underlying Relationship: The Court noted that the complainant and other persons had voluntarily joined the business as Independent Business Owners by executing Direct Seller Agreements on stamp paper. These agreements governed the rights and obligations of the parties and contained no stipulation regarding payment of a monthly salary of Rs. 22,000/- or provision of food and accommodation, as alleged in the FIR. 
• On the Ingredients of Cheating: The Court held that the allegations essentially arose out of a commercial and contractual relationship, and that the material on record did not prima facie disclose any fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the petitioners at the inception of the transaction — which is the sine qua non for constituting the offence of cheating under Section 318(4) BNS. The Court remarked that mere non-fulfilment of a promise or breach of contractual terms, absent fraudulent intention from the very inception, cannot by itself attract criminal liability. 
• On the Change from Non-Cognizable to Cognizable Treatment: The Court observed that on the very same complaint, the police had first recorded proceedings under Section 155 CrPC, treating the matter as non-cognizable, but within two days registered the FIR on identical allegations without any fresh material being brought on record. The Court held that the record did not disclose any tangible material explaining such a change in the nature of the proceedings, and that this circumstance supported the petitioners' contention that the dispute primarily arose out of a business arrangement and had been given a criminal colour. 
• On Relief Granted: Holding that the essential ingredients of the alleged offence were not made out, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR. 

What is Cheating under Section 318 BNS? 

About: 

• Section 318 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 420 IPC read with Section 415 IPC) defines and penalises cheating. 
• Cheating requires deception of a person, dishonestly or fraudulently inducing that person to deliver property or to do/omit an act which they would not otherwise do, causing or likely to cause damage or harm. 
• A crucial ingredient is that the fraudulent or dishonest intention must exist at the inception of the transaction; a subsequent failure to honour a promise, without such intention at inception, amounts at best to a civil breach of contract, not a criminal offence. 

Section 318(4) BNS: 

• Deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, or destruction of a valuable security, punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine — this is the aggravated form of cheating involving property. 

Section 3(5) BNS: 

• Corresponds to Section 34 IPC and deals with acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention, making each person liable as if the act were done by them alone. 

What is the Distinction Between Cognizable and Non-Cognizable Offences? 

• A cognizable offence is one in which a police officer may arrest without warrant and initiate investigation without prior permission of a Magistrate. 
• A non-cognizable offence is one in which police cannot arrest without a warrant or investigate without the Magistrate's permission; the informant must be referred to approach the competent Court, and the police record the matter under Section 174 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973). 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice JJ Munir and Justice Tarun Saxena, quashed an order refusing premature release to a convict, holding that the Governor's power under Article 161 of the Constitution, though sovereign in character, cannot be exercised arbitrarily and remains regulated by the applicable Rules and remission policy. 

What was the Background of the Case? 

• The petitioner, Ram Pratap Singh, was convicted in an attempt-to-murder case under Section 307/34 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, in 2002, and sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of ₹2,000. 
• His appeal before the High Court was dismissed in 2019, and the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed his Special Leave Petition. 
• In September 2022, a proposal for his premature release was sent to the jail authorities and the District Magistrate, Fatehpur, but it remained pending. The petitioner made an application in February 2025 seeking a decision on the proposal, pointing out that he had already served more than half of his sentence. 
• The jail report recorded that he had undergone 4 years, 6 months and 6 days without remission, and 5 years and 4 months with remission, against the total 7-year sentence, with his conduct recorded as satisfactory. 
• However, in June 2025, his premature release was refused on the ground that he had served only 2 years and 6 days without remission and 2 years, 1 month and 27 days with remission — figures that ran contrary to the jail report. 
• The petitioner challenged this order before the High Court, contending that it had ignored the jail report, wrongly calculated his period of incarceration, disclosed no adverse material against him, and failed to consider his satisfactory conduct in jail. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Error in Calculating the Period of Incarceration: The Court noted that under sub-Rule (iii) of Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners' Release on Probation Rules, 1938, a convict in the applicable category becomes eligible for premature release after serving one-third of the sentence without remission. Since the petitioner had actually served 4 years, 6 months and 6 days without remission against a 7-year sentence, the Court found he had served more than half the sentence, observing that the impugned finding was "borne of on an error apparent" and betrayed "non-application of mind to the record." The Court termed this misreading of the incarceration period a "manifest illegality." 
• On the Nature of the Governor's Power Under Article 161: The Bench held that the Governor's power to grant premature release, while a sovereign executive power, cannot be exercised arbitrarily and remains regulated by the applicable Rules and remission policy. It clarified that even though this power is constitutional in character — as distinguished from the State Government's statutory power under Section 432 CrPC — the decision cannot be arbitrary or rest on an error apparent regarding a fact as significant as the convict's period of incarceration. 
• On the Reliance on Undisclosed Recommendations: The Court noted that the rejection order relied upon recommendations from the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police against premature release, but neither the impugned order nor the State's response disclosed the contents of those reports. It observed that if these recommendations were made "without reasons and ipse dixit of the officers," fresh comments would have to be obtained from the concerned officers. 
• On Relief Granted: The Court held that the impugned order could not be sustained and, consequently, allowed the writ petition, quashing the June 26, 2025 order refusing premature release. The matter was remitted to the Government for a fresh decision within one month from receipt of the High Court's order. 

What is Article 161 of the Constitution of India? 

About: 

• Article 161 empowers the Governor of a state to grant relief to persons convicted under state laws. 
• Forms of relief: pardon, reprieve, respite, remission, suspension, and commutation of sentences. 
• Exercised on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, not as a personal/independent power. 
• Treated as part of the Governor's judicial function, alongside executive, legislative, and financial roles. 
• Aimed at ensuring justice, fairness, and mercy in appropriate cases; balances strict punishment with compassion. 

Forms of Relief: 

• Pardon – completely forgives the offence; wipes out conviction, sentence, and disqualifications; limited to state-law offences; excludes death sentence and court-martial cases. 
• Respite – awards a lesser sentence on humanitarian grounds (e.g., pregnancy, illness, old age); doesn't question guilt. 
• Reprieve – temporarily postpones execution of a sentence (esp. death penalty) to allow appeal/mercy petition. 
• Remission – reduces duration of sentence without changing its nature. 
• Commutation – substitutes a lighter punishment for a harsher one (e.g., death to life imprisonment). 

Governor (Article 161) vs President (Article 72): 

• President's power is wider — covers Union-law offences, court-martial cases, and full pardon of death sentences. 
• Governor's power is narrower — confined to state-law offences, excludes court-martial matters, and cannot fully pardon a death sentence (only suspend/remit/commute). 
• President acts on advice of Union Council of Ministers; Governor acts on advice of State Council of Ministers.