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Section 173(4) & Section 175(3) of BNSS

 24-Aug-2026

Satyabrata Dey v. State of Assam & Ors. 

"Without availing such statutory remedy provided under the BNSS, the petitioner has directly invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court seeking for initiation of criminal proceedings with registration of the FIR." 

Justice Manish Choudhury 

Source: Gauhati High Court 

Why in News? 

The Gauhati High Court, in Satyabrata Dey v. State of Assam & Ors. (2026), held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking registration and investigation of an FIR is premature where the petitioner directly approaches the High Court without first exhausting the statutory remedies available under Section 173(4) read with Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 

What was the Background of Satyabrata Dey v. State of Assam & Ors. (2026) Case? 

  • The dispute arose from a tender floated by the Lanka Municipal Board for the supply of sand gravel. The petitioner quoted a rate of ₹925 per cubic metre and claimed that his bid was the lowest. However, the Municipal Board accepted another person's tender at ₹1,250 per cubic metre. 
  • The petitioner further alleged that the successful bidder had not submitted the requisite Tax Clearance Certificate along with the tender documents and alleged irregularities in the tender process. 
  • The petitioner had earlier approached the Gauhati High Court seeking a criminal investigation into the alleged irregularities. The writ petition was dismissed because he had not filed an FIR before approaching the Court, though liberty was granted to take recourse to the appropriate provisions of law. 
  • Thereafter, the petitioner claimed to have sent an FIR by registered post to the Officer-in-Charge of Lanka Police Station. As the FIR was allegedly not registered, he again approached the High Court under Article 226 seeking a direction for registration and investigation of the FIR. 
  • The State opposed the writ petition and contended that the petitioner had an effective statutory remedy under the BNSS and ought to have approached the jurisdictional Magistrate instead of directly invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • On the Statutory Remedy Against Non-Registration of FIR: The Court observed that the BNSS provides a specific statutory mechanism to a person aggrieved by the refusal of the police to register information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. Such a person must first avail the remedy provided under Section 173(4) of the BNSS. 
  • On Approaching the Superintendent of Police: The Court noted that under Section 173(4) of the BNSS, where the officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to record information relating to a cognizable offence, the aggrieved person may send the substance of such information to the Superintendent of Police concerned. 
  • On Remedy Before the Magistrate: The Court observed that if the remedy before the Superintendent of Police does not result in the desired action, the aggrieved person can approach the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 175(3) of the BNSS seeking an investigation in accordance with law. 
  • On Direct Invocation of Article 226: The Court held that directly invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for registration of an FIR, without exhausting the statutory remedies provided under the BNSS, is contrary to the settled principles of law. 
  • On Applicability of Earlier CrPC Principles: The Court noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been replaced by the BNSS and that Section 175 of the BNSS is akin to Section 156 of the CrPC. Therefore, the settled principles requiring exhaustion of statutory remedies before seeking writ intervention continue to apply under the new criminal procedural framework. 
  • On Petitioner's Failure to Approach the Magistrate: The Court found that there was nothing in the petitioner's pleaded case to show that he had approached the jurisdictional Judicial Magistrate seeking registration and investigation of the FIR before filing the writ petition. 
  • On Prematurity of the Writ Petition: The Court held that the petitioner's prayer for registration and investigation of the FIR, without previously approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate and availing the statutory remedies under Sections 173(4) and 175(3) of the BNSS, rendered the writ petition premature. 
  • On Disposal: The Court declined to entertain the writ petition but granted liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedies available under the BNSS by first approaching the Superintendent of Police and thereafter the jurisdictional Magistrate, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sections 173(4) and 175(3). 
  • The Court also clarified that its observations should not be treated as an expression of opinion on the merits of the allegations or on whether the facts disclosed the commission of any criminal offence. 

What is Section 173(4) of BNSS? 

Section 173(4), BNSS – Remedy Where Police Refuses to Record Information 

  • Where the officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to record information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, the aggrieved person may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned. 
  • If the Superintendent of Police is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, he shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer subordinate to him. 
  • If the Superintendent of Police also fails to take appropriate action, the aggrieved person may make an application to the Magistrate. 

What is Section 175(3) of BNSS? 

Section 175(3), BNSS – Magistrate's Power to Order Investigation 

  • A Magistrate empowered under Section 210 of the BNSS may, after considering an application supported by an affidavit made under Section 173(4), and after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary and considering the submissions made by the police officer in this regard, order an investigation. 

Remedy for Non-Registration of FIR under BNSS 

Police Station refuses to register FIR → Approach Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS → If no effective action is taken → Approach jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS → Writ jurisdiction of the High Court should ordinarily not be invoked at the first instance. 


Civil Law

Order VII Rule 11 of CPC

 24-Aug-2026

Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar & Anr.

"The Court cannot be hesitant in granting relief of rejection of a plaint when it is so obvious from the pleadings itself." 

Justice J.B. Pardiwala & Justice K. Vinod Chandran 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, in N. Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar & Anr. (2026), held that a plaint can be rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) where the averments in the plaint itself clearly disclose that the suit is barred by limitation. 

  • The Court observed that although limitation is generally a mixed question of fact and law requiring adjudication at trial, where the limitation bar is glaring and evident from the plaint itself, the Court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC instead of unnecessarily allowing the suit to proceed to trial.

What was the Background of N. Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar & Anr. (2026) Case? 

  • The appellant, being the landowner, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement dated 18th August 2014 with the respondent-developer for construction of eight flats on two plots belonging to the appellant. 
  • Under the agreement, upon completion of construction, 56% of the super built-up area was to be allotted to the landowners, while the remaining 44% was to be allotted to the developer. 
  • The appellant cancelled the Joint Venture Agreement on 20th April 2016, alleging that the construction had not been completed within the stipulated period of 15 months. 
  • A lawyer's notice was subsequently issued on 22nd July 2016, to which the respondent replied on 23rd July 2016 disputing the cancellation of the agreement. 
  • After further communications between the parties, the appellant took possession of the properties in June 2017. 
  • The respondent instituted a suit in October 2022, seeking specific relief for division and allotment of its alleged 44% share in the property, more than six years after the first communication cancelling the Joint Venture Agreement. 
  • The appellant-defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. 
  • Both the Trial Court and the High Court rejected the application, following which the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • On Limitation Being Apparent from the Plaint: The Supreme Court held that although limitation ordinarily involves a mixed question of fact and law, this principle does not prevent rejection of a plaint where the bar of limitation is clearly apparent from the pleadings themselves. If the plaint on its face demonstrates that the suit is hopelessly time-barred, the Court need not wait for a full-fledged trial. 
  • On the Scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC: The Court reiterated that while deciding an application for rejection of plaint, only the averments contained in the plaint and the documents annexed with it are relevant. The Court is not required to examine the defence of the defendant or other materials on record at this stage. 
  • On Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust Case: The Court relied upon Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle & Anr. (2024) and reiterated that where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
  • On Determination of Cause of Action: The Court examined Paragraph 17 of the plaint, wherein the plaintiff itself had specified the events giving rise to the cause of action. The Court held that the cause of action arose on 20th April 2016, when the first communication cancelling the Joint Venture Agreement was issued. 
  • On the Suit Being Time-Barred: The suit was instituted only in October 2022, more than six years after cancellation of the Joint Venture Agreement. Since the applicable limitation period for the relief claimed was three years, the Court held that the suit was ex facie barred by limitation. 
  • On Duty of the Court to Reject a Time-Barred Plaint: The Supreme Court observed that a Court should not hesitate to reject a plaint where the limitation bar is obvious from the pleadings. Permitting such a suit to proceed to trial despite an evident statutory bar would defeat the purpose of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
  • On Disposal: The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court and directed that the plaint in O.S. No. 632 of 2022 pending before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu, stand rejected. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

What is Order VII Rule 11 of CPC? 

Order VII Rule 11, CPC – Rejection of Plaint 

The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: 

  • Clause (a) – No Cause of Action: Where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. 
  • Clause (b) – Undervalued Relief: Where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within the time fixed by it, fails to do so. 
  • Clause (c) – Insufficiently Stamped Plaint: Where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon insufficiently stamped paper, and the plaintiff fails to supply the requisite stamp paper within the time fixed by the Court. 
  • Clause (d) – Suit Barred by Law: Where the suit appears from the statements in the plaint to be barred by any law. A clear bar of limitation apparent from the plaint itself falls within this clause. 
  • Clause (e) – Plaint Not Filed in Duplicate: Where the plaint is not filed in duplicate. 
  • Clause (f) – Non-Compliance with Rule 9: Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Order VII Rule 9 CPC. 
  • The proviso stipulates that time for correction of valuation or supplying stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by exceptional cause and refusal would cause grave injustice. 
  • The power to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is an extraordinary power and must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. 
  • Under clause (d), the Court must determine from the averments in the plaint itself whether the suit is barred by any law, including the law of limitation. 
  • The scope of enquiry under Order VII Rule 11(d) is limited to the face of the plaint and the documents annexed thereto or referred to therein. 
  • The defence set up by the defendant cannot be considered while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
  • The power should be exercised only in clear and manifest cases where the plaint is ex facie barred. 
  • Where determination of limitation requires examination of evidence or consideration of mixed questions of law and fact, the plaint cannot be rejected under clause (d). 
  • The Court cannot travel beyond the four corners of the plaint while considering an application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11. 
  • Where several reliefs are claimed and even one relief is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety as barred by law. 
  • The provision should not be used to shut out genuine claims merely on technical grounds without full adjudication on merits.