List of Current Affairs

Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Samit Gopal, in Krishna Pal and others v. State (2026), allowed a criminal appeal and acquitted the surviving accused in a 1981 case, holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the necessary nexus between the alleged dacoity and murder as required for a conviction under Section 396 IPC (Section 308 of BNS). 

What was the Background of Krishna Pal and others v. State (2026) Case? 

• The case arose from an incident on December 30, 1981, when Atar Singh was killed near a culvert in front of the village of Chehka. 
• According to the prosecution, deceased Atar Singh was travelling with his son, brother, and others after alighting from a bus when they encountered Accused Mahavira and around 12 armed persons, with whom Mahavira allegedly had previous enmity. 
• Mahavira allegedly challenged Atar Singh and immediately fired at him; Atar Singh, carrying his licensed SBBL gun, allegedly fired back, injuring two persons from Mahavira's group. 
• Further firing allegedly followed from Mahavira's side, resulting in Atar Singh sustaining firearm injuries, falling on the roadside, and subsequently dying. 
• The prosecution further alleged that Accused Chandrapal took away Atar Singh's gun and cartridge belt after the firing. 
• The FIR initially invoked Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 404 IPC against six named accused and 12 unknown armed persons; the trial court, however, convicted the accused under Section 396 IPC and sentenced them to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. 
• During the pendency of the appeal, Krishan Pal, Ram Lal, Munshi Singh and Chandrapal died and the appeals qua them abated, leaving the appeal to survive only in respect of Sattu, whose conviction was examined by the High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Ingredients of Section 396 IPC: 
  The Court examined whether the prosecution evidence established the ingredients of Section 396 IPC, which applies where one of five or more persons conjointly committing dacoity commits murder in the course of committing that dacoity, and referred to Section 391 IPC, under which five or more persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit robbery constitute dacoity.
• On the Absence of a Prior Intention to Commit Dacoity: 
  The Court found that the prosecution's own version did not establish that the accused had gone to the spot with the intention of committing dacoity, since the parties had met all of a sudden and Mahavira had challenged Atar Singh because of pre-existing enmity, with the firing and death following from this sudden encounter and the taking of the gun and cartridge belt occurring only thereafter. 
• On the Missing Nexus Between Dacoity and Murder: 
  The Court held that the prosecution story was not consistent with a conviction under Section 396 IPC, since the provision contemplates five or more persons conjointly committing dacoity as the first act followed by murder in the course of that dacoity, whereas in the present case no such sequence, and no nexus between the act of committing dacoity and the murder, had been established. 
• On the Absence of Evidence of a Dacoit Gang: 
  The Court observed that the sides had met all of a sudden due to personal enmity between Atar Singh and Mahavira, and that no evidence had been brought on record to show that Mahavira headed a gang of dacoits that included the surviving appellant. 
• On Corroborating Circumstances: 
  The Court additionally found it relevant that despite the alleged firing by several persons, no other person from the informant's side was injured, and that no incriminating material had been recovered from the surviving appellant Sattu's possession or through any pointing-out memo. 
• The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment dated November 2, 1982 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge (Special Court), Etah, and acquitted the surviving appellant of the charges. 

What is Section 308 of BNS? 

Section 308 BNS — Dacoity: 

• Sub-section (1) — Definition of Dacoity: 
  When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, together with persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, number five or more, every such person committing, attempting, or aiding is said to commit "dacoity." 
• Sub-section (2) — Punishment for Dacoity: 
  Whoever commits dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• Sub-section (3) — Dacoity with Murder: 
  If any one of five or more persons who are conjointly committing dacoity commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• Sub-section (4) — Preparation to Commit Dacoity: 
  Whoever makes any preparation for committing dacoity shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• Sub-section (5) — Assembly for the Purpose of Dacoity: 
  Whoever is one of five or more persons assembled for the purpose of committing dacoity shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• Sub-section (6) — Belonging to a Gang of Dacoits: 
  Whoever belongs to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu, in Lucknow Development Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2026), set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had dismissed a long-pending writ petition filed by the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) and had instead granted the parties liberty to invoke Article 131, holding that a statutory authority cannot maintain proceedings under that provision. 

What was the Background of Lucknow Development Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The LDA had filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, against the Union of India, the GOC-in-C, Central Command, and the Station Commander, Sub-Area, Cantonment, Lucknow. 
• The dispute concerned land on which the LDA had developed a colony and allotted plots and flats to beneficiaries. 
• According to the LDA, officers of the Union Government and defence establishments were interfering with the physical possession of the allottees, asserting that the land belonged to them. 
• After attempts to resolve the dispute between the concerned authorities failed, the High Court dismissed the LDA's writ petition by order dated September 19, 2023, holding that the dispute could not be decided in writ proceedings, and granted liberty to the parties to initiate proceedings under Article 131. 
• Aggrieved, the LDA approached the Supreme Court in appeal. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the High Court's Characterisation of the Dispute: 
  The Court held that the High Court had fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the dispute, since the writ petition had been filed by the LDA itself and not by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 
• On the Status of the LDA Under Article 12 and Article 131: 
  The Court noted that the LDA is a statutory body constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, and that although it is a body corporate that may fall within the definition of "State" under Article 12, this does not make it a "State" for the purposes of Article 131. 
• On the Scope of the Expression "States" in Article 131: 
  The Court clarified that Article 131 confers original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court only in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States, or between two or more States, and that the expression "States" refers to the constituent States of the Union specified in the First Schedule, not every authority or instrumentality covered by the wider definition of "State" under Article 12. 
• On the Maintainability of the LDA's Recourse to Article 131: 
  The Court held that since the jurisdiction under clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 131 can be invoked only by the States specified in the First Schedule, it was not open to the LDA, as an authority or instrumentality under Article 12, to approach the Court in its original jurisdiction. 
• On the High Court's Error and Delay: 
  The Court described the High Court's approach as a "gross error," noting that the writ petition had remained pending for nearly two and a half decades, and criticised its dismissal on the footing that the dispute was one between the Union and the State. 
• The Court remitted the writ petition to the Allahabad High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law and, given the considerable time elapsed since the petition's institution, requested the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously. 

What is Article 131 of the Constitution of India? 

Background & Purpose: 

Article 131 states the provisions relating to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 

• Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute —  
  • Between the Government of India and one or more States; or 
  • Between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or 
  • Between two or more States, 

if the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. 

• Proviso: The said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad, or other similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution, continues in operation after such commencement, or which provides that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute. 

The term "States" in Article 131 has consistently been construed by courts as confined to the constituent States of the Union named in the First Schedule to the Constitution, and does not extend to statutory bodies, corporations, or other instrumentalities that qualify as "State" only under the broader definition in Article 12 for the purposes of enforcement of Part III fundamental rights. 

Case Laws: 

• The South India Corporation (P) Limited v. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum and Another (1963):  
  • The case arose in the context of Article 372 (Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation). 
  • The Court held that such provisions should be given a reasonable interpretation reflecting the intention of the Constitution's makers. 
• Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel (1985):  
  • The case concerned Article 309 (Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State), which provides that a competent authority may make rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service, and that such rules must be made "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" to be valid. 
• State of Rajasthan and Others v. Union of India and Others (1977):  
  • The Supreme Court held that Article 131 provides a forum for resolving disputes based on the existence or extent of a legal right.