List of Current Affairs

Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra, in Sanofi India Ltd. v. CBI (2026), dismissed an appeal by a pharmaceutical company against a Karnataka High Court order refusing to quash a corruption and criminal conspiracy case, and evolved a fresh three-stage framework to determine when the guilty mind of a natural person can be attributed to a corporation. 

What was the Background of Sanofi India Ltd. v. CBI (2026) Case? 

• The appellant pharmaceutical company had supplied medicines to a project of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). 
• It was arraigned as Accused No. 4 in an FIR registered by the CBI, alleging that Dr Anand, a Scientific Officer at BARC, had conspired with several pharmaceutical companies to procure medicines at inflated rates and in excess quantities. 
• A chargesheet was filed in 2017 against Dr Anand and the appellant company under Section 120B read with Section 420 of the IPC, 1860 (now Section 61 and Section 318, BNS, 2023), along with Sections 11, 12, 13(2) read with 13(1)(b) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
• No employee or official of the appellant company was named as an accused. 
• The appellant approached the Karnataka High Court seeking quashing, contending that a company cannot be prosecuted for criminal conspiracy independent of the natural persons acting on its behalf. 
• The High Court, relying on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., dismissed the contention, holding that a corporate entity can be prosecuted even without arraigning its directors or persons-in-charge. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Question Framed by the Court: 

The Court framed the issue as whether the High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that no natural person had been identified and arraigned alongside the corporate accused. 

On the Two Connected Questions of Corporate Criminal Liability: 

The bench held that the issue required answering two questions: first, whether a corporation can possess mens rea at all; and second, on what basis a natural person's mind can be attributed to the corporation. It noted that the first question stood settled in the affirmative by Indian courts, but that there had been little to no discussion on the second. 

On the Position Under English Law: 

• The Court traced the doctrine to Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. (1915), where the concept of a company's "directing mind and will" was first articulated. 
• In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass (1972), the House of Lords held that a shop manager, being merely "a cog in the machine," could not be equated with the company's directing mind absent delegation by the board. The bench read Tesco as recognising two pathways to attribution: a delegation route and a status route. 
• In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission (1995), Lord Hoffmann held that attribution is a matter of construction governed by primary rules (the company's constitution), general rules (ordinary agency principles), and special rules (fashioned by courts to give effect to a statute's purpose). 
• The Court reconciled these authorities through a sequential, hierarchical approach: first the company's constitutional documents, then implied delegation, and only thereafter a special rule based on statutory purpose, noting that status alone can no longer justify attribution without proof of actual authority over the specific transaction. 

On the Position Under Indian Law: 

• The Court noted that Indian courts had grappled with two separate questions: whether a company could be prosecuted for offences carrying mandatory imprisonment, and whether it could be held liable for offences requiring mens rea. 
• On the second, the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co. and the Madras High Court in AD Jayaveerapandia Nadar & Co. v. ITO had accepted that a company could be liable for mens rea offences by attributing to it the state of mind of its agents, without settling the "how." 
• The bench held that Velliappa Textiles and Iridium India Telecom addressed only the "whether" question and left the "how" question an "empty vessel, yet to be filled." 

On the Three-Stage Test for Attribution: 

The Court laid down a sequential, hierarchical three-stage inquiry to determine whether a natural person's act can be attributed to a corporation: 

• Stage One: Examining the corporation's constitutional documents (memorandum and articles of association) to determine in whom the power to do the act is vested. 
• Stage Two: Where the constitutional documents are silent, examining whether the power was nonetheless delegated to the person, applying general principles of agency. 
• Stage Three: Where the first two stages fail, asking whether, having regard to the purpose of the statute creating the offence, a special rule of attribution ought to be fashioned. 

On Clarifications to the Framework: 

• The Court rejected a standalone, status-based rule of attribution, holding that status within the corporation does not by itself suffice, though it may weigh heavily as a factor at the third stage. 
• It reiterated that the inquiry is transaction-specific and not a search for the company's "directing mind" in the abstract. 
• It clarified that the framework operates only from the natural person to the corporation, has no bearing on the individual's own liability, and need not be invoked where a statute itself supplies the answer, creates a deeming or vicarious liability fiction, or imposes strict or absolute liability. 
• The bench urged the legislature to undertake a systematic study of corporate criminal liability, pointing to "failure to prevent" offences such as Section 9 of the PC Act as a possible alternative model. 

On Non-Identification and Non-Arraignment of a Natural Person: 

The Court held that non-identification or non-arraignment of a natural person, by itself, is no ground to quash proceedings against a corporate accused. What the chargesheet must disclose is that the corporation itself committed the offence, not the specific individual who acted on its behalf. It clarified that Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528, BNSS) can still be invoked at the threshold if the allegations do not at least prima facie reveal that (i) some natural person acted on behalf of the corporation, (ii) such action is referable to the offence in question, and (iii) the surrounding circumstances do not render the existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable. 

On Application to the Facts: 

The Court held that the chargesheet against the appellant satisfied the test, since natural persons had prima facie acted on its behalf in relation to the offences alleged, and the surrounding circumstances gave rise to the possibility of the requisite mens rea. It clarified that the framework extends to natural persons generally, and is not confined to directors or persons-in-charge. 

What is the Concept of Mens Rea? 

• The doctrine of mens rea, a fundamental principle of criminal law, delves into the state of mind of the perpetrator at the time of committing a crime. 
• It is a Latin term which means "guilty mind." 
• It encapsulates the idea that for an act to be deemed criminal, there must be a corresponding criminal intent or mental state behind it. 
• At the heart of the doctrine lies the recognition that criminal liability should not be imposed solely on the basis of the commission of a wrongful act. 
• Instead, it requires a subjective assessment of the perpetrator's mental state, exploring factors such as intention, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. 
• In essence, mens rea reflects the principle that culpability is determined not merely by the act itself but also by the actor's culpable state of mind. 
• This ensures that individuals are held accountable only for acts they consciously and voluntarily commit with criminal intent. 

What is the Doctrine of Attribution in Corporate Criminal Liability? 

Origin of the Doctrine: 

• Vicarious liability was traditionally applied to hold corporations liable for the civil wrongs of their agents, requiring them to make good losses occasioned in the course of employment. This principle, however, was not extended to criminal wrongs, allowing corporations to act with impunity in such cases. 
• To plug this gap, English courts pierced the corporate veil and held corporations liable for criminal and civil wrongdoing where the offence was committed through the corporation's "directing mind and will." This came to be known as the Doctrine of Attribution. 

Indian Approach Before Iridium: 

• Indian High Courts, prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Iridium, were largely reluctant to hold companies criminally liable. 
• In State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co. (P) Ltd. (1964), the Bombay High Court took a forward-looking view, holding that whether a corporate body should be liable for the criminal acts of an individual depends on the nature of the offence, the position of the officer relative to the company, and other circumstances showing that the corporate body itself intended the act. 
• In Esso Standard Inc. v. Udharam Bhagwandas Japanwalla (1975), the Bombay High Court further held that a company's intention can be attributed to it only where it has been expressed through its general body, board meeting, or in accordance with its memorandum or articles of association. 
• In MV Javali v. Mahajan Borewell (1997), the Supreme Court held that where a mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine is prescribed, fine alone would be imposed where imprisonment cannot be. This "one size fits all" approach was later disapproved in Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles (2003), where the Court held that while a company cannot be imprisoned, courts have no discretion to substitute fine for imprisonment where a statute mandates both. 
• In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement (2005), the Supreme Court, without reference to the doctrine of attribution, held that a company can be prosecuted for offences punishable with mandatory imprisonment, but left open the question of mens rea-based offences. 
• Until Iridium, conflicting High Court rulings left the position on attributing criminal intent to a company unsettled. 

Resolution by Iridium: 

• In Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., the Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of attribution not to determine the liability of directors, but to determine the liability of the corporation itself. 
• The Court held that criminal liability arises where the offence is committed in relation to the business by a person or body of persons in control of its affairs, exercising a degree of control such that they can be said to constitute the corporation's "directing mind and will." 
• Such mens rea was held attributable to the corporation on the alter ego principle, and the Court upheld its earlier ruling in Standard Chartered Bank, thereby settling the position on corporate criminal liability at the time. 
• As the Supreme Court has now clarified in Sanofi India, however, Iridium answered only the "whether" question — leaving the "how" of attribution to be resolved through the three-stage framework discussed above. 

Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar, in Poonam v. State NCT of Delhi (2026), dismissed an appeal filed by a wife challenging a Family Court order that had returned her divorce petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, holding both that the appeal was not maintainable against the State and that it failed on merits. 

What was the Background of Poonam v. State NCT of Delhi (2026) Case? 

• The appellant-wife had filed an appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against an order of the Family Court returning her divorce petition under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for presentation before the appropriate court. 
• The Family Court had held that it lacked territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), over the wife's petition seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. 
• The parties had married on January 18, 2019 at Gurugram, and thereafter resided together at the husband's matrimonial home in Sangam Vihar, Delhi, for around one-and-a-half to two years. 
• Following the husband's employment at Gurugram, the parties shifted to rented accommodation there and continued to live together for more than four years. 
• The wife alleged that she had been subjected to cruelty during the marriage, particularly on account of her husband's habitual consumption of alcohol, and that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home approximately two weeks before filing the divorce petition, after which she resided separately near her parental home. 
• The Family Court found that although the parties had earlier lived together at Sangam Vihar, their last shared residence was at Gurugram, and held that the earlier Delhi residence was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under Section 19(iii) of the HMA. 
• The wife filed the present appeal against the State of NCT of Delhi, without impleading the husband as a party. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Maintainability of the Appeal Against the State: 
• The Court held that it could not comprehend how an appeal challenging an order passed in divorce proceedings between the wife and husband could be maintained against the State of NCT of Delhi, particularly when the husband had not been impleaded as a party to the appeal. 
• On the Wife's Contention Regarding Section 19(iii) of the HMA: 
• The Court noted the wife's submission that the parties' residence at Sangam Vihar for around one-and-a-half to two years was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Family Court in Delhi, and that Section 19(iii) did not require the joint residence to be the last in point of time. 
• On the Scope of Section 19(iii) of the HMA: 
• Rejecting this submission, the Court held that Section 19(iii) of the HMA specifically confers jurisdiction on the court within whose territorial limits "the parties to the marriage last resided together," making the last place of joint residence determinative for the purpose of that provision. 
• On the Application of the Provision to the Facts: 
• The Court held that reliance on the parties' earlier residence at Sangam Vihar could not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Family Court, when the parties had admittedly thereafter shifted to Gurugram and last resided together there for more than four years. 
• On the Final Outcome: 
• The Bench dismissed the appeal both on the ground of maintainability and on merits. 

What is Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? 

Section 19 of the HMA lays down the courts to which a petition under the Act is to be presented. It provides that every petition shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction — 

• The marriage was solemnised; or 
• The respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides; or 
• The parties to the marriage last resided together; or 
• In case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition; or 
• The petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which the Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive.