List of Current Affairs

Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Jaspreet Singh of the Allahabad High Court, in Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan v. Richa Mishra and 6 others (2026), set aside an Additional District Judge's order that had discharged a temporary injunction on the ground that it granted final relief at the interim stage, holding that no such absolute bar exists in law and that the question turns on the facts of each case. 

What was the Background of Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan v. Richa Mishra and 6 others (2026) Case? 

• Dr. Amod Kumar Sachan filed Regular Suit No. 455 of 2026 before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lucknow, seeking declaration and injunction concerning Hind Charitable Trust, pleading that he had always been its Chairman. 
• He alleged that while he was in Delhi, certain trustees broke open the locks of the Trust's administrative offices and removed records, and that minutes of a meeting dated 03.02.2026 were fabricated to remove him as Chairman and transfer management to Respondent No. 1. 
• He further alleged that by fabricated minutes dated 16.01.2026, earlier accepted resignations of trustees were revoked and a new founder trustee was inducted. 
• He sought a declaration that both sets of minutes were void ab initio, and applied under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for interim relief. 
• By order dated 02.04.2026, the Trial Court restrained the defendants from interfering with his functioning as Chairman until a fresh election was held under the trust deed. 
• Two appeals under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC were allowed by the Additional District Judge on 08.07.2026, holding that the Trial Court had granted final relief at the interim stage, that the appellate court's own unchallenged interim order operated as res judicata, that the discrepancies were an "accidental omission" under the trust deed, and that the plaintiff had not approached the court with clean hands. 
• The plaintiff challenged this order before the Allahabad High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Bar on Granting Final Relief at the Interim Stage: 

• The Court held that it would be an incorrect enunciation of law to state as a bland proposition that interim relief resembling final relief can never be granted, and that the Appellate Court could have discharged the injunction only if it had considered the facts and material on record and dealt with the Trial Court's findings. 

On the Powers of the First Appellate Court: 

• The Court held that a first appellate court hearing an appeal against an injunction order, though exercising powers co-extensive with the trial court, cannot substitute its own view without engaging with the trial court's findings and demonstrating why they are erroneous.  
• It held that the Appellate Court was bound to test the order against the prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, while avoiding a mini-trial. 

On the Trial Court's Findings: 

• The Court noted that the Trial Court had recorded findings on all three ingredients for grant of injunction, including discrepancies in the minutes of 03.02.2026 casting doubt on the meeting's authenticity, the absence of any agenda for either meeting, and the plaintiff's removal on the strength of an FIR without show-cause notice or inquiry. 

On the Appellate Court's Reliance on Its Own Interim Order: 

• The Court held that the Appellate Court's reasoning cut both ways, since by the same logic, its own interim order dated 10.04.2026 staying the Trial Court's order would itself amount to granting final relief at the interim stage.  
• It cautioned that applying legal propositions in the abstract, divorced from the facts, risks a "travesty of justice in the name of upholding the law." 

On the Tentative Nature of Interim Observations: 

• The Court held that observations made while entertaining a petition or appeal are purely tentative, do not affect the merits, and do not bind the court at final hearing, and that the Appellate Court's contrary approach reflected poorly on its understanding of legal propositions. 

On the Plea of 'Accidental Omission': 

• The Court held that the Appellate Court had impermissibly lifted the plea of "accidental omission" from the text of the trust deed even though no defendant had pleaded reliance on that clause, and that such a plea was a matter to be established at trial, not pre-judged at the interim stage. 

On the Clean Hands Objection: 

• The Court held that the Appellate Court ought to have recorded a finding on the nexus between the facts allegedly withheld and the plaintiff's right to seek injunction, and having failed to do so, could not rely on non-disclosure as a ground to discharge the injunction. 

On the Scope of Article 227: 

• The Court held that Article 227 does not permit it to re-appraise evidence or substitute its own findings, and accordingly set aside the Appellate Court's order, restoring both appeals for fresh decision. 

On Interim Directions Pending Fresh Hearing: 

• Noting that the dispute affected the functioning of hospitals and a medical college run by the Trust, the Court directed that the Trust's bank accounts be operated jointly by the petitioner and another founder trustee (not Respondent No. 1), with withdrawals confined to salaries, statutory dues, and similar payments, each to be placed before the Appellate Court. 

What is Order XXXIX CPC (Temporary Injunctions)? 

Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, empowers civil courts to grant temporary injunctions to preserve the subject matter of a suit pending final adjudication. Courts granting such relief must be satisfied on three settled ingredients: 

• Prima facie case — a serious question to be tried, not a conclusive finding on merits. 
• Balance of convenience — that greater hardship would be caused by refusing the injunction than by granting it. 
• Irreparable injury — that harm caused by refusal cannot be adequately compensated in damages. 

An appeal against an order under Order XXXIX lies under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC. While the appellate court exercises powers co-extensive with the trial court, it must engage with and displace the trial court's reasoning rather than substituting its own view without basis. 

Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, in Maya Banerjee v. Union of India & Ors. (2026), allowed an appeal filed by the widow of a Railway employee who died in harness, directing that she is entitled to family pension from the date of her husband's death in 2000, rather than from 2014 as held by the Bombay High Court. 

What was the Background of Maya Banerjee v. Union of India & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The appellant's husband, a Railway employee, died on 12.11.2000, while the appellant and her husband were residing separately due to a dispute, leaving her unaware of his service particulars at the time of his death. 
• Her husband was dismissed from service in 2001 — after his death — which was impermissible under the Railway Board's own circular. 
• When the appellant challenged the dismissal, her plea was rejected in 2012 on grounds of delay and a discrepancy in the recorded date of death. 
• She subsequently filed a civil suit, which declared 12.11.2000 as the correct date of her husband's death. 
• She then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which dismissed her claim as time-barred. 
• She moved the Bombay High Court, which allowed her claim for family pension but restricted the benefit to 2014 onwards — the year she had first approached the CAT. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Appellant's Contention: 

• The appellant contended that her entitlement to family pension arose immediately upon her husband's death, and could not be curtailed to a later date. 

On the Union Government's Reliance on Tarsem Singh: 

• The Union government relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, arguing that arrears for recurring wrongs are ordinarily restricted to three years prior to the filing of the writ petition, and that the High Court's restriction to 2014 was accordingly correct. 

On the Conflict Between Tarsem Singh and SK Mastan Bee: 

• The Court noted that while Tarsem Singh restricted arrears to three years prior to filing, an earlier decision in SK Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway — which specifically dealt with a widow's claim for family pension — had taken a different view that was not considered in Tarsem Singh. 

On the Principle Laid Down in SK Mastan Bee: 

• The Court held that it is the employer's obligation to compute and offer family pension to a widow without driving her to litigation, and that denial of the benefit amounts to a violation of Article 21. It noted that a widow's illiteracy and lack of resources justify granting pension from the date it became due — the date of her husband's death. 

On the Doctrine of Per Incuriam and Precedent: 

• Relying on Dr Shah Faesal v. Union of India and Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana, the Court reiterated that a coordinate bench of equal strength cannot take a contrary view without referring the matter to a larger bench, and that a subsequent decision failing to consider an earlier binding decision on the same point is rendered per incuriam and devoid of precedential value. 

On the Applicability of SK Mastan Bee to the Present Case 

• The Court held that SK Mastan Bee was directly applicable to a widow's family pension claim, and that Tarsem Singh, in laying down the three-year restriction, had failed to consider this earlier binding precedent. 

On the Nature of Pension as a Right 

• The Court held that pension is a valuable right and property, not a bounty, and that restricting the benefit to 2014 would inflict injustice on a poor widow who was not at fault for the delay in claiming it. 

On the Appellant Not Being at Fault 

• The Court observed that the appellant's husband had been dismissed after his death in violation of the Railway Board's own circular, that her representation for family pension was rejected over a discrepancy in the date of death despite a statutory death certificate already existing in her favour, and that she was compelled to file a civil suit to resolve this discrepancy — none of which was attributable to any fault on her part. 

What is the Principle Governing Conflicting Precedents (Per Incuriam)? 

The doctrine of per incuriam allows a court to disregard a precedent that was rendered in ignorance of a binding earlier decision, statutory provision, or other authority that would have affected the outcome. Key principles reiterated by the Court include: 

• A coordinate bench of equal strength cannot take a view contrary to an earlier coordinate bench decision without referring the matter to a larger bench. 
• A subsequent decision that fails to consider an earlier binding decision on the same point is rendered per incuriam and carries no precedential value. 
• Where two conflicting views exist from benches of equal strength, courts must identify and apply the earlier, correctly rendered decision, rather than the later per incuriam one. 

What is Article 21 of the COI? 

Text of Article 21: 

Protection of Life and Personal Liberty 

"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." 

Scope of the Right: 

• Guarantees the fundamental right to life and personal liberty against arbitrary state action. 
• The right to life is not confined to mere animal existence — it includes the right to live with dignity, livelihood, and a healthy environment. 
• Personal liberty covers freedom of movement, choice of residence, and the right to pursue any lawful occupation. 
• Available against the State; deprivation is permissible only through a "procedure established by law," which must itself be fair, just, and reasonable. 

Evolution Through Case Law: 

Narrow Interpretation (Early Phase) 

• A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras — Held personal liberty meant only "liberty of the body" (freedom from arrest/detention), and "law" meant state-made law alone. A restrictive reading. 

Widening of Personal Liberty 

• Kharak Singh v. State of UP (1963) — Personal liberty held to include all rights under Article 19(1). 
• R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970) — Personal liberty held to encompass the six freedoms under Article 19(1), not just Article 21. 

The Turning Point 

• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) — Overruled the narrow Gopalan view; held that the "procedure established by law" must be fair, just, and reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive. This case transformed Article 21 into a source of substantive due process in India. 

Expansion of "Right to Life" 

• Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) — Recognised the right to livelihood as part of Article 21; eviction without alternative arrangement held violative. 
• Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) — Right to a safe working environment (protection from sexual harassment) read into Article 21; laid down guidelines pending legislation. 
• NALSA v. Union of India (2014) — Recognised self-identification of gender as part of the right to life; extended rights (public facilities, medical care, reservation under Articles 15 & 16) to transgender persons. 
• Animal Welfare Board v. A. Nagaraja (2014) — Extended constitutional protection (via parens patriae and Article 51A(g)) to animal welfare; held Jallikattu unconstitutional. 
• K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — Recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right intrinsic to Article 21 and personal dignity. 
• Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) — Legalised passive euthanasia; recognised the right to die with dignity, including the right to refuse treatment via advance directives. 

Protection Against Arbitrary Detention & Fair Trial: 

• Article 21 prohibits arbitrary or unlawful detention and mandates due process before depriving liberty. 
• Guarantees the right to a fair trial — legal representation, right to be heard, and right to present evidence. 
• A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) (NSA case) — Held that principles of natural justice, while important, are not absolute and may be curtailed under preventive detention laws (e.g., National Security Act) depending on the statute's purpose and context. 

Key Takeaways: 

• Article 21 has evolved judicially to cover a wide array of rights — dignity, livelihood, privacy, healthy environment, protection from custodial violence and torture. 
• Any restriction on Article 21 rights must satisfy the test of being fair, just, reasonable, and proportionate — not merely lawful in form. 
• The provision is now understood as guaranteeing both procedural and substantive due process, following Maneka Gandhi.