List of Current Affairs

Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S Chandurkar, in Bhaskar Paul v. State of West Bengal (2026), quashed criminal proceedings under Section 10 of the POCSO Act against a school teacher, holding that his conduct, though inappropriate, did not disclose the sexual intent required to constitute the offence. 

What was the Background of Bhaskar Paul v. State of West Bengal (2026) Case? 

• Female teachers informed the headmaster that the appellant, a teacher, had physically touched some Class X girl students, who had verbally complained against him. 
• Pursuant to this, the District Child Protection Unit (DCPU) visited the school and prepared a Counselling-cum-Enquiry Report, based on which the police registered an FIR suo motu under Section 10 of the POCSO Act. 
• The Enquiry Report recorded that the girl students said the teacher used to beat them on their upper back when inattentive in class, and that the manner in which he touched them (rubbing their back, pinching at the waist) made them uncomfortable. 
• It also recorded an incident where the teacher slapped a student for not carrying a map and touched her neck "in an inappropriate manner." Other students stated that though he did not touch them, his manner of looking at them made them uncomfortable. 
• Statements of the victims were also recorded by the Magistrate under Section 183 of the BNSS (earlier Section 164 CrPC). 
• The appellant sought quashing of the FIR under Section 528 of the BNSS (earlier Section 482 CrPC) before the Calcutta High Court (Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri), which refused to quash the proceedings. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, which stayed the proceedings against him. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Essential Ingredient of Sexual Assault under Section 7: 
  The Court held that "sexual assault" under Section 7 of the POCSO Act requires touching of the child's private body parts, or any other act involving physical contact without penetration, done with "sexual intent" — sexual intent being the essential ingredient without which the offence is not made out. 
• On the Threshold for Section 10 of the POCSO Act: 
  The Court held that although the appellant's conduct as a teacher was inappropriate, particularly his resort to corporal punishment and lack of sensitivity while dealing with girl students, a careful reading of the victims' statements did not disclose the sexual intent necessary to attract Section 10. 
• On the Distinction between Inappropriate Conduct and Sexual Offence: 
  The Court observed that a teacher's inadequacy in handling students, or his resort to corporal punishment, would not by itself attract Section 10 of the POCSO Act, even where such conduct is objectionable from a disciplinary standpoint. 
• On the Irreversible Damage of a POCSO Prosecution: 
  The Court noted that an allegation of sexual assault against a teacher in a girls' school or co-educational institution virtually condemns him for his entire career and life, and that an eventual acquittal would be "wholly inadequate" to undo the damage already caused by the criminal trial itself. 
• On the Delay and Nature of the Evidence: 
  The Court flagged the delay in lodging the FIR and observed that the statements of the headmaster and lady teachers, who had set the criminal process in motion, amounted to hearsay evidence. 
• On Continuation of Prosecution Being an Abuse of Process: 
  The Court held that allowing the prosecution to continue on the basis of the material on record would amount to an abuse of the process of law and cause extreme prejudice to the appellant, though it clarified that this did not condone his conduct, and that he needed to sensitize himself while dealing with students of tender age, particularly girl students. 
• In view of the above, the Court quashed the entire proceedings arising out of the case pending before the Special Court at Alipurduar, and set aside the High Court's order. 

What is the Law Governing Sexual Assault under the POCSO Act, 2012? 

• Sexual Assault (Section 7): Whoever, with sexual intent, touches the vagina, penis, anus, or breast of a child, or makes the child touch such parts of the offender or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent involving physical contact without penetration, is said to commit sexual assault. 
• Punishment for Sexual Assault (Section 8): Sexual assault is punishable with imprisonment for a term of three to five years, and fine. 
• Aggravated Sexual Assault by Persons in Position of Trust or Authority (Section 9(f)): Sexual assault committed by a person on the management or staff of an educational institution, on a child studying in that institution, constitutes aggravated sexual assault. 
• Punishment for Aggravated Sexual Assault (Section 10): Aggravated sexual assault is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of five to seven years, and fine.

What is Corporal Punishment? 

About: 

• Corporal punishment is defined by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child as "any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light."  
  • According to the Committee, this mostly involves hitting (smacking, slapping, spanking) children with a hand or implements like sticks, belts, etc. 
• According to the World Health Organization (WHO), corporal or physical punishment is highly prevalent globally, both in homes and schools.  
  • Around 60% of children aged 2–14 years regularly suffer physical punishment by their parents or other caregivers. 
• There is no statutory definition of 'corporal punishment' targeting children in India. 

Types of Corporal Punishment: 

• Physical Punishment, as defined by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), encompasses any action that inflicts pain, injury, or discomfort upon a child.  
  • This includes coercing children into uncomfortable positions such as standing on a bench, against a wall in a chair-like stance, or with a school bag on their head. 
  • It also involves practices like holding ears through legs, kneeling, forced ingestion of substances, and confining children to enclosed spaces within the school premises. 
• Mental Harassment pertains to non-physical mistreatment that adversely affects a child's academic and psychological well-being.  
  • This form of punishment encompasses behaviours such as sarcasm, name-calling, scolding using derogatory language, intimidation, and the use of humiliating remarks. 
  • It also includes actions like ridiculing, belittling, or shaming the child, creating an environment of emotional distress and discomfort. 

Punjab and Haryana High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Deepak Sibal and Justice Rupinderjit Chahal, in Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India and Others (2026), in a batch of over 500 writ petitions, declared Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 unconstitutional, holding that it failed to cure the actual defect identified by nine High Courts and impermissibly attempted to overrule binding judicial decisions. 

What was the Background of Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India and Others (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner, an advocate and income tax assessee, had earlier succeeded before the same High Court in a 2024 judgment quashing a reassessment notice issued to her by her Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) under Section 148, on the ground that such notices could only be issued by a Faceless Assessing Officer under Section 151A read with the "e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022" notified on 29.03.2022. 
• This view was shared by a majority of High Courts (Telangana, Bombay, Rajasthan, Madras, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Gauhati, and Punjab and Haryana itself), while a minority (Calcutta, Delhi, Gujarat) held that JAOs retained concurrent jurisdiction. 
• While cross-Special Leave Petitions on this divergence were pending before the Supreme Court, Parliament enacted Section 147A through the Finance Act, 2026, with retrospective effect from 01.04.2021, providing that the Assessing Officer for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A "shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant" an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre, notwithstanding any judgment, Section 151A, or scheme framed thereunder. 
• The Supreme Court, by order dated 10.04.2026, set aside the impugned High Court judgments on this limited ground, remitted all matters to the respective jurisdictional High Courts, granted assessees liberty to challenge Section 147A, directed disposal preferably by 30.09.2026, and granted interim stay of reassessment proceedings. 
• The petitioners argued that without amending Section 151A or the 2022 scheme, Parliament could not nullify binding judicial pronouncements through a mere retrospective non-obstante clause, and that this amounted to legislative overreach in breach of the separation of powers. 
• The Revenue argued that a harmonious reading of the relevant provisions showed JAOs retained authority to issue Section 148 notices, that over 95% of assessees had already submitted to JAO-issued notices, and that the financial impact of an adverse ruling was estimated at around ₹17 lakh crore. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Doctrine of Separation of Powers: 
  The Court held that although not expressly part of the Constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers is clearly visible from its scheme, and that the Constitution demarcates the judiciary, executive, and legislature, with a breach by either organ negating the equality guaranteed under Article 14. 
• On the Legislature's Power to "Make" Law versus "Declare" Judicial Findings: 
  The Court held that under Articles 245, 246, and the Seventh Schedule, the legislature has the power to make and amend laws, but cannot "declare" what the law laid down by constitutional courts was meant to be, nor directly annul or legislatively overrule a judicial decision that has attained finality between parties. 
• On the Permissible Scope of Retrospective Validating Legislation: 
  The Court held that the legislature can, even retrospectively, validate a statute held illegal by a court, provided it removes the basis or defect identified by the court in the earlier law; the validating law must be such that the court could not have arrived at the same decision had the validating law existed at the time of its judgment. 
• On Abrogation as a Device to Bypass Judicial Decisions: 
  The Court held that abrogation cannot be used by the legislature to bypass an unfavourable judicial decision, and that validating legislation enacted solely to defy a judicial pronouncement amounts to legislative overreach and is unconstitutional. 
• On the Actual Defect Left Uncured by Section 147A: 
  The Court found that the non-obstante clause in Section 147A omitted any reference to Section 130 of the Act and its scheme dated 28.03.2022, and, more critically, left Section 151A and the "e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022" completely unamended and intact on the statute book, meaning the actual defect identified by the High Courts remained uncured. 
• On the Foreclosed Statutory Window for Exclusion: 
  The Court noted that under the first proviso to Section 151A(2), the Central Government could have excluded Section 148 from the faceless scheme only by notification issued before 31.03.2022, a window Parliament had already let lapse, and held that what was statutorily foreclosed could not be achieved through Section 147A. 
• On the Stated Legislative Objective of Certainty: 
  The Court rejected the argument that Section 147A was enacted to achieve certainty and avoid litigation, observing that it instead became "the breeding ground of litigation," with thousands of petitions pending across at least eight High Courts. 
• On the Alternate Challenge to the Section 148 Notices: 
  The Court held that, even assuming Section 147A survived scrutiny, the impugned notices were independently liable to be quashed as they were not issued through randomized automated allocation as mandated by Clause 3(b) of the scheme dated 29.03.2022 framed under Section 151A. 
• On the Revenue's Reliance on Section 144B and CBDT Notifications: 
  The Court rejected the Revenue's contention that the phrase "to the extent provided in Section 144B" excluded Section 148 notices from the faceless requirement, holding this would render the scheme a dead letter, and further held that internal CBDT notifications issued under Section 120 could not override the statutory scheme framed under Section 151A and approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
• On Alignment with Other High Courts: 
  The Court expressly agreed with the majority line of High Court rulings (Telangana, Bombay, Punjab and Haryana's own prior decisions, Rajasthan, Madras, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Gauhati) and respectfully disagreed with the minority view of the Delhi, Gujarat, and Calcutta High Courts. 
• In view of the above, the Court allowed the entire batch of writ petitions, declared Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 unconstitutional and struck it down, and independently set aside all impugned Section 148 notices for not being issued through randomized automated, faceless allocation. 

What is Section 147A of the Income Tax Act, 1961? 

About: 

• Section 147A was introduced to clarify the designation of the Assessing Officer (AO) for the purposes of Sections 148 and 148A, specifying that the AO does not include the National Faceless Assessment Centre or assessment units under Section 144B(3). 
• It was originally enacted to remove doubts regarding the validity of notices issued by traditional Jurisdictional Assessing Officers (JAOs) instead of the automated faceless system. 

Key Details of Section 147A: 

• Jurisdictional Role: It addresses the authority and role of Jurisdictional Assessing Officers (JAOs) in reassessment proceedings, seeking to affirm that JAOs retain the power to issue reassessment notices. 
• Recent Legal Status: The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down Section 147A as unconstitutional, ruling that the legislature could not use it to retrospectively override court verdicts regarding non-compliance with the randomized faceless allocation scheme.