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Criminal Law
When Can Court Convict a Person for a Charge Not Framed
16-Sep-2026
Supreme Court
Why in News?
A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria, in Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya (2026), held that an accused tried under the POCSO Act could be convicted for rape under Section 376 of the IPC (Section 64 of BNS) even though no separate charge under that section had been framed, since the offences shared the same actus reus and the accused had a fair opportunity to defend himself.
What was the Background of Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya (2026) Case?
- The Appellant had been convicted under Sections 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) for penetrative sexual assault.
- The Appellant's conviction under the POCSO Act could not be sustained because the prosecution failed to ascertain the victim's age under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
- The Appellant sought acquittal on the ground that the victim's minority remained unproved, and separately argued that he could not be convicted for rape since no charge under Section 376 of the IPC had been framed against him, and he had not been given a proper opportunity to defend himself on that charge.
- The matter reached the Supreme Court in appeal.
What were the Court's Observations?
- On the Power to Convict for an Uncharged Offence under Section 464 CrPC:
The Court, in a judgment authored by Justice Mishra, held that under Section 464 of the CrPC, an Appellate or Revisional Court may convict an accused for an offence for which no charge was framed, unless doing so would occasion a failure of justice. - On the Test for Failure of Justice:
The Court held that in judging whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it is relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were clearly explained to him, and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself. - On the Common Actus Reus of Rape and Penetrative Sexual Assault:
The Court held that the actus reus for rape under Section 375 of the IPC is the same as that for penetrative sexual assault under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, with the only distinguishing feature being the minority of the victim, and that non-framing of the rape charge would not enure to the accused's benefit where the factum of rape was clearly established. - On Rape Being a Cognate Offence to Penetrative Sexual Assault:
The Court held that since the offence of rape is cognate to penetrative sexual assault, it makes no difference for convicting the accused of the former offence despite charges having been framed only for the latter. - On the Accused Having Had a Fair Opportunity to Defend Himself:
The Court held that where an accused has been given an opportunity to defend himself against a charge under Section 3 of the POCSO Act, being of the same nature as an offence under Section 376 of the IPC, there is no failure of justice in convicting him under Section 376 of the IPC even in the absence of a formal charge, if the prosecution fails to prove the victim's minority. - On Reliance on Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. (2004):
The Court referred to Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P., where an accused tried for Sections 302, 498-A, and 304-B of the IPC was convicted under the uncharged Section 306 IPC, and reiterated that an Appellate or Revisional Court may convict an accused for an uncharged offence if the accused was aware of its basic ingredients, the main facts against him were clearly explained, and he had a fair chance to defend himself. - On the Scope of Appellate Powers:
The Court held that the powers of the Appellate Court are not curbed by the Trial Court's error in failing to frame a necessary charge, and that such powers are wide enough to alter findings and the nature and extent of sentence, including making any amendment or consequential order that may be just. - In view of the above, the appeal was partly allowed, modifying the Appellant's conviction to one under Section 376 of the IPC, in addition to upholding his conviction and sentence under Section 506 of the IPC.
What is Section 510 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?
Background & Purpose:
Section 510 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which corresponds to and replaces Section 464 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, safeguards convictions and sentences against being automatically invalidated merely on account of an error, omission, or irregularity in framing a charge.
Key Provisions of Section 510, BNSS, 2023:
- General Rule (Sub-section 1): No finding, sentence, or order passed by a competent Court is to be treated as invalid merely because no charge was framed, or because of an error, omission, or irregularity in the charge (including misjoinder of charges), unless the Appellate, Confirming, or Revisional Court is of the opinion that a failure of justice has, in fact, been occasioned.
- Remedial Powers on Finding a Failure of Justice (Sub-section 2): Where the Court of appeal, confirmation, or revision finds that a failure of justice has, in fact, occurred, it may —
- order that a charge be framed and the trial recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge, where the failure was due to an omission to frame a charge; or
- direct a new trial upon a charge framed in whatever manner it considers fit, where the failure was due to an error, omission, or irregularity in the charge.
- Proviso — Mandatory Quashing: If the Court finds that no valid charge could at all be framed against the accused on the facts proved, it must quash the conviction rather than order a retrial.
Comparison Between Section 510, BNSS, 2023 and Section 464, CrPC, 1973:
|
Aspect |
Section 464, CrPC, 1973 |
Section 510, BNSS, 2023 |
|
Provision Number |
Section 464 |
Section 510 |
|
Governing "Failure of Justice" Test |
No finding, sentence, or order invalid merely for lack of/error in charge, unless failure of justice occasioned |
Identically worded and retained without change |
|
Power on Omission to Frame Charge |
Court may order charge to be framed; trial recommences from that point |
Identically retained |
|
Power on Error/Irregularity in Charge |
Court may direct a new trial on a charge framed as it thinks fit |
Identically retained |
|
Proviso on Quashing |
Conviction must be quashed if no valid charge could be framed on facts proved |
Identically retained |
|
Substantive Change |
— |
None; provision renumbered as part of BNSS restructuring, with no change in text, scope, or legal effect |
|
Continuity of Precedents |
Governed conviction for cognate/minor uncharged offences (e.g., Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.) |
Precedents under Section 464 continue to apply, as reaffirmed in Pynchemalangaki Bareh v. State of Meghalaya (2026) |
Constitutional Law
Queer Partners Can Take Medical Decisions in Emergencies If Authorised by Patient
16-Sep-2026
Why in News?
Before a Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma of the Delhi High Court, the Union Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and the National Medical Commission (NMC), in Arshiya Takkar v. Union of India & Ors. (2026), have submitted that a competent adult should be permitted to nominate their partner, including a partner in a non-heterosexual or queer relationship, to take medical decisions on their behalf if they subsequently become incapacitated.
What was the Background of Arshiya Takkar v. Union of India & Ors. (2026) Case?
- The petition was moved by Arshiya Takkar, seeking the framing of guidelines to recognise the non-heterosexual partner of a patient as their medical representative, empowered to give consent in medical situations.
- In the alternative, the plea sought a declaration that a medical power of attorney given in advance by a patient to their non-heterosexual partner should be sufficient to permit such partner to act as the duly constituted medical representative during medical treatment or emergencies.
- The petitioner relied on Clause 7.16 of the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002, which mandates consent for medical procedures from a "husband or wife, parent or guardian in the case of a minor, or the patient himself," and contended that the absence of explicit recognition of partners in a queer union rendered her effectively powerless to make critical medical decisions for her partner — a right readily available to heterosexual couples.
- The petitioner contended that this constituted "systemic exclusion" and discrimination on the ground of sex under Article 15 of the Constitution, relying on Navtej Johar v. Union of India, which recognised sexual orientation as covered under the meaning of "sex," and further argued that the exclusion violated the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
- Last month, Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma had orally questioned the Centre on why, if same-sex partners have the right to relationship and cohabitation, they should be denied the choice to give medical consent for each other.
What has the Centre Submitted Before the Court?
- On Accommodating the Relief Within the Existing Framework: The Centre submitted that the reliefs sought in the petition are substantially capable of being accommodated within the existing legal and ethical framework, subject to applicable law and appropriate safeguards.
- On Respecting Constitutional Guarantees to the LGBTQIA+ Community: The Centre stated that it recognises and respects the constitutional guarantees of dignity, privacy, autonomy, equality, and individual choice available to all persons, including members of the LGBTQIA+ community, and clarified that its response was not intended to question the constitutional protection available to persons in queer relationships.
- On the Absence of Rationale for Exclusion Based on Sexual Orientation: The Centre submitted that where a competent adult has nominated or otherwise authorised their partner to act on their behalf in the event of incapacity, there is no medical or ethical rationale for excluding such person merely on account of the sex, gender, or sexual orientation of the partners, or because their union does not fall within the conventional understanding of marriage.
- On Relationships of Care Not Being Confined to Marital or Blood Ties: The Centre observed that administrative measures already demonstrate consistent recognition that relationships of care, dependence, and mutual responsibility are not necessarily confined to formally recognised marital or blood relationships, and that permitting a competent adult to nominate a queer partner for medical decision-making would be a logical and tailored extension of the same principle.
- On the Interpretation of Clause 7.16 of the IMC Regulations, 2002: The Centre submitted that Clause 7.16 may be read harmoniously and purposively with the existing legal framework, so as not to exclude a partner duly nominated or authorised by a competent adult patient, merely on account of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or the absence of a formally recognised marital relationship.
- On the Position in the Absence of Prior Nomination: The Centre submitted that in the absence of a prior nomination, the partner may also be considered, in appropriate circumstances and subject to applicable law, verification, and safeguards, as a person in a relationship of care or next friend for the purposes of medical decision-making.
- On Advancing Constitutional Values: The Centre submitted that such an interpretation, while preserving patient safety and due process, would advance the constitutional values of autonomy, dignity, equality, and non-discrimination.
- The Centre accordingly urged that the petitioner's prayers be examined in light of existing statutory provisions, judicial pronouncements, and government policy measures, with medical decision-making ultimately depending on the nature of treatment, the circumstances, the patient's wishes, and the applicable legal framework. The matter remains pending before the Delhi High Court.
What is LGBTQIA+?
About:
- LGBTQIA+ is an acronym representing lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and asexual persons.
- The "+" represents the many other identities still being explored and understood; the acronym is constantly evolving and may include terms like non-binary and pansexual.
- On the term "Queer": The term "Queer," now used within the acronym as an inclusive, self-identifying label, was earlier used as a derogatory slur against persons who did not conform to heterosexual or cisgender norms. It has since been reclaimed by the community as a term of pride and self-identification, and is today used as an umbrella term covering persons whose sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression falls outside conventional heterosexual or binary norms — including, but not limited to, those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or non-binary.
History of Recognition of LGBTQIA+ in India:
Colonial Era and Stigma (Pre-1990s):
- 1861: Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is introduced under British rule, criminalising "carnal intercourse against the order of nature," and becomes a major hurdle for LGBTQIA+ rights in India.
Early Recognition and Activism (1990s):
- 1981: The first All-India Hijra Conference is held.
- 1991: The AIDS Bhedbhav Virodhi Andolan (ABVA) publishes "Less Than Gay," the first public report on the status of LGBTQIA+ people in India, demanding legal changes.
Landmark Cases and Setbacks (2000s):
- 2001: The Naz Foundation files a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) challenging Section 377.
- 2009: The Delhi High Court, in Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, decriminalises consensual homosexual acts, seen as a major victory for LGBTQIA+ rights.
- 2013: The Supreme Court, in a setback, overturns the Delhi High Court's decision and upholds Section 377.
Recent Advancements and Ongoing Struggle (2010s–Present):
- 2014: The Supreme Court, in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (NALSA judgment), recognises transgender persons as a "third gender."
- 2018: The Supreme Court, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, strikes down Section 377, decriminalising consensual same-sex relationships.
- 2019: The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 is passed, granting legal recognition and prohibiting discrimination against transgender individuals.
- 2020: The Uttarakhand High Court acknowledges legal protection for live-in relationships of same-sex couples.
- 2021: In Anjali Guru Sanjana Jaan v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., the Bombay High Court holds that the petitioner, a transgender woman whose Village Panchayat election application (filed as a female candidate) was rejected, had the right to self-identify her gender, and accepts her application.
- 2022: In August 2022, the Supreme Court expands the definition of "family" to include same-sex couples and queer relationships.
- 2023: In October 2023, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court rejects petitions seeking legalisation of same-sex marriage in India, holding that it lacks the authority to modify the Special Marriage Act, 1954 by adding or removing provisions to include same-sex couples, and clarifies that the responsibility for enacting such laws lies with Parliament and state legislatures.
