List of Current Affairs

Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja, in Aquil Ahmed v. National Investigation Agency Through the Chief Investigating Officer (2026), held that an order passed under Section 25(6) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), confirming seizure or attachment of property as "proceeds of terrorism", is final in nature and can be challenged before the High Court under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA Act). 

What was the Background of Aquil Ahmed v. NIA (2026) Case? 

• The Designated Authority, Union Ministry of Home Affairs, had passed an order under Section 25(3) of the UAPA confirming attachment of the fourth and fifth floors of a property situated in Pune. 
• The appellant, Aquil Ahmed, challenged this order before the Special Judge, who dismissed his appeal and upheld the attachment. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant filed a further appeal before the Delhi High Court. 
• The NIA raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal, contending that Chapter V of the UAPA constitutes a complete code governing seizure, attachment, and forfeiture of proceeds of terrorism. 
• The NIA argued that Section 25(6) of the UAPA already provides an appeal against the Designated Authority's order to the Special Court, while Section 28 separately provides an appeal to the High Court against an eventual forfeiture order under Section 26, and that permitting a further appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act would create an impermissible second appeal against the same attachment order. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Nature of an Order Under Section 25(6) of the UAPA: The Court held that an order passed under Section 25(6) of the UAPA, confirming seizure or attachment of property as proceeds of terrorism, is final and not interlocutory in nature, even though it may eventually result in forfeiture of the property under Section 26. 
• On the Statutory Right of Appeal Under Section 21 of the NIA Act: The Court held that Section 21 of the NIA Act confers an unrestricted statutory right of appeal against any judgment, sentence, or order of a Special Court, the only exception being that the order must not be interlocutory. Since the attachment order was final, it fell squarely within this right of appeal. 
• On Attachment and Forfeiture Being Distinct Stages: The Court held that simple attachment of property does not automatically result in its forfeiture under Section 26 of the UAPA. A separate show cause notice under Section 27, along with an opportunity of representation and hearing, is required before an order of forfeiture can be passed. 
• On the Two Appeals Dealing with Distinct Stages: The Court held that an appeal against an attachment order and an appeal against a subsequent forfeiture order deal with distinct stages of the proceedings, each final in its own stage, and therefore do not amount to successive appeals against the same order. 
• On the Rejection of the NIA's Objection: The Court further observed that there was no reason to presume the High Court, while hearing a subsequent appeal against forfeiture, would not take due cognizance of its own earlier order passed in the appeal against attachment. On this basis, the Court rejected the NIA's preliminary objection and held the appeal maintainable.

What is Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008? 

Background & Purpose: 

•  Section 21 of the NIA Act provides the mechanism for appeals against orders passed by a Special Court constituted under the Act. It ensures that parties aggrieved by a Special Court's decisions have a statutory remedy before the High Court, while preserving the finality of purely procedural or interlocutory orders passed during the course of trial. 

Key Provisions: 

• Right of Appeal (Sub-section 1): An appeal lies to the High Court from any judgment, sentence, or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court, on both facts and law. 
• Limitation (Sub-section 2): Every such appeal must be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence, or order appealed from, though the High Court may entertain an appeal after this period if sufficient cause for the delay is shown. 
• Composition of the Bench (Sub-section 3): Every appeal is required to be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court. 
• Endeavour for Expeditious Disposal (Sub-section 4): The High Court is required to endeavour to dispose of the appeal within a period of three months from the date of admission. 
• Scope Read with Section 26, UAPA: While Section 21 excludes interlocutory orders from appeal, an order that finally determines a right or liability — such as confirmation of attachment of proceeds of terrorism under Section 25(6) of the UAPA — falls outside this exclusion and remains appealable, even though a further, distinct stage (forfeiture under Section 26) may follow later in the same proceedings.

Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu, in GP Sangeetha & Ors Etc. Etc. v. State of Kerala & Ors (2026), held that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work cannot be mechanically invoked on the sole ground of functional similarity of duties, and upheld a pay differential between directly recruited and promoted Higher Secondary School Teachers, Junior (HSST, Jr.), based on their difference in experience. 

What was the Background of GP Sangeetha v. State of Kerala (2026) Case? 

• The appellants were HSST, Jr. teachers appointed through direct recruitment under a 1998 government order in Government-aided schools in Kerala. 
• They claimed parity with HSST, Jr. teachers who had been appointed through transfer or promotion, seeking the same full-time pay scale extended to the latter category, on the ground that both groups performed identical duties within the same cadre. 
• The Kerala High Court's Single Judge, relying on earlier Supreme Court precedents, held that the appellants had suffered grave discrimination and were entitled to parity. 
• On appeal, the Division Bench reversed this finding, holding that promoted teachers could not be equated with direct recruits who were freshers, since the full pay scale for promotees was meant only to protect the status they already held prior to promotion. 
• Aggrieved, the directly recruited teachers appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the precedents applied by the Single Judge belonged to the last century and that the judicial approach to the equal pay doctrine had since shifted significantly. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• On the Evolution of the Equal Pay Doctrine: The Court traced the doctrine's trajectory, noting that in the last century, beginning with Randhir Singh v. Union of India, equal pay for equal work was treated as an expansive anti-exploitation principle under Articles 14 and 39(d), where mere sameness of designation was enough to claim parity. It observed that this position has since been recast: from State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu to State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, the doctrine has evolved into a strict test based on service rules. 
• On the Factors Required to Claim Equal Pay: The Court held that equal pay cannot be claimed merely by showing identical work; a claimant must establish complete parity in the source of recruitment, educational qualifications and experience, the mode of appointment through a constitutional process, and the nature of responsibilities and accountability. Mere functional similarity of work, it held, is no longer sufficient. 
• On Qualitative Differences in Work (Reliance on State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu): The Court held that equal pay cannot be judged merely by the volume of work performed, since qualitative differences may exist in reliability and responsibility. A bona fide, reasonable, and rational value judgment by administrative authorities in fixing pay scales does not amount to discrimination. 
• On Educational Qualification as a Valid Basis for Differentiation (Reliance on Government of West Bengal v. Tarun Kumar Roy): The Court held that the doctrine does not require automatic application merely because the nature of work is the same, irrespective of educational qualification or source of recruitment. Holders of a higher educational qualification can validly be treated as a separate class, and employees performing similar jobs but holding different qualifications can be treated differently. 
• On the Doctrine Having No Mechanical Application (Reliance on State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh and Related Precedents): The Court held that equal pay must be for equal work of equal value, and that persons doing the same work may still differ in the quality of their work. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on merit with due regard to seniority, a higher pay scale granted to them cannot be challenged, and a classification based on differing educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. 
• On the Legal Position Summarised in State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee: The Court held that a mechanical application of the doctrine has to be eschewed, though this does not mean the doctrine can never be enforced. For such enforcement, a host of factors must be considered; only where there is complete parity across all such factors can a writ court intervene and grant relief for equal pay for equal work of equal value. 
• On the Validity of Experience as a Differentiating Factor: Applying this position, the Court held that the difference in experience between transferee/promotee HSST, Jr. teachers and direct recruit HSST, Jr. teachers constituted a valid and intelligible differentia, having a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, and justified the grant of higher pay to the former. 
• On the Appellants' Reliance on State of West Bengal v. Anirban Ghosh: The appellants sought to distinguish Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee by relying on the Calcutta High Court's decision in Anirban Ghosh, pointing out that an SLP against it had been dismissed. The Court rejected this, holding that the binding Supreme Court precedents considered in Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee did not appear to have been placed before the Division Bench in Anirban Ghosh, rendering it per incuriam to that extent, and that mere dismissal of an SLP does not warrant a different view. 

What is the Doctrine of Equal Pay for Equal Work? 

Meaning:  

• The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" means that persons performing work of the same nature and value, under similar conditions, should be paid at the same rate, without discrimination based on arbitrary or extraneous factors. 

Constitutional Basis: 

• The doctrine is not an independent fundamental right but is derived by reading Article 14 (Right to Equality) with Article 39(d) of the Constitution, a Directive Principle of State Policy directing the State to secure equal pay for equal work for both men and women. 
• Being founded on Article 14, it operates as a facet of the guarantee against arbitrary classification — equals must be treated equally, and unequals cannot be treated as equals. 

Origin and Early Approach: 

• The doctrine was first judicially recognised as enforceable in Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982), where the Supreme Court held that equal pay for equal work, though a Directive Principle, can be enforced through Article 14 read with Article 39(d). 
• In its early phase, courts applied the doctrine expansively as an anti-exploitation principle — mere sameness of designation (teacher, clerk, driver, etc.) was often treated as sufficient to claim pay parity. 

Later, Stricter Approach: 

• Beginning with State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu and culminating in State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, courts moved to a stricter, fact-intensive test. 
• Under this approach, a claimant must show complete parity in: (i) source and mode of recruitment, (ii) educational qualifications, (iii) experience, and (iv) nature of duties, responsibilities, and accountability. 
• Mere functional or designational similarity of work is no longer sufficient; qualitative differences in reliability, responsibility, and volume of work can justify differential pay. 

Present Position: 

• The doctrine has no mechanical or automatic application. It cannot be invoked merely because two sets of employees carry the same job title or perform superficially similar tasks. 
• Relief can be granted only where there is complete parity across all relevant factors between the claimant and the comparator; a valid and intelligible differentia — such as experience, mode of appointment, or educational qualification — having a rational nexus with the object of classification will defeat a claim for parity.