List of Current Affairs

Madras High Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Chief Justice SA Dharmadhikari and Justice G Arul Murugan, in Agri SS Krishnamurthy v. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (2026), dismissed a plea by the AIADMK challenging part of a Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly resolution on the Mekedatu Dam issue. The Court held that Article 212 of the Constitution bars courts from questioning Assembly proceedings on the ground of irregularity of procedure. 

What was the Background of Agri SS Krishnamurthy v. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (2026) Case? 

• On June 18, a draft resolution was circulated to members objecting to the Karnataka Government's proposal to build a dam at Mekedatu and asking the Union Government to withhold clearance for the project. 
• On June 19, while the resolution was being debated, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) demanded that a separate tribunal be set up under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. 
• The Chief Minister replied that consultations on a special tribunal had been held and steps were underway to establish one. He then asked the Speaker to add the LoP's suggestion to the resolution. 
• The tribunal clause was incorporated into the resolution without being separately moved, seconded, debated or put to a distinct vote. 
• No member objected when the suggestion was added, and no member opposed the resolution when it was put to vote. It was declared carried unanimously. 
• On August 7, the AIADMK leader raised the same grievance on the Assembly floor. The Speaker ruled that there was no illegality, and this ruling was not questioned. 
• The AIADMK then filed a writ petition before the High Court. It argued that the tribunal clause was added in violation of Rule 104 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules. 
• The petitioner contended that although Article 212 bars courts from questioning the validity of legislative proceedings, the challenge was to the authenticity of the document communicated to the Union Government. 
• The petitioner expressly disclaimed any challenge to the substance of the resolution or to the Assembly's opposition to the Mekedatu project. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Nature of the Grievance: 

• The Court noted that the petitioner had no objection to the content of the resolution. The objection was confined to the manner in which the tribunal clause was introduced. 
• The challenge, at its core, concerned compliance with the procedure under Rule 104 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules. 
• The Court held that the complaint was, by definition, about the internal procedure by which the House arrived at its resolution. 
• The petitioner did not allege that the House lacked power to pass the resolution, that the resolution was void for want of jurisdiction, or that it was carried by fraud or in bad faith. 

On the Bar under Article 212(1): 

• The Court held that Article 212 of the Constitution explicitly bars courts from interfering in Assembly proceedings merely on the ground of irregularity of procedure. 
• A grievance about incorporating a suggestion without a separate motion, seconding, debate and division falls squarely within Article 212(1). 
• After discussing the Supreme Court's decisions on the issue, the Court held that the complaint was one on which it could not interfere. 

On the Plea of "Authenticity" of the Document: 

• The Court rejected the attempt to recast the challenge as one about authenticity. 
• What was alleged to be inauthentic was not the text of the resolution itself, only the sequence of steps by which the text was arrived at. That is still a matter of procedure. 

On Absence of Prejudice and the Petitioner's Conduct: 

• The Court observed that members of the party did not object when the amendment was introduced. They could not approach the court several weeks later and claim they were aggrieved. 
• A challenge of this kind can succeed only if prejudice is ex facie apparent. 
• The petitioner's continued presence through the debate, his silence at the vote, and his party's later unsuccessful attempt to reopen the issue within the House all showed that no prejudice existed. 
• Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 are not obliged to entertain a challenge founded on an irregularity that the petitioner could have objected to at the time and chose not to. 

Finding no mala fide or substantive illegality, the Court dismissed the petition. 

What is Article 212 of the Constitution? 

About: 

• Article 212 of the Constitution of India deals with courts not inquiring into proceedings of the Legislature. 
• It forms part of Chapter III of Part VI, which covers the State Legislature. 
• It embodies the principle of separation of powers. Each House is the master of its own internal procedure. 
• Article 122 is the corresponding provision for Parliament. 

The Provision: 

Article 212 states: 

"(1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. 

(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." 

Scope and Limits of the Immunity: 

• The protection extends only to irregularity of procedure. It does not cover illegality or unconstitutionality. 
• Courts may still examine legislative proceedings where there is gross illegality, lack of jurisdiction, violation of constitutional provisions, mala fides, or violation of fundamental rights. 
• In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that Articles 122 and 212 protect proceedings only against challenges based on mere procedural irregularity. Substantive illegality or unconstitutionality remains open to judicial review. 
• Under clause (2), the Speaker and other presiding officers are immune from the jurisdiction of courts for acts done in regulating procedure, conducting business, or maintaining order in the House. 

Relationship with Article 208: 

• Article 208 empowers each House of a State Legislature to make rules regulating its procedure and conduct of business. 
• Rules framed under Article 208 are internal to the House. A breach of such rules, without more, is a procedural irregularity protected by Article 212(1). 

Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice SVN Bhatti and Justice NV Anjaria, in Ganapati (Dead) by LRs v. Prabhakar & Others (2026), held that a Hindu widow who acquired an interest in her husband's property under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 becomes its absolute owner under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA), even without a formal partition. 

What was the Background of Ganapati (Dead) by LRs v. Prabhakar & Others (2026) Case? 

• The widow, Kashibai, acquired an interest in her husband's property after he died in 1949, before the HSA came into force. 
• Under the 1937 Act, this interest was a limited right, with a right to seek partition but without full ownership. 
• The plaintiff, the husband's son through his first wife, filed a suit concerning the property. The widow's legal representatives (the defendants) pleaded an oral partition. 
• The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court denied absolute ownership to the widow, holding that she had not sought partition of the inherited property under the 1937 Act. 
• In second appeal, the Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench) set aside these concurrent findings and recognised the widow's absolute ownership, regardless of whether partition was sought. 
• The plaintiff, through his legal representatives, appealed to the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Effect of Section 14(1) HSA: 

• The Court held that the property inherited by the widow became her absolute property under Section 14(1), which removed the restrictive character the property carried under the 1937 Act. 
• A Hindu widow, stepping into her husband's shoes, holds such property by satisfying the requirements of Section 14(1). 

On Partition Not Being a Pre-Condition: 

• The absence of a formal partition between the widow and the surviving coparcener does not, by itself, prevent her limited interest from being enlarged into an absolute right. 
• Partition is not a sine qua non for the widow to enjoy the property as an independent or absolute owner. 
• Even assuming no partition occurred in the undivided property, the coparcenary shares may fluctuate, but the widow's right cannot be denied. 
• The widow's limited right is not extinguished merely because she did not seek or obtain a partition. 

On the Failure to Prove Oral Partition: 

• Even if the widow's legal representatives failed to prove the oral partition they pleaded, the legal consequence of the 1937 Act read with Section 14(1) HSA remains intact and unaffected. 

On Reliance on Precedents: 

• The Court relied on V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) and Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh (1998), which recognise the broad operation of Section 14(1) in enlarging a Hindu woman's limited interest into an absolute one where that interest is traceable to a pre-existing right. 

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeal. 

What is Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? 

About: 

• Section 14 of the HSA deals with property of a female Hindu being her absolute property. 
• It abolished the concept of the "limited estate" (Hindu woman's estate) under which a woman could enjoy property during her lifetime but could not freely alienate it, and on her death it passed to the reversioners. 
• It operates retrospectively in the sense that it covers property acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, provided the woman was possessed of it when the Act came into force. 

The Provision: 

Section 14 states: 

"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. 

Explanation.—In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. 

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." 

Interplay between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2): 

• Section 14(1) is the general rule and is to be construed liberally in favour of women. 
• Section 14(2) is in the nature of a proviso and is to be construed narrowly. It applies only where the instrument, decree or award creates a new right for the first time and prescribes a restricted estate. 
• In V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977), the Supreme Court held that where a woman receives property in recognition of a pre-existing right (such as maintenance), the case falls under Section 14(1) and not Section 14(2), even if the instrument imposes restrictions.