List of Current Affairs

Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan, in 'R' v. 'E' & Anr. (2026), laid down safeguards to prevent the misuse of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) in matrimonial and child custody disputes. The Court also quashed an FIR alleging sexual assault of a minor girl by her father after a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe found the allegations unreliable. 

What was the Background of 'R' v. 'E' & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• The parties, referred to as 'R' (father) and 'E' (mother), married in 2011. Their daughter 'M' was born in 2015. 
• After the marriage broke down, the mother left the matrimonial home with the child in 2018. This led to prolonged litigation, including a guardianship petition, an FIR against the mother, divorce proceedings, and a custody dispute. 
• In March 2022, the Family Court directed the mother to hand over custody of the child to the father. The Karnataka High Court upheld this in January 2023, subject to visitation rights for the mother, and the Supreme Court dismissed the mother's Special Leave Petition in March 2023. Custody was handed over to the father in June 2023. 
• The father later challenged a High Court order modifying the visitation rights before the Supreme Court. 
• In the meantime, the mother lodged an FIR against the father alleging that he had sexually harassed the child on two occasions and threatened to kill her if the child disclosed it.  
• The FIR invoked Section 10 of the POCSO Act, Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (now Sections 115(2), 352 and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023). 
• In April 2026, the Supreme Court transferred the investigation to the CBI, to be conducted by a Committee headed by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General, along with a woman psychologist. The Court directed that no coercive steps be taken against either party during the investigation. 
• The CBI Committee included two Superintendents of Police and two experts from NIMHANS, one in child and adolescent psychiatry and one in clinical psychology. 
• The Committee examined witnesses including the child's class teacher, tuition teacher, school counsellor, housemaid and neighbours, and analysed CCTV footage from the father's house. It concluded that the allegations were not made out and the matter was not fit for prosecution. 
• The psychiatric evaluation found no signs of anxiety or trauma consistent with the allegations. It noted that prolonged parental conflict, ongoing litigation, repeated discussion of the allegations and exposure to family narratives may have influenced the child's account. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Growing Misuse of the POCSO Act in Matrimonial Disputes: 

• Referring to Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana, Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of U.P., and the Kerala High Court's decision in Suhara v. Muhammed Jaleel, the Court noted a worrying trend of spouses filing false POCSO complaints to gain leverage in custody disputes or secure better settlements. 

On the Inadequacy of Section 22 of the POCSO Act: 

• The Court observed that although Section 22 penalises false complaints, "by the time Section 22 is invoked substantial damage would be caused to the party falsely charged." Such damage may take the form of prolonged incarceration or an adverse impact on pending custody or guardianship proceedings. 
• It held that "certain precautions must be taken, within the four corners of the law, to prevent such harm from befalling the accused." 

On Striking a Balance: 

• The Court clarified that any precaution must not run counter to the object of the Act or dilute the seriousness with which such offences are to be treated. It described the exercise as a balance between preserving the Act's stringency and preventing irreparable harm to the accused. 

On the Threshold Conditions for Applying the Safeguards: 

The safeguards apply only when both of the following conditions are met: 

• the POCSO offence is alleged to have been committed by a parent or a family member living under the same roof as the child; and 
• a matrimonial dispute exists between the child's parents, indicating a possibly strained relationship. 

The police officer receiving the complaint has a duty to verify whether such a matrimonial dispute exists. 

On Arrest in POCSO Cases: 

• Where the threshold conditions are met, investigating officers must not act in haste or arrest the accused immediately upon registration of the FIR. 
• Referring to Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court held that the power to arrest is a statutory discretion and not an automatic consequence of registering an FIR.  
• The existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercising it are distinct, and arrest cannot be made merely because it is legally permissible. 

On Involvement of Experts in the Investigation: 

The investigating officer or the Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) must engage an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry or clinical psychology before deciding whether there is reason to believe the accused committed the offence for the purpose of arrest. This may be dispensed with only in exceptional cases, with reasons recorded in writing. 

The Court placed two limits on the expert report: 

• the investigating officer or SJPU is not bound by the expert's findings, as the report only aids the exercise of discretion; and 
• the report cannot be the sole basis for filing a chargesheet or a closure report. 

On Private Complaints before the Special Court: 

• For complaints filed directly before the Special Court under Section 33 of the POCSO Act, the same threshold conditions apply.  
• The Special Court must involve an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry or clinical psychology before deciding whether to take cognizance and issue summons, save in exceptional cases with reasons recorded in writing. 

On the Effect of POCSO FIRs in Custody Proceedings: 

• The Court held that "the mere registration of a case under the POCSO Act should not by itself give rise to an inference that the allegation is true." Courts dealing with custody or guardianship must independently form a prima facie view on whether the allegations are baseless. 

On the Applicability of the Safeguards: 

• The safeguards apply to FIR-based investigations pending on the date of the judgment, and to Section 33 private complaints in which summons have not yet been issued. 

Directions Issued: 

The Court directed as follows: 

• District Child Protection Units must update their expert registers under Rule 5 of the POCSO Rules, 2020 to include experts in child and adolescent psychiatry or clinical psychology. 
• Courts dealing with remand and bail in such cases must examine whether the investigating officer complied with the safeguards. 
• A copy of the judgment be sent to the Registrars General of all High Courts and the Chief Secretaries of all States and Union Territories for circulation and compliance. 

On the Facts of the Case: 

• Accepting the CBI's findings, the Court quashed the FIR against the father, holding that continuing the proceedings would be a gross abuse of process. It observed that with the CBI finding the case not maintainable, the very basis of the mother's claim to custody "stands shattered." 
• Applying the welfare of the child principle from Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal (1973), the Court held that legal custody and guardianship should rest with the father. 
• Since physical custody had remained with the mother since March 2023, the Court remitted the matter to the Family Court for the child's reintegration with the father. This process is to be guided by a Committee of Experts comprising the two CBI officers and the two NIMHANS doctors involved in the investigation, which will also decide interim custody arrangements. 
• The Court also quashed the FIR lodged by the father against the mother and directed the parties and the child to appear before the Family Court on 28 September 2026.

What is the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012? 

Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, in Union of India & Ors. v. Ramdhani Prasad (2026), held that Article 311(1) of the Constitution is violated only when a civil servant is dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate in rank to the one that appointed him. Where the removing authority is equal in rank to the appointing authority and is competent under the rules to impose the penalty, the constitutional bar does not apply. 

What was the Background of Union of India & Ors. v. Ramdhani Prasad (2026) Case? 

• The respondent received a call letter in May 1979 from the Commandant, Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF), Gorakhpur, directing him to report for initial training for the post of Rakshak. The letter made his appointment expressly conditional on successfully completing the training. 
• After training, the Assistant Commandant issued a Battalion Order in December 1979 appointing him and other recruits as Rakshaks and posting them to their battalions. A later Battalion Order in February 1980 reaffirmed this appointment. 
• The respondent subsequently overstayed his sanctioned leave by 72 days. He was chargesheeted under Rule 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, and after an ex-parte departmental enquiry, the Adjutant removed him from service in March 1983. His departmental appeal was dismissed in 1984. 
• He then filed a civil suit, claiming that he had been appointed by the Commandant/Chief Security Officer through the 1979 call letter, and that his removal by the Adjutant, a subordinate officer, violated Article 311(1). 
• The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appellate court reversed this and held the removal unconstitutional, and the Allahabad High Court affirmed that view in second appeal in 2023. 
• The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On Identifying the Actual Appointment Order: 

• The Court found the distinction between the call letter and the Battalion Order to be decisive. It noted that the call letter "did not contain an unconditional declaration that the respondent stood appointed as a regular Rakshak" and instead made the proposed appointment conditional on completing training. 
• The Battalion Order, by contrast, specifically recorded that the recruits had been appointed as Rakshaks upon completing training. 
• The Court rejected the argument that the Battalion Order was merely a posting order. It held that "an order may validly operate as both an order of appointment and an order of posting." 
• It concluded that the respondent was appointed as a regular Rakshak by the Assistant Commandant, not by the Commandant/Chief Security Officer. 

On the Statutory Scheme of Appointment and Removal: 

• After examining Sections 6 and 9 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, along with Rules 20 and 43 and Schedules I and II of the RPF Rules, 1959, the Court held that the Chief Security Officer has overall control over appointments. 
• However, the proviso to Section 6 expressly allows other superior officers to exercise appointing powers. The Rules also specifically authorise the Assistant Security Officer to both appoint and remove Rakshaks and Senior Rakshaks. 

On Reliance on Union of India v. Chandra Pal Pandey: 

• The Court relied on this decision, which held that the phrase "shall rest" in Section 6 denotes only overall control. It does not vest the power of appointment exclusively in the Chief Security Officer. 

On Reliance on Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer: 

• Applying the principle that delegating appointing power does not change the delegate's hierarchical rank, the Court held that the Adjutant was not subordinate in rank to the Assistant Commandant who had appointed the respondent. 
• The Adjutant was also competent under Schedule II to impose the penalty of removal. The essential ingredient of Article 311(1) was therefore absent, and the constitutional bar was never attracted. 

On the Plea of Violation of Natural Justice: 

• The Court rejected the claim that the ex-parte enquiry was vitiated. The respondent had acknowledged the chargesheet, replied to it, and been informed of the enquiry date, but did not appear. A show-cause notice was also issued before the removal order was passed. 
• The Court held that "the departmental inquiry cannot be held to be vitiated merely on the ground that it proceeded ex-parte." 

Conclusion: 

• The Court held that the first appellate court and the High Court had erred in treating the 1979 call letter as the appointment order. It set aside both judgments, restored the trial court's decree dismissing the suit, and upheld the order removing the respondent from service.

What is Article 311 of the Constitution of India? 

About: 

• Article 311 of the Constitution of India, 1950 deals with the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. 
• It falls under Part XIV of the Constitution (Services under the Union and the States). 
• It provides constitutional safeguards to civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, and acts as a limitation on the Doctrine of Pleasure under Article 310. 

The Provision: 

Article 311 states: 

Clause (1): 

• "No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed." 

Clause (2): 

• "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: 
• Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed: 

Provided further that this clause shall not apply— 

• (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or 
• (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or 
• (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry." 

Clause (3): 

• "If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." 

Persons Covered under Article 311: 

The protection extends to: 

• members of a civil service of the Union; 
• members of an all-India service; 
• members of a civil service of a State; and 
• persons holding a civil post under the Union or a State. 

Safeguards under Article 311: 

Protection against Removal by a Subordinate Authority (Clause 1): 

• A civil servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate in rank to the authority that appointed him. 
• This safeguard applies only to dismissal and removal. It does not extend to reduction in rank. 

Right to an Inquiry (Clause 2): 

• A civil servant cannot be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without an inquiry. 
• In that inquiry, he must be informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard on those charges. 

No Separate Hearing on Penalty (First Proviso to Clause 2): 

• Once the inquiry is completed, the penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry. 
• The employee need not be given a further opportunity to make a representation on the proposed penalty. 

Exceptions to the Requirement of Inquiry (Second Proviso to Clause 2): 

The inquiry under clause (2) is not required in the following three situations: 

• Conviction on a Criminal Charge: where the penalty is imposed on the ground of conduct that has led to the person's conviction on a criminal charge. 
• Inquiry Not Reasonably Practicable: where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, and records its reasons in writing. 
• Security of the State: where the President or the Governor is satisfied that holding an inquiry is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State. 

Finality of Decision (Clause 3): 

• Where a question arises as to whether it is reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, the decision of the authority empowered to dismiss, remove or reduce the person in rank is final.