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Punjab and Haryana High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Sumeet Goel of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Rampal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2026), held that where a Sessions Court has already examined an order in revision, a further challenge before the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS operates within an "extraordinarily constricted domain". The Court dismissed a challenge to a Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order directing a receiver to hand over about 514 kanals of land in District Kaithal to a samadh. 

What was the Background of Rampal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The dispute concerned about 514 kanals 6 marlas of land in Village Gohana, District Kaithal. 
• The petitioners claimed rights under a registered lease-deed dated 06.06.1970, stated to have been executed by the Mohatmim of Samadh Baba Nihal Gir for 99 years (1971 to 2070) for ₹60,000. They relied on a 1972 mutation and subsequent jamabandis (Record of Rights) and khasra girdawaris (possession records) to establish continuous cultivating possession. 
• According to the petitioners, they learnt in 2008 that the girdawari entries had been altered in favour of the samadh. The Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, corrected the entries in their favour, but on appeal the matter was remanded and remains pending. 
• The petitioners alleged that the respondents attempted to take forcible possession on 18.05.2015, following which they filed a civil suit for injunction. The private respondents then initiated proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the CrPC. 
• On 01.06.2015, the SDM, Kaithal, attached the land and appointed the Naib Tehsildar as receiver. On 11.12.2017, the Additional Sessions Judge set aside this order because the Magistrate had not recorded the satisfaction required under Section 145. 
• On a fresh application by the private respondents, the SDM, by order dated 04.01.2018, directed the receiver to deliver possession to Samadh Baba Nihal Gir through its Mahant. 
• The Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal, dismissed the petitioners' revision on 26.07.2024, noting that their civil suit had been dismissed on 29.08.2015, their first appeal on 10.01.2023, and that a regular second appeal was pending before the High Court. 
• The petitioners then approached the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS. 

Contentions of the Parties: 

• The petitioners argued that the SDM had failed to properly consider the lease-deed, the revenue entries and the revenue authorities' reports showing continuous possession.  
• They contended that once the 2015 attachment order had been set aside, the subsequent order directing delivery of possession was untenable, and that their rights under a subsisting lease running till 2070 could not be defeated through proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 CrPC. 
• The State submitted that the dispute was essentially private in nature.  
• The private respondents argued that the SDM's order suffered from no illegality or jurisdictional error, that the civil court had already decided the dispute against the petitioners, and that the revisional court had duly considered the revenue record and the civil court's judgment. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Scope of Section 528 BNSS: 

• The Court observed that inherent powers must be exercised sparingly, only to prevent abuse of the process of court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 
• It drew a distinction between two kinds of challenges.  
• Where the High Court is approached directly against an order of the court or authority of first instance, it has a broader canvas to examine perversity or illegality. Where the challenge is to an order passed by a Sessions Court in revision, the High Court's scrutiny is far narrower. 

On Section 528 as a Disguised Second Revision: 

• The Court noted that revisional jurisdiction is itself confined to patent illegality, procedural impropriety, jurisdictional error and manifest miscarriage of justice. 
• A further challenge under Section 528 against a revisional order therefore effectively becomes a disguised second revision, which the BNSS bars. 
• The Court held: "Consequently, the petitioner shoulders a heavily accentuated burden to demonstrate an egregious failure of justice or a glaring jurisdictional defect, for inviting an interference by the High Court, in such cases." 

On Disputed Questions of Fact: 

• The Court added that this restraint assumes heightened significance where the dispute turns on intricate and contested questions of possession, title and the legal effect of a lease-deed, which are "alien to summary proceedings." 

On the Pending Civil Proceedings: 

• The Court noted that the dispute was no longer confined to the revenue record. The petitioners' civil suit and first appeal had both been dismissed, and a regular second appeal was pending. The petitioners could not seek a complete re-adjudication of the parties' rights through a quashing petition. 

On the Earlier Order of 2017 and the Lease-Deed: 

• The Court held that the ASJ's order of 11.12.2017 did not assist the petitioners, as it was based on the material and circumstances existing at that time. It further held that the registered lease-deed could not, at this stage, be treated as conclusive proof of possession. 

On the Revisional Court's Order: 

• The Court found that the revisional court had not dismissed the revision mechanically but had considered subsequent developments, including the civil and revenue proceedings. The petitioners failed to show that this reasoning was perverse or that any material document or statutory provision had been ignored. 

Conclusion: 

• Finding no exceptional circumstance warranting interference, the Court dismissed the petition. It clarified that its observations were not an expression of opinion on any substantive right or claim of the parties pending before any civil, revenue or appellate forum.

What is Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023? 

About: 

• Section 528 of the BNSS saves the inherent powers of the High Court. It corresponds to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
• The provision does not confer any new power; it recognises powers inherent in the High Court as a superior court, to be exercised in exceptional cases. 

The Provision: 

Section 528 states: 

• "Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 

Purposes for which Inherent Powers may be Exercised: 

• To give effect to any order under the Sanhita. 
• To prevent abuse of the process of any court. 
• To otherwise secure the ends of justice.

What is the Bar on Second Revision under the BNSS?

About: 

• Section 438 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 397 of the CrPC) confers concurrent revisional jurisdiction on the High Court and the Sessions Judge to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order of an inferior criminal court. 

Section 438(3): 

• "If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them." 
• This clause bars a second revision by the same person. Courts have consistently held that the inherent powers of the High Court cannot be invoked to circumvent this bar, except in exceptional cases involving abuse of process or a miscarriage of justice.

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News? 

A Bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary of the Allahabad High Court, while deciding a batch of connected petitions, held that the operation of hookah bars and the provision of hookah services by restaurants in Uttar Pradesh is prohibited, even within a Designated Smoking Area.  

• The Court held that such activity violates Rule 4(3) of the Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008 (as amended in 2017), read with the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 (COTPA). 

What was the Background of the Case? 

• A batch of connected petitions was filed before the Allahabad High Court concerning the operation of hookah bars and the provision of hookah services in restaurants across Uttar Pradesh. 
• The question before the Court was not whether smoking tobacco through a hookah was, by itself, prohibited. The issue was whether restaurants and similar establishments could offer hookah as a service to customers within a Designated Smoking Area. 
• The petitioners advanced several arguments in support of continuing hookah services: 
  • First, that hookah service was permissible within a Designated Smoking Area, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Narinder S. Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (2014). 
  • Second, that restaurants could adopt a "self-service" model, under which the hookah would be prepared and handed over to the customer, who would then smoke it without any assistance from the establishment. 
  • Third, that supplying a hookah apparatus amounted to a rental of equipment rather than the rendering of a service. 
  • Fourth, that the Food Safety Department and the Municipal Corporation lacked jurisdiction to grant or regulate licences for hookah bars, and that the police lacked enforcement powers under COTPA. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the Scheme of COTPA and Designated Smoking Areas: 

• The Court observed that the general rule under COTPA is a prohibition on smoking in public places, and the Designated Smoking Area is only an exception carved out of that general prohibition. 
• While a Designated Smoking Area permits a person to smoke, it does not permit a restaurant to provide hookah as a service, since the amended Rule 4(3) prohibits any service in a smoking area. 

On the Effect of the 2017 Amendment and Narinder S. Chadha: 

• The Court noted that the pre-amendment Rule 4(3) required the smoking area to be used only for smoking, with "no other service(s)" allowed. Interpreting this language, the Supreme Court in Narinder S. Chadha had implicitly permitted the service of hookah in smoking zones, while prohibiting the service of food and other items. 
• However, in 2017 the Central Government substituted Rule 4(3) to provide that "No service shall be allowed in any smoking area or space provided for smoking." 
• The High Court treated this change in language as material. It held that Narinder S. Chadha must be read in the context of the earlier statutory text, and that the amended Rule 4(3) now bars the provision of hookah service even within a Designated Smoking Area. 

On the Self-Service Model: 

• The Court rejected the self-service argument. It noted that preparing a hookah involves several steps, including assembling the apparatus, placing tobacco in the bowl, filling the base with water, preparing the foil and placing heated charcoal, which require expertise. 
• The Court held: "The self-service model hypothetically synthesised by the petitioners to skirt around the clutches of the COTPA and the amended Rules is not a viable model as procedural operation of hookah intrinsically involves 'service' which needs to be carried out by the one having expertise in it and is not an operation that can be carried out by patrons who are not trained and are novices." 

On Hookah as Service and Not Rental: 

• The Court distinguished the arrangement from an ordinary rental, in which possession and control of the property pass to the customer. Here, the customer is required to remain within the Designated Smoking Area and consume the hookah there. 
• The Court observed: "The factum of mandatory consumption of hookah inside the Designated Smoking Area by the patron makes it abundantly clear that he is being provided a 'service' only." 
• Taking into account the ongoing assistance ordinarily required, such as replenishing charcoal, removing ash and changing tobacco, the Court held that preparing, assembling, delivering, lighting, replenishing and maintaining a hookah for consideration amounts to rendering a service. 
• It emphasised that the substance of the transaction, and not the label adopted by the establishment, is determinative. 

On Articles 21 and 19(1)(g): 

• The Court held that the right of a non-smoker to breathe clean air in a public place is a fundamental right under Article 21, which cannot be abridged by the commercial interests of an establishment claiming a right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). 

On Licensing Authorities: 

• The Court accepted the petitioners' contention that the Food Safety Department and the Municipal Corporation cannot issue licences authorising the operation of hookah bars. The food safety framework confers no such power, and the Municipal Corporation has no statutory provision empowering it to issue a separate hookah-bar licence. 

On Police Enforcement Powers: 

• The Court rejected the challenge to police powers, holding that Sections 12, 13 and 15 of COTPA empower police authorities to enforce the Act, including through search, seizure, confiscation and penalties in appropriate cases. 

On the Need for State Legislation: 

• The Court referred to legislative measures taken by Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Karnataka specifically dealing with hookah bars and providing enhanced punishment and fines.  
• It expressed the expectation that Uttar Pradesh would "rise to the occasion", including by considering a notification providing stringent punishment for serving hookah in Designated Smoking Areas. 
• The Court also noted the health concerns associated with hookah smoking and the misconception that hookah is necessarily less harmful than cigarettes. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court held that the operation of hookah bars and the rendering of hookah services by restaurants in Uttar Pradesh is a flagrant violation of Rule 4(3) and contrary to the scheme and object of COTPA.  
• The connected petitions were dismissed, and a copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, for information and necessary compliance.

What is the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 (COTPA)? 

About: 

• COTPA is a Central legislation enacted to prohibit the advertisement of, and to regulate the trade, commerce, production, supply and distribution of, cigarettes and other tobacco products. 
• It aims to protect public health, particularly of non-smokers, from the harmful effects of tobacco use and second-hand smoke. 

Key Provisions: 

• Section 4: Prohibits smoking in any public place. However, the proviso permits hotels having thirty or more rooms, restaurants having seating capacity of thirty or more, and airports to provide a separate provision for a smoking area or space. 
• Section 12: Empowers authorised officers to enter and search premises where they have reason to believe that provisions of the Act are being contravened. 
• Section 13: Empowers authorised officers to seize tobacco products and related materials in cases of contravention. 
• Section 21: Prescribes a fine for smoking in a public place in contravention of Section 4. 

What is Rule 4 of the Prohibition of Smoking in Public Places Rules, 2008? 

About: 

• The Rules were framed by the Central Government under COTPA to give effect to the prohibition on smoking in public places. 
• Rule 4 deals with the provision of a separate smoking area or space in hotels, restaurants and airports that qualify under the proviso to Section 4, and prescribes conditions for such areas, including physical separation, adequate ventilation and location away from entrances and exits. 

Rule 4(3) — Pre-amendment: 

• "The smoking area or space shall be used only for the purpose of smoking and no other service(s) shall be allowed." 

Rule 4(3) — Post-2017 amendment: 

• "No service shall be allowed in any smoking area or space provided for smoking."