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Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Achal Sachdev of the Allahabad High Court decided Ravi Chaurasiya & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2026). The Court held that under Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the police must inform a suspect of his right to have a counsel of his choice present during interrogation, even before he is formally arrested.  

• The Court also held that a later formal arrest and remand cannot cure an earlier illegal detention. It allowed the habeas corpus petition, directed the petitioner's release and awarded ₹30,000 as compensation. 

What was the Background of Ravi Chaurasiya & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• A habeas corpus petition was filed alleging illegal detention of Ravi Chaurasiya by the Soraon Police, Prayagraj. 
• The sequence of events was as follows: 

• The High Court called for CCTV footage from the police station. 
• The counter affidavit filed by the Station House Officer (SHO) and the Investigating Officer clearly admitted that the petitioner was in custody. 
• The SHO said that the failure to record the petitioner's presence in the General Diary was an "inadvertent mistake." 
• The questions before the Court were:  
  • Whether the petitioner's detention before his formal arrest was illegal, and whether the later arrest and remand could cure it. 
  • Whether the right to counsel during interrogation under Section 38 BNSS applies to a suspect who has not been formally arrested. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the right to counsel under Section 38 BNSS: 

• Section 38 BNSS gives an arrested person the right to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. 
• The provision cannot be read in a way that lets the police avoid this safeguard simply by postponing formal arrest. 
• The Court would not allow a practice in which the police:  
  • Avoid arresting a suspect, 
  • Call him to the police station and interrogate him for 5–6 hours, and 
  • Use his self-incriminatory statements, made without a counsel, to make him an accused. 
• Such a practice would violate his right against self-incrimination. 
• The police's duty under Section 38 BNSS also arises when a suspect is taken to the police station for interrogation. 
• The suspect must be informed, even before he is arrested or made an accused, of his right to have a counsel of his choice present at the police station during interrogation. 
• This does not mean that the counsel must be present throughout the interrogation. 

On the consequence of not informing the suspect: 

• The police cannot interrogate a person without telling him of his right to counsel and then rely on what he says to make him an accused. 
• Failure to inform the suspect of this right vitiates all information he gives, especially self-incriminatory statements. 

On the illegal detention: 

• The Court rejected the SHO's explanation of an "inadvertent mistake." It held that not recording the petitioner's presence in the General Diary was a "conscious omission" meant to escape the charge of illegal detention. 
• The petitioner was kept in police custody for more than 24 hours without being produced before a Magistrate. 
• Applying the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine in the context of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, the Court held that the later formal arrest and remand could not legitimise the initial illegal detention. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court allowed the habeas corpus petition. 
• It directed the petitioner's release, if he was not wanted in any other case. 
• It awarded ₹30,000 as compensation for the illegal detention. 

What is Section 38 of the BNSS? 

About: 

• Section 38 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 deals with the right of an arrested person to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation. 
• It corresponds to Section 41D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008. 
• It gives statutory form to the constitutional right to consult a legal practitioner. 

Provision: 

• When any person is arrested and interrogated by the police, he is entitled to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, though not throughout interrogation. 

Interpretation in Ravi Chaurasiya (2026): 

• The safeguard extends to a suspect called to the police station for interrogation, even if he has not been formally arrested. 
• The police must inform the suspect of this right. 
• Failure to do so vitiates the statements obtained, especially self-incriminatory ones. 

Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards Involved 

What is the Doctrine of "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"? 

• The doctrine originated in United States law. Under it, evidence derived from an illegal act, such as an unlawful search, arrest or interrogation, is treated as tainted and is excluded. 
• The "tree" is the illegal act, and the "fruit" is whatever flows from it. 
• Indian courts have generally not adopted the doctrine as a strict rule for excluding evidence. In Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (1974), the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through an illegal search is not inadmissible for that reason alone.

Source: Madras High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice GR Swaminathan and Justice MD Sumathi of the Madras High Court decided A v S (2026). The Court held that the parties' inability to have a child cannot be converted into a matrimonial fault of the wife, and that childlessness does not by itself amount to cruelty. It also held that the wife's willingness to undergo difficult fertility treatment showed her intention to preserve the marriage. The Court dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the Family Court's order refusing divorce. 

What was the Background of A v. S (2026) Case? 

• The parties married in 2007. 
• The husband claimed that the first six months of the marriage were peaceful, after which the wife's attitude changed. He sought divorce on the ground of cruelty and alleged that:  
  • The wife regarded her family as superior to his and made disparaging remarks about him and his family. 
  • She suspected him without reason whenever he came home late from office and accused him of deliberately staying away. 
  • The couple had no child, and the wife did not conceive even after treatment. 
  • On one occasion, she publicly abused him, called him impotent, assaulted him with footwear, removed her thali and threw it at him, and then left for her maternal home. 
  • She refused to return to the matrimonial home. 
• The wife denied all the allegations and contended that:  
  • The husband habitually consumed alcohol, and she had only objected to him driving home drunk. 
  • She never left the matrimonial home without informing him. The husband himself used to leave her at her sister's house whenever he travelled for work. 
  • She never abused or physically assaulted him. 
  • She had undergone surgery and was receiving medical treatment. The absence of a child was not due to any wilful refusal on her part to live a matrimonial life. 
• The Family Court dismissed the divorce petition. It found that:  
  • The husband's allegations were not supported by any evidence. 
  • The wife was undergoing treatment, and there was no conclusive proof that she was permanently incapable of having a child. 
• The husband appealed to the High Court. He argued that:  
  • The Family Court had placed undue emphasis on the absence of independent corroboration. 
  • Matrimonial cruelty usually occurs within the four walls of the home and cannot be proved through independent eyewitnesses or police complaints. 
• The question before the Court was whether the husband had established cruelty, and whether childlessness could be treated as a matrimonial fault of the wife. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On childlessness and the object of marriage: 

• The inability of the parties to have a child cannot, by itself, be converted into a matrimonial fault of the wife. 
• Marriage cannot be reduced to the sole object of procreation. 
• A spouse cannot be treated as having failed in the matrimonial relationship merely because the couple did not have a child. 

On the wife's fertility treatment: 

• The wife suffered from fibroids and had undergone treatment for them. 
• The treatment involved physical discomfort, repeated medical procedures, emotional uncertainty and considerable personal strain. 
• Her willingness to undergo such treatment cannot be treated as conduct amounting to cruelty. 
• On the contrary, it showed that she had not abandoned the marriage and intended to preserve it. 
• A person who intends to abandon matrimonial life would not ordinarily express willingness to resume it. 

On proof of cruelty: 

• Cruelty must be assessed by looking at the matrimonial relationship as a whole, not by applying a rigid or mechanical formula. 
• However, unproved allegations do not automatically become proven cruelty. 
• Relying on a Supreme Court decision, the Court held that although the cumulative effect of conduct is relevant, the foundational facts constituting that conduct must still be established. 
• In this case, the husband failed to establish his allegations of cruelty. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court found no infirmity in the Family Court's order and dismissed the husband's appeal. 

What is Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA?

About: 

• Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lists the grounds on which either spouse may seek a decree of divorce. 
• Clause (ia) of Section 13(1) allows a spouse to seek divorce if the other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. 
• This clause was inserted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. Before that amendment, cruelty was only a ground for judicial separation under Section 10, and the cruelty had to be such as to cause reasonable apprehension of harm. 
• The Act does not define cruelty. Courts have developed its meaning through judicial interpretation. 

Types of Cruelty: 

Key Principles Laid Down by Courts: 

• Standard of proof: In matrimonial cases, cruelty must be proved on a preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt (Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, 1975). 
• Mental cruelty: It must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together (V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, 1994). 
• Illustrative instances: The Supreme Court gave a non-exhaustive list of instances that may amount to mental cruelty and stressed that ordinary wear and tear of married life is not cruelty (Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, 2007). 
• Whole-relationship approach: Cruelty is assessed by considering the entire matrimonial relationship, including the social and personal background of the parties.