List of Current Affairs

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal of the Allahabad High Court decided Mohd Saakir @ Mohd Sakir v. State of U.P. (2026). The Court held that a transgender woman, even after sex-reassignment surgery, would not fall within the statutory definition of ‘woman’ under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). Holding that prima facie no offence under Section 69 BNS was made out, the Court granted bail to a man accused of establishing a physical relationship with a transgender woman on a false promise of marriage. 

What was the Background of Mohd Saakir @ Mohd Sakir v. State of U.P. (2026) Case? 

• The informant, a transgender woman, had been in a relationship with the applicant for more than one and a half years on his promise to marry her. 
• She alleged that he later refused to marry her after taking more than ₹5 lakh from her. 
• The FIR further alleged that he had established a physical relationship with her on a false promise of marriage. 
• The applicant sought bail. His counsel submitted that:  
  • In her statements under Sections 180 and 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the informant stated that she was assigned male at birth and had undergone vulval reconstruction surgery on 11th April 2023. 
  • She had disclosed her transgender identity to the applicant before entering into the relationship. 
  • A medical panel report dated 19th August 2026 did not find her to be female, but a male with changed genital parts and without a uterus. 
  • Section 69 BNS requires the victim to be a woman, and Section 2(35) BNS defines a woman as only a female human being. 
• The State opposed the bail application, arguing that a transgender woman should not be excluded from the definition of woman merely because she was assigned male at birth and later underwent surgery. 
• Considering the importance of the legal question, the Court appointed Advocate Mayuri Mehrotra as amicus curiae. She submitted that:  
  • Relying on the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s judgment in Viswanathan Krishnamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, a trans woman cannot be excluded from the definition of woman. 
  • Under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026, a transgender woman who obtains a post-surgery certificate would be covered within the definition of woman. 
• The question before the Court was whether a transgender woman would be deemed a ‘woman’ for the purpose of Section 69 BNS. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the definition of ‘woman’ under the BNS: 

• Section 2(35) BNS defines ‘woman’ as a female human being of any age. 
• Section 2(10) BNS recognises male, female and transgender as genders, and adopts the definition of “transgender person” under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. 

On the applicable law: 

• Since the alleged incident took place before the amendment dated 30th March 2026, the unamended Section 2(k) of the 2019 Act would apply. 
• This definition includes trans men and trans women irrespective of whether they have undergone sex-reassignment surgery or hormone therapy. 

On the separate identity of transgender persons: 

• A transgender person has a separate identity under the 2019 Act. 
• A person assigned male at birth who becomes female after sex-reassignment surgery, or a person assigned female at birth who becomes male after such surgery, remains a transgender person, and not a male or female human being. 
• The word ‘woman’ in Section 69 BNS includes only a female human being. 
• Hence, a transgender woman does not fall within the definition of ‘woman’ under Section 69 BNS, even after sex-reassignment surgery. 

On the protection available to transgender persons: 

• The Court referred to Section 18(d) of the 2019 Act, which deals with acts causing harm or injury to a transgender person, including physical and sexual abuse. 

On legislative intent: 

• Report No. 246 of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs had recommended bringing transgender women within the purview of the rape provisions of the BNS through an appropriate amendment. 
• Parliament did not accept this recommendation, and the definition of ‘woman’ remained unchanged. 

On the scope of the ruling: 

• The Court clarified that its observation is confined to the interpretation of ‘woman’ under Section 69 BNS and not for any other offence. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court held that prima facie no offence under Section 69 BNS was made out and granted bail to the applicant, subject to conditions. 
• The Court appreciated the assistance of the amicus curiae and directed the High Court Legal Aid Services Committee to pay her ₹10,000 towards her fee.

What is Section 69 of the BNS? 

About: 

• Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means. 
• It is a new provision with no direct corresponding section in the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Under the IPC, such cases were generally dealt with under Section 375 read with Section 90 (consent given under misconception of fact). 

Provision: 

• Whoever, by deceitful means or by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
• Explanation: “Deceitful means” includes inducement for, or false promise of, employment or promotion, or marrying after suppressing identity. 

Essential Ingredients: 

• The victim must be a ‘woman’ as defined under Section 2(35) BNS. 
• Sexual intercourse must be obtained by deceitful means or by a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling it. 
• The act must not amount to the offence of rape. 

Related Provisions 

Section 2(35) BNS – Woman: 

• “Woman” means a female human being of any age. 

Section 2(10) BNS – Gender: 

• The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used for any person, whether male, female or transgender. 
• “Transgender” has the meaning assigned to it under Section 2(k) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019. 

Section 2(k) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (unamended) – Transgender Person: 

• A person whose gender does not match the gender assigned at birth. 
• Includes trans men and trans women (whether or not they have undergone sex-reassignment surgery, hormone therapy, laser therapy or any other therapy), persons with intersex variations, genderqueer persons, and persons with socio-cultural identities such as kinner, hijra, aravani and jogta. 

Section 18(d) of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019: 

• Penalises harming, injuring or endangering the life, safety, health or well-being (mental or physical) of a transgender person, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and economic abuse. 
• Punishment: imprisonment of not less than six months, which may extend to two years, along with fine. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court decided Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. (2026). The Court held that the right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950, and that children, irrespective of their age, enjoy the same right. The Court made these observations while issuing directions to strengthen mechanisms for detecting and removing Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material (CSEAM) from social media platforms and other online services. 

What was the Background of Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The matter arose through Miscellaneous Application Nos. 2553–2554 of 2026, filed in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161–2162 of 2024. 
• The 2024 criminal appeals in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish dealt with offences relating to child sexual abuse material, where the Supreme Court had recommended the use of the term “Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material” (CSEAM). 
• In the present proceedings, the Court considered directions for detecting and removing CSEAM across social media platforms and online services. 
• In this context, the Court examined whether children should be altogether shielded from the internet and social media for their own safety. 
• Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1063. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the right to access and use the internet: 

• The right to access and use the internet is a fundamental right of every individual under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
• Children, irrespective of their age, enjoy the same rights. Denying this right to them altogether would be as absurd as saying that children below a certain age have no conscience worth protecting or freedom of speech worth expressing. 
• The safety of children and their freedom are not at odds with each other. Children are entitled to both. 

On the internet as a part of free speech: 

• Freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to know and to receive and impart information and ideas. 
• The internet is a marketplace of ideas, creative expression and information. Its value lies not only in the information it holds but also in the access it gives to adults and children alike. 
• For many children, especially in remote areas, the internet is often the only source of learning and information. 
• For children with special needs, it is often the only place where they find companionship with others like them. 

On earlier precedents: 

• In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), the Court held that the freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to carry on trade or business through the medium of the internet are constitutionally protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g). However, it did not express a view on whether the right to access the internet by itself is a fundamental right. 
• In Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India (2025), the Court recognised the right to digital access as a fundamental right under Article 21. 
• Building on these precedents, the Court declared the right to use the internet a fundamental right that cannot be denied to children. 

On blanket restrictions on children’s internet access: 

• The internet, as it exists today, is far from safe for children. 
• However, keeping children away from the internet because intermediaries have failed to detect and remove harmful material would amount to mistaking the victim for the problem. 
• Children do not stop using the internet merely because the law prohibits it. They may move to unregulated and potentially more unsafe platforms. 
• Restrictions may make children who are being enticed or threatened online reluctant to report such incidents to parents, guardians or trusted adults, out of fear of being reprimanded. 
• Blanket restrictions are “unproven measures of proven disproportionality”, and no jurisdiction has so far shown that children are safer because of them. 
• Age-based restrictions would require identifying and verifying the age of every user, involving continuous collection and monitoring of sensitive data, which creates a disproportionate risk of misuse and surveillance. 

On proportionate safeguards for children: 

• Rejecting blanket restrictions does not mean there should be no age-based safeguards. 
• Some safeguards are necessary to ensure children’s online safety and to regulate the content accessible to them. 
• The system could place greater emphasis on parental consent, guidance and oversight over children’s access to social media, along with a dedicated “child mode” for their accounts. 
• Such safeguards could include:  
  • Making children’s accounts private by default. 
  • Restricting contact and messages from unknown adults. 
  • Moderating advertisements and content accessible to children. 
• These measures could be implemented for pre-teens, with reasonable and proportionate means of verifying parental consent. The modalities were left to the Union Government. 
• The Union Government is not prevented from restricting children’s access to specific categories of content or services that are inherently harmful to them, such as adult-content websites. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court declared the right to access and use the internet a fundamental right of every individual, including children. 
• It also issued a series of directions to detect and remove CSEAM, including the creation of a comprehensive national database to enable identification and removal of such content across social media platforms.

What is the Right to Access Internet under the Constitution? 

About: 

• The right to access and use the internet has now been recognised as a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
• It is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution but has been read into the existing fundamental rights through judicial interpretation. 

Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression: 

• Guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
• Includes the right to know, and to receive and impart information and ideas. 
• The internet is a medium through which this freedom is exercised. 

Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions: 

• The State may impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom under Article 19(1)(a) in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
• Any such restriction must satisfy the test of proportionality. 

Article 21 – Protection of Life and Personal Liberty: 

• No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
• The Supreme Court has expansively interpreted Article 21 to include rights such as the right to privacy, education, health and, now, digital access and the right to access and use the internet. 

Article 19(1)(g) – Freedom of Trade and Business: 

• Guarantees the right to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
• In Anuradha Bhasin, the Court held that this freedom, when exercised through the internet, is constitutionally protected.