List of Current Affairs

Source: Karnataka High Court

Why in News?

A single-judge bench of Justice H.P. Sandesh of the Karnataka High Court decided Yaseer Arafat & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026). The Court held that merely expressing dissatisfaction with a judgment of the Supreme Court, by calling it a "denial of justice" and raising a "voice for justice", does not attract Section 153A (now Section 196 BNS) or Section 295A (now Section 299 BNS) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  

• Exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings. 

What was the Background of Yaseer Arafat & Ors. v. The State of Karnataka & Anr. (2026) Case? 

• Following the pronouncement of a judgment by the Supreme Court, slogans were found painted on roadside walls in Mangalore. 
• The slogans described the judgment as a "denial of justice" and called for raising the "voice for justice". 
• The Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Mangalore South Police Station lodged a suo motu complaint, alleging that the slogans were painted by the accused and were linked to the Popular Front of India (PFI). 
• Alleging that the act was intended to create disharmony in the country, the police registered an FIR in 2019 against 13 persons. 
• The FIR invoked Sections 153A (promoting enmity between groups), 295A (deliberate acts to outrage religious feelings) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the IPC, along with Section 3 of the Karnataka open places disfigurement law. 
• The accused approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and further criminal proceedings. 
• Petitioners' contentions:  
  • The complaint, even if accepted as it stands, discloses no offence under the sections invoked. 
  • Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech, and disagreeing with a judgment is neither sedition nor an attempt to outrage religious feelings. 
  • Relying on Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra (2024), the right to dissent in a lawful manner is integral to democracy and is protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21. 
• State's contentions:  
  • The petitioners reacted immediately after the judgment by putting up slogans in a public place. 
  • The act was likely to create disharmony in the country. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the content of the complaint: 

• The complaint itself only stated that the slogans called the judgment a "denial of justice" and raised a "voice for justice". 
• If that is the wording used, the ingredients of Sections 153A and 295A IPC are not attracted. 

On dissent against a judgment: 

• Though the slogans expressed dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's judgment, this amounts only to dissent about the judgment and not to creating disharmony. 
• The Court observed that for invoking Section 153A, there must be an element of acting against the State, which was absent here. 
• Expressing disagreement with a verdict falls within the scope of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 

On the test under Section 153A (applying Javed Ahmad Hajam): 

• The test is the general impact of the words on a significant number of reasonable people. 
• The mere possibility that a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will is not sufficient to attract clause (a) of Section 153A(1) IPC. 

On the exercise of inherent power: 

• Having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court found it a fit case to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR and all further proceedings against the petitioners.

What is Section 196 of the BNS? 

About: 

• Section 196 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 deals with promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony. 
• It corresponds to Section 153A of the IPC. 

Provisions: 

• Section 196(1)(a): Whoever, by words (spoken or written), signs, visible representations, electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups, castes or communities. 
• Section 196(1)(b): Whoever commits any act prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups, which disturbs or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. 
• Section 196(1)(c): Whoever organises or participates in any exercise, movement, drill or similar activity intending or knowing that participants will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence against any such group. 
• Punishment: Imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both. 
• Section 196(2): If the offence is committed in a place of worship or in an assembly engaged in religious worship or ceremonies, imprisonment up to 5 years and fine. 

What is Section 299 of the BNS? 

About: 

• Section 299 of the BNS deals with deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. 
• It corresponds to Section 295A of the IPC. 

Provisions: 

• Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens, by words (spoken or written), signs, visible representations, electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or religious beliefs of that class. 
• Punishment: Imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both. 
• Essential ingredient: The intention must be deliberate and malicious. Insults made unwittingly or carelessly are not covered.

Source: Allahabad High Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Indrajeet Shukla of the Allahabad High Court decided M/s Vikas Constructions v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2026). The Court held that non-payment of contractual dues admitted by a State authority is arbitrary, and such dues can be recovered through a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court directed the Nagar Panchayat to pay the admitted dues with simple interest at 6% per annum. 

What was the Background of M/s Vikas Constructions v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2026) Case? 

• The petitioner, a civil contractor, carried out construction work for the Nagar Panchayat, Chandauli under two work orders. 
• It claimed that bills amounting to Rs. 28,43,443 remained unpaid despite an application and reminders. 
• The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 seeking recovery of the outstanding dues. 
• The High Court directed the Executive Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Chandauli to state on personal affidavit whether the claim was admitted. 
• Respondents’ stand in the affidavit:  
  • Rs. 7,92,580 remained unpaid against the first work order, and the respondents were ready to consider its payment. 
  • The balance of Rs. 6,31,890 under the second work order could not be released because the petitioner had submitted an incomplete Form No. 26 instead of a bill in the prescribed format, and certification by the engineers was pending. 
  • Completion of the work was not disputed. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On maintainability of a writ for money claims: 

• The bar on deciding money claims in writ jurisdiction is not absolute. 
• Relying on Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager (2025), the Court noted that money claims can be decided under Article 226 where non-payment of admitted dues is arbitrary. 
• Under State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (1996), seriously disputed contractual claims must be decided in a civil suit, but admitted claims withheld on grounds such as lack of funds can be enforced in writ jurisdiction. 

On the admitted dues: 

• The dues were clear and categorical, and the respondent had admitted them in a personal affidavit. 
• There was no dispute that the work had been done and that the respondents were obliged to clear the outstanding amount. 
• Withholding admitted dues for an uncertain period is arbitrary and cannot be sustained in law. 
• Refusing to interfere would result in undue enrichment of the respondents at the cost of the petitioner’s legitimate claim. 

On the two amounts: 

• Rs. 7,92,580 under the first work order was an absolute admission and had to be paid. 
• Rs. 6,31,890 under the second work order would be paid once the petitioner completed the formalities indicated in the affidavit. 

On interest: 

• Relying on Dr. Poornima Advani & Anr. v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2025), the Court held that a person deprived of money legitimately due to him is entitled to be compensated by way of interest. 

Conclusion: 

• The Court allowed the writ petition.  
• The petitioner was directed to raise a fresh bill for the second work order within a fortnight, and the respondents were directed to pay the entire admitted dues within four weeks with simple interest at 6% per annum from the date the dues fell due until payment.

What is Article 226 of the Constitution of India? 

About: 

• Article 226 empowers every High Court to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including the Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. 
• Writs may be issued in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. 

Provisions: 

• Article 226(1): High Courts may issue writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and “for any other purpose”, which makes their writ jurisdiction wider than that of the Supreme Court under Article 32. 
• Article 226(2): A High Court may issue writs even to an authority outside its territory if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial jurisdiction. 
• Article 226(3): Where an interim order is passed without hearing the other party, that party may apply for its vacation, and the application must be disposed of within two weeks. 
• Article 226(4): The power under Article 226 does not derogate from the Supreme Court’s power under Article 32. 

Nature of the jurisdiction: 

• The remedy under Article 226 is discretionary. 
• The High Court ordinarily declines to interfere where an equally efficacious alternative remedy is available, though this is a rule of self-restraint and not a bar on jurisdiction.