List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu of the Supreme Court decided Dr MK Ravi Varma v. National Institute of Technology & Ors. (2026). The Court dismissed appeals filed by teachers whose Academic Grade Pay benefits were withdrawn after being found to have been granted by mistake, and upheld the Kerala High Court Division Bench’s order permitting the recovery. 

What was the Background of Dr MK Ravi Varma v. National Institute of Technology (2026) Case? 

• The appellants, teachers at a National Institute of Technology (NIT), were granted Academic Grade Pay around October 2009. 
• The benefit was withdrawn in January 2010 on the ground that the teachers had not completed the requisite years of service. 
• The teachers challenged the withdrawal through a writ petition before the Kerala High Court. 

Proceedings before the High Court: 

• A Single Judge allowed the writ petitions in November 2014, ruling in favour of the teachers. 
• In appeal, a Division Bench reversed this decision in November 2015, holding that the NIT had merely corrected a mistake. 
• The Division Bench also found that the teachers had not performed any additional duties because of their placement as Associate Professors and did not fall within any exceptional category. 
• Aggrieved, the teachers filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. 

Question framed by the Supreme Court: 

• Whether financial benefits voluntarily extended to a class of teachers, without any misrepresentation, fraud or fault on their part, could be withdrawn. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the history of precedents on recovery of excess payments: 

• The Court noted that State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), relied upon by the appellants, has a prior history and cannot be read in isolation. 
• In Chandi Prasad Uniyal v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court had held that:  
  • There is no principle that excess pay can be recovered only upon proof of misrepresentation or fraud by the recipient. 
  • Any amount paid or received without the authority of law can ordinarily be recovered, subject to limited exceptions of extreme hardship, which are not available as a matter of right. 
  • In such cases, the law implies an obligation on the payee to repay, failing which it would amount to unjust enrichment. 

On the apparent conflict and its resolution: 

• In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, an apparent conflict was noticed between Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India and Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana on one side, and Chandi Prasad Uniyal on the other. The question was referred to a 3-Judge Bench. 
• The 3-Judge Bench found no conflict, holding that:  
  • In Sahib Ram and Shyam Babu Verma, directions were issued under Article 142. 
  • Chandi Prasad Uniyal laid down the law under Article 136. 
• The present bench understood this to mean that Chandi Prasad Uniyal declared binding law under Article 141, while decisions following Sahib Ram and Shyam Babu Verma, being rendered under Article 142, lack the efficacy of binding precedent. 

On the course taken in later decisions: 

• The Court observed that the bench in Rafiq Masih (White Washer) did not apply Chandi Prasad Uniyal and instead followed the approach adopted in Sahib Ram, Shyam Babu Verma and Syed Abdul Qadir. 
• It noted that Thomas Daniel v. State of Kerala considered neither Chandi Prasad Uniyal nor the 3-Judge Bench decision in Rafiq Masih. 

On Section 72 of the Contract Act: 

• The Court remarked that no precedent in this line had discussed the applicability of Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, though the reasoning in Chandi Prasad Uniyal appears to draw inspiration from it. 
• It clarified that it was not casting doubt on the coordinate bench decisions in Rafiq Masih and Thomas Daniel, but only highlighting that the law may not have developed on correct lines. 

On the effect of an undertaking: 

• Relying on High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Jagdev Singh, the Court reiterated that the protection under the second category of paragraph 18 of Rafiq Masih does not apply where the employee was put on notice that excess payments would have to be refunded and furnished an undertaking to that effect. 

Application to the facts: 

• The NIT had placed on record undertakings given by the teachers agreeing to recovery if the pay fixation was found erroneous. 
• The Court held that a mistake had been committed in extending the benefit, which was withdrawn immediately upon detection. 
• In view of the undertakings, the recovery did not warrant interference in writ jurisdiction, and the Division Bench was right in reversing the Single Judge. 
• The appellants relied on a letter from the Director, Ministry of Human Resource Development, stating that benefits already given would not be recovered from academic staff of NITs. The Court rejected this, noting that the recovery had been effected two years before the writ petition was filed. 
• The appeals were dismissed and the Division Bench’s order was upheld. 

What is Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872? 

About: 

• Section 72 falls under Chapter V of the Act, which deals with “Of certain relations resembling those created by contract” (quasi-contracts). 
• It provides that a person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it. 

Key features: 

• The obligation arises by operation of law, not from any agreement between the parties. 
• It is founded on the principle of unjust enrichment: no person should retain a benefit to which they are not legally entitled. 
• The term “mistake” covers both mistake of fact and mistake of law. 
• The term “coercion” is used in its general sense and is not confined to the definition in Section 15 of the Act. 

What are the Exceptions Laid Down in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (2015)? 

In paragraph 18 of the judgment, the Supreme Court listed situations where recovery of excess payments by the employer would be impermissible: 

• Recovery from employees belonging to Class III and Class IV (Group C and Group D) services. 
• Recovery from retired employees, or employees due to retire within one year of the order of recovery. 
• Recovery where the excess payment was made for a period exceeding five years before the order of recovery was issued. 
• Recovery where an employee was wrongfully required to discharge the duties of a higher post and was paid accordingly, even though entitled to work against an inferior post. 
• Any other case where the court concludes that recovery would be iniquitous, harsh or arbitrary to such an extent as to outweigh the employer’s right to recover. 

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice R Mahadevan of the Supreme Court decided Haramani Sahoo & Ors. v. Lalita Nayak & Ors. (2026). The Court set aside the orders of the trial court and the Orissa High Court refusing amendment of the plaint, and allowed the amendment subject to costs of Rs 25,000, while explaining the law on amendment of pleadings after commencement of trial. 

What was the Background of Haramani Sahoo v. Lalita Nayak (2026) Case? 

• The appellants (plaintiffs) sought to amend their plaint in a civil suit concerning a parcel of land, after the trial had already commenced. 
• The proposed amendment sought to introduce additional matters and reliefs, which the appellants claimed were based on a subsequent discovery of a relevant document or transaction. 
• The respondents opposed the amendment on grounds including delay, limitation, and prejudice from having to meet fresh pleadings. 

Proceedings before the lower courts: 

• The trial court rejected the application for amendment. 
• The Orissa High Court upheld the trial court’s refusal. 
• Aggrieved, the appellants approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the scope of Order VI Rule 17 CPC: 

• The rule confers a discretionary power on the court to allow amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. 
• Its object is twofold:  
  • To enable effective and complete adjudication of the dispute. 
  • To prevent a party from introducing, at a late stage, matters that could have been raised earlier with due diligence. 

On the proviso and due diligence: 

• Where an amendment is sought after the trial has commenced, the proviso is attracted, and the applicant must show due diligence. 
• Belatedness alone is not decisive. The central question is whether, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised before trial began. 
• An explanation founded on subsequent discovery cannot be dismissed as mere omission, inadvertence or negligence. 

On change in nature of the suit: 

• Relying on AK Gupta & Sons Ltd v. Damodar Valley Corporation, the Court distinguished between:  
  • An amendment that sets up an entirely new case or cause of action; and 
  • An amendment that merely offers a different or additional approach to the same facts. 
• Reiterating Abdul Rahman v. Mohd Ruldu, the Court held that a change in the relief claimed does not by itself change the nature of the suit, and the power of amendment should be exercised in the interest of complete justice. 

Factors governing amendment (Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons): 

• Whether the amendment is imperative for proper and effective adjudication. 
• Whether the application is bona fide or mala fide. 
• Whether it causes prejudice that cannot be adequately compensated in money. 
• Whether refusal would lead to injustice or multiple litigation. 
• Whether it fundamentally alters the nature and character of the case. 
• As a general rule, amendment should be declined if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be time-barred on the date of the application. 

On a liberal approach: 

• Citing Life Insurance Corporation v. Sanjeev Builders and Akkiraju Panduranga Rao v. Gunlapally Ranga Rao, the Court reiterated that courts should avoid a hypertechnical approach and be liberal, especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. 

On limitation: 

• A claim clearly barred by limitation, particularly one that would defeat an accrued right of the opposite party, is a relevant consideration. 
• However, where limitation is itself arguable and turns on disputed facts, such as when or how the plaintiff learnt of the relevant document or transaction, the amendment need not be rejected at the threshold. 
• The Court relied on Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu (mere delay is not by itself a ground for refusal) and Pankaja v. Yellappa (no absolute rule that an amendment must be rejected merely because the relief is alleged to be time-barred). 

On merits at the amendment stage: 

• At this stage, the court examines only whether the amendment is permissible, not the ultimate merits or maintainability of the new reliefs. 
• Such objections cannot be finally decided unless the proposed claim is ex facie barred in law; the opposite party remains free to raise them before the trial court. 

On prejudice and multiplicity of proceedings: 

• The need for fresh pleadings is not a ground to refuse amendment. Prejudice arising from additional factual and legal issues can be addressed by allowing an additional written statement and, where necessary, imposing costs. 
• Refusal could fragment the controversy over the same property into separate proceedings, risking inconsistent findings on the same land. 
• Balancing this against the considerable delay and inconvenience to the respondents, the Court found it appropriate to allow the amendment subject to costs. 

Clarifications: 

• Allowing the amendment does not amount to acceptance of the averments, nor does it confer any declaration or substantive right on the appellants. 
• Maintainability, limitation and merits remain open for the trial court to decide in accordance with law. 
• The orders of the trial court and the Orissa High Court were set aside, and the amendment was allowed subject to costs of Rs 25,000. 

What is Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC? 

About: 

• Order VI deals with pleadings generally, and Rule 17 governs the amendment of pleadings. 
• The court may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend its pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just. 
• All amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties shall be made. 

Proviso: 

• No application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court concludes that, in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 

Legislative history: 

• Rule 17 was omitted by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999, owing to concerns that frequent amendments delayed trials. 
• It was restored by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002, with the addition of the proviso restricting post-trial amendments. 

Key principles: 

• The power is discretionary and must be exercised judicially. 
• Amendments that are necessary to decide the real controversy should generally be allowed. 
• Amendments should not be allowed where they introduce a time-barred claim that defeats a valuable accrued right, are mala fide, or cause prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs. 
• Courts are more liberal with amendments to the plaint before trial, and stricter after trial has commenced, where due diligence must be shown.