List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice K Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court decided Gopal Lodhi v. State of MP & Anr. (2026). The Court set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order quashing a rape case on the basis of a compromise and directed the trial to proceed, while granting anticipatory bail to the accused with conditions. 

What was the Background of Gopal Lodhi v. State of MP (2026) Case? 

• A case was registered against the petitioner under:  
  • Sections 64(1), 33(2) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). 
  • Sections 3(1)(w)(i), 3(1)(w)(ii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). 
• The petitioner approached the Supreme Court seeking anticipatory bail. 
• During the proceedings, the petitioner’s counsel informed the Court that:  
  • The matter had been compromised between the parties. 
  • The High Court had disposed of an application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), accepting the compromise in exercise of its inherent powers. 
• Considering the seriousness of the offence, the Supreme Court expressed discomfort and examined the decisions relied upon by the High Court. 

Question before the Supreme Court: 

• Whether a case involving a heinous offence such as rape could be quashed by the High Court under its inherent powers solely on the basis of a settlement between the parties. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the precedents relied upon by the High Court: 

• The Court noted that Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Anita Maria Dias & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. cautioned that inherent power to quash should not be exercised in cases involving heinous and serious offences showing mental depravity, or offences like murder, rape and dacoity, which cannot be termed private in nature. 
• In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, it was held that when parties settle, the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) (now Section 528 of the BNSS) may be invoked, except where:  
  • The offences are heinous and serious, involving mental depravity, such as murder, rape or dacoity. 
  • The offences fall under special statutes such as the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
• In Shambhu Kharwar v. State of UP, the case was quashed because the allegations themselves showed that the relationship was consensual, and not merely because of a settlement. 
• The Court was not prima facie satisfied that these decisions enabled the High Court to quash a complaint alleging rape on the basis of a compromise, and called for the records of the case from the High Court. 

On the limits of inherent jurisdiction: 

• Quashing a case under Section 482 CrPC relying solely on a compromise, especially in a non-compoundable offence, would amount to stepping outside the jurisdiction under that provision. 
• Such quashing would also be in violation of the scheme of compounding under Section 320 CrPC. 

On coerced settlements and false complaints: 

• The Court expressed concern not only about settlements that may be arrived at through coercion by the accused, but also about the possibility of a multiplicity of false complaints being made with the lure of a future financial settlement. 

On the interaction with the victim: 

• The bench interacted with the victim through the office of the District Legal Services Authority, in the presence of its Secretary. 
• The victim stated that she was coerced into the settlement, that she was not ready for a settlement, and that she required money for settlement. 
• She categorically stated that she had made the complaint and stated the truth in it. 
• The Court clarified that the truth of the allegations would have to be examined at trial, and expressed no opinion on them. 

Directions issued: 

• The order of the High Court quashing the case was set aside, and the trial was directed to proceed. 
• The petitioner was granted anticipatory bail subject to conditions. 
• The Court distinguished the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. 

What is Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023? 

About: 

• Section 528 of the BNSS saves the inherent powers of the High Court. It corresponds to Section 482 of the CrPC. 
• It provides that nothing in the Sanhita shall limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary:  
  • To give effect to any order under the Sanhita, 
  • To prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or 
  • Otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 

Key features: 

• The provision does not confer any new power; it only recognises and preserves powers inherent in the High Court. 
• The power is to be exercised sparingly, with caution, and only in exceptional cases. 
• It cannot be used to override express provisions of the Sanhita. 

Quashing on the basis of compromise: 

• The power to quash criminal proceedings on settlement is distinct from the power to compound offences. 
• Following Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, offences that are predominantly civil, commercial, matrimonial or private in nature may be quashed on settlement where continuing the proceedings would be futile. 
• Heinous and serious offences such as murder, rape and dacoity, which affect society at large, are ordinarily not to be quashed merely because the parties have settled. 

Compounding of offences – Section 359 of the BNSS: 

• Section 359 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 320 of the CrPC) lists the offences that may be compounded, either without permission or with the permission of the court. 
• Offences not specified in the provision are non-compoundable and cannot be compounded. 
• Rape under Section 64 of the BNS is a non-compoundable offence. 

Source: Punjab and Haryana High Court

Why in News? 

Justice Deepak Gupta of the Punjab and Haryana High Court decided Janhit Sewa Charitable Trust (Regd.) v. Smt. Ashulika Sharma & Anr. (2026). The Court partly allowed a revision petition filed by the trust and restrained the daughter-in-law of a deceased life trustee from acting as a trustee on the strength of her mother-in-law's will until the suit is decided. 

What was the Background of Janhit Sewa Charitable Trust v. Ashulika Sharma (2026) Case? 

• The trust was created by a deed dated 2nd June 1989, with Shambhu Dayal Shastri as "the trustee". Its objects included relief to the poor, education and medical relief, and it was undisputedly a public charitable trust. 
• In 2004, Shastri appointed his wife Asharfi Devi and his two sons, Prahlad Sharma and Mahender Sharma, as whole-life trustees. 
• After Shastri's death in 2007, the trustees chose Prahlad Sharma as principal trustee and chairman. 
• Mahender Sharma (Defendant No. 2) was removed as trustee by a resolution in August 2015, following an FIR over an alleged assault on the trust's sewadars. The High Court declined to stay his removal in 2017, and his challenge remains pending in a separate suit. 
• Asharfi Devi died in 2019, leaving a registered will dated 6th October 2015, which:  
  • Bequeathed her properties to Mahender Sharma and stated that he would accordingly be "head" of the trusts. 
  • Made his wife, Ashulika Sharma (Defendant No. 1), "nominee" for the trusts in which the testatrix was a lifetime trustee. 
• The trust filed a suit seeking:  
  • A declaration that the will, insofar as it appointed either defendant as trustee, was void and not binding on the trust. 
  • An injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the trust's functioning. 

Proceedings before the Lower Courts: 

• In 2019, the trial court granted interim protection, noting that neither the trust deed nor the supplementary deed allowed a trustee to appoint a successor by will. 
• In March 2026, however, the trial court dismissed the injunction application, and the Additional District Judge, Faridabad, affirmed that order, holding that:  
  • The registered will carried a presumption of genuineness. 
  • Clause 6(b) of the trust deed empowered the testatrix to nominate a trustee. 
  • An injunction would amount to grant of final relief. 
  • Related questions were pending in other suits. 
• Aggrieved, the trust filed a revision petition before the High Court. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

On the scope of interference under Article 227: 

• Citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India, the Court acknowledged that it does not sit in appeal over discretionary interlocutory orders. 
• However, relying on Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil and Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, it held that discretion resting on a misreading of the basic document, non-consideration of material evidence, or a wrong legal premise is not judicious and can be corrected. 
• The Court held that concurrence of two courts does not protect an order whose foundation is a misconstruction of a document. 

On the construction of the trust deed: 

• The deed defined "the trustee" as the founder and his "successors in office", and used singular language throughout. 
• Clause 6(b) allowed "the trustee" to nominate successors in office and, where more than one person was nominated, to frame rules for their meetings. 
• Read as a whole, the power under Clause 6(b) belonged to the single founder-trustee as a means of providing for the office after him. 
• It did not prima facie allow each member of a group of successor-trustees to carve out and perpetuate a personal seat by will. 
• If it did, each life trustee could hand a seat to a person of their choice, turning management of a public trust into a family entitlement, which would be contrary to Clauses 9 and 10 of the deed that irrevocably dedicate the trust property to public charitable purposes. 

On the applicability of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882: 

• The Court accepted that Section 1 of the Act excludes public charitable trusts from its application. 
• Nevertheless, the general equitable principles underlying Sections 47, 73 and 75 of the Act apply. Under these principles:  
  • A trustee cannot delegate the office. 
  • New trustees are appointed by the person empowered by the instrument, or failing such person, by the continuing trustees or the court, and not by the will of a deceased co-trustee. 

On the competence of the testatrix: 

• There was nothing to show that Asharfi Devi was ever the founder's sole successor in office, or that any rule authorised an individual life trustee to nominate her own successor. 
• The collective choice of a chairman after the founder's death pointed towards collective rather than individual succession. 
• The Court held that even if the will was genuine and validly executed, it could not confer a right which the testatrix herself was not competent to pass on. 

On the errors of the lower courts: 

• The courts below read Clause 6(b) in isolation, which went to the very foundation of the prima facie case. This was not merely a choice between two plausible readings. 
• The trial court departed from its own 2019 prima facie view without giving reasons. 
• The appellate court treated the testatrix's attendance at a Satsang in January 2016 as answering the plea of mental incapacity, which the High Court termed a premature appreciation of evidence. It expressed no opinion on capacity, as the case turned on her competence under the deed. 
• The respondents' claim that the will was not challenged was factually incorrect, since the first relief in the suit was a declaration that the will was void. 

On interim relief amounting to final relief: 

• The principle laid down in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra that interim relief should not amount to final relief did not apply. 
• Restraining the defendants merely preserved the position as it stood during the testatrix's lifetime. 

On the maintainability objections: 

• Objections to the trustee's authority to sue, and those under Section 92 and Order 31 of the CPC, had been rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 in 2024, and that order was never challenged. 
• Relying on Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R., the Court noted that a suit by a public trust against persons claiming its management does not necessarily fall within Section 92 of the CPC. 
• Since earlier litigation was disclosed in the plaint, no deliberate suppression was made out. 

On balance of convenience: 

• The trust handles public donations, and allowing a person whose title is prima facie doubtful to participate in management could expose its decisions and accounts to challenge. 
• Ashulika Sharma held no office in the trust during the testatrix's lifetime, and refusing her interim relief would cause her no irreparable loss. 

On the position of Mahender Sharma: 

• His claim under the will was as unsustainable as his wife's. 
• However, his independent claim to trusteeship depends on the validity of his 2015 removal, which is pending in another suit. 
• The Court did not consider the submission regarding his conviction in the assault case, since the judgment was not on record and his appeal is pending. 

Directions issued: 

• Until the suit is decided, Ashulika Sharma is restrained from acting as, or holding herself out as, a trustee, and from obstructing the trust's functioning, management, accounts or property on the strength of the will. 
• Mahender Sharma shall not claim to be, or act as, trustee or head of the trust on the basis of the will. His independent claim remains governed by the 2017 order and the pending suits. 
• The managing trustees shall maintain proper accounts, including donation-box collections, as required by Clause 7 of the deed, and file half-yearly statements before the trial court with copies to the defendants. 
• All observations were clarified to be prima facie and shall not affect the trial on merits or the other pending suits. 

What are the Legal Principles Governing Appointment of Trustees? 

About: 

• A public charitable trust is one created for the benefit of the public at large or a section of it, for purposes such as relief of the poor, education or medical relief. 
• Under Section 1 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, the Act does not apply to public or private religious or charitable endowments. However, courts have applied the equitable principles underlying the Act to such trusts. 

Section 47 – Trustee Cannot Delegate: 

• A trustee cannot delegate the office or any of the duties to a co-trustee or a stranger. 
• Exceptions exist where the instrument of trust so provides, the delegation is in the regular course of business, it is necessary, or the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents. 

Section 73 – Appointment of New Trustees: 

• A new trustee may be appointed when a trustee dies, remains absent from India, is declared insolvent, desires to be discharged, refuses to act, or becomes unfit or personally incapable of acting. 
• The appointment is made by the person nominated for that purpose in the instrument of trust, or failing such person, by the author of the trust or the surviving or continuing trustees. 

Section 75 – Vesting of Trust Property in New Trustees: 

• A newly appointed trustee has the same powers, authorities and discretions, and acts in all respects as if originally nominated as trustee. 

Key features: 

• Trusteeship is an office of personal confidence and not a heritable property right. 
• Succession to the office is governed by the instrument of trust, the continuing trustees or the court, and not by testamentary disposition.