List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court

Why in News?

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran of the Supreme Court decided Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel v. Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (2026). The Court dismissed an appeal against a Gujarat High Court order that had granted non-parties leave to appeal against a consent decree. It held that a stranger to a compromise decree is not barred from appealing if the decree prejudicially affects their rights or interests. 

What was the Background of Girishbhai Natwarlal Patel v. Gautam Punjabhai Palkhiwala (2026) Case? 

• The dispute concerned a parcel of land in Gujarat. 
• A Cooperative Housing Society filed a suit for specific performance, based on an agreement to sell, against the legal heirs of the original owner. 
• The suit ended in a compromise decree in favour of the Society. 
• In 2020, the decree was put into execution, and a sale deed was executed through a Court Commissioner in favour of the appellant, Patel, with the Society joining as a confirming party. 
• Nine persons (Respondent Nos. 1–9), claiming through the HUF associated with the original purchaser of the land, approached the Gujarat High Court. They alleged that:  
  • The consent decree and the proceedings that followed were the result of fraud and collusion. 
  • The original seller’s legal heirs had no subsisting title to transfer the property. 
  • The proceedings had prejudiced their rights. 
• They relied on documents obtained under the RTI process, which allegedly showed the appellant’s close association with the Society, including his position as its chairman in 2002–2003. 

Proceedings before the High Court: 

• The High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from entering upon, selling, transferring, mortgaging, leasing or creating third-party rights in the disputed property. 
• The High Court then:  
  • Continued the injunction. 
  • Condoned a delay of about 11 years. 
  • Granted Respondent Nos. 1–9 leave to appeal against the consent decree. 
• Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the scope of the bar under Section 96(3) and Order XXIII: 

• The estoppel arising from a consent decree operates only among the parties to the decree, not against a stranger who was never a party to it. 
• A person who was neither a party to the original proceedings nor to the compromise cannot be treated as having consented to the decree just because others consented to it. 
• Such a person is not barred under Section 96(3) read with Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A of the CPC, because those provisions are limited to the parties to the compromise. 

On the limits of a non-party’s right to appeal: 

• Being a non-party does not give an unrestricted right of appeal. 
• The non-party must:  
  • Show prima facie that the impugned decree prejudicially affects their rights or interests. 
  • Obtain leave of the appellate court under the settled principles governing appeals by non-parties. 

On who may appeal under Section 96 of the CPC: 

The Court summarised that an appeal under Section 96 may be filed by: 

• Any party to the suit adversely affected by the decree or, if that party is dead, their legal representative. 
• Any transferee of the interest of such a party who is bound by the decree, to the extent of that interest. 
• A non-party, only with leave of the appellate court. Leave should be granted where the person:  
  • Would be aggrieved or prejudicially affected by the judgment. 
  • Would be bound by it as res judicata under Explanation VI to Section 11 of the CPC. 
  • Is bound by the order or aggrieved by it. 
• As a rule, leave will not be refused to a person who could have been made a party (ex nominee). 
• Whether a person is adversely affected by a decree is a question of fact, decided on the circumstances of each case. 

On the test for granting leave against a consent decree: 

• An application for leave to appeal against a consent decree must be examined under the same principles that apply to a non-party challenging an ordinary decree passed after adjudication. 
• The deciding question is whether the applicant has shown a legally cognisable interest that the impugned decree prejudicially affects. 
• That the decree is a consent decree neither removes this requirement nor, by itself, bars the grant of leave. 

On the facts of the case: 

• For the limited purpose of deciding whether they could seek leave, the material on record showed that Respondent Nos. 1–9 had asserted a legally cognisable interest that the consent decree may prejudicially affect. 
• Not being parties to the original suit or the compromise did not, by itself, disentitle them from seeking leave where the decree allegedly impinged on their independent rights. 
• The High Court was therefore justified in granting leave to appeal. 

Clarification: 

• The conclusion was confined to the respondents’ standing to challenge the decree and the need for appellate scrutiny. 
• It was not an opinion on the merits of their claim to the land or on the truth of the allegations of fraud and collusion, which must be decided in accordance with law. 

Outcome: 

• The High Court’s order was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. 

What is a Consent Decree? 

• A consent decree (or compromise decree) is a decree passed by the court on the basis of a lawful agreement or compromise between the parties, rather than after adjudication on merits. 
• It is essentially a contract between the parties with the seal of the court on it. It binds the parties to it and operates as an estoppel between them.

What is Section 96 of CPC? 

Section 96 – Appeal from Original Decree: 

• Section 96(1): Unless this Code or any other law in force expressly provides otherwise, an appeal lies from every decree passed by a court exercising original jurisdiction. The appeal goes to the court authorised to hear appeals from that court’s decisions. 
• Section 96(2s): An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. 
• Section 96(3): No appeal lies from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. 
• Section 96(4): No appeal lies from a decree in a suit of the kind Courts of Small Causes can hear, where the amount or value of the original suit’s subject matter does not exceed ten thousand rupees. The only exception is an appeal on a question of law. 

Source: Allahabad High Court 

Why in News?

Justice Pankaj Bhatia of the Allahabad High Court decided Smt. Archana Boodh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2026). The Court held that continuing KGBV teachers on contract for years on low pay, with no step towards creating posts or regularising them, amounts to forced labour under Article 23. It directed the State to sanction posts, frame service conditions on par with regular teachers and consider regularisation claims within four months. 

What was the Background of Smt. Archana Boodh v. State of U.P. (2026) Case? 

About the KGBV Scheme: 

• The Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV) Scheme was launched in 2004 under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan. 
• It provides residential schooling to girls from socially, educationally and economically backward sections in rural and remote areas. 
• It was later merged into Samagra Shiksha. 
• Teachers were first engaged through a selection process held under an advertisement dated 10th July 2009. Since then, they have been appointed on contract from year to year on an honorarium. 

About the Petitioners: 

• The petitioner in the leading writ petition has worked in a KGBV since 11th January 2010, on a contract renewed from time to time. 
• In the connected petition filed by Reeta Verma and 376 others, 270 petitioners had served for more than 10 years, and the rest for shorter periods. 
• Part-time teachers receive an honorarium of Rs. 12,790 per month. After a 25% EPF deduction, Rs. 9,592 is left in hand. 

Terms of Engagement under the Government Orders: 

• Teachers are engaged for 11 months and 29 days, with a one-day gap before the next academic year. 
• Contracts are not renewed if services are unsatisfactory or no longer required. 
• Services may be terminated on one month’s notice or, in extreme cases, without notice. 

Petitioners’ Contentions: 

• Most of the petitioners have crossed the age limit for entering any other service, and the State has exploited this vulnerability by denying them job security. 
• Their duties are similar to those of teachers governed by the U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, who receive statutory salaries and protection in State-run and aided schools. 
• Since the State set up these schools to discharge its obligation under Article 21-A read with the RTE Act, it must give reasonable service conditions to the teachers who help it do so. 
• By a Government Order dated 9th April 2026, the State raised the honorarium of:  
  • Shiksha Mitras and part-time instructors in primary and upper primary schools from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 18,000 per month. 
  • Part-time teachers from Rs. 9,000 to Rs. 17,000 per month (payable for 11 months a year). 
• The petitioners’ own representation for Rs. 17,000 per month remained undecided. 

State’s Contentions: 

• No posts had been sanctioned for KGBV teachers. 
• The engagement was co-terminus with the scheme. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

On the nature of the petitioners’ work: 

• The petitioners were appointed after a selection process. 
• Studies of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, the National Education Policy, 2020 and the Ministry of Education’s framework for implementing Samagra Shiksha all recognise their role as similar in every respect to that of regularly appointed teachers in State-run and aided schools. 
• There was no material to show that their work was in any way different. 

On the plea that no posts existed and the engagement was co-terminus with the scheme: 

• The Court rejected this plea because:  
  • The scheme has run for over two decades. 
  • The work is perennial in nature. 
  • The State is obliged under Section 8(d) of the RTE Act to provide teaching staff. 

On the applicability of the RTE Act, 2009: 

• KGBVs fall within the definition of “school” under Section 2(n). 
• Section 7(1) makes funding a concurrent responsibility of the Centre and the States, but Section 7(5) makes the State Government responsible for providing funds to implement the Act. 
• Section 8 obliges the appropriate Government to:  
  • Provide teaching staff. 
  • Ensure good quality elementary education conforming to prescribed standards. 
  • Ensure that children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups are not discriminated against. 

On discrimination against disadvantaged students: 

• Students in Government and aided schools are taught by well-paid teachers, while disadvantaged students in KGBVs are taught by ill-paid teachers working under insecure conditions. 
• The Court held this to be clear discrimination against the disadvantaged students studying in KGBVs. 

On the duties and protections of KGBV teachers: 

• Under Sections 23 to 28 of the RTE Act, KGBV teachers and teachers of other State-run schools have similar duties and obligations. 
• However, KGBV teachers do not get even the benefit of the proviso to Section 24(2), which requires a reasonable opportunity of hearing before disciplinary action. 
• Rule 20 of the RTE Rules, 2010 requires terms of service to be notified so as to create a professional and permanent cadre. No such rules have been framed for KGBV teachers, whose appointment, salary and service conditions are still governed by Government Orders. 

On the inadequacy of the honorarium: 

• The honorarium paid is even less than what is prescribed for semi-skilled workers. 
• The Court remarked that calling it an “honorarium” was a cruel joke. 

On the doctrine of purity of means: 

• Referring to Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court held that a laudable end does not justify unconstitutional means. 
• The end, namely the education of deprived students, especially girls, is laudable and has achieved considerable success, as reports of the Ministry of Education and NCERT show. 
• The means adopted, however, are not:  
  • Teachers have been paid inadequately. 
  • They have been denied any security. 
  • They have been continued for years on a low honorarium without any step towards regularisation. 
• Engaging teachers for 11 months and 29 days with a one-day gap, and providing that contracts will not be renewed if services are not required, even without notice, is inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution and violates the RTE Act. 

Conclusion on Articles 14 and 23: 

• Continuing the petitioners on contract for years without creating posts, absorbing them or paying them on par with regularly appointed teachers is a form of forced labour prohibited by Article 23. 
• It violates the petitioners’ rights under Articles 14 and 23 in Part III and is inconsistent with the Directive Principles in Part IV. 

Directions issued: 

• Within four months, the State Government shall:  
  • Create posts of teachers for KGBVs in Uttar Pradesh, keeping in view the Schedule to the RTE Act. 
  • Frame service conditions for all KGBV teachers, including those who are not petitioners, on par with those for regularly appointed teachers up to the Intermediate level. 
  • Have regularisation claims against the newly created posts considered by the competent authority, having regard to qualifications and length of service. 
  • Revise the honorarium periodically to bring it on par with the salaries of teachers in its own and aided schools. 
• Until these steps are taken:  
  • All KGBV teachers, including the petitioners, shall be paid Rs. 17,000 per month from the date of the judgment. 
  • They shall be entitled to protection of their services under Section 24(2) of the RTE Act. 
• On funding:  
  • The Central Government is responsible for sharing the expenditure as agreed. 
  • The State cannot claim that the directions must await central funds. It may recover the central share on the principle of “pay and recover”. 
• The writ petitions were disposed of.

What is Article 23 of the COI? 

Article 23 – Prohibition of Traffic in Human Beings and Forced Labour: 

Text of the Provision: 

• Article 23(1): Traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited. Any contravention of this provision is an offence punishable in accordance with law. 
• Article 23(2): The State may impose compulsory service for public purposes. While imposing such service, the State shall not discriminate only on grounds of religion, race, caste or class, or any of them. 

Key Features: 

• The right is available to both citizens and non-citizens. 
• It protects individuals against the State as well as private persons. 
• It places a positive obligation on the State to abolish exploitative practices such as human trafficking and other forms of forced labour. 

Practices Expressly Prohibited: 

• Traffic in human beings 
• Begar (compelling a person to work without payment) 
• Other similar forms of forced labour 

Exception – Compulsory Service for Public Purposes: 

• The State may require compulsory service for public purposes, such as military service or social service. 
• This power is subject to the bar on discrimination only on grounds of religion, race, caste or class. 

Case Law: 

• People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982):  
  • The Supreme Court held that the scope of Article 23 is wide and unlimited. 
  • “Force” includes not only physical or legal force but also economic circumstances that compel a person to work against their will for less than the minimum wage. 
  • The Court directed the Government to take the necessary steps to punish private individuals who violate the fundamental right under Article 23.