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Criminal Law

Benefit of Juvenile Justice Act Cannot Be Denied to Child in Conflict With Law

 06-Nov-2025

Prahlad Prasad Rathour v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. 

 “Benefit of Section 24(1) JJ Act must be extended to every child in conflict with law; past proceedings cannot disqualify him.” 

Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru 

Source: Chhattisgarh High Court 

Why in News? 

The Chhattisgarh High Court held that a person who was below 18 years of age when an alleged offence occurred must be treated as a Child in Conflict With Law (CCL) under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act), and that all disqualifications attached to such criminal cases stand removed under Section 24(1) of the Act. 

  • The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru delivered the judgment in Prahlad Prasad Rathour v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., setting aside the petitioner’s termination from government service. 

What was the Background of Prahlad Prasad Rathour v. State of Chhattisgarh Case? 

  • The appellant, an ex-serviceman from the Indian Navy with an exemplary service record of 15 years, was appointed as a Food Inspector in 2018 under the quota reserved for ex-servicemen. 
  • In 2024, his services were terminated by the State authorities on the basis of a police verification report that mentioned two minor criminal cases registered against him in 2002, when he was still a minor. 
  • Both cases were settled in 2007 before the Lok Adalat through compromise, long before he joined State service. The authorities, however, cited “suppression of material facts” in the verification form as the reason for termination. 
  • The learned Single Judge dismissed his writ petition on 07.01.2025, upholding the termination. The petitioner then filed a writ appeal before the Division Bench, contending that: 
    • The alleged offences were trivial and occurred when he was a child; 
    • He was acquitted through compromise nearly 11 years before joining service; 
    • His conduct and character during naval service were “Exemplary” and “Very Good”; and 
    • He was entitled to the benefit of Section 24(1) of the JJ Act, 2015, which erases disqualifications attached to such cases. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

The Division Bench found the termination order arbitrary and legally unsustainable. 

It observed that: 

  • The criminal cases against the appellant pertained to 2002, when he was below 18 years, and both concluded in 2007. 
  • On the date of verification in 2018, there was no subsisting disqualification or pending proceeding. 
  • The State’s reliance on stale cases to declare the appellant “unfit” for public service was contrary to law laid down by the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) and Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. (2024), which held that non-disclosure of trivial or long-closed cases does not amount to suppression. 
  • The appellant was a Child in Conflict With Law (CCL) at the time of the alleged offences, and under Section 24(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, all disqualifications arising from such proceedings stand removed. 
  • The termination without giving any opportunity of hearing violated the principles of natural justice under Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The Court also said that the purpose of Section 24(1) is to allow a child to lead a dignified life free from stigma, ensuring rehabilitation and reintegration. 

Who is a Child in Conflict with Law?  

About: 

  • The child in conflict with law is a concept based on the Juvenile justice Act defined under Section 2(13) of the JJ Act where it is stated that when a person who has not attained the age of 18 years has committed a crime or alleged to have been committed a crime shall be deemed to be a child in conflict with law.  
  • It is generally presumed that a child is born with innocence and due to societal behaviors and psychological disparities they may be deprived of moral and ethical values which lead them to commit offences.  
  • When a minor commits such crimes against society, it is said to conflict with the law.  
  • It is noticed and observed that with the right kind of care and rehabilitation a child can be transformed into a better human.  

Constitutional Provisions: 

  • Article 21: The right to life and personal liberty states that no person can be deprived of living his life with liberty.   
  • Article 22(1): The Right to be informed about the arrest and to consult an advocate of a person who has been arrested.  

Provisions Related to Juvenile Justice Act 

  • Section 2(13): Any person who has not attained the age of 18 years alleged or found to have committed an offence shall be called a child in conflict with laws.  
  • Section 12(1): When a person who has not attained the age of 18 years alleged to have been committed an offence either bailable or non bailable offence shall be granted bail subject to that his bail would not result into any danger to him and proper care should be taken by the juvenile justice board while granting bail.  
  • Section 3: This section ensures that a child covered under the purview of this act shall be reunited with his family as soon as possible subject to his best interest.  
  • Section 104: This section empowers the Board to review its own decision on an application filled by the aggrieved party pertaining to the proper constitution of members specified in the act. 

Criminal Law

High Court Cannot Quash Investigation Ordered under Section 156(3) CrPC Without Proper Grounds

 06-Nov-2025

Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka & Ors. 

“Courts must allow investigation when a prima facie case is made out, not thwart it on technicalities.” 

Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Pankaj Mithal 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench comprising Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Pankaj Mithal set aside the Karnataka High Court’s orders that had quashed an FIR and a Magistrate’s direction under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (175 (3) BNSS), holding that the High Court had erred in interfering with a lawful order directing investigation. 

  • The Court held that the Magistrate’s discretion under Section 156(3) cannot be curtailed merely because of a clerical expression or assumption, and that the High Court’s interference at the pre-investigation stage was premature and unjustified. 

What was the Background of Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka Case? 

  • The complainant, filed a private complaint before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Belagavi, alleging that the accused persons had forged an e-stamp paper and fabricated a rent agreement to illegally claim possession over certain property. 
  • It was alleged that despite a status quo order passed by the High Court in connected civil proceedings, the accused filed the forged document in court to mislead authorities and violate judicial orders. 
  • Considering these allegations, the Magistrate directed the police to register a case and investigate under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Accordingly, an FIR was registered for offences of forgery, cheating, and criminal conspiracy under Sections 419, 420, 468, 471, and 120B of the IPC. 
  • The accused approached the Karnataka High Court, which quashed the Magistrate’s order and the FIR, holding that the Magistrate had used the term “further investigation” without applying his mind. 
  • Aggrieved, the complainant moved the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing an order that was within the Magistrate’s power.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

The Supreme Court observed that the Magistrate’s order under Section 156(3) was perfectly valid and that the High Court’s interference was wholly unjustified. 

The Court held that: 

  • The use of the word “further” in the Magistrate’s order was a clerical error, not a reference to Section 173(8) CrPC, and did not invalidate the direction for investigation. 
  • The Magistrate had examined the complaint and documents before directing investigation, showing due application of mind. 
  • The complaint disclosed serious cognizable offences relating to forgery and use of fake e-stamp papers, warranting police inquiry. 
  • The High Court, by quashing the order at the pre-investigation stageprematurely halted the criminal process contrary to established legal principles. 

The Court emphasised that Magistrates have wide powers under Section 156(3) to ensure that genuine complaints are investigated and that High Courts should not interfere unless the proceedings are clearly malicious or an abuse of process. 

What is the Difference between Section 156 of CrPC and Section 175 of BNSS? 

Section 156 of CrPC 

Section 175 of BNSS 

(1) Any officer-in-charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. 

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIV 

 

Provided that considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the Superintendent of Police may require the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. 

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. 

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. 

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. 

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 210 may, after considering the application supported by an affidavit made under sub-section (4) of section 173, and after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary and submission made in this regard by the police officer, order such an investigation as above-mentioned. 

 

(4) Any Magistrate empowered under section 210, may, upon receiving a complaint against a public servant arising in course of the discharge of his official duties, order investigation, subject to- 

(a) receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to him; and 

(b) after consideration of the assertions made by the public servant as to the situation that led to the incident so alleged. 

What are the Safeguards Introduced by Section 175 of BNSS? 

  • The following are the new changes which are introduced in the form of safeguards to prevent abuse of process of law: 
    • Firstly, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3). 
    • Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing the registration of FIR. 
    • Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3). 
  • It is to be noted that Section 175 (3) of BNSS is a result of law laid down by the judicial decisions over the years. 
  • In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015) the Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.  the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). 
    • It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) of the CrPC must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. 
    • The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the CrPC were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the accused by registration of FIR.