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Criminal Law
Salil Bali v. Union of India (2013)
24-Nov-2025
Introduction
This landmark judgment examines the constitutional validity of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, particularly following the December 16, 2012, Delhi gang rape incident involving a juvenile.
- The judgment was delivered by a Bench headed by Chief Justice Altamas Kabir on July 17, 2013.
- The case involved a batch of seven Writ Petitions and one Transferred Case challenging the protective provisions of the JJ Act.
Facts
- The case was triggered by a spurt in criminal offences committed by persons aged 16 to 18 years, particularly the December 16, 2012 Delhi gang rape incident.
- Petitioners including Salil Bali and Saurabh Prakash challenged the JJ Act, seeking declaration of the entire Act as ultra vires the Constitution.
- The petitioners argued that while the Indian Penal Code recognizes the age of criminal responsibility as 12 years (Sections 82 and 83), the JJ Act grants leniency with a maximum sentence of three years under Section 15 to individuals up to 18 years, even for heinous crimes like murder and rape.
- The petitioners contended that this differential treatment violates Article 21 of the Constitution and argued that juveniles committing heinous offences should be tried under normal adult law.
Issues Involved
- Whether the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, is ultra vires the Constitution of India?
- Whether the definitions of "child" [Section 2(k)] and "juvenile in conflict with law" [Section 2(l)] setting the upper age limit at 18 years were arbitrary, irrational, and unconstitutional?
- Whether the sentencing structure under Section 15 (maximum three-year period) and provisions for removal of disqualification under Section 19 violated Articles 14 and 21, particularly in heinous offence cases?
- Whether the court should direct the Government to amend the Act to allow juveniles aged 16 to 18 with sufficient maturity to be tried under general penal laws?
Court’s Observations
- The Court held that fixing 18 years as the upper age limit for juvenility was a conscious policy decision of Parliament taken after years of deliberation.
- The Court reiterated, citing BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India, that questioning the wisdom or fairness of public policy decisions is neither the domain of Courts nor within the scope of judicial review.
- The Court noted that the Act is consistent with Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which empowers the State to enact special provisions for children.
- The Court recognized that the JJ Act was enacted in conformity with international standards, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, and the Beijing Rules, 1985.
- The Court emphasized that the 18-year limit is based on Article 1 of the UN Convention and scientific data suggesting that a child's physical and mental growth and development continues until at least 18 years of age.
- The Court emphasized that the JJ Act is based on restorative justice rather than retributive justice, aiming for rehabilitation and re-integration of children in conflict with law into mainstream society.
- The Court noted that the age of 18 years was fixed based on expert understanding that children could still be redeemed until this age.
- The Court observed that statistics from the National Crime Records Bureau showed that crimes committed by juveniles constituted only around 2% of the country's crime rate, making the December 16, 2012 incident an "aberration rather than the Rule."
- The Court clarified that the 2006 amendment to Section 15(1)(g) mandates a three-year sentence which must be undergone even if the juvenile attains 18 years during that period, dispelling the misunderstanding that juveniles are "allowed to go free" upon turning 18.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed all Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case, finding no constitutional infirmity in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.The Court held that the Act was founded on sound principles and represented the "collective wisdom of Parliament. "The Court opined that effective and sincere implementation of existing laws would yield better results than legislative change. The Court found no sufficient data or constitutional basis to warrant changes in the statutory provisions.