Introduction: 

This judgment delivered by Justice Sanjay Dwivedi of the Madhya Pradesh High Court  examined the scope and interplay between Section 375 and Section 377 IPC in the context of a complaint of unnatural sex by a wife against her husband. The petitioner, an elected MLA belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, sought quashing of an FIR alleging offences under Sections 294, 323, 376(2)(n), 377, 498-A, and 506 IPC. 

The case raised profound questions regarding the legality of invoking Section 377 IPC between legally married spouses, marital rape exception, tribal customs permitting second marriage, and malicious prosecution due to personal disputes. 

Facts of the Case: 

• The petitioner, Umang Singhar, a sitting MLA, was accused by his second wife (respondent no.2) of unnatural sexual acts and cruelty. 
• Both parties entered marriage on 16th April 2022, though the petitioner’s divorce from his first wife was pending at the time. 
• The complainant-wife alleged multiple acts of sexual abuse and unnatural sex during their marital relationship. 
• The petitioner claimed the FIR was an act of vengeance and extortion, made after he filed a civil suit for damages against the complainant. 
• The complaint lacked specific dates, times, or medical evidence and was found to be a counterblast to ongoing litigation. 

Issues Involved: 

• Whether Section 377 IPC is applicable between husband and wife in light of the 2013 amendment to Section 375 IPC? 
• Whether the complaint filed by the wife amounts to malicious prosecution? 
• Whether the second marriage of a Scheduled Tribe person without formal divorce is void or recognized under tribal custom? 
• Whether the FIR was liable to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC? 

Court’s Observations: 

• Justice Sanjay Dwivedi’s Observations and Judgment: 
  • Section 375 vs. Section 377 IPC: The Court held that post-2013 amendment, Section 375 covers all forms of penetration (vaginal, anal, oral) within the definition of rape, yet Exception 2 exempts acts by a husband with his wife. Therefore, the same act cannot simultaneously be considered unnatural sex under Section 377, especially between spouses. 
  • Implied Repeal: Following principles from T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe,1982 and Dharangadhra Chemical Works v. Municipality, 1985 the Court ruled that Section 377 is impliedly repealed in marital contexts where Section 375 Exception 2 applies. The acts described overlap, and Section 375 prevails as the specific and updated provision. 
  • Navtej Singh Johar Case: The Court acknowledged the Navtej Singh Johar ruling, emphasizing that consensual acts are not punishable under Section 377 and that the term "against the order of nature" has evolved. Between spouses, consensual acts cannot be termed unnatural. 
  • Marital Intimacy and Indian Culture: The Court underscored that sexual relations between husband and wife are not limited to procreation, and consensual practices for intimacy or pleasure cannot be labeled as "unnatural". 
  • Customs of Scheduled Tribes: Referring to Kunwar Singh Marko and Deepak Maravi, the Court accepted that tribal customs permitting second marriage are valid, and hence the petitioner’s marriage with respondent no.2 was not void. 
  • Malicious Prosecution: The Court held that the FIR was filed vindictively, lacked specificity, and was filed after the notice in a civil suit. Following State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,1980 such FIRs are liable to be quashed for being vexatious and mala fide. 

Conclusion: 

The Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the FIR against Umang Singhar, ruling that Section 377 IPC has no application between a husband and wife post-2013 amendment where Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC applies. The Court further held that the complaint was motivated by vengeance, lacking any cogent evidence or legal basis, and was therefore an abuse of the process of law. 

This judgment establishes that Section 377 IPC must be interpreted in consonance with the 2013 amendments to Section 375, and tribal customs of marriage must be given due regard. It also affirms that malicious use of legal provisions for personal vendetta undermines the administration of justice, justifying quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.