Introduction

• This case deals with a law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution which was challenged to be void.

Facts

• The Act known as the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, 1948 (Act) was enacted on 19^th October 1948 and was the prevailing law in the State of Madhya Pradesh when the Constitution came into effect.
• On 13^th June 1950, the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar issued an order under the Act, prohibiting residents of specific villages from participating in the manufacture of bidis.
• Subsequently, on 19^th June 1950, two petitions were filed in the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the order on the grounds that it adversely impacted the petitioners' right to freedom of occupation and business.
• While the petitions were under consideration, the specified agricultural season mentioned in the 19^th June 1950’s order, ended.
• However, a new order, identical in terms, was issued on September 29, 1950, for the upcoming agricultural season from 8^th October to 18^th November, 1950.
• This subsequent order was also contested through a supplementary petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue Involved

• Whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?

Observations

• To assess the compatibility of the challenged legislation with fundamental rights, a thorough examination of its provisions is imperative within the court's purview.
• The Act's preamble articulates its purpose, emphasizing the supply of sufficient labour for agricultural activities in bidi manufacturing regions, contributing to increased food production and cultivation of fallow lands.
• Empowered by the Act, the Deputy Commissioner possesses the authority to prohibit beedi manufacturing in specific villages and dictate the agricultural season.
• The court observed that non-compliance with these directives, as outlined in Section 7 of the contested Act, carries a penalty of six months' imprisonment.
• In evaluating restrictions on fundamental rights, it is essential that limitations on personal enjoyment be reasonable, avoiding arbitrariness and excessiveness in the interest of public welfare.
• The court observed that legislative actions should strike a delicate balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and the permissible restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
• Critically, the impugned act results in a complete cessation of business during specific agricultural seasons and areas, constituting an extreme regulatory measure. Instead of a blanket ban, a more measured approach, such as regulating working hours, could have sufficed for labour allocation.
• The provision, as it stands, lacks a reasonable nexus to its objective and exceeds the necessity of the case.
• Notably, the ban not only prohibits manufacturing but also bars employers from hiring labour from neighbouring areas.
• The language used in the contested provisions is expansive enough to encompass restrictions both within and beyond the constitutionally acceptable limits of legislative action affecting rights.
• The respondent's argument, contending that legislative restrictions are not conclusive and can be subject to judicial review, stands against the clear provisions of the Constitution.
• In instances of contravention with fundamental rights, it is the prerogative of the SC, acting as a vigilant guardian of rights, to determine the validity of legislative acts and potentially set them aside if found to violate the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of India.
• The court finally held that the Act failed to meet the standard of reasonableness, rendering it constitutionally void.
• Consequently, the directives issued by the deputy commissioner were deemed null, non-operational, and ineffective.

Conclusion

• Hence, while allowing the petitions the court directed the respondents to not to enforce Section 4 of the Act in whatsoever manner against the petitioners.