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April 2023
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Gaddipati Divija and Anr. v. Pathuri Samrajyam and Ors.
Keywords: Civil Law, Specific Relief Act, 1963, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 18.04.2023
Bench Strength: 2 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justices Krishna Murari and Sanjay Karol
Case in brief:
- Mr. G. Venugopala Rao (Mr. Rao) executed an agreement of sale with Ms. Pathuri Samrajyam (Respondent) on 14th August 2022 in respect of his immovable property (Property).
- The Respondent paid the partial advance consideration amount to Mr. Rao.
- Subsequently, Respondent became aware of the fact that the Property was attached by the Civil Court in recovery proceedings against Mr. Rao.
- Mr. Rao died in 2003 and was survived by two minor children and a wife (Appellants).
- Respondent filed a suit before the Civil Court seeking specific performance of the Agreement of Sale, by directing the Legal Heirs to execute a sale deed in favor of Respondent.
- The Trial Court observed that Respondent failed to prove that she is entitled for specific performance of the contract and directed refund of advance consideration amount to her.
- The High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order and observed that the Respondent had fulfilled the conditions laid down in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and thus entitled to seek specific relief.
- The Appellants filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Verdict:
- While dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order.
- The Court observed that Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) required a plaintiff to aver in pleadings and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform his obligation under the contract, in order to seek specific performance of contract.
- However, after the 2018 amendment to Section 16 of SRA Act, the requirement of averring its willingness to perform has been done away with. Since the matter at hand dates to 2002, the amended Section 16 of SRA was inapplicable.
Relevant Provision:
Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Personal bars to relief
Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favor of a person—
(a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or
(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or willfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or
(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation—For the purposes of clause (c) —
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;
(ii) the plaintiff must aver the performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.
State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt and Ors.
Keywords: Constitution of India, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 26.04.2023
Bench Strength: 2 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Justice Pankaj Mithal
Case in brief:
- These civil appeals arise out of a common order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad confirming the order of the learned Single Judge, holding that the respondents possessing a degree of BAMS (Bachelor of Ayurved in Medicine and Surgery) should be treated at par with the doctors holding MBBS degrees and that they are entitled to the benefits of the recommendations of the Tikku Pay Commission.
- The issue before the Supreme Court was, whether Allopathy doctors and doctors of indigenous medicine can be said to be performing equal work so as to be entitled to equal pay.
Verdict:
- The Gujarat High Court order was set aside by the Apex Court.
- The Apex Court held that allopathy doctors and doctors of indigenous medicine cannot be said to be performing equal work so as to be entitled to equal pay.
Relevant Provision:
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 - Equality before law –
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc. -
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(f) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
(5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
Siju Kurian v. State of Karnataka
Keywords: Criminal Law, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 17.04.2023
Bench Strength: 2 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justices Aravind Kumar and Surya Kant
Case in Brief:
- While working as a labourer at the farmhouse of the deceased, accused is alleged to have hit him with an iron rod, leading to his death.
- He is also accused of stealing articles from the farmhouse and selling them for undue monetary gain.
- After the complaint was filed by the son of the accused, the proceedings against the accused were initiated.
- The Trial Court concluded that the prosecution did not establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him.
- The High Court reversed the acquittal on the ground that there was erroneous appreciation of evidence and convicted the accused.
- Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
Verdict:
- The Apex Court found no irregularity in the circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution and upheld the conviction of the accused.
- The Court further held that a confessional statement, which is otherwise admissible in evidence as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, will not become solely because it was recorded not in the mother tongue of the accused.
Relevant Provision:
Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - How much of information received from accused may be proved —
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
M/s. N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. And Ors.
Keywords: Civil Law, Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 25.04.2023
Bench Strength: 5 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justices K.M. Joseph, Aniruddha Bose, C.T. Ravikumar, Ajay Rastogi and Hrishikesh Roy.
Case in Brief:
- The petitioner and the respondent in the matter had entered into a sub-contract which contained an arbitration clause.
- Certain disputes arose and the respondent invoked the Bank Guarantee furnished by the petitioner.
- A suit was filed before the Commercial Court regarding the said invocation.
- The respondent filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the suit and sought for reference of disputes to arbitration.
- However, the Commercial Court rejected the application.
- A revision petition was filed by the respondent before the Bombay High Court.
- The High Court held that the Section 8 application was maintainable.
- Thereafter an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.
Verdict:
- Justice Joseph in concurrence with Justice Bose and Justice Ravikumar decided that an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 attracts stamp duty and which is not stamped or insufficiently stamped cannot be acted upon in view of Section 35 of the Stamp Act unless following impounding and paying requisite duty.
- Justice Rastogi and Justice Roy concluded that non-stamping or insufficient stamping of the substantive instrument would not render the arbitration agreement unenforceable and noted that stamp deficiency being a curable defect would not render the arbitration agreement void.
Relevant Provision:
Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitration agreement —
(1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen, or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in—
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.
Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement —
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued, and an arbitral award made.
Shri Rakesh Raman v. Smt. Kavita
Keywords: Personal Law, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 26.04.2023
Bench Strength: 2 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and J.B. Pardiwala
Case in Brief:
- The husband and wife have been living separately for the last 25 years.
- The couple had lived together as husband and wife for barely four years after which they fell apart and there is no child out of wedlock.
- There are bitter allegations of cruelty and desertion from both sides and multiple litigations between the two in the last 25 years.
- In May 2009, the Trial Court allowed the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty.
- An appeal was filed by the wife before the Delhi High Court.
- The High Court set aside the trial court order in April 2011, following which the man approached the Supreme Court.
Verdict:
- While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court has held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage can be read as the ground of "cruelty" under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for the dissolution of marriage.
- The bench further noted that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not yet a ground for dissolution of marriage, though a recommendation to that effect was made by the Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006).
- The long separation and absence of cohabitation and the complete breakdown of all meaningful bonds and the existing bitterness between the two, has to be read as cruelty under Section 13(1) (ia) of the 1955 Act.
Relevant Provision:
Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Divorce -
(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party -
(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or
(ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or
(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or
(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or
(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Explanation - In this clause,
(a) the expression mental disorder means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;
(b) the expression psychopathic disorder means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment;
(iv) has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or
(v) has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or
(vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or
(vi) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive;
Explanation - In this sub-section, the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.
Surendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Anr.
Keywords: Criminal Law, Indian Penal Code,1860, Supreme Court
Date of Judgement/Order: 11.04.2023
Bench Strength: 2 Judges
Composition of Bench: Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar
Case in Brief:
- An FIR was lodged by the police on 01.12.2010 for an incident which took place on 28.11.2010.
- The FIR registered stated that the complainant’s younger brother Narendra Singh was attacked by 5 persons namely Bhupendra Singh, Vijendra Singh and Bhawani Singh, Sangeeta and Gulab Kanwar.
- Due to this, Narendra Singh and Bhawani Singh became unconscious.
- Though the five persons were named in the FIR, the police filed charge-sheet only against two persons, Bhupendra Singh and Vijendra Singh.
- The Trial Court convicted the accused Vijendra Singh for the offence under several sections of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
- The Rajasthan High Court had set aside the conviction of the accused Vijendra Singh for offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC by observing that no case is made out for conviction with the aid of Section 149 IPC.
- Thereafter an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against a Rajasthan High Court judgement.
Verdict:
- While allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court recently observed that the Section 149 (Unlawful assembly) of the Indian Penal Code will be attracted even if the specifically named five or more persons are facing trial separately.
- The Court said once the accused was found to be part of an unlawful assembly, he would be liable for murder even if the fatal blow was not given by him but someone else who was part of such unlawful assembly.
Relevant Provision:
Section 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object—
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Punishment for murder -
Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.