Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

Date of Judgment - 05. 03. 2024

Bench Strength - 2 Judges

Composition of Bench - Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta

Case in Brief:

• The case relates to an incident that took place on 01^st December 2016.
• Shahin Parveen (deceased) was a widow and resided at her matrimonial house with her two children, her brother-in-law (accused) and his wife.
• The accused started pressuring her into entering the profession of immoral trafficking and prostitution.
• As the deceased did not concede, the accused caught the deceased and poured kerosene on her.
  • Accused ignited the matchstick and threw it at her. He was assisted by his wife and brother of his wife.
• The Police station Katghar, Moradabad received a written report which was a transcription of the complaint made by the deceased who had been admitted in the district hospital with 80% deep thermal and facial burns.
• On the basis of written report, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered for the offence punishable under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and on the same day her statement (dying declaration) was recorded. Later, the victim was admitted to Safdarjung hospital, where she succumbed to her injuries. Consequently, the case was altered to the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
• The trial court found that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and convicted them for offences punishable under sections 302 and 34 of IPC and the same was affirmed by Allahabad High Court.
• The present appeal was filed in Supreme Court.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court found that the dying declaration was cogent, trustworthy and reliable. But the statement of victim revealed that she had a quarrel with her brother-in-law and pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze was committed by him. Insofar as the other two accused, the statement of the victim only states that they aided her brother-in-law.
• Therefore, the Supreme Court found that, though the said dying declaration can be the sole basis of maintaining the conviction of main accused and in the absence of any specific role attributed to two other accused, they are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 32 (1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA): Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant -
  • Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: ––

(1) When it relates to cause of death. –When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

• Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment for murder -
  • Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

[Original Judgment]

Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors. v. ZEE Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Date of Judgment - 14.03. 2024

Bench Strength - 3 Judges

Composition of Bench -Chief Justice D Y Chandrachud, Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Mishra

Case in Brief:

• An article titled "India Regulator Uncovers $241 Million Accounting Issue at Zee" was published by Bloomberg and its journalist on 21^st February 2024.
• The said article talked about the status of the Zee-Sony merger and an ongoing investigation carried out by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).
• After the article's publication, Zee (aggrieved) filed a defamation suit before the court of the learned Additional District Judge (ADJ) against Bloomberg and its journalist.
• They claimed that the article presented speculations on the business operation of Zee as truth and that the allegations of illegal fund diversion did not have any basis.
• Zee filed a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, and on the first day of the hearing of the suit, Zee pressed for ex-parte ad interim injunction against Bloomberg.
• On 01^st March 2024, an ex-parte ad interim order was passed by ADJ directing the concerned journalist and editor to take down an article published on their online platform within a week.
• The order of the trial judge was upheld by a single judge of the High Court (HC) of Delhi on 14^th March 2024.
• The present appeal was filed in the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The bench explained that the three-fold test (prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss) for the grant of interim relief is well established in the jurisprudence of SC
  • This test can be equally applied to the grant of interim injunction in defamation suit.
• The bench criticized how the trial court judge applied the three-fold test. They held that the test cannot be applied ‘mechanically’. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. A cursory reproduction of the submissions and precedents before the court is not sufficient.
• The SC overruled a trial judge’s order and held that there are additional factors that judges must considered when considering pre-trial injunctions. The order of the trial judge suffers from such mechanical application as reason were not provided.

Relevant Provision:

• Order XLIII, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely -

(a) An order under rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court except where the procedure specified in rule 10A of Order VII has been followed.

(c) An order under rule 9 of order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit.

(d) An order under rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte.

(f) An order under rule 21 of Order XI.

(i) An order under rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement.

(j) An order under rule 72 or rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale.

(ja) An order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 105 of that Order is appealable.

(k) An order under rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit.

(l) An order under rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave.

(n) An order under rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit.

(na) An order under rule 5 or rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person.

(p) Orders in interpleader-suits under rule 3, rule 4 or rule 6 of Order XXXV.

(q) An order under rule 2, rule 3 or rule 6 of order (XXVIII).

(r) An order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 2A, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX.

(s) An order under rule 1, or rule 4 of Order XL.

(t) An order of refusal under rule 19 of Order XLI to re-admit, or under rule 21 of Order XLI to re-hear, an appeal.

(u) An order under rule 23 or rule 23A of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court.

(w) An order under rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review.

• Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 of CPC:
  • Rule 1 - Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted.—Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—

(a) That any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or

(b) that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to 3 [defrauding] his creditors,

(c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit,

the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property [or dispossession of the plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit] as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.

• • Rule 2- Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.—

(1) In any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, whether compensation is claimed in the suit or not, the plaintiff may, at any time after the commencement of the suit, and either before or after judgment, apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from committing the breach of contract or injury complained, of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right.

(2) The Court may by order grant such injunction, on such terms as to the duration of the injunction, keeping an account, giving security, or otherwise, as the Court thinks fit.

[Original Judgment]

Dablu Kujur v. The State of Jharkhand

Date of Judgment - 12.03.2024

Bench Strength - 2 Judges

Composition of Bench - Justice Bela M Trivedi and Justice Pankaj Mithal

Case in Brief:

• The application filed by the accused for bail in respect of the First Information Report (FIR) registered for the offences under the Sections 302, 120B/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) and Section 25 (1-B) A/26/27/28 of the Arms Act was dismissed by the High Court of Jharkhand.
• Hence, the accused challenged the decision of the High Court before the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• The SC also denied bail to the accused stating that the trial was its “fag end”.
• The SC directed the State of Jharkhand to examine the chargesheet whether it is in accordance with law or not and directed DGP of Jharkhand to file an action report within four weeks from today.
• The SC said we have found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police report do not comply with the requirements of Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Non-compliance of Section 173(2) of CrPC gives rise to many legal issues.
• It is further directed that the officer in charge of police stations in every State shall strictly comply with the directions given by SC and the non-compliance thereof shall be strictly viewed by the concerned courts in which the Police Reports are submitted.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Report of police officer on completion of investigation -

(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating -

(a) the names of the parties;

(b) the nature of the information;

(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;

(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;

(e) whether the accused has been arrested;

(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;

(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.

(h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.

[Original Judgment]

Sita Soren v. Union of India

Date of Judgment: 04.03.2024

Bench Strength: 7 Judges

Composition of Bench: Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud, Justices A S Bopanna, M M Sundresh, Pamidighantam Sri Narsimha, J B Pardiwala, Sanjay Kumar and Justice Manoj Misra.

Case in Brief:

• An election was held on 30^th March 2012 to elect two members of the Rajya Sabha representing the State of Jharkhand which led to initiation this case.
• The allegation against the appellant (voter) was that she accepted a bribe from an independent candidate for casting her vote in his favor. And she did not cast her vote in favor of the alleged bribe giver and instead cast her vote in favor of a candidate belonging to her own party.
• The appellant moved the High Court to quash the charge sheet and the criminal proceedings instituted against her.
• The appellant claimed protection under Article 194(2) of Constitution of India, 1950 (COI) and relying on the judgment given in the case of P V Narasimha Rao v. State (1998).
  • The High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the appellant had not cast her vote in favor of the alleged bribe giver and thus, is not entitled to the protection under Article 194(2) of the COI>
• An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court (SC).

Verdict:

• On 20^th September 2023, a 5 judge bench recorded prima facie reasons doubting the correctness of the decision in P V Narasimha case and referred the matter to a larger bench of 7 judges.
• A 7 judge bench overruled the judgment of majority (P V Narasimha case) on the aspect that by virtue of Articles 105 and 194 of the COI a member of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly can claim immunity from prosecution on a charge of bribery for casting a vote or speech in the house.
• SC said that the judgment of the majority in P V Narasimha which grants immunity from prosecution to a member of the legislature who was allegedly engaged in bribery for casting vote or speaking has wide ramifications on public interest, probity in public life and parliamentary democracy. There is a grave danger of this court allowing an error to be perpetuated if the decision were not reconsidered.

Relevant Provisions:

• Article 105 of the COI: Powers, privileges, etc., of the Houses of Parliament and of the members and committees thereof -

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament.

(1) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

(2) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978.

(3) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of Parliament or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of Parliament.

• Article 194 (2) of COI: Powers, privileges, etc., of the House of Legislatures and of the members and committees thereof-

(2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

[Original Judgment]

Srikant Upadhayay & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 14.03.2024

Bench strength: 2 Judges

Composition of Bench: Justices C T Ravikumar and Sanjay Kumar

Case in brief:

• A First Information Report (FIR) was registered pursuant to the direction of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), East Champaran, Bihar on complaint filed by respondent no. 4 under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CRPC).
• The allegations in the complaint are that Jagmati kunwar grandmother of respondent no.4 reached in the front of house of appellant no. 2, he (appellant no.2) said she is the witch who made his child sick and shall not be spared.
• Then appellant and 8 other family members gathered around her and caught hold of her hair and asked others to bring dung and accused put dung into the mouth of Jagmati kunwar. And they tore the clothes of Jagmati and made her half naked.
• The Trial Court on perusal of FIR, charge sheet, and case diary found that sufficient materials are available to proceed against the 12 accused including appellant and court took cognizance of offences under sections 341, 323, 354B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3/4 of Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act, 1999 (Daain Act).
• The appellant neither appeared before the trial court nor sought for regular bail. Before the date fixed for their appearance, appellant filed application for anticipatory bail before the session court. The application for anticipatory bail was dismissed.
• Meanwhile, the appellant approached the High court (HC) by filing application seeking anticipatory bail. Before that the trial court issued non-bailable warrants. It is to be noted that non-bailable warrants were pending against them when they moved HC.
• After that the trial court issued a proclamation under section 82(1) of CrPC and proceedings under section 83 of CrPC were also initiated.
• The application for anticipatory bail was dismissed, obviously taking note of the proceedings under section 82 and 83 of CrPC and observing that owing to such developments the application for pre-arrest bail could not be maintained.
• The appeal was filed before the Supreme Court (SC) against the order passed by HC.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court held that mere pendency of an application for anticipatory bail does not bar a trial court from issuing steps for proclamation against absconding accused under Section 82 of CrPC.
• In the view of the proviso under Section 438(1) of CrPC, it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the matter for consideration, the court is not rejecting the application, it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail.
• SC held that power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. At any rate, when a warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke extraordinary power. The conduct of the appellants in the light of aforesaid circumstances leaves us with no hesitation to hold that they are not entitled to seek the benefit of pre-arrest bail. SC dismissed the application.

Relevant Provision:

• Section 438 of CrPC: Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest -

(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:-

(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation.

(ii) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence.

(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and

(iv)Where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail.

Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-Section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant, the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.

(1-A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-Section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court.

(1-B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice.

(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including -

1. 1. A condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required.
   2. A condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer.
   3. A condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court.
   4. Such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of Section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.

Provided that where such penalty is not paid and cannot be recovered in the manner aforesaid, the person so bound as surety shall be liable, by order of the Court ordering the recovery of the penalty, to imprisonment in civil jail for a term which may extend to six months.

(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1).

(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code.

• Section 82 of CrPC: Proclamation for person absconding -

(1) If any Court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation.

(2) The proclamation shall be published as follows :-

(i) (a) it shall be publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which such person ordinarily resides,

(b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which such person ordinarily resides or to some conspicuous place of such town or village;

(c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the court-house;

(ii) the Court may also, if it thinks fit, direct a copy of the proclamation to be published in a daily newspaper circulating in the place in which such person ordinarily resides.

(3) A statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of sub-section (2), shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this Section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.

(4) Where a proclamation published under sub-section (1) is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable under Sections 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459, or 460 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and such person fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.

(5) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) shall apply to a declaration made by the Court under sub-section (4) as they apply to the proclamation published under sub-section (1).

[Original Judgment]