February 2025

Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

Date of Judgement/Order – 19.02.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan 

Case In Brief: 

•  The Appeal concerns an order passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh,. Bilaspur dated 22 July 2024, denying regular bail to the appellant.  
• The criminal case involves charges under Sections 420, 201, 120-B read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) related to cryptocurrency fraud. 
• The amount involved in the fraud is approximately Rs. 4 Crore, affecting almost 2000 investors. 
• The charge sheet has been filed against 5 individuals including the appellant. 
• The trial is ongoing in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, with only one witness examined so far. 
• The prosecution plans to examine 189 witnesses in total. 
• The Appellant has been in custody since December 2023. 
•  The maximum punishment that can be imposed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (if the offence is established) would be 7 years. 
• The Counsel in this case attracted the attention of the Court to Section 437 (6) of CrPC which is currently Section 480 (6) of BNSS. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court held in this case that the provisions of Section 437(6) (Section 480 (6)), as such, cannot be considered to be mandatory in nature and cannot be interpreted to grant an absolute and indefeasible right of bail in favour of the accused. 
• While considering an application under Section 480 (6) the following factors are relevant: 
  • Whether the reasons for being unable to conclude trial within sixty days from the first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the accused? 
  • Whether there are any chances of the accused tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner? 
  • Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the accused on being bailed out? 
  • Whether accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period? 
• If the answer to any of the above is affirmative that would act as a fetter on the right of the accused under Section 480 (6) of BNSS. 
• It was also observed by the Court that the factors mentioned above are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 
• The Court held that the approach adopted by the Court while considering the application under Section 480 (6) of BNSS is liberal in nature and it should be a sound and judicious exercise of discretion in the favour of the accused. 
• Also, normal parameters that are deciding bail application would also be relevant while deciding application under Section 437(6) of the Code, but not with that rigour as they might have been at the time of application for regular bail. 
• The Court hence concluded that the appellant shall be released on bail subject to certain terms that may be imposed by the Trial Court.

Relevant Provision: 

• Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – Section 480  (6) – If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.  
• [Read Original Judgement]

Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr v. The State of Karnataka 

Date of Judgement/Order – 20.02.2025  

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan 

Case In Brief: 

• This case involves a matrimonial dispute resulting in the death of Geetha, who was married to Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale (Appellant No. 1) for approximately 8 years at the time of the incident. 
• According to the prosecution, after one year of marriage, Geetha's husband and his family members began harassing her regarding dowry and household work. 
• On the date of the incident, around 8:00 p.m., while Geetha was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law (Appellant No. 2) allegedly poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. 
• Neighbours rushed to the scene and transported Geetha to the hospital, where she succumbed to her burn injuries after one week. The cause of death was determined to be septicemia. 
• Geetha's mother, Tippavva Chandru Patil, filed an FIR on 3rd January, 2013, which was registered as Crime No. 2 of 2013 at Mudalagi Police Station, Mudalagi Circle, District Belagavi, Karnataka. 
• The FIR alleged that the accused had treated Geetha cordially for one year after marriage, but subsequently ill-treated her physically and mentally, forcing her to wake up early to perform household chores and work in others' homes. 
• The FIR further alleged that the accused pressured Geetha to bring Rs. 5,000 from her maternal home, and when she failed to do so, they allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 
• Following the FIR registration, the Tehsildar recorded Geetha's dying declaration (Exhibit-46) at the hospital within four hours of the incident. 
• The police charged the husband and mother-in-law for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302, and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 
• The trial court acquitted both accused, finding that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 
• The State appealed to the High Court, which reversed the acquittal and sentenced both accused to life imprisonment with a fine. 
• The matter was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the husband and mother-in-law. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court examined the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar, in which Geetha stated that her mother-in-law Jaitunabi Sanavale poured kerosene on her and set her on fire during an argument regarding her children. 
• The Court noted that according to Geetha's statement, when she was going to the bathroom, her mother-in-law lit a matchstick and threw it on her, while her husband Vasant tried to extinguish the fire by splashing water on her. 
• The Court observed that the Tehsildar's testimony was not effectively challenged during cross-examination, and nothing substantial was elicited to disbelieve that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give a dying declaration. 
• The Court examined Dr. Gopal Ramu Wagamude's  testimony, which confirmed Geetha's statement that her mother-in-law poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, and that Geetha had sustained 90% burn injuries. 
• The Court noted that there was no cross-examination of Dr. Wagamude to disbelieve the oral dying declaration made by the deceased before him. 
• The Court states that in neither the oral dying declaration to the doctor nor in the declaration to the Tehsildar did the husband figure as a participant in the crime. 
• The Court disagreed with the High Court's reasoning that the husband was guilty by virtue of Section 34 IPC (common intention) based on his alleged failure to take his wife to the hospital. 
• The Court explained that for Section 34 IPC to apply, there must be participation in the criminal act and sharing of common intention by all parties involved. 
• The Court clarified that Section 34 IPC requires a pre-arranged plan and presupposes prior concert, necessitating a meeting of minds between the parties. 
• The Court rejected the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, noting that while the crime occurred inside the house, there was insufficient evidence to establish that the husband shared common intention with his mother. 
• The Court observed that the husband's attempt to extinguish the fire by pouring water on his wife contradicted the allegation of common intention. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court correctly held the mother-in-law guilty of the offence but erred in convicting the husband under Section 34 IPC without sufficient evidence of his participation or common intention. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – Section 3 (5): When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
• Section 190 :  If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. 

 [Read Original Judgement] 

Hiralal Babulal Soni v. The State of Maharashtra (2025)  

Date of Judgement/Order – 25.02.2025 

Bench Strength – 3 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice BR Gavai, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice KV Vishwanathan. 

Case In Brief: 

• The case originated from a banking fraud at Vijaya Bank, Nasik Branch, Maharashtra, involving fraudulent Telegraphic Transfers (TTs) and subsequent withdrawals amounting to Rs. 6,70,00,000/-. 
• On 30th January, 1997, an individual claiming to represent M/s. Globe International approached the bank to open an account, which was initially not accepted due to signature discrepancies. 
• The account was eventually opened on 6th February, 1997, after confirmation from Surendera Bhandary, Assistant General Manager of Vijaya Bank, Fort Branch, Bombay, who had issued a letter of introduction. 
• The prosecution alleged that all documents submitted for opening the account were forged, and both the individual representing the firm (purportedly Surendra Jain) and the firm itself (Globe International) were fictitious. 
• Between 25th April and 6th August 1997, the account received 12 fraudulent TTs totaling Rs. 6,70,00,000/-, primarily from Vijaya Bank, Ansari Road Branch, New Delhi. 
• The amounts credited through these TTs were simultaneously withdrawn, with a significant portion converted into demand drafts issued in favor of M/s. Chenaji Narsinghji (M/s. CN) and M/s. V.P. Jewellers for purchasing gold bars. 
• On 12th August, 1997, it was discovered that no payment for these TTs had ever been made at Vijaya Bank, Ansari Road Branch, Delhi, exposing the fraudulent nature of the transactions. 
• The CBI investigation revealed that the gold bars purchased through these fraudulent transactions were allegedly delivered to accused No. 3 (Nandkumar Babulal Soni) or through him to an absconding accused named Mayur Desai @ Mukesh Shah. 
• On 1st June, 2001, after almost four years of investigation, the CBI conducted a search at accused No. 3's shop and seized 205 gold bars of various makes (ARY, HARMONY, Johnson Mathew, Credit Suisse, and PAMP Suisse). 
• The Trial Court framed charges against the accused persons for offences under Section 120B read with Sections 403, 409, 411, 420, 471, 477A and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
• The Trial Court convicted all three accused but directed that the seized 205 gold bars be returned to accused No. 3 (Nandkumar Babulal Soni). 
• On appeal, the High Court acquitted accused Nos. 1 and 2 (bank officials) but upheld the conviction of accused No. 3 for offences under Section 120B and Section 411 read with Section 120B of the IPC. 
• The High Court also reversed the Trial Court's order regarding the gold bars, directing that they be confiscated and placed at the disposal of the State Government. 
• Three separate appeals were subsequently filed in the Supreme Court: by Nandkumar Babulal Soni challenging his conviction and seeking return of the gold bars; by Hiralal Babulal Soni seeking return of the gold bars based on an ex-parte decree in his favor; and by Vijaya Bank also claiming entitlement to the seized gold bars. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court examined the essential requirements for proving an offence under Section 411 IPC (dishonestly receiving stolen property), noting that the prosecution must establish: (i) possession of stolen property by the accused, (ii) prior possession by someone other than the accused, and (iii) knowledge by the accused that the property was stolen. 
• The Court observed that the Trial Court had explicitly found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the seized gold bars were the same as those sold by M/s. CN to Globe International through fraudulent means. 
• The Court noted that both the Trial Court and High Court had observed that witnesses from M/s. CN had failed to identify the seized gold bars as those sold to Globe International. 
• The Court states that the Trial Court stated "the distance between may and must is very vast and prosecution has to cover that distance to reach the destination of must, however, the prosecution in this case could not achieve that level of proof." 
• The Court found it contradictory that despite acknowledging this evidentiary gap, both lower courts had still convicted accused No. 3 under Sections 120B and 411 IPC. 
• The Court reiterated the established legal principle that "however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of proof beyond reasonable doubt," citing its decision in Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi). 
• The Court determined that even if it were proven that accused No. 3 had received demand drafts from Mukesh Shah and purchased gold bars from M/s. CN and M/s. V.B. Jewellers, the prosecution would still need to prove that accused No. 3 had knowledge or reason to believe that these demand drafts were fraudulently obtained. 
• Regarding the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the Court clarified that this provision applies only when the prosecution has established facts from which reasonable inferences can be drawn about other facts within the special knowledge of the accused. 
• The Court found that the significant delay of four years in recovering the property fundamentally undermined the identification basis, making mistaken identification a reasonable possibility. 
• The Court held that the invocation of Section 114 of the Evidence Act (presumptions) was impermissible since the prosecution had failed to discharge its initial burden of proof. 
• The Court concluded that the prosecution had "utterly failed" to complete the chain of circumstances against accused No. 3, and therefore allowed his appeals, setting aside his conviction and ordering that the seized gold bars be returned to him. 
• The Court dismissed the appeals of both Vijaya Bank and Hiralal Babulal Soni, finding that neither had established entitlement to the gold bars, while clarifying that these findings would not prevent them from pursuing other legal remedies available to them. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 317 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Deals with Stolen property 
• (1) Property, the possession whereof has been transferred by theft or extortion or robbery or cheating, and property which has been criminally misappropriated or in respect of which criminal breach of trust has been committed, is designated as stolen property, whether the transfer has been made, or the misappropriation or breach of trust has been committed, within or without India, but, if such property subsequently comes into the possession of a person legally entitled to the possession thereof, it then ceases to be stolen property.  
• (2) Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.  
• (3) Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, the possession whereof he knows or has reason to believe to have been transferred by the commission of dacoity, or dishonestly receives from a person, whom he knows or has reason to believe to belong or to have belonged to a gang of dacoits, property which he knows or has reason to believe to have been stolen, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.  
• (4) Whoever habitually receives or deals in property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.  
• (5) Whoever voluntarily assists in concealing or disposing of or making away with property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 

[Original Judgment] 

Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. (2025)  

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.02.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice N Kotiswar Singh 

Case In Brief: 

• The appellant was arrested on 10th June 2024 in connection with FIR No. 121 of 2023, which was registered on 25th March 2023 for serious financial and documentary fraud offenses under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, involving allegations of criminal breach of trust, cheating, forgery, and criminal conspiracy. 
• There is a dispute regarding the exact time of arrest, with the appellant claiming he was arrested at 10:30 a.m. at his office in HUDA City Centre, Gurugram, while the 1st respondent maintains the arrest occurred at 6:00 p.m. on the same day, which creates a critical legal discrepancy concerning the compliance with legal arrest procedures. 
• The appellant alleges a violation of his constitutional rights under Article 22(1), asserting that he was not properly informed of the grounds of his arrest, and was allegedly produced before the Judicial Magistrate at Gurgaon on 11th June 2024 at 3:30 p.m., which he claims breaches Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
• Following his arrest, the appellant was hospitalized at PGIMS, Rohtak, where a serious human rights violation occurred: he was handcuffed and physically chained to his hospital bed, a fact confirmed by the Medical Superintendent through an official affidavit after the Supreme Court issued a notice requesting clarification. 
• In response to the hospital treatment, the Gurugram Police took disciplinary action by suspending the officers responsible for escorting the appellant, with the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Shri Abhimanyu, filing an affidavit on 24th October 2024 confirming the suspension, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police initiating a departmental inquiry against these officers on 23rd October 2024. 
• The appellant challenged the judgment and order dated 30th August 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, primarily focusing on the procedural irregularities in his arrest, the failure to communicate arrest grounds, and the inhumane treatment during his hospitalization. 
• The case raises critical legal questions about the procedural safeguards during arrest, the constitutional protection of an accused's rights, and the standards of human dignity that must be maintained even when an individual is in police custody or hospitalized during legal proceedings. 

Verdict: 

• The Constitution of India mandates that grounds of arrest must be effectively and fully communicated to the arrestee in a clear and comprehensible manner, which is not a mere procedural formality but a fundamental constitutional requirement protecting individual liberty. 
• When arrest grounds are not communicated promptly and clearly, the entire arrest becomes constitutionally invalid, rendering the detention illegal and unconstitutional, with the filing of a chargesheet or taking of cognizance unable to validate a fundamentally flawed arrest process. 
• The burden of proving compliance with arrest communication requirements falls on law enforcement agencies, who must definitively demonstrate that they have communicated arrest grounds directly to the arrested person in a language they understand, with magistrates having a constitutional duty to verify this compliance. 
• Communication of arrest grounds to third parties is explicitly rejected, with the communication must being direct and personal to the arrested individual, ensuring they fully understand the legal basis of their detention and can potentially seek immediate legal remedy. 
• An arrest found unconstitutional due to failure in communicating grounds is completely vitiated, requiring immediate release of the arrested person, though this does not affect the underlying case and allows for re-arrest through proper legal procedures that comply with constitutional mandates. 
• The court emphasizes that communicating arrest grounds is a critical safeguard of personal liberty, serving as a meaningful protection against arbitrary state action and reinforcing the principle that individual rights are paramount in the legal system. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Article 22 of the Constitution of India, 1950 
• Article 22 deals with Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. 
• Article 22(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. 

[Original Judgment] 

Vinod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 13.02.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The case involves an appellant named Vinod Kumar who was convicted under Section 302 (murder) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  
• The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, with an additional one year of rigorous imprisonment in default of payment.  
• The conviction was initially rendered by the Sessions Court (Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Shahdara, Delhi) and subsequently confirmed by the High Court of Delhi.  
• The case pertains to the death of one Dharminder, who was the appellant's neighbor.  
• On 12th July 1995, around noon, the appellant allegedly took the deceased with him, stating they would return soon.  
• The deceased's body was discovered on 14th July, 1995, in a bathroom on a building's terrace, with a rope tied to the neck and hands bound behind the back.  
• The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, primarily focusing on:   
  • Last seen together theory  
  • Evasive replies given by the appellant  
  • Proximity of time between last seen and death  
  • Appellant's absconding behavior  
  • Recovery of bloodstained clothes  
  • Unexplained injuries on appellant's person

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court observed that:  
  • The Court noted significant deficiencies in the prosecution's evidence, particularly regarding the testimony of prosecution witnesses PW-1 (father) and PW-3 (mother).  
  • The Court identified multiple material omissions in PW-3's testimony that amounted to contradictions under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC).  
  • The Court determined that the prosecution failed to establish two crucial circumstances beyond reasonable doubt:   
    • The "last seen together" theory  
    • The appellant's alleged evasive replies  
  • The Court observed that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete and conclusively establish guilt.  
  • The Court identified a procedural irregularity in the trial court's handling of witness contradictions under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.  
  • The Court established that prior statements used for contradictions must be properly proved through the investigating officer before being incorporated into witness depositions.  
  • The Court stipulated that trial judges should mark contradicted portions with identifiers (AA, BB, etc.) and ensure proper proof before including them in depositions.  
  • The Court observed the absence of any established motive for the commission of the offence, which was particularly significant given the circumstantial nature of the evidence. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 180 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 

• Examination of witnesses by police. 
  • (1) Any police officer making an investigation under this Chapter, or any police officer not below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, acting on the requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.  
  • (2) Such person shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.  
  • (3) The police officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section; and if he does so, he shall make a separate and true record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records:  
  • Provided that statement made under this sub-section may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means:  
  • Provided further that the statement of a woman against whom an offence under section 64, section 65, section 66, section 67, section 68, section 69, section 70, section 71, Report how submitted. Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry. Police officer's power to require attendance of witnesses. Examination of witnesses by police. section 74, section 75, section 76, section 77, section 78, section 79 or section 124 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is alleged to have been committed or attempted, shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer. 

[Original Judgement] 

Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta & Ors. (2025) 

Date of Judgement/Order – 20.02.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Sandeep Mehta   

Case In Brief: 

• Vishal Shah (appellant) and Monalisha Gupta (defendant) got married on 19th February 2018, following Hindu customs and ceremonies.  
• In March 2018, the couple moved to the United States, where the appellant had been working as a Software Engineer since 2014.  
• The marriage faced problems almost immediately. On 23rd March 2018, appellant reported an incident of domestic abuse to local US police, showing visible injuries on his face. He requested only a warning be given to his wife.  
• On 2nd April 2018, another incident occurred where Monalisha allegedly scratched appellant’s face, causing significant injuries. This led to her being charged with second-degree assault in the US.  
• After only 80 days of marriage, the couple returned to India due to their differences. When it was time to return to the US, the defendant refused to go back with the appellant.  
• The appellant returned alone to the USA. The couple has had no children.  
• Between 2018 and 2020, the defendant lived in the same house as appellant's mother, Gayatri Shah.  
• On 14th September 2020, Gayatri Shah left her own house to live with her daughter, claiming she was forced to leave due to physical and mental torture by the defendant.  
• Appellant's passport was impounded by Indian authorities on 3rd October 2018, due to various cases filed against him.  
• Currently, the defendant works as a Research Specialist at PwC in Kolkata, earning ₹50,000 per month. While Vishal was earning ₹8 lakhs per month in 2018, he claims to be currently unemployed.  
• Multiple cases have been filed by both parties against each other and their family members across different courts in Muzaffarpur (Bihar), Howrah (West Bengal), and the United States.  
• Trial Court (Judicial Magistrate, Howrah):  
  • The court noted that the appellant’s passport had been impounded on October 3, 2018, by the Government of India.  
  • When appellant challenged the impounding of his passport through a Writ Petition it was dismissed by the High Court.  
  • Despite knowing about the impounded passport, the trial court ordered initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant for his non-appearance in the suit filed under Section 26 of the Protection of Women & Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act). 
• High Court of Calcutta  
  • The Calcutta High Courtdismissed the appellant’s Criminal Revision through a non-speaking order.  
  • The High Court simply stated that no grounds for interference were made out, without examining the merits or providing detailed reasoning.  
• Aggrieved by the same the present appeal has been filed before the Supreme Court.

Verdict:

• The Supreme Court observed that:  
  • On Trial Court's Order:  
    • The trial court grossly erred in requiring the appellant’s personal presence as DV Act proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature such proceedings have no penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, under Section 31 of the DV Act.  
    • The extradition order was untenable since the appellant’s non-appearance was due to his impounded passport.  
    • The trial court failed to consider circumstances beyond the appellant's control.  
  • On High Court's Order:  
    • The High Court should have examined the case record more thoroughly.  
    • A reasoned decision addressing the merits was expected rather than a non-speaking order.  
  • On Marriage Breakdown:  
    • The marriage never really took off, with only 80 days of cohabitation.  
    • Multiple litigations filed by both parties showed their vindictive attitudes.  
    • No meaningful marital relationship developed between the parties.  
    • The long separation and failed reconciliation attempts proved an irretrievable breakdown.  
  • On Passport Impounding:  
    • The Court called it "ex-facie illegal" as it violated principles of natural justice.  
    • Further, the Court held that no opportunity was given to the appellant to be heard before impounding.  
    • Additionally, it was held that mere filing of cases is not sufficient ground for impounding a passport.  
  • On Permanent Alimony other factors to be considered as:  
    • Standard of living during marriage.  
    • Period of separation.  
    • Financial status of both parties.  
    • Determined ₹25 lakhs as fair and reasonable settlement.  
  • The Supreme Court ultimately found this to be a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage warranting the exercise of powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 31 of the DV Act states that a breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act.
• Shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
• The offence under sub-section (1) of Section 31 shall as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had passed the order, the breach of which has been alleged to have been caused by the accused. 
• While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrates may also frame charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or any other provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as the case may be, if the facts disclose the commission of an offence under those provisions.

[Original Judgement]