Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P 

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta 

Case In Brief: 

• The case involves Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh, who was accused of sexually assaulting his minor daughter, approximately 9 years old at the time of the incident. 
• On 28th October 2015, an FIR was lodged by Smt. Rajani (wife of the appellant) at Police Station Chandpur, District Fatehpur. 
• According to the FIR, Rajani had gone to her parental home approximately two months prior with her youngest son Krishna (aged 2), leaving her minor daughter (the victim) and son Vishnu (aged 4) in the custody of her husband. 
• The incident allegedly occurred on 22nd October 2015 at approximately 8:00 p.m., when the appellant enticed his minor daughter, took her to the rooftop, and committed sexual assault upon her. 
• The victim was reportedly detained on the roof through threats and was only able to come down in the morning, at which point she narrated the incident to her grandfather, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3). 
• Ram Naresh Singh telephonically informed the victim's mother (the informant) about the occurrence, after which the appellant allegedly absconded. 
• The informant initially did not go to her matrimonial home due to fear but later approached the police station with her father Ranjeet Singh, father-in-law Ram Naresh Singh, and the victim to file the FIR. 
• The investigation was undertaken by Rajesh Kumar Singh (PW-7), and the minor victim was subjected to medical examination by Dr. Manisha Shukla (PW-4). 
• The medical examination revealed redness present over the labia minora in the victim's vagina, though her hymen was intact. Forensic material was collected for pathological examination, DNA mapping, and examination for the presence of spermatozoa. 
• The victim's birth certificate was collected from school, and she was examined under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (CrPC) wherein she made emphatic allegations of penetrative sexual assault against her father. 
• The appellant was charged with offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Sections 3/4/5 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).  
• When questioned under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant denied the allegations, claiming he had been falsely implicated because he had previously lodged an FIR against his wife and his father (PW-3). He contended that at the time of the incident, the child was residing with his sister. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court addressed the appellant's contention regarding the application of Section 42A of the POCSO Act, 2012 which the appellant argued should override the provisions of the IPC due to its status as a special law. 
• The Court observed that Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres. Section 42 specifically addresses the quantum of punishment when an act constitutes an offence under both the POCSO Act and the IPC. 
• The Court noted that Section 42 mandates that when a particular act or omission constitutes an offence under both the POCSO Act and the IPC or Information Technology Act, 2000, the offender shall be liable to punishment under whichever law provides for a greater degree of punishment. 
• The Court observed that Section 42A, in contrast, deals with procedural aspects and gives overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law where the two acts are inconsistent with each other. 
• The Court observed that Section 42A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be interpreted to override the scope and ambit of the enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 
• The Court observed that since Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC provide for higher punishment compared to Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in accordance with Section 42 of the POCSO Act. 
• The Court observed that the High Court, while deciding the appeal against conviction, had increased the rigour of punishment by directing that the life imprisonment would extend to the remainder of the appellant's natural life, which effectively eliminated any possibility of early release. 
• The Court concluded that the High Court erred in enhancing the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially in the absence of an appeal for enhancement by the State. 

Relevant Provision: 

• Section 42 of the POCSO Act, 2012: Alternate Punishment -  
  • This section addresses situations where an offence is punishable under both POCSO and other laws (like the Indian Penal Code or Information Technology Act). It establishes that the offender shall be punished under whichever law provides the greater punishment. 
• Section 42A of the POCSO Act, 2012: Act not in Derogation of any Other Law -  
  • This section clarifies that POCSO provisions are supplemental to other laws, not replacements. In cases of inconsistency with other laws, POCSO's provisions override them to the extent of that inconsistency. 
  • These sections collectively define sexual offences against children, establish severe punishments, and ensure that POCSO takes precedence when it offers stronger protections than other laws. 

[Read Original Judgment]

Ranjit Singh Bath & Anr v. Union Territory Chandigarh & Anr.  

Date of Judgement/Order – 06.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S Okha and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The second respondent filed a complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 
• Based on the complaint, the Judicial Magistrate passed an order on 14th June 2017, directing the concerned Police Station to register an FIR under Sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).  
• The appellants challenged this order by filing a quashing petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. 
• The High Court dismissed the quashing petition through an impugned order. 
• The points raised by the Appellant were as follows: 
  • The appellants’ counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2015), particularly paragraph 27 of the judgment. 
  • The appellants’ counsel also referred to Babu Venkatesh & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.(2022), which followed the Priyanka Srivastava decision. 
• The points raised by the Respondent were as follows: 
  • The second respondent's senior counsel argued that while there was no specific mention of compliance with Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC, the compliance was made in substance. 
  • It was stated in paragraph 14 of the complaint that a written complaint had been addressed to the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh, and was marked to the Economic Offences Wing for inquiry on 29th January 2014. 
  • The second respondent's counsel admitted that there was no explicit averment that Section 154(3) of the CrPC was invoked. 
• Thus, the matter was before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict: 

• The Court held that the requirement under Section 154 (1) of CrPC is that the information regarding the commission of cognizable offence has to be furnished to the officer in charge of police station. 
• Further, Section 154 (3) only comes into picture when the officer in charge of the police station refuses or neglects to register the FIR under Section 154 (1). 
• The Court held that before the complainant chooses to adopt the remedy under Section 156 (3), he must exhaust the remedies provided for under Section 154 (1) and (3) of CrPC and he must make those averments in the complaint and produce the documents in support. 
• The Court held that in the present facts the Court has completely ignored the binding precedent in the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of UP (2015). 
• The Court quashed and set aside the steps taken on the basis of an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate.

Relevant Provision:

Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case — 

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.  

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.  

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.

[Read Original Judgment] 

Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra & Ors.  

Date of Judgement/Order – 19.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna B. Varale 

Case In Brief: 

• Chenmougam Aroumugam (father of respondents 1-8) purchased a ½ share of 'A' Schedule property under a sale deed. 
• On 15th December 1959, Tiranti Tam (mother of respondents 1-8) purchased the other ½ share of 'A' Schedule property (Door No. 10, Mariamman Kovil Street, Thiruvalluvar Nagar, Pondicherry). 
• On the same day the father donated his half share to his wife, making her the absolute owner of the entire 'A' Schedule property. 
• The mother died on 11th February 1976, leaving behind respondents 1-8 as her legal heirs. 
• On 12th December 1977, the father purchased 'B' Schedule property. 
• The father bequeathed the 'B' Schedule property through a Will in favor of respondent No. 9, allegedly after developing intimacy with her. 
• Respondent No. 2 filed a suit against his father seeking permanent injunction to prevent alienation of the suit properties. 
• On 22nd June 1981, while the suit was pending, the father executed a sale agreement with Raju Naidu (appellant) for the 'B' Schedule property for Rs. 60,000. 
  • Rs. 10,000 was paid as advance on the same day. 
  • Rs. 30,000 was paid later. 
  • Rs. 20,000 remained unpaid. 
• The appellant was put in possession of the property. 
• The court decreed in favor of respondent No. 2, directing the father not to alienate Item 2 of the suit properties to the extent of 7/8th share. 
• The father executed another Will in favor of respondent No. 9 in respect of 'A' Schedule property. 
• The father died during the pendency of his appeal against the judgment in OS No. 262 of 1980. 
• Respondents 1-8 filed a suit against respondent No. 9 and the appellant to: 
  • Declare both Wills void and unenforceable. 
  • Establish themselves as rightful owners of 'A' and 'B' Schedule properties. 
  • Direct the appellant to pay rent for 'B' Schedule property. 
• The subsequent legal proceedings centered around: 
  • The validity of the two Wills executed by the father. 
  • The legal rights of the appellant who had paid partial consideration and was in possession of the 'B' Schedule property. 
  • The refund of the advance money paid by the appellant. 
  • The timing and execution of court orders regarding property possession. 
• Trial Court (Principal Subordinate Judge at Puducherry): 
  • Declared Exhibit A7 Will (for 'B' Schedule property) as void and not binding on respondents 1-8. 
  • Declared Exhibit A8 Will (for 'A' Schedule property) as void and unenforceable to the extent of 7/8th share. 
  • Held that respondents 1-8 are:  
    • Rightful owners of 7/8th share of 'A' Schedule property. 
    • Absolute owners of 'B' Schedule property. 
  • Ordered respondents 1-8 to refund the advance money of Rs. 40,000 to the appellant within three months. 
  • Entitled respondents 1-8 to recover possession of 'B' Schedule property within one month after such payment. 
• Appellate Court (III Additional District Judge at Pondicherry): 
  • Held that Exhibit A8 Will (for 'A' Schedule property) was valid to the extent of 1/9th share in favor of respondent No. 9. 
  • Held that Exhibit A7 Will (for 'B' Schedule property) was valid to the extent of 1/4th share. 
  • Partly allowed the appeal in favor of the respondents. 
  • Dismissed the appeal (A.S. No. 145 of 1989) filed by the appellant. 
• High Court of Judicature at Madras: 
  • Applied the doctrine of 'merger' - held that once the decree is modified by the Appellate Court, the Trial Court's decree merges with it. 
  • Rejected the contention that execution petition was time-barred, noting that:  
    • The Appellate Court passed its judgment in 1993. 
    • Review petitions remained pending until December 13, 2001. 
  • Held that Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable because:  
    • The appellant had knowledge about the pendency of the suit. 
    • Yet still entered into an agreement with the father of respondents 1-8. 
  • Supported the Executing Court's extension of time for deposit under Section 148 of CPC. 
  • Noted that limited rights of a transferee during litigation (lis pendens) cannot obstruct decree holders' rights to execute the decree. 
• The appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court observed the following: 
  • There is no fault with the High Court's observations and conclusions. 
  • The Court confirmed the doctrine of 'merger' - when an Appellate Court passes a decree, the decree of the Trial Court merges with it regardless of whether it affirms, modifies, or reverses the original decree. 
  • It Supported the High Court's finding that there was no inordinate delay in execution. 
  • The Court agreed that Section 53A of TPA was not applicable in this case. 
  • The Court endorsed the view that the limited rights of a transferee during litigation cannot obstruct the decree holders' execution rights. 
  • Finally, the Court dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit.

Relevant Provision:

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Part performance— 

Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract

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Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra 

Date of Judgement/Order – 17.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra 

Case In Brief: 

• Raj Kumar Mishra was working as a Junior Assistant at CBSE through a contractor named M/s Manpower Security Services. 
• In 1999, Mishra's services were terminated through an oral order, which he claimed was illegal and unjustified. 
• Conciliation proceedings between Mishra and CBSE failed to resolve the dispute regarding his employment status. 
• The matter was subsequently referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal in Kanpur for detailed examination. 
• The tribunal initially found that Mishra was engaged with CBSE and had worked as an employee, awarding him compensation of Rs. 1 lakh. 
• Despite the compensation, the tribunal did not order Mishra's reinstatement to his previous position. 
• Mishra challenged this decision, arguing that reinstatement should have been mandatory under Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 
• CBSE consistently maintained that Mishra was a contract worker and not a direct employee, presenting contractor bills as evidence of his employment arrangement. 
• The core dispute centered on whether Mishra had a direct master-servant relationship with CBSE or was merely a contract worker supplied by a manpower agency. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court meticulously scrutinized the fundamental legal principle of establishing a master-servant relationship, emphasizing that such a relationship must be conclusively documented through explicit paperwork. 
• The Court critically examined the respondents' primary contention that supervisory and jurisdictional control automatically constitutes an employment relationship, summarily rejecting this simplistic legal interpretation. 
• After comprehensive analysis, the Court determined that merely being posted at various locations and performing diverse work duties does not inherently establish a direct employment offence or master-servant relationship. 
• The judicial bench comprehensively evaluated the presented documentary evidence and found insufficient substantive proof to validate the respondents' claim of being direct employees of the appellants. 
• Recognizing the absence of compelling documentary evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that remanding the matter back to the Labour Court would be an futile procedural exercise, thereby directly intervening to resolve the jurisdictional dispute. 
• The Court ultimately allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's orders for remand and effectively quashing the previous awards granted to the respondents. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen -  

• Section 25F mandates specific procedural and compensatory requirements that an employer must strictly follow before retrenching a workman who has completed continuous service of not less than one year. 
• The provision establishes three critical conditions precedent to lawful retrenchment:  
  • Providing one month's written notice to the workman, explicitly stating the reasons for retrenchment. 
  • Alternatively, paying full wages in lieu of the notice period. 
  • Ensuring complete wage compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for each completed year of continuous service. 

[Read Original Judgment] 

Kulandaisamy & Anr. v. State Represented by Its Inspector of Police & Anr. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 07.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S Okha and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The case involves two appellants, Kulandaisamy and another individual, who are challenging a legal matter that originated with a First Information Report (FIR).  
• An FIR was filed against the appellants, which initiated a criminal investigation. 
• The appellants filed a petition to quash this FIR in the High Court of Judicature at Madras. 
• The investigation by law enforcement was still in its preliminary stages at the time of the legal proceedings. 
• The appellants seem to believe that the matter underlying the FIR is more of a civil dispute rather than a criminal issue. 
• The High Court originally dismissed the appellants' petition to quash the FIR, suggesting there was some prima facie material that could warrant an investigation. 
• Unsatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellants approached the Supreme Court, filing a Special Leave Petition to challenge the High Court's order. 

Verdict: 

• The Supreme Court made the following observations: 
  • Preliminary Investigation Stage: 
    • The investigation was still at a preliminary stage, as shown in the respondent-State's counter affidavit. 
    • The Court emphasized that there is no absolute rule preventing judicial interference just because an investigation is in its early stages. 
  • High Court's Original Order Criticism: 
    • The Supreme Court found the High Court's approach to dismissing the petition unusual. 
    • The Court noted that the High Court did not consider the appellants' plea to quash the First Information Report (FIR) on its merits. 
  • Specific Criticisms of High Court's Order: 
    • The Supreme Court was particularly critical of the High Court's order, which they considered an unheard-of approach in dealing with a petition under Section 482 of CrPC. 
    • The Court felt the High Court had not properly examined the appellants' arguments. 
  • Remedial Action: 
    • The Supreme Court quashed and set aside the High Court's original order dated 1st April 2024. 
    • They restored the original Criminal Original Petition (No.7963 of 2024) to the Madras High Court's file. 
    • The Court directed the restored petition to be listed on 24th March 2025, before the roster Bench. 
  • Procedural Directions: 
    • The parties present in the Supreme Court were ordered to appear before the High Court on the specified date. 
    • The Supreme Court left all questions open for the High Court to decide. 
    • The overall thrust of the Supreme Court's observations was that the High Court should conduct a more thorough and substantive review of the petition to quash the FIR. 

Relevant Provision: 

Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Saving of inherent powers of High Court -  

Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 

[Read Original Judgment]

Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd. 

Date of Judgement/Order – 26.03.2025 

Bench Strength – 2 Judges 

Composition of Bench – Justice Abhay S Okha and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan 

Case In Brief: 

• The case involves a dispute between an appellant and a Credit Co-Operative Society regarding two cheques issued for loan repayments. 
• The first loan was for Rs. 3,50,000/- obtained on 3rd July 2006, for which two security cheques were issued. 
• The first cheque was deposited and led to a criminal case in 2007, which was subsequently withdrawn after the appellant paid the cheque amount on 23rd September 2016. 
• A second loan of Rs. 11,97,000/- was allegedly granted to the appellant on 25th July 2008. 
• The respondent issued a legal notice dated 11th November 2016 regarding the dishonoured cheque. 
• The appellant, through her advocate, disputed the claim and requested loan documents to prepare a response. 
• The respondent filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on 15th December 2016. 
• The Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) issued process on 2nd March 2017. 
• The Appellant filed a Criminal Writ Petition challenging the process, which was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on 18th December 2023. 
• The High Court found no issues with the JMFC's order and held that the appellant's contentions could be addressed during the trial. 

Verdict:  

• The Court laid down that if the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, then the learned Magistrate has to issue a process in terms of sub-Section (1) of Section 204 of the CrPC. 
  • The corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is Section 227. 
• The Court observed that in the present facts there was suppression of material facts by the party. 
• The material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. 
• In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a ‘false notice reply’, but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. 
• The Court held that setting the criminal law in motion by suppressing the material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of process of law.  
• The Supreme Court hence quashed and set aside the complaint.

Relevant Provision

Section 227 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of accused -  

(1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his advocate.  

(2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided. 

[Read Original Judgment]