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Civil Law

Order VII Rule 1 of CPC

 20-May-2025

M/S A. G. Overseas Pvt Ltd & Ors. v. Chetan Dass  

“The 120-day limit under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC applies to the original plaint, not to replies to amended plaints, and cannot be invoked to strike off the defence in such cases.” 

 Justice Manoj Jain   

Source: Delhi High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Manoj Jain   held that the 120-day limit for filing a written statement under the CPC does not apply to replies to amended plaints. 

  • The Delhi High Court held this in the matter of M/S A. G. Overseas Pvt Ltd & Ors. v. Chetan Dass (2025). 

What was the Background of M/S A. G. Overseas Pvt Ltd & Ors. v. Chetan Dass (2025) Case? 

  • M/s A.G. Overseas Pvt Ltd & Ors. (Defendants/Petitioners) were defending a commercial suit filed by Chetan Dass (Plaintiff/Respondent). 
  • The Defendants were duly served with summons and appeared before the Trial Court. 
  • Subsequently, on 29th April 2024, the Plaintiff moved an application under Order VI Rule 17 seeking amendment in the plaint. 
  • The Trial Court allowed the amendment application and granted the Defendants an opportunity to file a written statement to the amended plaint, adjourning the matter to 12th July 2024. 
  • On the adjourned date, the Trial Court noted that no written statement had been filed by the Defendants, consequently striking off their defence and closing their right to submit a written statement. 
  • The Trial Court's decision was premised on the expiration of the period prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act for filing the written statement. 
  • Aggrieved by this order, the Defendants filed the present petition challenging the Trial Court's decision to strike off their defence. 
  • No offence was alleged in this civil commercial matter which concerned procedural compliance with the timelines for filing written statements under the Commercial Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The High Court observed that the stipulation in the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC is for calculating the period within which a written statement is to be filed, which must be reckoned from the date on which the defendant was served with the summons. 
  • The Court held that once service is complete and the defendant appears before the court, if there is a subsequent amendment to the plaint, the court may provide a timeframe for filing a written statement to the amended plaint. 
  • However, for the purposes of striking off defence, the Court cannot ipso facto rely on the provisions applicable to the original plaint. 
  • The High Court noted that the summons issued to the Defendants were not in the proper form as these were "Summons for Settlement of Issues" rather than the summons prescribed for a commercial suit. 
  • Crucially, the Court observed that the outer permissible limit of 120 days to file a written statement had not even expired when the Trial Court struck off the Defendants' defence on 12th July 2024. 
  • The High Court remarked that the Defendants should have been more cautious and vigilant in ensuring timely filing of their written statement. 
  • No offence was at issue in this matter as it pertained solely to civil procedure and the right to file a written statement in response to an amended plaint. 
  • The Court ultimately allowed the petition, directing that the written statement be taken on record subject to payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/- by the Defendants. 

What is Order VII Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code,1908 (CPC)? 

  • Rule 1 of Order VII deals with the particulars to be contained in a plaint. It states that - 
    • The plaint shall contain the following particulars: — 
      • (a) The name of the Court in which the suit is brought. 
      • (b) The name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff. 
      • (c) The name, description and place of residence of the defendant, so far as they can be ascertained. 
      • (d) Where the plaintiff or the defendant is a minor or a person of unsound mind, a statement to that effect. 
      • (e) The facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. 
      • (f) The facts showing that the Court has jurisdiction. 
      • (g) The relief which the plaintiff claims. 
      • (h) Where the plaintiff has allowed a set-off or relinquished a portion of his claim, the amount so allowed, or relinquished. 
      • (i) A statement of the value of the subject matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court fees, so far as the case admits. 

Mercantile Law

Arbitrability of Trademark Disputes

 20-May-2025

K Mangyarkarasi v. NJ Sunderesan 

“The assumption that all matters relating to trademarks are outside the scope of arbitration is plainly erroneous.” 

Justice R Mahadevan and Justice JB Pardiwala 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

A bench of Justice R Mahadevan and Justice JB Pardiwala held that all trademark disputes are not outside the purview of arbitration. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the case of K Mangyarkarasi v. NJ Sunderesan (2025). 

What was the Background of K Mangyarkarasi v. NJ Sunderesan (2025) Case?   

  • The petition arises from a judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 9th January 2025, which rejected the Civil Revision Petition filed by the petitioners. 
  • The petitioners had initially filed a suit in the Commercial Court seeking permanent injunction against the respondents regarding trademark usage of "Sri Angannan Biriyani Hotel" and damages of Rs. 20 lakhs. 
  • The respondents filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act), requesting that the parties be referred to arbitration based on arbitration clauses in two Deeds of Assignment of Trade Marks dated 20th September 2017, and 14th October 2019. 
  • The Commercial Court allowed the Section 8 application on 6th February 2024, referring the parties to arbitration, finding that the dispute arose from contractual arrangements rather than trademark registration issues. 
  • The first petitioner (Mrs. K. Mangayarkarasi) is the proprietrix of the trademark after her father Late Angannan, who died in 1986, and her husband Kathirvadivel took over the business until his death in 1990. 
  • The respondent (N.J. Sundaresan) is the son of Jagadeeswaran (brother of Kathirvadivel), who had assisted in the business until his death in 2019. 
  • The petitioners claimed that the first petitioner was misled into signing blank papers which were later fraudulently filled as Assignment Deeds by the respondent. 
  • Both the Commercial Court and the High Court found that the dispute was arbitrable as it arose from contractual arrangements (Assignment Deeds) and not from trademark registration issues that would operate in rem. 
  • The courts determined that the allegation of fraud was between the parties with no public domain implications, making it suitable for arbitration. 
  • The High Court dismissed the Civil Revision Petition on these grounds, leading to the current petition before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

  • The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the High Court's decision to refer the parties to arbitration. 
  • The Court reaffirmed that under Section 16 of the A & C Act, an Arbitral Tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, even when objections about the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement are raised. 
  • The Court clarified that while certain categories of disputes are generally treated as non-arbitrable (such as criminal matters and certain rights in rem), not all trademark disputes fall outside the scope of arbitration. 
  • The Court held that disputes arising from subordinate rights related to trademarks, such as license agreements, are arbitrable as they relate to rights and obligations between parties. 
  • The Court determined that allegations of fraud do not automatically make a dispute non-arbitrable, especially when the fraud is alleged between parties with no public domain implications. 
  • The Court emphasized that where a valid arbitration agreement exists, a judicial authority is under a positive obligation to refer parties to arbitration with no discretion to override this legislative mandate. 
  • The Court cited the principle of "generalia specialibus non derogant" (general law should yield to special law), stating that once jurisdiction is ousted by a special statute like the Arbitration Act, civil courts should respect this ouster. 
  • The Court referenced its recent decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024) , noting that even when a party claims a discharge voucher was obtained by fraud or coercion, this itself gives rise to an arbitrable issue. 
  • The Court emphasized the time-sensitive nature of arbitration proceedings and that courts should limit their examination under Section 11 to merely ascertaining the existence of an arbitration agreement. 
  • The Court concluded that allegations of fraud, criminal wrongdoing, or statutory violation do not detract from the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes arising from civil or contractual relationships. 

What Disputes are Non Arbitrable? 

  • A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors. (2016): 
    • The courts have held that certain kinds of disputes may not be capable of adjudication through the means of arbitration. 
    • The Court held that the following categories of disputes are not arbitrable: 
      • patent, trade marks and copyright; 
      • anti-trust/competition laws;  
      • insolvency/winding up;  
      • bribery/corruption;  
      • fraud;  
      • criminal matters. 
  • Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Limited & Ors., (2011): 
    • The well-recognised examples of non-arbitrable disputes are : 
      • disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of criminal offences; 
      • matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child custody; 
      • guardianship matters;  
      • insolvency and winding up matters;  
      • testamentary matters (grant of probate, letters of administration and succession certificate); and 
      • eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to grant eviction or decide the disputes. 
    • The Court further held that generally and traditionally all disputes relating to rights in personam are considered to be amenable to arbitration; and all disputes relating to rights in rem are required to be adjudicated by courts and public tribunals, being unsuited for private arbitration. 
  • Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation reported in (2021): 
    • The Court held that the grant and issue of patents and registration of trademarks are matters that fall within the sovereign or government functions and have erga omnes effect. 
    • The assumption that all matters relating to trademarks are outside the scope of arbitration is plainly erroneous. 
    • There may be disputes that may arise from subordinate rights such as licenses granted by the proprietor of a registered trademark. 
    • Undisputedly, these disputes, although, involving the right to use trademarks, are arbitrable as they relate to rights and obligations inter se the parties to a license agreement. 

Constitutional Law

Supreme Court of India Mandates Three Years of Court Practice for Judicial Service Exams

 20-May-2025

All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 

“Restored the requirement of three years' minimum practice as an advocate for entry-level judicial posts, applicable only to future recruitments. A certificate from a senior advocate, duly endorsed, will serve as proof of experience.” 

Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice AG Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice AG Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran has restored the requirement of a minimum three years of legal practice for candidates applying to entry-level judicial posts, applicable to future recruitments only. 

  • The Supreme Court held this in the matter of All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (2025). 

What was the Background of All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (2025) case? 

  • The matter pertains to the eligibility criteria for entry-level judicial service positions in India. 
  • Prior to 2002, most States maintained a prerequisite that candidates must possess a minimum of three years' practice as advocates to be eligible for judicial service. 
  • The condition was abolished by the Supreme Court in 2002 in the All India Judges Association case, thereby permitting fresh law graduates to apply for Munsiff-Magistrate posts without prior practical experience. 
  • Subsequently, applications were filed before the Supreme Court seeking reinstatement of the minimum practice requirement. 
  • Several High Courts supported the move to reintroduce the minimum practice requirement, contending that absence of practical experience was detrimental to the efficient administration of justice. 
  • Senior Advocate Siddharth Bhatnagar, acting as Amicus Curiae, raised substantial concerns regarding the admission of fresh law graduates to judicial service without any practical experience as advocates. 
  • The majority of High Courts and States submitted that entry of fresh law graduates to judicial service has proven "counter productive." 
  • It is noteworthy that only the High Courts of Sikkim and Chhattisgarh opposed the restoration of the three-year practice requirement. 
  • The instant matter was reserved for judgment, whereafter the Court stayed recruitment processes initiated without the minimum service condition. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon careful consideration, has deemed it appropriate to restore the condition mandating a minimum practice of three years as an advocate for candidates applying to entry-level posts in judicial service. 
  • The Court has clarified that the period of practice may be reckoned from the date of provisional enrollment to the Bar. 
  • The Court has held that the restored condition shall not have retrospective application to recruitment processes already initiated by the High Courts prior to the date of judgment. 
  • The Court has specified that the minimum practice requirement shall be applicable exclusively to future recruitments. 
  • The Court has established that a certificate issued by an advocate possessing a minimum standing of ten years, duly endorsed by the judicial officer of that station, shall constitute sufficient proof of fulfillment of the practice condition. 
  • For advocates practicing at the Supreme Court or High Courts, the Court has stipulated that a certificate from an advocate with minimum standing of ten years, endorsed by an officer designated by the Court, shall be deemed adequate evidence. 
  • The Court has acknowledged concerns regarding the effectiveness of the practice period, noting potential circumvention through nominal signing of vakalaths without substantive legal practice. 
  • The Court has considered the submissions of most High Courts that prior practice is essential for efficient functioning as judicial officers. 
  • The Court has taken judicial notice of the prevailing view among High Courts and States that admission of fresh law graduates to judicial service has proven counterproductive. 
  • No specific observations pertaining to any offence were made by the Court in the present matter.

Is 3-year Practice Necessary for Judiciary? 

  • The Supreme Court has ruled that candidates must have a minimum of three years of practice as a lawyer to be eligible for judicial service as civil judges (junior division). 
  • The Judgment of All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors (2025) will not be applicable to Rajasthan notification, Uttarakhand notification and Chhattisgarh notification. 
  • The three-year practice requirement must be certified and endorsed by a lawyer with at least 10 years of standing at the Bar. 
  • Experience as a law clerk to judges will be counted toward the three-year practice requirement. 
  • The three-year legal practice period begins from the date of provisional enrollment as an advocate, not from the date of clearing the All-India Bar Exam (AIBE). 
  • The Court has mandated that successful candidates must undergo one year of training before presiding in court. 
  • The ruling will apply prospectively and will not affect ongoing judicial recruitment processes that have already commenced.