List of Current Affairs

Source:  Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 does not confer on the Juvenile Justice Board any power to review it’s own orders. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025). 

What was the Background of Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) Case?   

• The Supreme Court disposed of two criminal appeals that were heard together, since the parties, legal representatives, and issues involved were the same. 
• On 21st February 2023, the Supreme Court directed that SLP (Crl.) D. No. 24862 of 2022 be tagged with SLP (Crl.) No. 11233 of 2022, which was later converted into Criminal Appeal No. 603 of 2025. 
• In Criminal Appeal No. 603 of 2025, the appellant (complainant and mother of the deceased) challenged the order of the Allahabad High Court dated 13th May 2022, which had dismissed her Criminal Revision No. 82 of 2022. 
• The case originated from an application filed by the mother of respondent No. 2 before the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), Meerut, seeking a declaration that he was a juvenile in conflict with law. 
• On 27th August 2021, the JJB dismissed Miscellaneous Case No. 55/2021, holding that respondent No. 2 was not a juvenile as he was above 18 years of age on the date of the incident, i.e., 17th February 2021. 
• Respondent No. 2, through his mother, filed Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 2021 before the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge, POCSO Court, Meerut. 
• On 14th October 2021, the learned Additional Sessions Judge set aside the JJB’s order and held that respondent No. 2 was a juvenile, based on a school certificate showing his date of birth as 8th September 2003. 
• The complainant then filed Criminal Revision No. 82 of 2022 before the High Court, assailing the above decision. 
• On 13th May 2022, the High Court dismissed the revision, upholding the lower court's reliance on the school certificate and ruling out the need for a medical examination. 
• In a parallel bail matter, the JJB had rejected bail to respondent No. 2 on 27th October 2021. 
• Respondent No. 2 then filed Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 2021 before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, who also rejected the bail on 1st December 2021. 
• Respondent No. 2 next filed Criminal Revision No. 234 of 2022 before the High Court, challenging the bail rejections. 
• On 13th May 2022, the High Court allowed the revision, held that gravity of the offence is not a sufficient ground to deny bail to a juvenile, and ordered that respondent No. 2 be enlarged on bail upon furnishing a personal bond and two sureties. 
• The complainant, aggrieved by this bail order, filed SLP (Crl.) D. No. 24862 of 2022 before the Supreme Court. 
• On 18th November 2022, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and issued notice in the SLP filed against the High Court order. 
• Later, on 4th February 2025, leave was granted, thereby converting the SLP into a regular criminal appeal.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Additional District and Sessions Judge and the High Court were justified in holding respondent No. 2 to be a juvenile at the time of the incident. 
• Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 prescribes a clear order of preference for age determination:  
  • first the school matriculation certificate,  
  • then birth certificate from municipal authorities, and 
  • only in the absence of both should medical tests be conducted. 
• The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) erred in ordering a medical examination when school certificates and a municipal birth certificate were available, both indicating the respondent's date of birth as September 8, 2003. 
• Based on proper documentation, respondent No. 2 was 17 years, 3 months, and 10 days old at the time of the incident (February 17, 2021), making him a juvenile delinquent. 
• The JJB had no authority to review its own earlier determination of the respondent's date of birth (September 8, 2003) from a previous case, as the JJ Act, 2015 confers no such power of review. 
• For heinous offenses committed by juveniles aged 16-18 years, the JJB must conduct a preliminary assessment of the juvenile's mental and physical capacity before deciding whether trial should proceed in a Children's Court. 
• The JJB correctly conducted this preliminary assessment and found respondent No. 2 physically and mentally fit to understand the consequences of his actions, ordering the case to be transferred to the Juvenile Court/POCSO Court. 
• The High Court granted bail to respondent No. 2, and since three years have passed without evidence of misuse of liberty, the court found no reason to interfere with the bail order. 
• The court dismissed both appeals but noted that the appellant and the State may seek cancellation of bail if respondent No. 2 misuses his liberty.

What are the Powers and Functions of the Juvenile Justice Board? 

• Following are the powers and functions if the Juvenile Justice Board: 
  • Ensure informed participation of the child and the parent/guardian in every step of the process. (Section 8(3)(a)). 
  • Ensure that the child's rights are protected throughout the process of apprehending the child, enquiry, after care and rehabilitation. (Section 8(3)(b)). 
  • Ensure availability of legal aid for the child through legal service institution. (Section 8(3)(c)). 
  • Wherever necessary, provide an interpreter or translator, having such qualifications, experience, and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, to the child if he fails to understand the language used in the proceedings. (Section 8(3)(d)). 
  • Direct Probation Officer/Child Welfare Officer/Social Worker to conduct social investigation to ascertain the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed and to submit report within 15 days from the date of first production of the child before the JJB. (Section 8(3)(e)). 
  • Adjudicate and dispose of cases of children in conflict with law in accordance with the process of inquiry in section 14. (Section 8(3)(f)). 
  • When a Child in Conflict with Law is in need of care and protection, JJB will simultaneously transfer such matters to Child Welfare Committee. (Section 8(3)(g)). 
  • Include an individual care plan for the child's rehabilitation in a final order disposing of the matter. (Section 8(3)(h)). 
  • Conduct enquiry for declaring fit persons regarding case of children in conflict with law. (Section 8(3)(i)). 
  • Conduct at least one monthly inspection of the residential facilities of children in conflict with law and recommend action for improvement in quality of services to the DCPU and the State Government. (Section 8(3)(j)). 
  • Order police to register F.I.R. for offences committed against child in conflict with law on a complaint made in this regard. (Section 8(3)(k)). 
  • Order police to register F.I.R. for offences against child in need of care and protection on a written complaint by a CWC. (Section 8(3)(l)). 
  • Conduct regular inspection of jails meant for adults, to ensure no child is locked in such jails and take immediate measures for transfer of such a child to the observation home. (Section 8(3)(m)). 
  • The JJB shall make an order directing the Police to destroy relevant records of such conviction after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period. (Section 24(2)). 

Source:  Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the Justice G. Girish held that telephonic treatment by doctor not criminal negligence in patient's death. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the matter of Dr. Joseph John MD v. The State of Kerala and another (2025). 

What was the Background of Dr. Joseph John MD v. The State of Kerala and another (2025) Case? 

• Dr. Joseph John, a Consultant Gastroenterologist at a private hospital in Ernakulam, was booked under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) for alleged criminal negligence. 
• The case involved a 29-year-old kidney transplant recipient who was admitted to the hospital on 14th May 2012 for abdominal pain and vomiting related to intestinal complaints. 
• After successful treatment, the patient was advised discharge, but developed breathlessness, fever, and vomiting around midnight on 25th May 2012. 
• The duty nurse called Dr. John at his residence around 4:30 a.m. on 26th May 2012, whereupon he prescribed certain medications over telephone and directed laboratory tests. 
• The patient was later shifted to the Nephrology Intensive Care Unit at 8:00 a.m. on 26th May 2012 and passed away approximately 34 hours later due to renal complications. 
• The patient's father filed a complaint alleging medical negligence, claiming the doctor failed to attend to the patient personally or refer him to a nephrologist immediately. 
• Following investigations, a State Level Apex Body found fault with the petitioner, directing investigation against him on charges of criminal negligence. 
• Consequently, the Investigating Officer filed a final report against Dr. John alleging commission of offence under Section 304A IPC. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court noted that the course adopted by the petitioner (prescribing medicines and laboratory tests) had not been found wrong by any members of the Expert Panel. 
• The Court emphasized that for fixing criminal liability on a doctor, the standard of negligence required to be proved must be so high as can be described as "gross negligence" or "recklessness." 
• The Court observed that mere inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care might create civil liability but would not suffice to hold a medical professional criminally liable. 
• Justice G. Girish highlighted that criminal prosecution of doctors without sufficient material showing gross negligence would amount to "great disservice to the community at large." 
• The Court found absolutely nothing on record to show the petitioner's actions amounted to gross negligence never expected from a doctor of similar stature. 
• The High Court concluded that the criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner constituted an abuse of process of court which had to be terminated at the threshold. 
• Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings pending against the petitioner in C.C. No.174/2018 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam. 

What is Section 106 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023 (BNS)? 

• Section 106 of the BNS addresses deaths caused by negligent acts. 
• The statute establishes criminal liability for any person who causes death through rash or negligent conduct not amounting to culpable homicide, punishable with imprisonment up to five years and fine. 
• The provision contains a specific clause pertaining to registered medical practitioners, prescribing a reduced maximum punishment of two years imprisonment and fine when death occurs during a medical procedure. 
• The section explicitly defines "registered medical practitioner" as one possessing qualifications recognized under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019, with registration in either the National or State Medical Register. 
• A heightened penalty applies in sub-section (2) for hit-and-run cases, imposing imprisonment up to ten years and fine upon those who cause death through rash and negligent driving and subsequently flee without reporting to authorities. 
• This statutory framework creates a graduated approach to negligence-related deaths, distinguishing between general negligence, medical negligence, and vehicular negligence with flight from the scene. 
• The provision acknowledges the specialized nature of medical practice by creating a separate sentencing structure for healthcare professionals, reflecting legislative intent to differentiate between ordinary negligence and errors occurring within professional medical contexts. 
• Importantly, as confirmed by judicial precedent, conviction under this section requires proof of gross negligence or recklessness, particularly in medical cases, not merely error of judgment or insufficient care. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Sachin Datta held that in the absence of any bonafide negotiations after the issuance of the notice invoking arbitration, the period cannot be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996." 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the matter of Tirupati Constwell Private Limited v. Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd (2025). 

What was the Background of Tirupati Constwell Private Limited v. Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd.(2025) Case? 

• Tirupati Constwell Private Limited was awarded a tender for civil, sanitary, and electrical works for 131 Dwelling Units of the D.S.N.E.F. Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. at Plot No. 1, Sector 19, Dwarka, Phase-I, New Delhi through a letter dated 24th October 2005. 
• An agreement dated 31st October 2005 was executed between Tirupati Constwell Private Limited and Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd for execution of the project. 
• The agreement stipulated that M/s Khurmi Associates Pvt. Ltd would prepare drawings and specifications describing the work as the architecture consultancy firm. 
• Disputes arose when Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd allegedly failed to clear Tirupati Constwell's running account bills amounting to Rs. 80,92,26,992/-. 
• The agreement required payment of outstanding dues within one month of receiving running bills from Tirupati Constwell. 
• Tirupati Constwell claimed that the respondent never disputed the outstanding payment during the subsistence of the agreement and repeatedly reassured that the outstanding amount would be paid. 
• Tirupati Constwell issued a conciliation notice dated 11th December 2018 to Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd, which was opposed by the respondent through a letter dated 10th October 2019. 
• As disputes persisted, Tirupati Constwell issued a notice dated 22nd February 2019 invoking arbitration under clause 39.1 of the agreement. 
• Tirupati Constwell also sent a letter dated 15th March 2019 to M/s Khurmi Associates Pvt. Ltd seeking consent to act as an arbitrator. 
• Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd responded on 16th March 2019, refusing to consent to arbitration and stating they did not possess a copy of the agreement. 
• According to Tirupati Constwell, Mr. Harpreet Singh Khurmi of the architecture firm subsequently acted as a mediator and issued a notice dated 27th March 2019 to explore the possibility of an amicable resolution. 
• Further communications and alleged "proceedings" were conducted on various dates
• On 24th August 2019, the architect recused from the proceedings, citing that the respondent had questioned his impartiality to act as an arbitrator. 
• Tirupati Constwell subsequently filed a petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 02nd July 2024, seeking appointment of arbitrator(s). 
• Tirupati Constwell contended that the period between 27th March 2019 and 24th August 2019 should be excluded when calculating the limitation period for filing the petition. 
• Delhi States Employees Federation CGHS Ltd argued that no mediation proceedings took place between the parties and that the petition was time-barred.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Court observed that after issuance of the notice invoking arbitration, Tirupati Constwell addressed a letter to the Managing Director of the architect firm on 15th March 2019 requesting consent to act as an arbitrator, not as a mediator. 
• The Court noted that the communications dated 27th March 2019 and 04th June 2019 from the architect to the respondent did not contain any reference to requests from either party for the architect to act as a mediator or conciliator. 
• The Court examined the "proceedings" issued by the architect on 20.06.2019, 15.07.2019, 30.07.2019, and 24.08.2019, observing that in each instance, the architect described himself as an "Arbitrator" rather than a mediator. 
• The Court determined that nothing in the record indicated that the architect was asked by either party to act as a mediator at any point. 
• The Court concluded that no "bonafide negotiations" were conducted after the issuance of the notice invoking arbitration, nor was the architect authorized to act as a mediator. 
• The Court observed that limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act begins once a valid notice invoking arbitration has been sent and there has been a failure or refusal by the other party to comply. 
• The Court noted that the respondent's reply dated 16.03.2019 constituted an unequivocal refusal to comply with the arbitration notice, meaning limitation began to run from that date under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
• The Court cited the Supreme Court judgment in Geo Miller & Company Pvt. Ltd. vs Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., which states that periods of "bonafide negotiating towards an amicable settlement" can be excluded when calculating limitation periods. 
• However, the Court found that the communications and "proceedings" in this case could not be construed as reflecting any "bonafide negotiations" between the parties. 
• The Court distinguished the present case from precedents cited by the petitioner, noting that unlike in Unisys Infosolutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Gurbani Media Pvt. Ltd., the parties here did not engage in a discernible settlement process. 
• The Court noted the clarification provided in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning regarding limitation periods in arbitration cases. 
• The Court concluded that the period between 27.03.2019 and 24.08.2019 could not be excluded for determining whether the petition was filed within the limitation period. 
• The Court observed that counsel for Tirupati Constwell had conceded that if this period was not excluded, the petition would be beyond the prescribed limitation period. 
• Based on these observations, the Court determined that the petition was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and therefore dismissed it. 

What is Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 

• Allows any person of any nationality to be an arbitrator unless parties agree otherwise. 
• Gives parties freedom to agree on appointment procedures, with default mechanisms if they fail to agree. 
• In three-arbitrator tribunals, each party appoints one arbitrator, and those two select the third presiding arbitrator. 
• Provides remedy through Section 11(6) when there's a breakdown in the agreed appointment procedure, allowing courts to intervene after the 30-day period expires. 
• Limits judicial intervention under Section 11(6A) to only determining the existence of an arbitration agreement. 
• Sets limitation periods for filing applications under Section 11(6), which begin running upon issuance of arbitration notice and rejection by the other party.

Cases Referred

• SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning (2024): 
  • Established that limitation for Section 11 applications begins only when a valid arbitration notice is sent and the other party refuses to comply. 
  • Clarified that courts should not conduct intricate evidentiary inquiries into whether claims are time-barred at the arbitrator appointment stage. 
• Geo Miller & Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (2020): 
  • Held that periods during which parties were conducting bonafide negotiations for settlement can be excluded from limitation calculations. 
  • Required that the entire negotiation history must be specifically pleaded and placed on record for such exclusion. 
• Arif Azim Co. v. M/s Aptech Ltd. (2024): 
  • Created a two-pronged limitation test requiring courts to examine whether the Section 11(6) petition itself is time-barred and whether the claims are clearly dead claims. 
  • Established that courts may refuse to appoint an arbitral tribunal if either prong is answered against the party seeking arbitration.