List of Current Affairs

Source:  Jammu & Kashmir High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of  Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi, held that a statutory tribunal’s power of review is confined to the same limitations as a civil court under Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (CPC). 

• This was held in the matter of Ravinder Singh & Ors. v. Om Prakash & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Ravinder Singh & Ors. v. Om Prakash & Ors. (2025) Case ? 

• Ravinder Singh and others, residents of Karan Nagar, Jammu for over 40 years, filed a writ petition against Om Parkash, who owned land measuring 08 marlas and 24 sq. ft. under khasra No. 95 in the same locality. 
• Om Parkash obtained permission from Jammu Municipal Corporation on 26th  November 2010 to construct a ground, first, and second floor building with specific allocations - 1150 sq. ft. residential on ground floor, 649 sq. ft. residential and 501 sq. ft. commercial on first floor, and 1150 sq. ft. residential on second floor. 
• The sanctioned plan mandated a front setback of 40 ft. and rear setback of 20 ft., with the construction intended for mixed residential-commercial use as per zoning regulations. 
• Om Parkash constructed the building in violation of the approved plan, using RCC columns to create large commercial halls instead of the permitted residential structure, covering 1856 sq. ft. for commercial use on ground floor against the allowed 1150 sq. ft. 
• On the first floor, he covered 1856 sq. ft. for commercial purposes instead of the sanctioned 649 sq. ft. residential and 501 sq. ft. commercial space, and constructed an unauthorized 410 sq. ft. projection slab. 
• Municipal authorities served notices dated 12th November 2011 under Sections 7(1) and 12(1) of the J&K Control of Building Operation Act, 1988, followed by another notice dated 31st July 2012 under Section 7(3) directing demolition within five days. 
•  Om Parkash challenged the demolition notices before the J&K Special Tribunal, which initially dismissed his appeal on 11th February 2013, holding that the violations were major and non-condonable under applicable regulations. 
• Despite no statutory provision for rehearing, Om Parkash filed an application for rehearing, leading the Tribunal to pass a fresh order dated 14th March2013 modifying its earlier decision. 
• The Tribunal directed municipal authorities to reassess violations against applicable norms rather than strictly adhering to the original permission, considering existing building lines and allowing fresh action against unauthorized constructions in the neighbourhood. 
• During the pendency of proceedings, Om Parkash filed a counter writ petition alleging that the original petitioners had also raised constructions without proper building permissions under municipal laws. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that the writ petition was not maintainable as it was filed merely on apprehension, with no actual adverse action initiated against the petitioners pursuant to the Tribunal's order dated 14th March 2013. 
• The Court noted that petitioners lacked locus standi since they were not parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal and had no legal or statutory rights infringed by the impugned order. 
• The Court found the writ petition premature, observing that "the writ, on mere apprehension, is not maintainable, unless there is material on record to indicate that the adverse action is imminent or there is real threat of invasion of rights of the petitioners." 
• The Court established that tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act possess review powers analogous to civil courts under Section 22(3)(f), subject to limitations enumerated in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. 
• The Court clarified that tribunals can review decisions only on specific grounds including discovery of new evidence, error apparent on face of record, or other sufficient cause, and cannot correct erroneous orders under the guise of review. 
• The Court observed that the Tribunal was justified in reviewing its earlier order based on newly discovered evidence, specifically photographs showing comparative setbacks in the vicinity that were not produced during initial proceedings. 
• The Court distinguished between procedural review (for fundamental procedural lapses) and merit review (confined to statutory grounds), noting that the Tribunal had not committed any procedural illegality warranting intervention. 
• The Court dismissed the main writ petition for lack of maintainability while directing municipal authorities to reassess violations afresh, with liberty to take action against any unauthorized constructions in accordance with applicable law after affording opportunity of hearing to affected parties.

What is Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC?

• Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is the statutory provision that empowers courts to review their own judgments and orders, providing an exceptional remedy where traditional appellate channels may not be available or adequate. 
• The provision establishes three specific and exhaustive grounds upon which a court may exercise its review jurisdiction - discovery of new and important matter or evidence not previously available despite due diligence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason as may be deemed appropriate by the court. 
• The rule confers the right upon any person who considers himself aggrieved by a decree or order to seek review, whether such decree or order allows an appeal but no appeal has been preferred, or whether no appeal is permitted at all, thereby providing a safety valve for judicial errors. 
• For claiming review on the ground of discovery of new evidence, the applicant must demonstrate that such matter or evidence was not within his knowledge at the time of the original proceedings and could not have been produced despite exercising due diligence, ensuring that the provision is not misused for belated presentation of available evidence. 
• The concept of "error apparent on the face of the record" refers to patent and self-evident errors that do not require elaborate reasoning or lengthy examination of evidence to detect, distinguishing it from errors of judgment that require detailed analysis and are not subject to review jurisdiction. 
• The phrase "any other sufficient reason" is interpreted restrictively and must be construed ejusdem generis with the other specified grounds, preventing arbitrary exercise of review powers and ensuring that review remains an exceptional remedy rather than a substitute for appeal. 
• The rule specifically provides for review in cases where no appeal is allowed, recognising that certain judicial orders may not be subject to appellate scrutiny yet may contain manifest errors requiring correction through the review mechanism. 
• The Explanation to the rule categorically excludes the reversal or modification of legal principles by superior courts in other cases as grounds for review, maintaining the finality of judgments and preventing endless litigation based on evolving jurisprudence. 
• Order XLVII Rule 1 embodies the principle that review jurisdiction is not an alternative mode of appeal and cannot be exercised to re-examine the merits of a case or to correct mere errors of judgment, but is confined to rectifying patent illegalities or considering genuinely new material that could not have been presented earlier despite reasonable efforts. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan directed the Central Government to constitute the National Road Safety Board within six months, as mandated under Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, with no further extension. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India and Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India and Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The present application raises critical issues concerning pedestrian safety and the implementation of statutory provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.  
• The applicant has highlighted the fundamental necessity of proper footways and footpaths for citizens, emphasising that such infrastructure must be accessible and usable by persons with disabilities.  
• The matter particularly concerns the mandatory removal of encroachments on footpaths to ensure unobstructed pedestrian movement. 
• Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 mandates the constitution of a National Road Safety Board with specific functions and duties. The Board is required to advise the Central Government and State Governments on various aspects related to road safety and traffic management.  
• These functions include establishing standards for vehicle design, weight, construction, manufacturing processes, operation, and maintenance of motor vehicles and safety equipment. 
• The Board's responsibilities extend to advising on registration and licensing of motor vehicles, formulation of standards for road safety, road infrastructure, and traffic control systems.  
• Additionally, the Board must facilitate safe and sustainable use of the road transport ecosystem and promote new vehicle technology for enhanced safety.  
• The legislation also mandates the Board to focus on safety of vulnerable road users and implement programmes for educating and sensitizing drivers and other road users. 
• Despite the statutory mandate, the National Road Safety Board has remained merely a paper entity without proper constitution through appointment of Chairperson and Members. 
• The Amicus Curiae brought to the Court's attention that this Board, carrying important functions and duties, existed only in theory without practical implementation.  
• This situation has prevented the Board from fulfilling its statutory obligations and providing necessary recommendations for road safety improvements across the country. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court expressed its inability to comprehend why the Government of India required an extended period of nine months to implement a statutory provision that has been pending for a considerable time.  
• The Court noted that the Government had filed an affidavit seeking nine months for constituting the National Road Safety Board, which the Court found unreasonable given the importance and urgency of road safety matters. 
• The Court emphasised that before any recommendations of the Board could be implemented, the Board must be properly constituted with appropriate appointments of Chairperson and Members.  
• The Court recognised that the delay in constitution of the Board was hindering the effective implementation of road safety measures across the nation. The bench observed that road safety is a matter of utmost public importance that cannot be delayed indefinitely due to administrative inaction. 
• The Court granted a reduced timeframe of six months from the date of the order for the Government of India to ensure constitution of the National Road Safety Board. 
• The Court made it explicitly clear that no further extension of time would be granted under any circumstances, indicating the Court's firm stance on this matter. The Court also directed that compliance reports should be filed to monitor the progress of implementation. 
• The Court scheduled the matter for listing on 1st August 2025, to review the progress made by the Government in constituting the Board.  
• The Court recorded appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae and other legal representatives in bringing this important matter to judicial attention. 

What is National Road Safety Board (Section 215B of MV Act) ? 

• Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 is a legal provision that establishes the National Road Safety Board as a statutory body in India. 
• Legal Framework of Section 215B: 
  • The section provides the constitutional foundation and mandate for the National Road Safety Board, empowering it to serve as an advisory body to both Central and State Governments on comprehensive road safety matters. 
• Statutory Functions under Section 215B: 
  • The Board is legally mandated to advise on eight core areas: 
    • Vehicle Standards and Safety Equipment - Standards for design, weight, construction, manufacturing processes, operation and maintenance of motor vehicles and safety equipment 
    • Registration and Licensing Framework - Oversight of motor vehicle registration and licensing systems 
    • Road Safety and Infrastructure Standards - Formulation of standards for road safety, road infrastructure and traffic control mechanisms 
    • Sustainable Transport Ecosystem - Facilitation of safe and sustainable utilization of road transport systems 
    • Technology Promotion - Advancement of new vehicle technologies for enhanced safety 
    • Vulnerable Road User Protection - Specific focus on safety measures for pedestrians, cyclists and other vulnerable road users 
    • Education and Awareness Programs - Development of driver education and road user sensitization programs 
    • Prescribed Functions - Additional functions as may be prescribed by the Central Government 
• Legal Implementation: 
  • The section was operationalized through notification dated 3rd September 2021, when the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways constituted the Board along with its governing Rules.  
  • These Rules provide the Board with authority to establish Technical Working Groups as necessary for effective functioning. 
• Legal Significance: 
  • Section 215B represents a shift toward centralized, expert-driven road safety governance, creating a statutory framework for evidence-based policy formulation and standardization of road safety practices across India's federal structure. 

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Jyoti Singh held that mere inaction by a party called upon by the other one to act, cannot lead to an inference as to implied consent or acquiescence of such party to such appointment of the Arbitrator.  

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of M/s Supreme Infrastructure India v. Freyssinet Mermad India Pvt. (2025). 

What was the Background of M/s Supreme Infrastructure India v. Freyssinet Mermad India Pvt. (2025) Case?   

• The Petitioner, a non-government public company engaged in construction, was awarded a project on 15th October 2012 to construct an additional office complex for the Supreme Court near Pragati Maidan, New Delhi. 
• On 6th February 2013, the Petitioner issued a Work Order to the Respondent for the design, supply, and installation of pre-stressed sil anchors. 
• The address provided by the Petitioner in the Work Order was “Supreme City, Hiranandani Complex, Near Chitrath Studio Powai, Mumbai, 400076.” 
• On 24th July 2014, the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) terminated the contract with the Petitioner. 
• The Work Order included a dispute resolution clause stipulating arbitration under Indian law, with the arbitration seat at New Delhi. 
• The Respondent allegedly invoked arbitration by sending a notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act), and unilaterally appointed a Sole Arbitrator. 
• The Petitioner claims it never received the Section 21 notice or any communication from the Arbitrator and was therefore unaware of the arbitral proceedings. 
• An ex parte arbitral award was passed on 15th March 2016, but a signed copy of the award was allegedly never delivered to the Petitioner. 
• In 2019, the Respondent filed an execution petition (No. 566/2019) before the Bombay High Court, which was withdrawn on 27th October 2021 due to non-payment of stamp duty. 
• A second execution petition (Commercial Execution No. 14691/2022) was refiled after stamp duty payment but was again withdrawn on 17th October 2022, citing an erroneous belief that the Petitioner was under liquidation. 
• On 10th April 2024, the Respondent filed a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, before the NCLT, Mumbai. 
• The Petitioner became aware of the arbitral proceedings and award only upon receiving an email from NCLT dated 28th June 2024 attaching a copy of the IBC petition. 
• The Petitioner asserts that the arbitral proceedings and award are invalid due to lack of notice under Section 21, unilateral appointment of the Arbitrator, and non-receipt of the signed arbitral award.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that the delivery of the signed award is not a mere formality; it initiates crucial limitation periods for filing applications under Sections 33 and 34 of the Act. 
• In Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (2017), the Court stressed that arbitration proceedings commence only when the respondent receives a notice under Section 21 requesting reference of the dispute to arbitration. 
• The notice serves to inform the respondent of the claims, potentially narrowing or resolving disputes before arbitration, thereby playing a critical role in the arbitral process. 
• The courts have held that appointing an arbitrator unilaterally, without consent or proper invocation of the arbitration clause, violates Section 21 and is legally untenable. 
• Even before the 2015 amendment to Section 12(1), it was settled law that arbitration requires mutual consent (consensus ad idem), and any unilateral appointment is void. 
• The judgment in Vineet Dujodwala v. State of NCT of Delhi (2024) confirmed that a unilateral appointment of an arbitrator is enough to nullify the award, regardless of other procedural defects. 
• In Lt. Col. H.S. Bedi (Retd) v. STCI Finance Limited (2020) the Court held that a party’s failure to respond to a Section 21 notice does not amount to implied consent for unilateral appointment; the correct route is approaching the Court under Section 11. 
• The Court finally held that owing to the lack of a valid Section 21 notice, the unilateral appointment of the arbitrator, and non-delivery of the signed award, the arbitral award dated 15th March 2016 be set aside. 
• In Benarsi Krishna Committee and Others v. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited, (2012) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court held that ‘party to arbitration’ proceedings means party to the arbitration agreement and if the copy of the signed award is not delivered to the party, it would not amount to compliance with provisions of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act, a provision which deals with form and content of the arbitral award. 
• From a reading of the aforementioned judgments, it is clear that delivery of an arbitral award under Section 31(5) is not an empty formality and as it is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32 arises and receipt by the party of the award then sets in motion several periods of limitation such as for an application for correction under Section 33(1) and application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act etc. Reading of Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act leaves no trace of doubt that a ‘signed copy’ of the award must be delivered to the ‘party’ to the arbitration agreement. In the present case, signed copy of the award has not been received by the Petitioner till date, an uncontroverted fact, and therefore, limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) has not commenced. In light of this, it is held that the petition is not barred by limitation 
• It is no longer res integra that arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the Respondent, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 

What is the Requirement of Notice under Section 21 of A & C Act  ? 

• Section 21 of the Act provides for the requirement of notice under the Act. 
• The important points enumerated are as follows: 
  • Commencement Depends on Request Receipt: Arbitral proceedings begin when the respondent receives a request to refer the dispute to arbitration. 
  • Party Agreement Can Alter Rule: This rule applies unless the parties have mutually agreed on a different date or method for commencement. 
  • Receipt Date is Crucial: The actual date of receipt of the request by the respondent determines when the arbitration officially starts. 

What are the Landmark Judgments on Notice under Section 21 of A & C Act ? 

• Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (2017, DHC): 
  • The Court emphasized on the importance and mandate of issuing notice under Section 21 of the Act. 
  • It was held that a plain reading of Section 21 indicates that except where parties have agreed to the contrary, the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings would be the date on which the recipient of the notice receives from the claimant a request for referring the dispute to arbitration. 
  • The object behind the notice is as follows: 
    • Party to the arbitration agreement against whom a claim is made should know what the claims are and it is possible that in response to the notice, the recipient of the notice may accept some claims either wholly or in part and disputes may get narrowed down. 
    • This may help in even resolving the disputes and reference to arbitration could be avoided 
• Shriram Transport Finance Company Limited v. Narender Singh (2022): 
  • The Court held that if no notice is received under Section 21 by the recipient, there is no commencement of arbitral proceedings.