List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Abhay S Oka and AG Masih held that prosecution may produce additional documents post-chargesheet, even if earlier omitted, as long as no prejudice is caused to the accused. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sameer Sandhir versus Central Bureau of Investigation (2025). 

What was the Background of Sameer Sandhir v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2025) Case? 

• The appellant Sameer Sandhir was accused No. 7 in a corruption case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under Case No. RC-217/2013/A0004.  
• An FIR was registered on 3rd May 2013 for offences punishable under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Sections 7, 8 and 10 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.  
• Between 8th January 2013 and 1st May 2013, the Ministry of Home Affairs had granted permission to intercept telephone calls of several accused persons and one Manoj Garg. 
• Two Compact Discs (CDs) containing call records of 189 and 101 calls respectively were seized on 4th May 2013 and 10th May 2013.  
• These CDs were sent to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for analysis on 27th May 2013.  
• The CBI filed the original chargesheet on 2nd July 2013, but at that time the CFSL report was not available.  
• On 25th October 2013, the CFSL forwarded its report and original sealed CDs back to the CBI. 
• A supplementary chargesheet was filed on 30th October 2013 along with the CFSL report, but the CDs were inadvertently not produced before the court. 
•  During the trial proceedings in September 2014, when the prosecution sought to play the CDs while recording evidence of witnesses, the defence objected on the ground that the CDs were neither relied upon nor filed in court, and copies were not supplied to the accused. 
• The CBI then filed applications seeking permission to produce the CDs on record, which led to prolonged litigation through the trial court and High Court before reaching the Supreme Court.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that if there is an omission on the part of the prosecution in forwarding relied upon documents to the learned Magistrate, even after the chargesheet is submitted, the prosecution can be permitted to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation.  
• The Court emphasized that the word "shall" used in sub-section (5) of Section 173 CrPC cannot be interpreted as mandatory but as directory, considering the preliminary stage of prosecution. 
• The Court noted that in the present case, the CDs were seized and referred for forensic analysis along with voice samples of the accused and were specifically referred to in the supplementary chargesheet filed on 30th October 2013. 
• When the CDs were sought to be produced, they were not new articles but were very much part of the investigation already conducted, and there was merely an omission on the part of the CBI to produce them physically. 
• The Court clarified that the issue of whether the produced CDs were the same as those seized, their authenticity, and the validity of the certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act remains open for determination during trial. 
• The Court further observed that procedural lapses in submitting evidence can be remedied post-chargesheet provided there is no prejudice to the accused, and the accused retains the right to challenge the admissibility and authenticity of such documents during trial.  
• The principle established in Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai(2002) was reaffirmed, allowing rectification of inadvertent omissions if they do not compromise the fundamental rights of the accused. 

What is Section 193 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) ? 

• Section 193 of the BNSS replaces Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and governs the submission of police investigation reports to Magistrates upon completion of inquiry into criminal offences. 
• Section 193(6) specifically applies to cases falling under section 190, which deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates, thereby establishing a procedural safeguard for fair trial principles in the criminal justice system. 
• Section 193(6)(a) creates a statutory obligation for police officers to forward "all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely" along with the investigation report, ensuring comprehensive disclosure of prosecution evidence to the Magistrate. 
• Section 193(6)(b) mandates the simultaneous forwarding of "statements recorded under section 180 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses," ensuring that foundational witness evidence is contemporaneously provided to the judicial authority. 
• The provision ensures that the Magistrate has complete information before taking cognizance and subsequently facilitates the accused's fundamental right to receive all relevant documents as part of their defence preparation under section 230. 
• Sub-section (6) creates a mandatory statutory obligation rather than a discretionary power, thereby strengthening procedural integrity and ensuring transparency in the investigation process within the criminal justice framework. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan held that the expression “at any stage of the proceedings” used in Order I Rule 10 of CPC cannot be construed to mean that the defendant can keep reagitating the same objection at different stages of the same proceeding, when the issue has been determined conclusively at a previous stage. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors. (2025) Case?   

• The appellant is the grandson of Late Jameela Beevi, who was the original defendant in O.S. No. 617 of 1996 filed by respondent no. 1 before the Principal Sub Court, Palakkad. 
• On 14th June 1996, Jameela Beevi executed an agreement to sell a shop property to the original plaintiff for ₹6,00,000, with ₹1,50,000 payable within three months. The appellant was a witness to this agreement. 
• The suit property comprises a tiled-roofed shop on 1 cent of land located in Palakkad, Kerala. It was purchased by Jameela Beevi through an assignment deed dated 10th September 1976. 
• Clause 8 of the deed indicated tenancy rights of one of Jameela Beevi’s sons, Late Shahul Hameed (father of the appellant), who was a tenant from 1969 until his death on 1st November 1992. 
• The plaintiff claimed he was always ready to pay the balance but Jameela Beevi failed to execute the sale deed, leading to a suit for specific performance. 
• On 30th June 1998, the Trial Court decreed the suit ex parte in favour of the plaintiff. 
• Jameela Beevi filed I.A. No. 2204 of 1998 to set aside the ex parte decree, which was dismissed on 30th June 1999. 
• The High Court allowed her appeal in CMA No. 125 of 1999, restoring the suit for trial. 
• In her written statement, Jameela Beevi denied the sale agreement and alleged forgery by the plaintiff. 
• On 17th March 2003, the Trial Court decreed the suit again, holding the agreement valid and enforceable. 
• The decree was challenged in RFA No. 281 of 2003, which the High Court dismissed on 2nd August 2008. 
• The Supreme Court also dismissed SLP (C) No. 18880 of 2008 on 13th August 2008, making the decree final. 
• On 30th July 2003, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 2548 of 2003 for execution of the decree under Section 28(5) of the Specific Relief Act and Order XXI Rule 19 of the CPC. 
• Jameela Beevi died on 19th October 2008, and the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 3823 of 2008 on 20th November 2008 to implead her legal heirs. 
• Some legal heirs objected to execution, claiming possession was not granted and the full balance amount was not deposited on time. 
• The Trial Court found that the deposit of ₹97,116 on 30th July 2003 was valid as per the High Court’s earlier order in I.A. No. 931 of 2004 and held possession was implied in the decree. 
• On 11th April 2012, I.A. No. 669 of 2009 seeking rescission of the contract was dismissed. 
• The High Court dismissed CRP No. 233 of 2012 on 14th June 2012, affirming the dismissal of the rescission petition. 
• On 19th July 2012, the appellant filed I.A. No. 2348 of 2012 seeking deletion of his name from the party array, claiming he was a tenant and not a legal heir. 
• On 19th June 2013, the Trial Court dismissed the appellant’s I.A., noting that he had participated in the proceedings since 2008 without objection and was now attempting to delay the execution. 
• The Trial Court held that the plea was barred by constructive res judicata and lacked bona fides. 
• The appellant challenged the order in O.P. (C) No. 2290 of 2013, which was dismissed by the High Court on 29th November 2021. 
• The High Court ruled that the appellant’s impleadment was valid, and his application was barred by res judicata. It also upheld the Trial Court’s rejection of his claim of independent possession. 
• The appellant has now approached the Supreme Court by filing the present appeal against these orders. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The law allows courts to add or remove parties at any stage under Order I Rule 10 CPC, but this power cannot be misused to undo an impleadment under Order XXII Rule 4 after several years without initial objection. 
• If the appellant had objections to his impleadment as a legal heir, he should have raised them at the time of impleadment under Sub-rule (2) of Order XXII Rule 4. 
• If the Trial Court had rejected his objection, the appellant could have challenged it by filing a revision application before the High Court. 
• The appellant, despite being impleaded and participating in proceedings since 2008, never objected to his impleadment or raised the claim of being an independent tenant until four years later. 
• He also remained silent during earlier proceedings related to rescission of the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, both at the Trial Court and in the High Court. 
• The Supreme Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2004) held that the principle of res judicata applies even at different stages within the same proceeding. 
• While courts can act at "any stage" under Order I Rule 10, the same issue cannot be repeatedly raised at different stages once conclusively settled. 
• The Calcutta High Court in Tarini Charan Bhattacharya v. Kedar Nath Haldar (1928) clarified that even an erroneous legal decision can operate as res judicata if not challenged timely. 
• In contrast to earlier cases where impleadment under Order XXII Rule 4 was clearly mistaken, in the present case, the appellant had no such ground and the correct remedy lay in timely objection, not in belated invocation of Order I Rule 10. 
• Regarding the appellant’s claim that the decree did not include possession, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd.(2024)  and Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal (1982), holding that where the seller had exclusive possession, the decree for specific performance implicitly includes the obligation to deliver possession. 
• Hence, the claim that the decree-holder is not entitled to possession lacks merit and is rejected. 
• Both the Trial Court and the High Court correctly rejected the appellant’s application, and the Supreme Court found no legal error in their findings. 
• The appeal is dismissed with costs of ₹25,000 to be paid by the appellant to the Legal Services Authority within two weeks. 
• As the sale deed has already been executed in favour of the respondent no. 1, the Executing Court must now ensure that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is delivered to him within two months, using police assistance if necessary.

What Constitutes Impleadment?

About:  

• Sub-rule (2) of Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) grants the court wide discretion to add or remove parties at any stage of the suit proceedings. 
• This power can be exercised either on the court’s own motion (suo motu) or upon an application by any party to the suit or even by a third party seeking impleadment. 
• The provision allows the court to delete a party’s name on terms it deems just and proper, or to add any party whose presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved. 
• The objective of Order I Rule 10 is to ensure that the real controversy between the parties is adjudicated upon, and no person whose rights may be affected is left out of the proceedings. 
• In contrast, Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC provides for the impleadment of legal heirs when a defendant dies during the pendency of the suit. 
• Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 explicitly allows a person who is impleaded as a legal heir to contest the fact that they are a legal representative of the deceased defendant and raise any relevant defences. 
• Relevant Case Law 
  • Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1992): 
    • This case explains the purpose and scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC.  
    • The Supreme Court held that the provision is designed to bring on record all necessary parties whose presence is required for an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute.  
    • It also clarified that the court has the power to implead parties suo motu if their presence is necessary for the resolution of the matter. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Joymalya Bagchi held that standard form employment contracts reflect unequal bargaining power, and when challenged, such contracts must be examined in light of this inequality—placing the burden on the employer to prove that any restrictive covenant is not oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Vijaya Bank & Anr. v. Prashant B Narnaware (2025). 

What was the Background of Vijaya Bank & Anr. v. Prashant B Narnaware (2025) Case ? 

• The respondent employee initially joined Vijaya Bank in 1999 as a Probationary Assistant Manager and was confirmed in service in 2001, subsequently being promoted to Middle Management Scale II.  
• In 2006, the appellant-bank issued a recruitment notification for 349 officers across different grades, which contained a specific condition requiring selected candidates to execute an indemnity bond of Rs. 2 lakh, stipulating payment of this amount if they left service before completing three years. 
• The respondent, being cognizant of this condition, voluntarily applied for the position of Senior Manager-Cost Accountant with a basic pay of Rs. 18,240 and was duly selected for the post. 
• Upon receiving his appointment letter dated 7th August 2007, clause 11(k) explicitly required him to serve the bank for a minimum period of three years and execute an indemnity bond for Rs. 2 lakh, with the amount being payable in case of resignation before completion of the stipulated minimum period. 
• The respondent voluntarily resigned from his erstwhile position as Manager, MMG-II and joined as Senior Manager, MMG-III on 28th September 2007, while also executing the required indemnity bond.  
• However, on 17th July 2009, before completing the mandatory three-year tenure, the respondent tendered his resignation to join IDBI Bank, and his resignation was accepted by the appellant-bank. Consequently, on 16th October 2009, the respondent paid the sum of Rs. 2 lakh to the appellant-bank under protest, as per the terms of the indemnity bond.  
• Subsequently, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging clause 9(w) of the recruitment notification and clause 11(k) of the appointment letter, alleging violations of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and Sections 23 and 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.  
  • The Single Judge of the High Court, relying on the decision in K.Y Venkatesh Kumar v. BEML Ltd., allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned clause, directing the appellant-bank to refund the amount, which decision was subsequently upheld by the Division Bench.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that standard form employment contracts prima facie evidence unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, requiring careful judicial scrutiny when challenged.  
• The Court established that whenever the weaker party to such a contract pleads undue influence, coercion, or alleges that any term is opposed to public policy, courts must examine such pleas while keeping in mind the unequal status of parties and the context in which contractual obligations were created.  
• The Court held that the onus to prove that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is not in restraint of lawful employment or opposed to public policy lies on the covenantee (employer) and not on the employee. 
• The Court distinguished between restrictive covenants operating during the subsistence of an employment contract versus those operating after its termination, emphasising that negative covenants operative during the contract period, when employees are bound to serve exclusively, are generally not regarded as restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Contract Act.  
• The bench noted that public policy relates to matters involving public good and public interest, and what is considered 'just, fair and reasonable' in society varies with time, with civilisational advancements and evolving standards of human rights altering the contours of public policy.  
• In the context of employer-employee relationships, the Court recognized that technological advancements, re-skilling requirements, and preservation of specialised workforce in a free market are emerging considerations in the public policy domain. 
• The Court observed that public sector undertakings like the appellant-bank, operating in a deregulated free-market environment, require tools to retain efficient and experienced staff to survive competition with private players.  
• Finally, the Court found that the liquidated damages clause was reasonable considering the bank's position as a public sector undertaking that cannot resort to private appointments and must undertake expensive, time-consuming recruitment processes involving open advertisement and fair competitive procedures to comply with constitutional mandates under Articles 14 and 16. 

What are the Legal Principles Relating to Interpretation of Standard Form Employment Contracts? 

• Standard form employment contracts prima facie evidence unequal bargaining power.  
• Whenever the weaker party to such a contract pleads undue influence/coercion or alleges that the contract or any term thereof is opposed to public policy, the Court shall examine such plea keeping in mind the unequal status of the parties and the context in which the contractual obligations were created.  
• The onus to prove that a restrictive covenant in an employment contract is not in restraint of lawful employment or is not opposed to public policy, is on the covenantee i.e. the employer and not on the employee. 

Case Referred  

• Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. (1967), which established the crucial distinction between restrictive covenants operating during the subsistence of an employment contract versus those operating after its termination, holding that negative covenants during employment are generally not considered restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Contract Act.  
• Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986), which laid down the principle that standard form contracts affecting large groups of persons, if unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to public interest and should be deemed void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy. 
• K.Y Venkatesh Kumar v. BEML Ltd. (2009), noting that the BEML case involved a restrictive covenant that imposed both a minimum employment term and a clog on future employability, unlike the present case which only imposed financial consequences for early resignation without restricting future employment opportunities.