List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Dr. Swarna Kanta Sharma held that the provisions under Chapter XXV including Section 328, 329 and 330 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) are couched in mandatory language. Thus, the procedure contemplated therein is mandatory in nature. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the case of State v. Neeraj (2025). 

What was the Background of State v. Neeraj (2025) Case?   

• The case involves allegations of attempted sexual assault by a boy named Neeraj (respondent) against a minor girl victim. 
• The victim alleged that Neeraj attempted to commit an inappropriate sexual act with her in a vacant plot, with Neeraj being unknown to the victim prior to the incident. 
• The victim underwent medical examination on 18th September 2015, at BJRM Hospital, Delhi, where the doctor recorded the history as "alleged history of attempt to sexual assault" in the Medical Legal Certificate (MLC). 
•  A witness named Richa claimed to have observed the incident from her residence and testified that the accused had undressed both himself and the victim and was about to sexually assault her before being apprehended. 
• Following investigation completion, a chargesheet was filed against the accused under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. 
• The Sessions Court discharged the accused on 29th April 2017, based on a medical assessment by the Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (IHBAS) Medical Board. 
• The Medical Board diagnosed the accused as suffering from severe mental retardation with a mental age equivalent to that of a four-year-old child, though without behavioral problems. 
• The Court concluded that the accused could not understand the nature of his act nor was he capable of entering a defense, thereby finding no grounds to proceed with the case. 
• The accused's father was directed to furnish a surety bond of Rs. 10,000 under Section 437-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) as a condition of the discharge. 
• The State by way of the present petition wishes to assail the order passed by the Sessions Court. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The impugned order was passed by the learned Sessions Court during the stage of inquiry, as charges had not yet been framed. 
• Therefore, the applicable provisions were Sections 328 and 330 of the CrPC, which govern procedures relating to accused persons of unsound mind. 
• The chargesheet was filed on 30th January 2016, along with an IQ certificate from IHBAS dated 2nd February 2009, which assessed the mental age of the accused as that of a four-year-old child. 
• On 19th April 2016, the Sessions Court directed the investigating officer to submit a report regarding the mental condition of the accused, suggesting that the Court suspected the accused might be of unsound mind and incapable of defending himself. 
• On 26th May 2016, the learned Sessions Court directed that a report be obtained from the Medical Board at IHBAS to assess the accused’s fitness to stand trial and his current mental status. 
• The Medical Board’s report was prepared on 16th September 2016 and received by the Sessions Court on 1st October 2016. It diagnosed the accused as a case of severe mental retardation. 
• The Sessions Court correctly followed the mandate of Section 328(1) and (1A) of CrPC by referring the accused for a medical examination and summoning the concerned medical expert (Dr. Vijender Singh) as CW-1. 
• Based on the medical evidence and the earlier IQ certificate, the Sessions Court concluded that the accused was not capable of understanding the nature of the act or entering a defence. 
• However, once this conclusion was reached, the Sessions Court was required to proceed under Section 328(4) of CrPC and follow the procedure prescribed in Section 330 of CrPC. 
• The Sessions Court failed to comply with the mandatory procedure under Section 330(3) CrPC which required it to assess whether the accused could be safely discharged upon furnishing sufficient security or needed to be placed in a residential facility. 
• The Sessions Court did not analyze the nature of the alleged act or the extent of the accused’s mental retardation before passing the discharge order. 
• The discharge order did not reflect any assessment of whether the accused posed a danger to himself or others, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 330(3) CrPC. 
• The Court also did not seek or consider any further medical or expert opinion on whether the accused could be safely managed in his home environment or needed institutional care. 
• This failure amounted to a neglect of the judicial responsibility owed to both the accused and the public at large. 
• Section 330(3) CrPC exists to ensure that while mentally retarded persons may not be held criminally liable, they are not released into society without appropriate safeguards if they pose a risk. 
• The provision mandates the Court to carefully evaluate the nature of the offence, the degree of mental retardation, and obtain proper expert advice before releasing or institutionalizing the accused. 
• The omission to follow Section 330(3) of CrPC rendered the impugned discharge order, dated 29th April 2017, legally unsustainable. 
• Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order dated 29th April 2017, to the extent it discharged the accused without following due procedure. 
• The matter was remanded back to the learned Sessions Court for passing a fresh order in compliance with Section 330 of CrPC, relating to the release or placement of the accused. 

What is the Distinction Between Unsoundness of Mind and Mental Retardation? 

• The legislature clearly distinguishes between “unsoundness of mind” (mental illness) and “mental retardation” (a developmental condition). 
• Section 84 of IPC only provides exemption from criminal liability to persons of unsound mind if, at the time of the offence, they were incapable of understanding the nature or wrongfulness of the act. 
• Mental retardation, being static and developmental, is not per se covered under Section 84 IPC. 

What are the Relevant Provisions for Unsoundness of Mind? 

• Chapter XXV of the CrPC, which includes Sections 328 to 339, contains provisions regarding accused persons of unsound mind. 
• This chapter outlines the procedure to be followed when an accused is suspected to be suffering from either unsoundness of mind or mental retardation, and these provisions apply at both the inquiry and trial stages. 
• Section 328 of CrPC 
  • Section 328 of the CrPC applies when a Magistrate holding an inquiry has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and, as a result, incapable of making his defence. 
  • In such a situation, the Magistrate is obligated to direct a medical examination of the accused by a civil surgeon or other designated medical officer.  
  • The examining officer must be presented as a witness, and their examination must be recorded in writing. 
  • If, during this examination, the accused is found to be of unsound mind, then he is to be referred to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist for further assessment, care, and treatment.  
  • The psychiatrist or clinical psychologist must then inform the Magistrate whether the accused suffers from unsoundness of mind or mental retardation. 
  • Section 328(3) provides that if the accused is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of entering defence, the Magistrate must evaluate the medical evidence and any submissions made by the advocate of the accused. 
    • If there is no prima facie case against the accused, the Magistrate may discharge him and proceed according to Section 330. 
    • If a prima facie case exists, the Magistrate must postpone the proceedings for the period required for treatment as advised by the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, and the accused is to be dealt with under Section 330. 
  • Section 328(4) provides that if the accused is found to be suffering from mental retardation and incapable of entering defence, the Magistrate is required to close the inquiry and directly proceed under Section 330.  
    • During the pendency of the medical examination or inquiry, Section 328(3) permits the Magistrate to issue appropriate directions under Section 330 for the interim handling of the accused. 
• Section 329 of CrPC 
  • Section 329 of the CrPC applies once the trial has commenced, that is, after charges have been framed.  
    • It provides that if, during the trial, it appears to the Magistrate or Court of Session that the accused is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, the Court must first try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity.  
    • This includes directing a medical examination of the accused. Based on the findings, the Court must determine whether a prima facie case exists.  
    • If no such case is made out, the Court may discharge the accused. If a prima facie case is found, the Court must postpone the trial for the period necessary for the treatment of the accused and proceed under Section 330. 
• Section 330 of CrPC 
  • Section 330 of the CrPC deals with the procedure for handling accused persons found incapable of entering defence due to unsoundness of mind or mental retardation, both during inquiry and trial stages.  
  • Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 330 provide for the release of such an accused on bail if his condition does not warrant in-patient treatment and a friend or relative undertakes to care for him and prevent him from causing harm to himself or others. 
  • If these conditions are not met, the accused is to be detained in safe custody in a facility capable of providing regular psychiatric treatment, and a report must be sent to the State Government. 
  • The Court can invoke the provisions of Section 330(1) or (2) in various circumstances. These include cases where an inquiry into the accused’s mental condition is ongoing under Section 328(2), when a prima facie case is found and proceedings are postponed under Section 328(3), or when a trial is postponed for treatment under Section 329(2). 
  • Section 330(3) of the CrPC provides the procedure for considering the release or continued custody of an accused who is found incapable of making a defence due to unsoundness of mind or mental retardation.  
    • This provision requires the court to assess whether, considering the nature of the act committed and the extent of the mental condition, the accused can be released safely.  
    • Clause (a) of Section 330(3) allows the court to discharge and release the accused, provided that medical or specialist opinion confirms that the accused poses no danger and sufficient security is furnished to guarantee the accused’s and public’s safety.  
    • Clause (b) applies when the court determines that the accused cannot be safely released. In such a case, the court may order that the accused be placed in a designated residential facility that caters to persons with unsoundness of mind or mental retardation and provides appropriate care, education, and training. 
    • Section 330(3) applies in cases where there is no prima facie case against the accused suffering from unsoundness of mind, as per Section 328(3) and 329(2), or when the inquiry or trial cannot proceed due to mental retardation, as per Section 328(4) and 329(3). 
    • Section 330(3) aims to balance the rights and dignity of an accused who lacks mental capacity with the necessity of ensuring public safety. 
    • It empowers the court to evaluate both the nature of the alleged offence and the extent of the accused’s mental condition before deciding whether the accused may be released with appropriate safeguards or must be placed in a facility offering care and supervision. 
• Section 331 of CrPC 
  • Section 331 of the CrPC stipulates that if an accused person, previously found to be of unsound mind and released under Section 330, subsequently regains mental fitness, the inquiry or trial which had been postponed must be resumed.  
  • This provision is only applicable to persons of unsound mind and not to those with mental retardation, since Sections 328 and 329 contemplate postponement only in cases of unsoundness of mind. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Abhay S Oka, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanatullah(dissenting) and Justice Augustine George Masih held that Air Force School, Bamrauli is not “State” under Article 12; writ petitions against it not maintainable under Article 226 Constitution of India,1950 (COI) . 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors. (2025).  

What was the Background of Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors. (2025) Case ? 

• Air Force Schools were established in 1966 to provide education to children of Indian Air Force personnel and are managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society, which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in November 1987. 
• The Air Force School at Bamrauli in District Allahabad obtained affiliation with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and operates under the supervision of IAF officers who serve as Officers-in-Charge. 
• Dileep Kumar Pandey was appointed as a trained graduate teacher for physical education at the school in July 2005 following a selection process conducted by IAF officers, initially on probation with multiple extensions. 
• In June 2007, the school declared Pandey surplus and offered him either contractual employment or termination, prompting him to file a writ petition challenging this decision and seeking confirmation of his employment. 
• Sanjay Kumar Sharma was appointed as a post-graduate Commerce teacher in 1993, later became officiating Principal in 2003, but faced disciplinary proceedings and termination after complaints were filed against him. 
• Both teachers filed writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court arguing that the Air Force School constituted a 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution, making their employment disputes subject to constitutional remedy through writ jurisdiction. 
• The appellants contended that the IAF exercises deep and pervasive control over the school through funding, pay scale determination, construction using public funds, and administrative oversight through the Command Schools Management Committee. 
• The school and Union of India argued that Air Force Schools operate through voluntary contributions from IAF personnel as Non-Public Funds, function independently without statutory regulation, and maintain private contractual relationships with staff. 
• The central legal dispute involved determining whether institutions like Air Force Schools, despite performing educational functions and having connections with government agencies, qualify as 'State' or 'authority' under Article 12 for purposes of constitutional remedies. 
• The resolution of this constitutional question would determine whether employees of such institutions could seek relief through writ petitions under Article 226 or were limited to pursuing remedies through ordinary civil courts for breach of private contract. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

Majority Opinion by Justice Abhay S. Oka with Justice Augustine George Masih concurring: 

• The Air Force Educational and Cultural Society is a non-profit welfare association managing a non-public fund school financed primarily through student fees and Air Force personnel contributions. 
• No evidence exists of Central Government or Ministry of Defence control over the school's functioning, and the school is not governed by statutory rules despite IAF officers serving ex-officio on committees. 
• The School Managing Committee, not the IAF, exercised day-to-day control, and the 1985 CBSE application claiming full IAF financing lacked supporting evidence. 
• Even if the school performs public functions, this alone is insufficient to bring it within Article 12's scope, following precedents in St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society. 
• The teacher-school relationship was contractual without public law elements, making it unsuitable for writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of COI. 

Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah: 

• The Air Force School was amenable to writ jurisdiction as it was founded by IAF as a welfare initiative and administered by serving IAF officers exercising authority over critical functions. 
• The IAF exercised deep and pervasive control over the school's mundane workings, not merely regulatory control, as evidenced by undersigning day-to-day orders. 
• Imparting education is a public function, and since the school served both IAF and non-IAF families under government-like control, its operations affected public interest. 
• The "non-public funds" claim was rejected as these funds were facilitated and exempted by the Government, bearing public character and being traceable to the public exchequer. 
• IAF officers' involvement in principal selection and interviews, sometimes allegedly favouring relatives, proved the school was not insulated from official influence. 
• The predominant composition of serving IAF officers in governing bodies established institutional IAF involvement, with decisions made in official capacity rather than private capacity. 

What is "State" Under Article 12 of the Constitution of India? 

Definition of State Under Article 12 

Article 12 of the Constitution of India provides an inclusive definition of "State" for the purpose of fundamental rights enforcement. According to Article 12, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes: 

• Government and Parliament of India: 
  • The Union Executive and Parliament of India 
  • Any Department of Government or institution under the control of a Department of Government (e.g., Income Tax Department) 
  • The President while acting in his official capacity 
• Government and Legislature of Each State: 
  • The State Executive and Legislature of each State 
  • Includes Union Territories as well 
• Local or Other Authorities Within the Territory of India: 
  • Local Authorities: As defined in Section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 - municipal committees, district boards, bodies of commissioners, or other authorities legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with control or management of municipal or local funds 
  • Examples: Municipalities, District Boards, Panchayats, mining settlement boards 
  • Other Authorities: This term is not specifically defined, leading to judicial interpretation 

Tests for Determining "State" Under Article 12 

• Union of India v. R.C. Jain (1981) Test for Local Authorities: 
  • An authority qualifies as a "local authority" if it: 
  • Has a separate legal existence 
  • Functions in a defined area 
  • Has the power to raise funds on its own 
  • Enjoys autonomy (self-rule) 
  • Is entrusted by statute with functions usually entrusted to municipalities 
• R.D. Shetty v. Airport Authority of India (1979) - Five-Point Test: 
  • Justice P.N. Bhagwati established criteria to determine if a body is an agency or instrumentality of the State: 
  • Financial Resources: State is the chief funding source (entire share capital held by government) 
  • Deep and Pervasive Control: Extensive state control over operations 
  • Functional Character: Functions are governmental in essence with public importance 
  • Government Department Transfer: A government department transferred to a corporation 
  • Monopoly Status: Enjoys monopoly status conferred or protected by the State 
    • Note: This test is illustrative, not conclusive, and must be applied with care and caution. 

Why the IAF School was NOT Considered "State" - Supreme Court Ruling? 

The Supreme Court held that the Air Force School in Bamrauli was NOT a "State" under Article 12 for the following reasons: 

• Nature of Organization: 
  • The Air Force Educational and Cultural Society is a non-profit welfare association 
  • The school is a non-public fund school 
  • Finances derived primarily from student fees and contributions by Air Force personnel through welfare funds 
• Absence of Government Control: 
  • No evidence of control by Central Government or Ministry of Defence over school's functioning 
  • School not governed by statutory rules despite IAF officers serving ex-officio on committees 
  • School Managing Committee (not IAF) exercised day-to-day control 
• Financial Independence: 
  • Despite 1985 CBSE application claiming "fully financed by IAF," no evidence of actual IAF funding 
  • Even if school was built with public funds, no evidence of recurring government grants or statutory control 
  • Funds were primarily from private sources (fees and welfare contributions) 
• Limited IAF Involvement: 
  • While school may follow IAF pay scales, this did not constitute pervasive control 
  • Education Code followed was not a statutory instrument 
  • Code regulations were not legally binding like statutory rules 
• Legal Relationship: 
  • Teacher-school relationship was contractual in nature 
  • No public law element involved 
  • Not subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 

Dissenting Opinion 

Justice Amanullah disagreed, arguing that: 

• IAF exercised deep and pervasive control through serving officers in management. 
• School performed public functions (education). 
• Even "non-public funds" had public character as they were government-facilitated. 
• IAF's involvement in day-to-day operations made it subject to Article 12. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice AG Masih and Justice K Vinod Chandran mandates "one rank one pension" for all retired High Court judges, ensuring full pension irrespective of date of retirement, source of entry, or service tenure. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court (2025). 

What was the Background of In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court (2025) Case? 

• Multiple petitions were filed by retired High Court judges and their family members regarding various pension-related disputes and denial of terminal benefits under the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. 
• The primary grievance involved discrimination in pension payments where retired judges who had previously served as District Judges were not receiving full pension, as their prior service in the district judiciary was not being considered for pension calculations. 
• Break-in-service penalty was being imposed on judges who had a gap between their retirement as District Judges and their appointment as High Court Judges, resulting in reduced pension amounts despite their continuous judicial service. 
• Judges who entered district judiciary after the New Pension Scheme (NPS) came into effect were facing uncertainty about their entitlement to pension under the traditional High Court judges' pension scheme versus the contributory pension system. 
• Additional Judges of High Courts were being denied full pension benefits and were not being treated at par with permanent judges, despite performing the same judicial functions during their tenure. 
• Family members of deceased Additional Judges were being denied benefits including gratuity and family pension, with authorities arguing that the deceased judge had not completed the minimum qualifying service period of 2 years and 6 months. 
• Provident fund payments were being withheld from judges appointed after the NPS implementation, creating financial hardship and uncertainty about their retirement benefits under Section 20 of the Act. 
• The pension structure was creating different categories of retired judges with varying benefit amounts based on their source of entry (district judiciary versus bar), date of appointment, and length of service, leading to discriminatory treatment. 
• These issues collectively raised fundamental questions about equal treatment of constitutional office holders and the independence of judiciary, as financial security after retirement affects judicial decision-making during service. 
• The matter required judicial intervention to establish uniform pension principles and ensure that all retired High Court judges receive equal treatment in terminal benefits, regardless of their career path or appointment circumstances. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that creating different pension categories would constitute "absolute absurdity" and held that all retired judges would be entitled to pension calculated on the basic pension of Rs.13,50,000/- per annum to remove arbitrariness, inequality and discrimination while bringing parity in pension payments. 
• The Court found that discrimination in pension based on source of entry violates Article 14 of the Constitution, observing that when all High Court judges receive equal treatment in salary and perquisites during service, any differential treatment in terminal benefits after retirement would be patently discriminatory. 
• The Court emphasised the principle of "one rank one pension" stating that once a judge assumes the constitutional office of High Court Judge and enters the constitutional class, no differential treatment is permissible merely on the ground of date of appointment or source of entry. 
• The Court ruled that break-in-service cannot be grounds for pension denial, noting that precedent established in Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg case had already settled this issue, directing full pension consideration regardless of gaps between district and High Court service. 
• The Court observed that the definition of "Judge" under Section 2(g) of the HCJ Act is comprehensive and includes Chief Justice, acting Chief Justice, Additional Judge and acting Judge, making any artificial discrimination between permanent and Additional Judges a violation of the statutory definition. 
• The Court noted that Additional Judges perform identical functions and receive similar pay and allowances as permanent judges during service, with their status being determined by fortuitous circumstances of vacancy availability rather than merit or capability differences. 
• The Court found the denial of family pension and gratuity to Additional Judges' families to be "patently arbitrary" since the statutory definition of "Judge" encompasses Additional Judges, making such denial unsustainable and discriminatory. 
• The Court applied harmonious construction principles to interpret gratuity provisions, directing that 10 years be added to service period for calculation purposes, ensuring deceased judges' families receive benefits regardless of minimum qualifying service completion. 
• The Court clarified that all allowances under the HCJ Act must be paid uniformly including leave encashment, commutation of pension, and provident fund, emphasising that mode of entry as High Court Judge cannot affect entitlement to statutory benefits. 
• The Court recognised the constitutional imperative of judicial independence by ensuring uniform terminal benefits, observing that permitting different states to have varying terminal benefits would create discrimination and undermine the uniformity required for constitutional office holders. 

What are the Directions Passed by the Bench ? 

• The Union of India shall pay full pension of Rs 15 lakh per annum to a retired Chief Justice of the High Court. 
• The Union of India shall pay full pension of Rs 13.50 lakh per annum to a retired High Court Judge other than a retired Chief Justice of the High Court. A retired High Court Judge shall also include a person who retired as an Additional Judge. 
• The Union of India shall follow the principle of "one rank one pension" for the retired judges of the High Court, irrespective of their source of entry, that is district judiciary or the bar, and irrespective of the number of years they have served either as a district judge or a High Court judge, and all of them shall be paid full pension. 
• In the case of a retired judge of a High Court, who has previously served as a District Judge, the Union of India shall pay full pension, irrespective of any break in service, between the date on which he/she retired as a judge of the District Judiciary and the date on which he/she assumed charge as a judge of the High Court. 
• In the case of a retired judge of a High Court, who has previously served as a District Judge and who entered into the district judiciary after the coming into force of the Contributory Pension Scheme or the new pension scheme, the Union of India shall pay the full pension. In so far as their contribution to the NPS, we direct the States to refund the entire amount contributed by such of the retired judges of the High Court, along with the dividend if any accrued thereon. However, the contributions made by the State Governments shall be retained by the respective States along with the dividend, if any, accrued thereon; 
• The Union of India shall pay family pension to the widow or family members of a judge of the High Court who died in harness, irrespective of whether such a judge was a permanent judge or an additional judge of the High Court. 
• The Union of India shall pay gratuity to the widow or family members of a judge of the High Court who died in harness, by adding career period for the period of service undergone of the said judge, irrespective of the minimum qualifying period of service, has been completed or not. 
• The Union of India shall pay all allowances to the judge of a High Court in accordance with the provisions of the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act 1954 and the same shall include leave encashment, commutation of pension, provident fund.