List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

A bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice SVN Bhati held that an accused cannot be discharged under Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) by relying on the materials submitted by the defence instead of relying on the chargesheet and list of documents submitted by the prosecution.  

• The Supreme Court held this in the case of State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB v. Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi and others (2025). 

What was the Background of State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, ACB v. Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi and others (2025) Case?   

• Between November 1994 and May 2006, Rayapati Subba Rao (A-1) served as Cotton Purchase Officer in the Cotton Corporation of India (CCI), Guntur Branch. 
• CBI registered an FIR in 2006 alleging a conspiracy where A-1 and his son A-3 purchased cotton from farmers at lower market prices before the government announced Minimum Support Price (MSP). 
• The accused allegedly hoarded the cotton and later resold it to CCI at higher MSP rates using benami farmers (A-4 to A-47) as fronts. 
• Many of the alleged farmers had insufficient or no agricultural land to produce the large quantities of cotton they purportedly sold to CCI. 
• Bank accounts were opened in these farmers' names, often introduced by A-3 or his employees, and payments were allegedly diverted through forged signatures. 
• The prosecution claimed a wrongful loss of Rs. 21,19,35,646/- to CCI and corresponding wrongful gain to the accused persons. 
• CCI responded to CBI's inquiry in 2007 stating that no rules were violated, no loss was caused, no complaints were received, and all purchases were made as per MSP guidelines. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Special Court and High Court discharged the accused primarily based on CCI's letter dated 31st January 2007, which contradicted the prosecution's allegations of loss and rule violations. 
• The Supreme Court held that the lower courts committed a fundamental legal error by considering documents summoned by the defense at the discharge stage. 
• Under Section 239 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC), courts can only consider the chargesheet and documents filed by the prosecution under Section 173, not additional material brought by the accused. 
• The Court ruled that allowing accused persons to file additional documents at the discharge stage would amount to a "mini-trial" and permit them to present their defense prematurely. 
• The Supreme Court emphasized that the magistrate's role under Section 239 is to examine only the prosecution's material to determine if charges are groundless, not to conduct a detailed examination of defense evidence. 
• The orders of discharge were set aside as they exceeded the statutory limits of discretionary jurisdiction under Section 239 of CrPC. 
• The case was remanded to the Special Court to decide on discharge/framing of charges based solely on the chargesheet and accompanying prosecution documents, without considering the CCI correspondence relied upon earlier. 

What is Section 239 of CrPC? 

• Section 239 of CrPC lays down discharge in case of warrant cases instituted on police report. 
• Key components of Section 239 of CrPC: 
  • Consideration Requirement: The Magistrate must consider the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 of CrPC. 
  • Examination Power: The Magistrate has discretionary power to make such examination of the accused as he thinks necessary. 
  • Hearing Opportunity: Both the prosecution and the accused must be given an opportunity to be heard before any decision is made. 
  • Standard for Discharge: The Magistrate shall discharge the accused if he considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. 
  • Mandatory Recording: The Magistrate must record his reasons for ordering the discharge of the accused. 
• Section 262 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) provides for discharge. 
  • Section 262 (1) of BNSS provides for the time limit of filing the application for discharge. 
  • This provision provides that the accused may prefer an application an application for discharge within a period of 60 days from the date of supply of copies of document under Section 230 of BNSS. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan has held that the encashment of a bank guarantee by the Customs Department does not amount to payment of customs duty; therefore, Section 27 of the Customs Act,1962 and the doctrine of unjust enrichment do not apply, and the amount must be refunded with interest. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of M/S Patanjali Foods Limited (Formerly Known As M/S Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd.)  v. Union of India & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of M/S Patanjali Foods Limited (Formerly Known As M/S Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd.)  v. Union of India & Ors. (2025) Case? 

• M/s M.P. Glychem Industries Limited imported crude degummed soyabean oil in bulk at Jamnagar port in September 2002 and sought clearance for home consumption. 
• The Customs Department refused clearance, demanding higher customs duty based on a tariff value notification under Section 14(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. 
• The importer argued that the tariff notification had not come into effect at the time of import, making them liable only for duty under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act. 
• Due to the impasse with goods being held up, the company challenged the notification's validity before the Gujarat High Court in 2002. 
• The High Court granted interim relief allowing goods clearance against bank guarantees totalling Rs. 77,43,859 for the differential duty amount. 
• M/s M.P. Glychem Industries merged with M/s Ruchi Soya Industries Limited in 2006, which later became M/s Patanjali Foods Limited. 
• The High Court dismissed all writ petitions in September 2012, prompting the company to appeal before the Supreme Court. 
• While appeals were pending, the Customs Department encashed the bank guarantees in January 2013 and appropriated the secured amounts. 
• The Supreme Court in Param Industries Limited case (2015) ruled that such tariff notifications were invalid if not offered for sale by the Central Board at the time of clearance. 
• Following this favourable ruling, Patanjali Foods sought a refund, but the Department invoked Section 27 and unjust enrichment doctrine to deny the claim. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court held that encashment of bank guarantees offered as security cannot be treated as payment of customs duty under the Customs Act. 
• Section 27 of the Customs Act and the doctrine of unjust enrichment are not applicable when amounts are recovered through coercive encashment rather than voluntary duty of payment. 
• The doctrine of unjust enrichment presupposes actual payment of duty by the claimant, which is absent in cases of arbitrary encashment of security instruments. 
• The Customs Department acted with extreme haste in encashing guarantees while the matter was under Supreme Court consideration, instead of awaiting judicial determination. 
• The retention of amounts after the favourable Supreme Court ruling in Param Industries Limited became wholly untenable and unauthorised in law. 
• The Court directed immediate refund with 6% interest from encashment date, recognising such retention as unjust and unlawful appropriation of funds. 

What is the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment?  

• The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary legal principle based on the concept that no person can seek to collect duty from both ends. 
• It prevents individuals from claiming refunds when they have already passed the burden of duty or tax to other persons, thereby avoiding any real loss or prejudice to themselves. 
• The doctrine ensures that refund claims succeed only when the petitioner establishes that they have not passed on the burden of duty to another person and have themselves borne the burden. 
• Where the burden of duty has been passed on to others, the real loss is suffered by the person who ultimately bears the burden, making it just for the State to retain such amounts on behalf of the people. 
• The power of courts is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person, and this doctrine is inapplicable to the State as it represents the people. 
• In cases of indirect taxes like central excise and customs duty, tax collected without authority of law shall not be refunded unless the claimant proves they had not passed the burden to third parties. 

Relationship between Section 27 of Customs Act and Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment 

• Section 27 of the Customs Act incorporates the doctrine of unjust enrichment as a statutory requirement for processing refund claims of customs duty. 
• Any person claiming a refund under Section 27 must establish through documentary evidence that the duty amount was collected from or paid by them, and the incident had not been passed on to any other person. 
• The provision requires the applicant to furnish evidence proving that they have not transferred the burden of duty to customers or other parties, embodying the unjust enrichment principle. 
• A refund can be denied either in part or wholly by applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment under Section 27, ensuring that only genuine claimants who have actually borne the financial burden receive refunds. 
• Section 27 provides the procedural framework within which the substantive principle of unjust enrichment operates, requiring specific documentation and proof to prevent windfall gains. 
• The section ensures that refund claims are adjudicated under the principle that no person should be allowed to recover duty amounts when they have already recovered the same from their customers or other parties.

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Amit Rawal and Justice K.V. Jayakumar has held that denial of public employment solely due to Hepatitis B infection is illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,1950 (COI), as it amounts to unjust discrimination. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the matter of X v. FACT and Others, (2025). 

What was the Background of X v. FACT and Others (2025) Case? 

• The appellant successfully secured Rank 2 in the competitive selection process for the position of Assistant General at Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Limited (FACT). 
• Following his selection, the appellant was required to undergo a mandatory pre-employment medical examination as per standard organizational procedure. 
• The medical officer who conducted the examination declared the appellant medically unfit for the position, leading to the rejection of his candidature. 
• Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court challenging the rejection based on medical grounds. 
• The court initially directed FACT to constitute a Medical Board under Clause 11 of the FACT Pre-Employment Medical Examination Procedure to re-examine the appellant. 
• The three-member Medical Board examined the appellant and found him afflicted with Chronic Hepatitis B infection, noting it as communicable through blood and bodily fluids. 
• Dissatisfied with this report, the appellant filed another writ petition challenging the Medical Board's findings and recommendations. 
• The court then directed a fresh medical examination by a new Medical Board constituted by a Government Hospital or Government Medical College. 
• The newly constituted two-member Board again declared the appellant medically unfit, though acknowledging he could work with universal precautions. 
• The Single Judge ruled that the court could not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to substitute the expert medical committee's opinion, prompting the appellant to file an appeal before the Division Bench.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Division Bench conducted a comprehensive review of all medical reports and legal precedents presented during the proceedings. 
• The court observed that none of the medical reports demonstrated that the appellant lacked the requisite capacity or ability to perform the duties associated with the position. 
• The Division Bench noted that FACT had failed to properly appreciate and interpret the medical reports when issuing the rejection letter to the appellant. 
• The court emphasized that denial of public employment based solely on Hepatitis B infection constitutes a clear violation of Article 14 of the COI. 
• The Division Bench recognized that such discrimination amounts to an illegal, unfair, and unjustifiable offence against constitutional principles of equality. 
• The court determined that the Single Judge had committed an error in refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present matter. 
• The Division Bench concluded that public employers cannot reject candidates merely on grounds of Hepatitis B infection without establishing legitimate concerns related to job performance capacity. 

Does Denial of Employment for Hepatitis B Violate Article 14 of the Constitution? 

• Denial of public employment to a candidate solely on the ground of Hepatitis B infection constitutes a direct violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. 
• Such denial amounts to unconstitutional discrimination against individuals based on their medical condition, creating an arbitrary classification that has no rational nexus with the ability to perform job functions. 
• The State's refusal to provide equal opportunity in public employment based on Hepatitis B status violates the fundamental principle that all citizens are entitled to equal protection under the law. 
• Excluding candidates with Hepatitis B from public employment creates an unreasonable and hostile classification that fails the test of constitutional validity under Article 14. 
• When public employers deny employment opportunities based solely on Hepatitis B infection without considering actual job performance capacity, it constitutes arbitrary state action prohibited under Article 14. 
• The constitutional guarantee of equality before law encompasses the right to equal opportunity in public employment, which is violated when candidates are rejected purely on grounds of Hepatitis B status. 
• Article 14 violation occurs when employment denial is based on medical conditions that have no reasonable connection to the essential functions and requirements of the public position. 
• The practice of systematically excluding individuals with Hepatitis B from public employment creates a class-based discrimination that is fundamentally opposed to the egalitarian principles enshrined in Article 14.