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Criminal Law
Promise of Marriage
30-May-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, the bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta quashed the rape case, citing the complainant's manipulative conduct and abuse of legal process.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Batlanki Keshav (Kesava) Kumar Anurag v. State of Telangana & Anr, (2025).
What was the Background of Batlanki Keshav (Kesava) Kumar Anurag v. State of Telangana & Anr,2025 Case?
- The complainant and the accused appellant met through the 'Bharath Matrimony' website while the appellant was residing in the United States of America, and they agreed to marry each other with an initial wedding date fixed for January 6, 2021.
- The appellant avoided the scheduled marriage date and returned to the United States without marrying the complainant but later came back to India and allegedly established physical relations with her.
- Following a previous complaint filed by the complainant, both parties reached a resolution at the police station in the presence of the Inspector, whereby the appellant agreed to marry the complainant and get the marriage registered, with a written agreement signed by both parties.
- The appellant and his mother subsequently showed reluctance towards the marriage on various pretexts, making excuses about auspicious dates and ceasing communication about wedding arrangements while allegedly harassing the complainant.
- The complainant filed the first FIR (Crime No. 751 of 2021) on June 29, 2021, alleging cheating and breach of promise to marry, mentioning only one incident of sexual intercourse dated 24th June, 2021.
- Subsequently, the complainant filed another complaint in Kerala which was transferred to Cyberabad, resulting in FIR No. 103 of 2022 being registered on 1st February, 2022.
- The second FIR alleged multiple incidents of forcible sexual intercourse on May 4, May 11, May 28, and June 7, 2021, along with accusations that the appellant refused to marry her citing caste differences.
- The charges included offences under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code for rape and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
- The appellant sought quashing of the second FIR through a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was initially rejected by the Telangana High Court.
- Investigation revealed that the complainant had previously filed similar complaints against other men, including an Assistant Professor at Osmania University in 2019, with identical allegations of cheating and sexual exploitation under false promise of marriage.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Court noted significant contradictions between the two FIRs filed by the complainant, particularly that the first FIR mentioned only one incident of sexual intercourse while the second FIR alleged multiple incidents that predated the first complaint, making it improbable that an educated 30-year-old woman would omit such crucial details.
- Upon examining chat records between the parties, the Court observed that the complainant had admitted to being manipulative and stated she was "trying to get a green card holder," while also mentioning her intention to "invest on the next victim" and irritate her targets until they abandoned her.
- The Court found that the complainant exhibited a pattern of vindictive and manipulative behavior, having previously filed similar complaints against other men, which established her tendency to lodge false allegations when relationships did not proceed as desired.
- The Court determined that the appellant was justified in withdrawing from the proposed marriage upon discovering the complainant's aggressive sexual behavior and obsessive nature, as evidenced by the chat records and her documented psychological condition.
- Regarding the caste-based allegations under the SC/ST Act, the Court observed that these were introduced only in the second FIR filed seven months later, with no mention of caste discrimination in the original complaint, indicating fabrication to invoke harsher penal provisions.
- The Court concluded that continuing the prosecution would constitute a travesty of justice and gross abuse of the judicial process, as the second FIR contained fabricated and malicious allegations without substantive evidence.
- Ultimately, the Court held that the impugned FIR was nothing but a bundle of lies designed to harass the appellant, and quashed both FIRs along with all consequent proceedings to prevent further abuse of the legal system.
What is Promise to Marry under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) ?
- Section 69 of BNS, 2023 specifically criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or false promise of marriage, carrying punishment of imprisonment up to ten years and fine.
- Courts must establish that the accused had no intention of marrying from the beginning, the false promise was the primary reason for consent, and the accused knew consent was based on this deceptive promise
- The provision distinguishes between genuine promises that remain unfulfilled due to circumstances versus deliberately false promises made with malicious intent from inception.
- This legal framework evolved from judicial recognition of 'rape on false promise of marriage' in landmark cases like Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh,2019 Rape on False Promise of Marriage by the Supreme Court of India.
- Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh - Established judicial recognition of rape on false promise of marriage as distinct sexual offence category.
- Supreme Court has expressed concerns about increasing criminal complaints in long-term relationships, noting it would be implausible for complainants to continue relationships for years under mere promises without evidence of initial deception For Offence of Rape on False Promise to Marry, Physical Relationships Must Be Shown to Be Only Based on Marriage Promise.
- Recent Supreme Court judgment held that false promise allegations become baseless when relationships actually culminate in solemnization of marriage
- Courts exercise judicial restraint to prevent misuse, particularly in cases involving vindictive complainants or natural relationship deterioration.
Civil Law
Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC
30-May-2025
Source: High Court of Jammu and Kashmir
Why in News?
Recently, Justice Sanjay Dhar held that “sufficient grounds” under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) must be interpreted broadly to allow withdrawal and refiling of suits in the interest of justice.
- The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir held this in the matter of Manzoor Ahmad Wani v. Ayaz Ahmad Raina (2025).
What was the Background of Manzoor Ahmad Wani Vs Ayaz Ahmad Raina, 2025 Case ?
- Ayaz Ahmad Raina (plaintiff) filed a civil suit seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction against Manzoor Ahmad Wani (defendant) to restrain interference with his possession over a patch of land situated at Survey No.3063/1725 at Vailoo.
- The plaintiff claimed that in 2010, the defendant had initially leased the suit land to him for establishing a car service station and later agreed to sell the property for Rs.50,000 as sale consideration.
- Based on this alleged transaction, the plaintiff asserted rightful possession of the land and claimed to have invested approximately Rs.15 lakh in construction and maintenance of the property while regularly paying electricity and water charges.
- The defendant, while admitting to handing over possession, contended that it was only on a licence basis with an annual fee of Rs.24,000 and denied any sale agreement or transfer of ownership rights.
- The defendant stated that he required the land for personal use and was conducting construction on his adjacent land after obtaining proper NOCs and permissions from concerned authorities.
- After the defendant filed his written statement, the case was scheduled for recording preliminary statements when the plaintiff sought to withdraw the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC.
- The plaintiff cited factual and legal defects, omissions in the statement of facts, and various inadvertent mistakes of technical nature in the original pleadings as grounds for withdrawal.
- The trial court allowed the withdrawal application, permitting the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, observing that improper relief sought constituted a formal defect.
- Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a new suit with enhanced reliefs including declaration of ownership, specific performance of agreement dated 6th July 2011, and mandatory injunction for execution of sale deed.
- The defendant challenged both the trial court's withdrawal permission and the maintainability of the fresh suit, arguing that no formal defect existed and that omitted reliefs could have been sought through amendment rather than fresh litigation.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The High Court extensively examined Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b) CPC and held that the expression "sufficient grounds" grants wide judicial discretion to trial courts, which cannot be given restrictive meaning so as to shut out fair trial on merits.
- The Court rejected the narrow interpretation that clause (b) must be read ejusdem generis with clause (a), clarifying that "sufficient grounds" are distinct and independent from "formal defects" based on the precedent in Fateh Shah v. Mst. Bega.
- Justice Dhar emphasised that merely because some error has been made by the plaintiff in good faith, his case cannot be shut out as it would cause grave prejudice, and such error can only be set right by granting fresh trial opportunity.
- The Court observed that the plaintiff's failure to seek appropriate declaratory and specific performance reliefs despite pleading relevant facts would inevitably result in suit failure, constituting "sufficient ground" under Order XXIII Rule 1(3)(b).
- Dismissing the contention regarding amendment as an alternative, the Court held that Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings) and Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC operate in distinct fields, and accepting the defendant's argument would render Order XXIII Rule 1 provisions redundant.
- The Court found that the trial court exercised its discretion on sound legal principles in accordance with law, and such discretion cannot be subject to judicial review in supervisory jurisdiction.
- Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition, upholding both the trial court's order permitting withdrawal with liberty to file fresh suit and the maintainability of the subsequent litigation.
What is Order XXIII Rule 1(3)?
- Court's Discretionary Power: Grants the court discretion to permit a plaintiff to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter
- Two Grounds for Permission:
- (a) Formal Defect: When the court is satisfied that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect
- (b) Sufficient Grounds: When there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit
- Formal Defects Include: Want of notice under Section 80 CPC, improper valuation, insufficient court fee, confusion regarding suit property identification, misjoinder of parties, failure to disclose cause of action
- Sufficient Grounds: Independent and distinct from formal defects, granting wide judicial discretion to trial courts for fair trial on merits
- Court's Terms and Conditions: The court may impose such terms as it thinks fit while granting permission
- Same Subject Matter: Permission applies to withdrawal with liberty to institute fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter or part of the claim
- Judicial Satisfaction Required: The court must be satisfied about the existence of either formal defect or sufficient grounds before granting permission
- Prevents Abuse of Process: Ensures that the right to withdraw is not used to the detriment of legitimate rights of defendants
- Liberal Interpretation: "Sufficient grounds" should be given wide connotation and not restrictive meaning to avoid shutting out fair trial on merits
- Distinct from Amendment: Operates independently from Order 6 Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings) and serves different purposes in civil procedure
Mercantile Law
Anti Dissection Rule
30-May-2025
Source: Delhi High Court
Why in News?
A bench of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Sachin Datta held that anti dissection rule is not inconsistent with ascertaining if the competing marks are similar by taking note of the dominant parts.
- The Delhi High Court held this in the case of Under Armour INC v. Anish Agarwal & Anr (2025).
What was the Background of Under Armour INC v. Anish Agarwal & Anr (2025) Case?
- The appellant, Under Armour, Inc., has filed an intra-court appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), challenging the order dated 29th May 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in an interim application.
- The appellant had filed a suit for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off against the respondents, seeking an interim injunction to restrain them from using certain trademarks alleged to be deceptively similar to its registered trademarks, especially “UNDER ARMOUR.”
- The Single Judge, through the impugned order, imposed limited restrictions on the respondents’ use of the impugned marks but refused to grant an ad interim injunction as prayed by the appellant.
- The appellant contends that the learned Single Judge erred in rejecting the injunction, particularly by misapplying the doctrine of initial interest confusion, which the appellant argues should have been sufficient to establish a prima facie case of trademark infringement.
- The appellant is a U.S.-based company incorporated in 1996, engaged in manufacturing and selling sports apparel, footwear, and related products, and has a presence in India since 2017, with its first retail store opening in New Delhi in 2019.
- The appellant claims ownership of globally recognized trademarks including “ARMOUR,” “UNDER ARMOUR,” and “UA,” which are registered in India and other jurisdictions.
- In India, the appellant has multiple trademark registrations under various classes, including Classes 9, 18, 25, 28, 35, 41, and 42, for marks such as ARMOURVENT, ARMOURBITE, ARMOURFLEECE, ARMOURBLOCK, HOVR, and UNDER ARMOUR.
- Although the appellant does not hold registration for the standalone word “ARMOUR” in India, it owns such registrations in other countries including the U.S., Canada, the EU, and several Asian nations.
- The respondents include a company incorporated in India and its director/promoter, who are engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing clothing and footwear under the trademark “AERO ARMOUR.”
- The respondents also operate a website www.aeroarmour.store for selling their products and have filed a trademark application for “AERO ARMOUR” under Class 25, which is currently opposed by the appellant before the Trademark Registry.
- Despite the pending opposition proceedings, the respondents have been actively marketing and selling products under the impugned mark, prompting the appellant to file a civil suit along with an interim injunction application.
- The Single Judge disposed of the interim application without granting the full relief sought, leading to the present appeal on grounds that the judge did not correctly apply the principles of trademark law and initial interest confusion.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- Anti-Dissection Rule:
- The Delhi High Court reiterated that a trademark must be evaluated in its entirety and not by isolating its individual components.
- A composite mark’s protection cannot extend to individual elements unless those elements independently qualify for protection.
- Dominant Part Evaluation Not Barred:
- While a trademark must be considered as a whole, it is permissible to evaluate dominant elements within composite marks to assess the overall similarity and potential confusion between competing marks.
- Commercial Impression is Key:
- The overall commercial impression of a trademark is what matters in assessing similarity.
- Similarities between parts of marks are only relevant if they affect the commercial impression as a whole.
- Permissible Emphasis on Dominant Elements:
- Courts may accord more or less importance to specific parts of a mark based on their distinctiveness and commercial significance, especially when evaluating composite marks.
- Possibility of Multiple Dominant Parts:
- A single trademark can have more than one dominant part. In this case, “ARMOUR” was claimed as dominant in both ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ and ‘AERO ARMOUR’, and its role in shaping commercial impression needed proper evaluation.
- Failure to Address Dominant Feature ‘ARMOUR’:
- The lower court failed to analyze whether “ARMOUR” was the dominant component of the impugned mark, which was necessary for assessing overall similarity.
- Comparison with STREET ARMOUR Case:
- The appellant cited a previous case where the court found ‘STREET ARMOUR’ deceptively similar to ‘UNDER ARMOUR’, reinforcing the argument that ‘ARMOUR’ is a significant and distinctive part of its brand.
- Faulty Focus on Design and Product Category:
- The Single Judge erroneously focused on the t-shirt designs and attempted to draw a market segmentation between casualwear and sportswear without sufficient basis, which is not a reliable ground to negate confusion.
- Strong Trademark Entitled to Greater Protection:
- ‘UNDER ARMOUR’ is a strong mark with significant goodwill, warranting broader protection from similar competing marks such as ‘AERO ARMOUR’.
- Same Class of Goods and Trade Channels:
- Both parties manufacture similar clothing and accessories under Class 25, and their products are sold through the same e-commerce platforms like Amazon and Myntra, making confusion more probable.
- No Justifiable Market Segmentation:
- The assumption that the two brands cater to different market segments was unfounded.
- Clothing consumers may be influenced by brand themes like valour or weaponry but may still consider both products in the same purchasing context.
- Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Applied:
- The court emphasized that trademark infringement can occur even if the consumer is only confused initially (before purchase).
- Momentary confusion or initial interest based on mark similarity is sufficient to establish infringement.
- Duration of Confusion Irrelevant:
- Even brief confusion at the initial stage (such as seeing the mark online) fulfills the condition of “likelihood of confusion” under Section 29(1), 29(2), and potentially 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
- Rejection of “Informed Customer” Argument:
- The lower court’s view that customers would examine and recognize differences does not negate infringement if initial confusion still occurs.
- Intentional Adoption of Similar Mark:
- Though respondent claimed to have coined “AERO ARMOUR” independently, the court noted that the respondent, being in the same industry, would reasonably be aware of the well-known “UNDER ARMOUR” mark, suggesting their choice of a similar mark was not wholly honest.
- Proximity to Famous Marks Requires Greater Distance:
- New market entrants must maintain a greater degree of separation from strong and well-known trademarks. The closer a mark gets to a famous brand, the higher the risk and likelihood of infringement.
- Thus, the Delhi High Court held that prima facie ‘AERO ARMOUR’ infringes the trademark rights of ‘UNDER ARMOUR’.
What is the Rule of Anti Dissection?
- The Anti-Dissection Rule, as held by the Supreme Court in Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001), mandates that a trademark must be considered as a whole and not dissected into individual parts for comparison.
- The rationale for the rule is that an average consumer perceives a trademark by its overall commercial impression, not through scrutiny of its individual components.
- In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd. (1959), the Supreme Court held that the trademarks “Glucovita” and “Gluvita” were deceptively similar despite the minor difference of the syllable “co.” The Court emphasized that the marks should be judged in their entirety.
- In Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo (1962), the Court reiterated that a customer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection could be misled by the overall similarity of “Amritdhara” and “Lakshmandhara,” even though a close comparison reveals differences.
- In National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros Ltd. (1953), the Supreme Court ruled that a trademark may still be refused registration if it is likely to cause confusion or deception, regardless of the lack of exact resemblance.
- The Rule of Dominant Feature requires identification of the most prominent or striking part of a mark, which may strongly influence consumer perception.
- It was held by the Delhi High Court in the case of South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc. (2014) that evaluating a mark’s dominant feature does not violate the anti-dissection rule, as long as the overall impression of the mark is taken into account.
- The Court stated that it is inappropriate to focus only on one part of a composite mark while ignoring other elements; all elements should be considered in determining likely customer reaction.
- In a referenced US case involving ‘JOSE GASPAR GOLD’ and ‘GASPAR’S ALE’, the Court held that both marks gave the commercial impression that the name “GASPAR” was the source identifier, thus leading to potential confusion.
- The court in that case emphasized that assigning different weights to components of a mark depending on their commercial impression does not breach the anti-dissection rule.