List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice G. Girish has held inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)cannot be invoked to set aside interim orders under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act( unless there is a glaring illegality or abuse of process. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the matter of Titus v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of Titus v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2025) Case? 

• Nature of the Dispute: An interim order was passed by the Grama Nyayalaya, Vellanadu under Section 12(1) of the PWDV Act, 2005. This section allows an aggrieved person or Protection Officer to seek relief from a Magistrate for domestic violence matters. 
• Petitioner's Action: The affected party filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C) before the Kerala High Court seeking to set aside this interim order. The petition was filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
• Registry's Concern: The Court Registry identified a procedural defect and did not assign a case number to the petition. The Registry questioned whether the petition was maintainable under Section 528 BNSS, given that Section 29 of the PWDV Act already provides an appeal mechanism against such orders. 
• Legal Framework:  
  • Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) grants inherent powers to High Courts to pass orders for giving effect to any order, preventing abuse of court process, or securing justice. 
  • Section 29 of the PWDV Act provides a specific appeal route to the Court of Session against Magistrate's orders. 
  • The PWDV Act is welfare legislation specifically designed to protect women from domestic violence. 
• Procedural Issue: The central question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent powers when a statutory appeal remedy already exists under the PWDV Act, and whether the interim order contained any manifest illegality or blatant irregularity that would justify such intervention. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court relied on established Supreme Court precedents in Vijayalekshmi Amma V.K.(Dr.) & Anr v. Bindu V and Others (2010), Naresh Potteries (M/s.) V. M/s. Aarti Industries (2025), and Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (2025) to establish the legal framework. 
• The Court noted that extraordinary inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) cannot be exercised to quash interim orders passed by Magistrates under Sections 18 to 23 of the PWDV Act unless absolutely necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of court process, or secure justice. 
• The Court emphasized that since the PWDV Act, 2005 is welfare legislation specially enacted to provide justice to women suffering from domestic violence, High Courts must be extremely slow and circumspect when exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1). 
• The Court clarified that interference through inherent powers can only be made when there is gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. The Court stated that only in cases of manifest illegality and blatant irregularity of proceedings would the High Court be justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to unsettle orders passed by Magistrates under PWDV Act provisions. 
• The Court observed that High Courts must generally adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing applications under Section 12(1), as excessive interference would defeat the very object of enacting the PWDV Act, 2005. 
• The Court noted that against orders passed by Magistrates, there is an appeal provided under Section 29 to the Court of Session, unlike cases involving cognizance of offences or process issuance where no appeal remedy exists. 
• The Court found that the interim order in question (Annexure A3) could not be characterized as one of gross illegality or irregularity, and that the petitioner could approach the same court seeking modification or vacation of the order if sufficient reasons existed. 
•  The Court sustained the defect noted by the Registry regarding maintainability, finding that the petition under Section 528 BNSS was not the appropriate remedy given the availability of statutory appeal under Section 29 of the PWDV Act. 
• The Court directed the Registry to return the petition to the petitioner, effectively refusing to entertain the matter under the inherent powers provision.

What is Interim Orders under DV Act ?

Section 12 - Application to Magistrate: 

• Who Can Apply: An aggrieved person, a Protection Officer, or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act. 
• Mandatory Consideration: Before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate must take into consideration any domestic incident report received from the Protection Officer or service provider. 
• Types of Relief Available: The relief sought may include compensation or damages without prejudice to the right to institute a separate suit for compensation for injuries caused by domestic violence acts. 
• Set-off Provision: Where a decree for compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount paid under the Magistrate's order shall be set off against the decree amount. 
• Application Form: Every application must be in the prescribed form and contain prescribed particulars or as nearly as possible thereto. 
• Timeline for First Hearing: The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court. 
• Disposal Timeline: The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing. 

Section 23 - Power to Grant Interim and Ex Parte Orders: 

• General Power: In any proceeding under the Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper. 
• Ex Parte Orders: If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, has committed, or is likely to commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order based on the aggrieved person's affidavit. 
• Scope of Ex Parte Orders: Ex parte orders can be granted under Section 18 (Protection orders), Section 19 (Residence orders), Section 20 (Monetary reliefs), Section 21 (Custody orders), or Section 22 (Compensation orders). 
• Affidavit Requirement: Ex parte orders must be based on affidavit in prescribed form submitted by the aggrieved person. 

Related Provisions for Interim Relief: 

• Duration: Protection orders under Section 18 remain in force until the aggrieved person applies for discharge (Section 25). 
• Modification: The Magistrate may alter, modify, or revoke any order upon application from either party if there is a change in circumstances requiring such action (Section 25). 
• Enforcement: All orders made under the Act are enforceable throughout India (Section 27). 
• Appeal: There is an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days from the date the order is served on the aggrieved person or respondent, whichever is later (Section 29). 
• Distribution of Orders: The Magistrate must provide free copies of orders to parties, police officer in-charge, and relevant service providers (Section 24). 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

The Supreme Court of India in Safdar Nagori v. State of Madhya Pradesh examined whether its 2022 order staying proceedings under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) should prevent High Courts from deciding appeals against conviction for sedition offences. 

What was the Background of Safdar Nagori v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025) Case? 

Background: 

• Petitioner: Safdar Nagori 
• Conviction: Convicted in 2017 under Section 124A of the IPC (sedition) along with other charges. 
• Incarceration Period: 18 years (indicating arrest occurred around 2007). 
• Appeal Status: Filed appeal in Madhya Pradesh High Court against the conviction. 

The Judicial Dilemma: 

• The MP High Court heard the petitioner's appeal against conviction in full. 
• However, the High Court deferred delivering judgment, citing the Supreme Court's May 2022 order in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India.  
• The 2022 order directed that "All pending trials, appeals and proceedings with respect to the charge framed under Section 124A of IPC be kept in abeyance" pending constitutional review of the sedition law. 
• The petitioner's appeal involves only the sedition charge as he has already served sentences for other offences. 

Arguments Before the Supreme Court: 

Petitioner's Arguments: 

• The petitioner's appeal involves only the sedition charge as he has already served sentences for other offences. 
• The stay order in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India was never intended to apply to fully argued appeals in concluded cases. 
• The 2022 order has created a judicial dilemma where High Courts decline to decide appeals even after full hearings. 
• The petitioner remains incarcerated without appellate recourse, violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 
• Urged the Court to clarify whether judgment could be delivered in appeals involving Section 124A charges when hearings are completed, and no fresh trial or investigation is pending. 

Constitutional Implications Raised: 

• Serious implications for personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
• The tension between judicial efficiency and ongoing constitutional review of sedition laws. 
• The need to balance the stay order's purpose with the rights of those in prolonged incarceration.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

Judicial Bench: 

• The matter was heard by a two-judge bench comprising: 
• Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha 
• Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan 

Key Observations: 

• Trial Status Recognition: 
  • The Court acknowledged that the trial against the petitioner was "virtually concluded after submissions made by the public prosecutor as well as the defense." 
• Interpretation of 2022 Order: 
  • The Court noted the need for clarification regarding the operation of paragraph 8(d) of the Order passed on 11th May 2022 in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India, which states that, “All pending trials, appeals and proceedings with respect to the charge framed under Section 124A of IPC be kept in abeyance. Adjudication with respect to other Sections, if any, could proceed if the Courts are of the opinion that no prejudice would be caused to the accused." 
• Constitutional Implications: 
  • The Court implicitly recognized the serious implications for personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, as highlighted by the petitioner's counsel regarding prolonged incarceration without appellate recourse. 

Court's Decision and Directions: 

• Issue of Notice: 
  • The Supreme Court issued notice in the matter, indicating it found merit in examining the question raised regarding the scope of its 2022 order in S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India. 
• Administrative Direction: 
  • The Court directed that the Special Leave Petition be listed on July 25, 2025, before an appropriate bench after taking instructions from the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. 
• Significance of Listing: 
  • The direction to list before an "appropriate bench" suggests the matter may require consideration by a larger bench or specialized bench given its constitutional implications and the need for authoritative interpretation of the 2022 order. 
• Judicial Recognition: 
  • By issuing notice, Justices P.S. Narasimha and R. Mahadevan effectively recognized that the case presents a genuine constitutional question about the balance between judicial stays and personal liberty, particularly in cases where appeals have been fully heard but judgments remain pending due to the stay order.

What is Sedition Law? 

Historical Background: 

• Sedition laws were enacted in 17th century England when lawmakers believed that only good opinions of the government should survive, as bad opinions were detrimental to the government and monarchy. 
• The law was originally drafted in 1837 by Thomas Macaulay, the British historian-politician, but was inexplicably omitted when the IPC was enacted in 1860. 
• Section 124A was inserted to IPC in 1870 by an amendment introduced by Sir James Stephen when it felt the need for a specific section to deal with the offence. 

Sedition under IPC: 

• Definition and Elements: 
  • Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code lays down the punishment for sedition. The provision defines sedition with specific elements that must be proven for conviction. 
  • Section 124A IPC Definition: It defines sedition as an offence committed when "any person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the government established by law in India". 
• Key Components: 
  • Disaffection Explained: The law clarifies that disaffection includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. However, the provision includes an important caveat - comments without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, will not constitute an offence under this section. 
  • Intent Requirement: The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of intent in sedition cases. In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1995), the Supreme Court reiterated that the real intent of the speech must be taken into account before labeling it seditious. 
• Punishment Framework: 
  • It is a Non-Bailable Offence 
  • Punishment under Section 124A ranges from imprisonment up to three years to a life term, to which a fine may be added

Sedition under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 

• The Transformation: 
  • The BNS removes sedition as an offence. Instead, there is a new offence for acts endangering India's sovereignty, unity and integrity.  
  • The BNS removes sedition as a crime but introduces a new provision penalizing acts endangering national security and unity. This includes inciting secession, armed rebellion, or activities endangering India's sovereignty. 
• Section 152 of BNS: The New Framework: 
  • This section was introduced as a replacement for the previous sedition law under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).  
  • The sedition law was seen as a relic of the colonial era and was often argued to be misused.
• Key Features of Section 152: 
  • Title: "Act Endangering Sovereignty, Unity and Integrity of India.” 
  • Scope: In the BNS, this has been replaced by Section 152, titled 'Act Endangering Sovereignty, Unity and Integrity of India,' with some differences from the original IPC offence. 
  • Effective Date: Came into effect on 1 July 2024. 
• Judicial Interpretation: 
  • A bench of Justice Arun Monga held that Section 152 of BNS should not be used to cripple legitimate dissent and only deliberate actions with malicious intent would fall within the ambit of this provision. 
  • To prevent Section 152 from becoming a de facto sedition law, courts must establish clear guidelines that protect legitimate criticism and free expression.  
  • The provision's interpretation should be guided by established judicial precedents that distinguish between genuine threats to national security and legitimate dissent. 

Comparative Analysis: IPC vs BNS 

• Similarities: 
  • Subsequently, Section 124A of IPC has largely been retained in the form of Section 152 in the new Bhartiya Nyaya Samhita. Despite the change in terminology, the core concerns about government criticism remain. 
• Key Differences: 
  • Terminology: While IPC focused on "sedition" and "disaffection," BNS emphasizes "endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity." 
  • Scope: The provision on endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India may have retained aspects of sedition. 
  • Intent: The new provision appears to focus more on specific acts that endanger national security rather than general criticism. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices PS Narasimha and R Mahadevan held that the legal heirs of a deceased tortfeasor cannot claim compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for an accident caused by his own rash and negligent driving. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of G. Nagarathna & Ors. v. G. Manjunatha & Anr. (2025). 

What was the Background of G. Nagarathna & Ors. v. G. Manjunatha & Anr. (2025)? 

• N.S. Ravisha was driving a Fiat Linea car at high speed in a rash and negligent manner when the vehicle toppled, resulting in his death.  
• The deceased was not the owner of the vehicle but had borrowed it from the actual owner.  
• Following the fatal accident, Ravisha's legal heirs, including his wife, son, and parents, filed a compensation claim of ₹80 lakhs under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Arsikere. 
• The appellants sought compensation for the death of their family member despite the fact that the accident occurred due to his own rash and negligent driving.  
• The legal heirs argued that since the deceased was not the owner of the vehicle, the insurance company could not avoid its liability to provide compensation for the loss that occurred.  
• The case involved the fundamental legal question of whether legal heirs can claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act when the deceased person was himself responsible for the accident through his own negligent driving, constituting a self-inflicted tort or offence against road safety regulations 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Karnataka High Court observed that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased himself, making him a self-tort-feasor, and therefore his legal heirs cannot claim any compensation for his death, as it would amount to a person who committed a breach getting compensation for his own wrongs.  
• The High Court further observed that since the deceased had borrowed the vehicle from the owner, he is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the owner, and hence the insurance company cannot be held liable to compensate the owner or borrower for injuries or death caused by their own negligence 
• The Court noted that allowing such compensation would set a dangerous precedent where individuals could benefit from their own wrongful acts or offence against traffic regulations.  
• The Supreme Court observed that there was no good ground for interference with the impugned decision of the High Court and reiterated the established legal principle that legal heirs of a deceased person driving a vehicle negligently cannot seek compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. 

What is Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act? 

About: 

• Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides the legal framework for filing applications seeking compensation arising out of motor vehicle accidents.  
• An application for compensation can be made by the person who has sustained injury in the accident, enabling them to seek redressal for their physical harm and related losses.  
• The owner of property damaged in the accident is also entitled to file an application for compensation under this section to recover losses for property damage. 
• Where death has resulted from the motor vehicle accident, all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased person are empowered to make an application for compensation on behalf of the deceased.  
• Any agent who has been duly authorized by the injured person or by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased can also file a compensation application on their behalf. 
• The section mandates that where all legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in the compensation application, the application must be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all legal representatives of the deceased, and those legal representatives who have not joined must be impleaded as respondents to the application. 
• Every application under this section must be made at the option of the claimant to either the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area where the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within whose local limits the claimant resides or carries on business, or within whose local limits the defendant resides. 
• The application must be in the prescribed form and contain the prescribed particulars as required by the rules.  
• Where no claim for compensation under section 140 is made in the application, the application must contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.  
• The Claims Tribunal is required to treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. 

Case Laws: 

• Ningamma and another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009): 
  • To establish the legal principle that when an accident occurs due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased himself, making him a self-tort-feasor his legal heirs cannot claim any compensation for his death.  
  • The Court cited this precedent to support its conclusion that allowing compensation in such circumstances would amount to a person who committed a breach getting compensation for his own wrongs, which would be contrary to established legal principles. 
• Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Nayan, (1977): 
  • The Court applied the legal principle established in this case that when a person borrows a vehicle from the owner, he is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the owner for the purposes of liability and insurance coverage.