List of Current Affairs

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Kerala High Court held that an accused can independently challenge a trial court’s arbitrary and unreasoned refusal to grant consent for withdrawal of prosecution under Section 360 BNSS / Section 321 CrPC, even if the State does not appeal. 

• The Kerala High Court held this in the case of George Alexander @ Prince v. State of Kerala (2025). 

What was the Background of George Alexander @ Prince v. State of Kerala (2025) Case ? 

• The present matter arose before the Kerala High Court through two revision petitions filed by accused persons challenging trial court orders that refused consent to withdraw prosecution against them. Justice Kauser Edappagath presided over the consolidated hearing of Crl.R.P. No. 268 of 2017 and Crl.R.P. No. 23 of 2017. Both cases presented the common legal question of whether an accused person can challenge a trial court's order refusing consent to withdraw prosecution under Section 360 of BNSS (Section 321 of CrPC) when the State has chosen not to challenge such orders. 
• The first revision petition originated from S.C. No. 684 of 2013 pending before the Additional Assistant Sessions Court, Thalassery. The petitioners in this case were accused Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 9, who faced multiple serious charges under various statutory provisions. The offences alleged against these accused persons were punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 452, 427, 332, and 152 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Additionally, they were charged under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act, Sections 3(1) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, and Section 38 read with Section 52 of the Kerala Police Act. 
• The accused persons initially appeared before the trial court and were subsequently released on bail. Following their release, the Public Prosecutor filed an application numbered CMP No. 1203/2015 under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking withdrawal from prosecution against all the accused persons. The learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, after considering the application, dismissed the same through an order dated 28.07.2015. Aggrieved by this dismissal, the accused persons approached the Kerala High Court by filing Crl.R.P. No. 268 of 2017 challenging the trial court's refusal to grant consent for withdrawal from prosecution. 
• The second revision petition emerged from C.C. No. 689 of 2009 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thiruvalla. This case involved a sole accused person who was charged with offences punishable under Sections 466 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 466 pertains to forgery of record of Court or of public register, while Section 468 relates to forgery for the purpose of cheating. The accused person appeared before the trial court and was released on bail after the initial proceedings. 
• Subsequently, the Assistant Public Prosecutor filed an application numbered Crl.M.P. No. 7326 of 2016 under Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code (corresponding to Section 360 of BNSS) seeking withdrawal from prosecution against the accused. The learned Magistrate, after examining the application, dismissed it through an order dated 07.12.2016. The accused person, being dissatisfied with this dismissal, filed Crl.R.P. No. 23 of 2017 before the Kerala High Court challenging the trial court's refusal to grant consent for withdrawal from prosecution. 
• Both revision petitions raised the identical legal question regarding the maintainability of revision petitions filed by accused persons against orders refusing consent to withdraw from prosecution when the prosecuting agency has not challenged such orders. During the hearing of these revision petitions, the Kerala High Court expressed doubts about the maintainability of such petitions filed by accused persons. Consequently, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor were requested to address detailed arguments on the question of maintainability along with the merits of the respective cases.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• Legislative Framework and Executive Function: The Court observed that under the scheme of BNSS and CrPC, prosecution of an offender is primarily the responsibility of the executive branch of government, and withdrawal of prosecution constitutes an executive function where Section 360 of BNSS establishes a dual requirement - the application must be made by the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and the consent of the court must be obtained for such withdrawal. 
• Object and Purpose of Section 360: The Court observed that the object of Section 360 of BNSS is to reserve power to the Executive Government under the supervision of the judiciary, enabling withdrawal of criminal cases on larger grounds of public policy while also serving to protect accused persons from unnecessary and vexatious prosecution, reflecting the legislative intent to balance executive discretion with judicial oversight. 
• Judicial Function and Court's Role: The Court observed that the provision contemplates consent by the court in a supervisory manner rather than an adjudicatory capacity, where the court's duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the public prosecutor to request withdrawal but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent uninfluenced by irrelevant considerations. 
• Revisional Jurisdiction and Locus Standi: The Court observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 438 read with Section 442 of BNSS refers to its supervisory power to examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, and if third parties can challenge orders passed under Section 360 of BNSS in revision, there is no reason why an accused person, who is the real aggrieved party, cannot maintain a revision under these provisions. 
• Accused Person's Right to Challenge: The Court observed that if an order refusing to grant consent for withdrawal from prosecution under Section 360 of BNSS is vitiated by non-application of mind to relevant materials, or is demonstrably illegal, arbitrary, or perverse resulting in miscarriage of justice, the accused being the person aggrieved has every right to challenge the same in revision, even if the State has not chosen to challenge the order. 
• Trial Court's Deficiencies: The Court observed that both impugned orders were not speaking orders and failed to meet the basic requirements of judicial decision-making, with no reasons stated for not allowing the applications filed by the Prosecutor for withdrawal from prosecution, and the failure of trial courts to provide reasoned orders and their non-application of mind to the relevant materials amounted to a miscarriage of justice. 

What is Section 360 of BNSS? 

• Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) empowers Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors to withdraw from prosecuting criminal cases with the court's permission.  
• This provision allows withdrawal at any time before final judgment, either for all charges or specific charges against the accused.  
• The legal consequence depends on the timing of withdrawal - if done before charges are framed, the accused is discharged, while withdrawal after charges are framed results in acquittal. Special permission from the Central Government is required for cases involving Union matters, Central laws, government property damage, or crimes by Central Government employees during official duty. 

Landmark Judgments on Withdrawal of Prosecution 

• Abdul Wahab K v. State of Kerala (2018): The Supreme Court emphasized that Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors have a crucial independent role under the statutory framework. They must apply their own mind and carefully consider the societal impact of granting withdrawal permission, ensuring they act as independent judicial officers rather than mere government representatives. 
• State of Kerala v. K Ajith and others (2021): This judgment established comprehensive guidelines for courts deciding withdrawal applications. The Court must verify that the Public Prosecutor's function has not been improperly exercised, the application is made in good faith for public policy and justice rather than to obstruct legal processes, it doesn't contain improprieties that would cause manifest injustice, the consent serves justice administration, and permission isn't sought for ulterior purposes unconnected with law vindication. 

Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua  held that mere use of encroached forest land does not confer locus standi to challenge eviction proceedings initiated against the actual encroachers. 

• The Himachal Pradesh High Court  held this in the matter of Nishant Mahajan & Anr. v. State of H.P. & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Nishant Mahajan & Anr. v. State of H.P. & Ors.,(2025) Case? 

• In 2011, an FIR was registered against Ravi and Vikram Singh for allegedly encroaching upon forest land measuring 01-03-61 hectares in Manali-III forest, Kullu district. The FIR was filed under Sections 447 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 32 & 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. However, in 2014, both accused persons were acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate who extended to them the benefit of doubt. 
• Following the FIR registration, revenue officials conducted a demarcation in February 2013 and detected unauthorised occupation by Ravi and Vikram Singh over government land in eight khasra numbers, including Khasra No. 1328. The officials found that the brothers had encroached upon the land and constructed a 'Gompa' (Buddhist monastery) and planted an apple orchard. Based on this demarcation, the Collector, Forest Division Kullu issued a notice under Section 4(1) of the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971. 
• When the brothers objected to the demarcation, a fresh survey was ordered and conducted in March 2016. This fresh demarcation revealed that Khasra No. 1328 was vacant with nine Deodar trees, one Kail tree, and one Popular tree growing on it. Consequently, the Collector passed an eviction order on 05th April 2016, directing the Forest Department to take possession of all eight khasra numbers, including 1328, and fence the area to prevent future encroachments. The brothers accepted this order and did not file any appeal. 
• Meanwhile, in November 2011, Ravi had sold portions of his land to the present petitioners - Nishant Mahajan and Khushal Chand Mahajan (father and son).  
• The petitioners purchased land parcels in nearby khasra numbers and used the disputed forest land as an approach road to their property. 
• In November 2021, Arjun Thakur filed a complaint through the Chief Minister Sankalp Helpline, alleging that a cemented road had been constructed over forest land in Khasra Nos. 1315, 1328, and 1346 for the benefit of the petitioners' commercial property. Following this complaint, revenue officials conducted another demarcation in the presence of forest officials, which detected illegal construction of a cemented road in Khasra No. 1328. 
• The investigation revealed that the Block Development Officer, Naggar, and the Gram Panchayat, Nasogi had constructed a road named "C/O Road from DAV School to house of Sh. Vikram" during 2018-19 with an expenditure of Rs. 1,50,000 sanctioned by the Deputy Commissioner Kullu.  
• The Gram Panchayat claimed they had only carried out crate work alongside the road but had not constructed the actual road structure. 
• Based on these findings, the Range Forest Officer filed a complaint under Section 4(1) of the Act against the Block Development Officer and the Gram Panchayat. After issuing show cause notices and hearing their responses, the Collector, Forest Division Kullu passed an eviction order on 22nd August 2022, holding that the respondents had unauthorisedly occupied forest land and encroached upon 00-68-56 hectares in Khasra No. 1328 by constructing a cemented road over 00-11-08 hectares. 
• The eviction order was implemented on 25th May 2023, and the Forest Department cleared the encroachments, took possession of the land, and fenced it. However, on 29.05.2023, forest officials reported that the land had been broken overnight and a road had been paved again, contrary to the Collector's order. 
• The petitioners, who had been using this road to access their property, filed applications before the Collector Forest for setting aside the eviction order and for their impleadment in the case, claiming the order was passed ex parte against them. When these applications were dismissed, they filed a third-party appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, which was also dismissed on the ground that they lacked locus standi as they were not necessary parties to the original proceedings. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that petitioners, being mere users of a road constructed over forest land (Khasra No. 1328), lacked proper legal standing to challenge the eviction order. Even if they possessed easementary rights as users, the Collector Forest lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate private easement disputes, making their plea legally irrelevant to the forest encroachment proceedings. 
• The Court applied the doctrine of res judicata, ruling that petitioners' previous unsuccessful challenge to the same eviction order (22.08.2022) in CMPMO No. 126 of 2024 under Article 227, which was dismissed on 02th April 2024, barred them from filing a subsequent writ petition on the same matter without obtaining express liberty to institute separate proceedings. 
• The Court established that under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, and following the Supreme Court's interpretation in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad case, "forest" includes all statutorily recognised forests and any area recorded as forest in government records, irrespective of ownership. Land with Deodar, Kail, and Popular trees constitutes forest land requiring protection. 
• The Court noted that a prior order dated 05th April 2016 by the Collector Forest had already established the Forest Department's ownership of Khasra No. 1328 and ordered removal of encroachment. This order became final and absolute when the original encroachers (Ravi and Vikram Singh) failed to file any appeal, creating binding precedent for the current case. 
• The Court found that petitioners had endeavoured to mislead the Court by falsely claiming the road existed "from times immemorial" and served public purposes. The Divisional Forest Officer's report contradicted these claims, establishing that the road did not connect to other villages, was not used by students for school access, and served only the petitioners and original encroachers. 
• The Court concluded that merely asserting a need to use forest land for non-forest purposes, without proper legal permission, is insufficient in law to justify continued encroachment. The absence of any recorded permission for non-forest use of the land, combined with Supreme Court directives on forest protection, rendered the petitioners' necessity-based arguments legally untenable. 

Implications for Forest Land Encroachment Cases 

This ruling establishes that: 

• Mere usage of encroached forest land does not confer standing to challenge eviction proceedings 
• Only those with ownership rights or direct involvement in the encroachment can be considered necessary parties 
• Easementary rights (right to use a path/road) are separate from ownership rights and don't grant party status in eviction cases 
• Forest authorities focus on removing encroachers, not resolving private easement disputes 

This principle helps streamline forest land eviction proceedings by limiting party participation to those directly involved in the encroachment, rather than all users of the encroached land. 

Source: Bombay High Court  

Why in News? 

The Bombay High Court on Monday held that the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act) will not apply to complaints lodged by female advocate members of the Bar Council of India (BCI) or the Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa (BCMG) against other advocates. 

• The Bombay High Court held this in the matter of UNS Women Legal Association v. Bar Council of India & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of the Case? 

• The UNS Women Legal Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in 2017 seeking the formation of permanent grievance redressal mechanisms to address sexual harassment complaints against lawyers. 
• The PIL contended that the provisions of the POSH Act, 2013 must be invoked against complaints filed by female advocates over sexual harassment by their male counterparts. 
• The petitioner argued that women advocates face sexual harassment in their professional environment and should be protected under the comprehensive framework provided by the POSH Act. 
• The case raised fundamental questions about the applicability of workplace sexual harassment laws to the legal profession and the nature of the relationship between advocates and bar councils. 
• The matter involved determining whether the employer-employee relationship necessary for POSH Act application exists between bar councils and practicing advocates. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• A division bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep Marne held that the provisions of the POSH Act will not apply to complaints of female lawyer members as there is no "employee-employer" relationship between advocates and bar councils. 
• The Court observed that "The provisions of the Act of 2013 apply when there is an employee-employer relationship. But in case of advocates and the BCI or the BCMG, there is no such relationship as neither the BCI nor the BCMG can be said to be employers of the advocates." 
• The bench clarified that the provisions of the POSH Act will apply only to the employees of the BCI and BCMG, who are the committee members and staff of the said associations. 
• For any kind of misconduct with lady lawyers by their male counterparts, the bench made it clear that the provisions of the Advocates Act are well in place, specifically citing Section 35 of the Advocates Act which provides action against professional or other misconduct by lawyers. 
• The Court noted that this existing remedy is available for lady lawyers to file complaints against any kind of harassment which may amount to professional or other misconduct. 
• With these observations, the bench disposed of the PIL filed by the UNS Women Legal Association, effectively dismissing their demand for POSH Act application. 

What is the POSH Act, 2013? 

About: 

• The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 provides a comprehensive legal framework for addressing sexual harassment of women at workplaces. 
• The Act defines sexual harassment as any unwelcome act or behavior (whether directly or by implication) of sexual nature, including physical contact, demand for sexual favors, sexually colored remarks, showing pornography, or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 
• Every employer is required to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) at each office or branch with 10 or more employees to address complaints of sexual harassment. 
• For workplaces with less than 10 employees, complaints are addressed by Local Complaints Committees (LCC) constituted at the district level. 
• The Act mandates that the ICC must be headed by a woman and include at least one member from amongst women's organizations or person familiar with issues relating to sexual harassment. 
• The Act provides for interim relief including transfer of complainant/respondent, granting leave, and other measures to ensure the complainant's safety and continuation of employment. 
• Penalties include compensation to the complainant, disciplinary action against the respondent, and potential criminal prosecution under relevant sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Indian Penal Code. 

Comparison Between POSH Act and Sexual Harassment Laws 

POSH Act vs. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) Provisions: 

• POSH Act is a civil remedy focusing on workplace-specific sexual harassment with emphasis on prevention, prohibition, and redressal through internal mechanisms. 
• BNS Sections 74 (IPC 354), 75 (IPC 354A), 76 (IPC 354B), 77 (IPC 354C), 78 (IPC 354D) 79 deal with sexual harassment or offenceas criminal offenses with penalties including imprisonment and fines. 
• POSH Act provides for compensation to the victim, while BNS focuses on punishment of the perpetrator. 
• POSH Act has a broader definition of sexual harassment including non-physical conduct, while BNS provisions are more specific to physical acts and verbal/non-verbal conduct. 
• POSH Act mandates preventive measures like awareness programs, while BNS is purely punitive. 
• POSH Act provides for interim relief and protection during proceedings, while BNS procedures follow standard criminal law processes. 
• POSH Act requires mandatory reporting by employers, while BNS complaints are typically victim-initiated. 

Implications of the Judgment 

The Bombay High Court's ruling creates important precedents for the legal profession. Women advocates facing sexual harassment from colleagues must now rely on the Advocates Act's disciplinary mechanisms rather than the more comprehensive POSH Act framework. This decision highlights the unique nature of the legal profession where practitioners are not employees but independent professionals regulated by bar councils. 

The judgment emphasizes that while POSH Act protections are not available for inter-advocate harassment, the Advocates Act provides adequate remedies through its professional misconduct provisions. However, critics argue that the disciplinary mechanisms under the Advocates Act may not be as robust or victim-friendly as the POSH Act's specialized procedures.