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Civil Law

Fair Wages to Housekeeping Staff

 10-Jul-2025

Korambayil Hospital & Diagnostics Centre (P) Ltd.& Anr v. State of Kerala and Ors. 

"Private Hospital's Housekeeping Staff Can't Be Treated as Mere Cleaners" 

Justice Viju Abraham 

Source: Kerala High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Viju Abraham directed to pay wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 to housekeeping staff engaged in the Private hospitals. 

  • The Kerala High Court held this in the matter of Korambayil Hospital & Diagnostics Centre (P) Ltd.& Anr v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Korambayil Hospital & Diagnostics Centre (P) Ltd.& Anr v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2025) Case? 

  • The case arose when the Assistant Labour Officer inspected the hospital premises and initiated proceedings under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. 
  • The inspection led to an order directing the hospital and the contractor to pay over ₹7.31 lakh as arrears and an equal amount as compensation to 34 employees who worked from October 2015 to March 2016. 
  • The petitioners argued that since the workers were cleaners, only the general notification for sweeping and cleaning (Rs. 150 per day in municipal areas) applied, and they had complied with it. 
  • However, the agreement between the hospital and the contractor established that the services provided were comprehensive housekeeping, which attracted a higher wage scale notified for private hospitals. 
  • The hospital claimed they were paying the notified minimum wage for sweeping and cleaning under a general notification, but the court found this insufficient. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

  • Justice Viju Abraham observed that the agreement itself specified that the contractor would provide full housekeeping services, including maintaining hygiene and neatness in the entire hospital. 
  • The services included trained staff for sensitive areas like operation theatres and ICUs, which goes beyond mere cleaning work. 
  • The Court upheld the Deputy Labour Commissioner's conclusion that the staff were doing work equivalent to that of housekeeping staff and were entitled to the higher minimum wage as notified for private hospitals. 
  • The court emphasized that "a person engaged as housekeeping staff is entitled for pay fixed as per Ext.P4 and if the same is not paid, will be a violation of the principles of 'equal pay for equal work'." 
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jagjit Singh and Ors. (2017), which held that "it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour." 
  • The Court noted that "An employee engaged for the same work cannot be paid less than another who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare State. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity." 

What is the Minimum Wages Act, 1948? 

  • The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is a comprehensive legislation enacted to prevent exploitation of workers and ensure payment of minimum wages in scheduled employments. 
  • The Act aims to secure the welfare of workers in the unorganized sector by providing for fixation and revision of minimum wages. 
  • The Act empowers both Central and State Governments to fix minimum wages for different categories of workers in scheduled employments. 
  • The Act classifies employment into skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled categories, with different minimum wage rates for each category. 
  • The Act provides for penalties for non-payment of minimum wages and empowers labour officers to conduct inspections and enforce compliance.

Constitutional Law

Binding Parliamentary Laws

 10-Jul-2025

Sorabh Kamal Jain v. State of Maharashtra

“We direct the Director General of Police not to delegate its power to any subordinate Officer while filing the reply. We reserve our right to take necessary action against the concerned Investigating Officer for breach of the provisions of law if deem necessary and required, after we peruse the Affidavit of the DGP  ” 

Justices Ajay Gadkari and Rajesh Patil 

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Ajay Gadkari and Rajesh Patil  directs DGP to clarify on oath whether Parliamentary laws and DGP circulars are binding on Maharashtra Police, warning of action for CrPC violations. 

  • The Bombay High Court held this in the matter of  Sorabh Kamal Jain v. State of Maharashtra,(2025). 

What was the Background of Sorabh Kamal Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) Case? 

  • A First Information Report (FIR) was lodged on 3rd June 2024 for an economic offence. 
  • The investigation has been ongoing for more than 13 months from the date of registration. 
  • The investigating officer assigned to the case holds the rank of Assistant Police Inspector at the local police station. 
  • The case involves economic offences which typically require thorough and systematic investigation of procedures. 
  • The basic investigative procedure of drawing panchnama of the scene of offence has not been completed despite the passage of 13 months. 
  • The case diary maintenance has been found to be irregular and non-compliant with statutory requirements. 
  • The investigation appears to be proceeding at a slow pace with fundamental investigative steps remaining incomplete. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Court expressed astonishment at the submission that despite the crime being registered on 3rd June 2024, more than 13 months ago, the basic tenet of investigation, namely drawing of panchnama of scene of offence, has not been carried out by the concerned Investigating Officer till date. 
  • The Court noted that less said is better about the remaining part of the investigation of an offence of this nature, being an economic offence, which is being conducted by an officer of the rank of Assistant Police Inspector. 
  • Upon personal perusal of the case diary, the Court found that it was maintained in a casual manner with loose leaves in a yellow colour plastic file. 
  • The first page of the case diary bore no number and date, and was typed on ledger paper. 
  • Case diary entries No.1 to 13 were found to be loose sheets, indicating clear violation of the mandate of law under Section 172(1-B) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
  • The Court observed that the concerned Investigating Officer has clearly violated the mandate of law under Section 172(1-B) of the Criminal Procedure Code, coupled with various Circulars and directions issued by the office of the Director General of Police, Maharashtra State. 
  • The Court noted that the office of the Director General of Police has issued Circulars dated 6th December 2018, 16th September 2021, and 12th February 2024, repeatedly directing all police personnel in Maharashtra to maintain case diary as per Section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
  • The Court observed that all police personnel in the State of Maharashtra must follow the mandate of law as per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, as well as directions issued by the office of the Director General of Police. 
  • The Court noted that directions issued by the office of the Director General of Police are not percolated to the lower rank of police personnel, who are blatantly violating the directions issued by the topmost Authority of the Police Department. 
  • The Court remarked that this situation is unconscionable and unpardonable, noting that in a disciplined police force, the police personnel themselves are not following discipline and are not following mandatory directions issued by the office of the Director General of Police. 
  • The Court directed the Director General of Police to explain on oath whether the provisions of law enacted by the Parliament of India are binding and mandatory on police personnel in the State of Maharashtra, or whether those are to be retained only in the books of law. 
  • The Court sought clarification on whether Circulars and directions issued by the office of Director General of Police, Maharashtra State are binding on all police force. 
  • The Court reserved its right to take necessary action against the Investigating Officer concerned for breach of the provisions of law if deemed necessary and required, after perusing the Affidavit of the Director General of Police. 

What is the Parliamentary Legislative Authority? 

  • The Parliament of India is the supreme legislative authority in the country and possesses the constitutional power to enact laws on subjects within its legislative competence. 
  • Parliament has the authority to destroy the effects of precedents established by the Supreme Court by passing statutory laws that override judicial decisions. 
  • Legislation enacted by Parliament can abrogate judicial precedents either impliedly or expressly through statutory provisions. 
  • When Parliament enacts a law that is inconsistent with an existing judicial precedent, the statutory provision impliedly overrides the precedent without expressly stating so. 
  • Parliament can expressly abrogate a judicial precedent by specifically mentioning in the statutory provision that the particular precedent or judicial decision shall not apply or is being overruled. 

What are Constitutional Frameworks? 

Legislative Response to Judicial Decisions: 

  • Under the Indian constitutional system, while the judiciary interprets the law, Parliament retains the ultimate authority to make laws and can override judicial interpretations through legislation. 
  • Judicial precedents, though binding under Article 141 of the Constitution, are subject to legislative override when Parliament exercises its constitutional power to enact laws. 
  • When Parliament enacts a statute that conflicts with a judicial precedent, the statutory provision takes precedence over the judicial decision. 

Legislative Response to Judicial Decisions: 

  • Parliament can respond to judicial decisions by enacting specific legislation that addresses the issues raised in court judgments. 

Clarification of Legal Position: 

  • Through statutory enactments, Parliament can clarify the legal position on matters where judicial precedents may have created uncertainty or where legislative intent differs from judicial interpretation. 

Retroactive Effect: 

  • Parliament can enact laws with retroactive effect to nullify the impact of judicial precedents, subject to constitutional limitations. 

Separation of Powers: 

  • While the judiciary has the power to interpret laws and create binding precedents, Parliament maintains the constitutional authority to enact laws that can override such precedents. 

Democratic Legitimacy: 

  • Parliamentary laws derive their authority from democratic mandate and constitutional provisions, enabling them to supersede judicial precedents when enacted within constitutional bounds. 

Constitutional Supremacy: 

  • Both parliamentary legislation and judicial precedents operate within the framework of the Constitution, with Parliament's legislative power being subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. 

Constitutional Law

Commutation of Sentence for Violation of Article 21

 10-Jul-2025

Surendra Kumar v. CBI 

“In criminal jurisprudence, sentencing is not merely a mechanical exercise but involves a careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.” 

Justice Jasmeet Singh

Source: Delhi High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Jasmeet Singh Commutes Sentence Citing 40-Year Delay as Violation of Right to Speedy Trial. 

  • The Delhi High Court held this in the matter of Surendra Kumar v. CBI (2025). 

What was the Background of Surendra Kumar v. CBI (2025) Case ? 

  • Surendra Kumar, employed as Chief Marketing Manager of the State Trading Corporation of India (STC), allegedly demanded a bribe of Rs. 15,000 from Abdul Karim Hamid of M/s Abdul Hamid and Co. in January 1984 for placing a dried fish supply order of 140 tonnes with his firm. 
  • The complainant Abdul Karim Hamid approached the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 4th January 1984 and lodged a formal complaint, leading to the registration of a case under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 
  • The CBI conducted a trap operation at Hotel Kanishka where Kumar was apprehended with Rs. 7,500 in phenolphthalein-treated currency notes, and subsequent sodium carbonate solution test on his hands turned pink, confirming contact with the treated notes. 
  • Kumar was arrested on 4th January 1984 and the CBI filed a chargesheet against him for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. 
  • After examining 13 witnesses during the trial, Kumar was convicted on 21st October 2002 and sentenced on 24th October 2002 to concurrent terms of two years rigorous imprisonment for IPC Section 161 and three years rigorous imprisonment for Prevention of Corruption Act offences, along with fines of Rs. 7,500 each. 
  • Kumar filed an appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 27 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and remained on bail throughout the trial and appeal proceedings, having been in custody for only one day. 
  • The appeal remained pending for over 22 years before its final disposal in 2025, raising significant concerns about violation of the right to speedy trial in the criminal justice system. 
  • The case demonstrates the procedural complexities and systemic delays in corruption cases, where despite successful trap operations and conviction, the appellate process extended for more than two decades, potentially affecting the administration of justice and the rights of the accused. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

  • The Court noted that Kumar had initially advanced arguments on the merits but subsequently gave up his challenge to conviction and restricted his arguments to seeking reduction of sentence quantum, acknowledging that he was not challenging the judgment of conviction dated 21st October 2002. 
  • The Court emphasized that in criminal jurisprudence, sentencing is not merely a mechanical exercise but involves careful balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the objective of sentencing must be a combination of deterrence and rehabilitation which must be worked out on individual and case-to-case basis. 
  • The Court observed that the incident took place on 4th January 1984 and proceedings had been continuing for over four decades, with the trial taking nearly 19 years to conclude and the appeal remaining pending for more than 22 years, noting that such inordinate delay is plainly at odds with the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
  • The Court noted that the 'Sword of Damocles' and uncertainty regarding the fate of Kumar's case had persisted for nearly 40 years, which by itself constituted a mitigating factor, and such prolonged uncertainty and delay in judicial proceedings had violated Kumar's fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
  • The Court observed that a vital mitigating factor was Kumar's advanced age of 90 years, coupled with his suffering from serious health ailments, making him highly vulnerable to the physical and psychological impact of incarceration, and any imprisonment would risk causing irreversible harm and would defeat the very objective of sentence mitigation. 
  • The Court noted that Kumar was a senior officer with STC who had already suffered incarceration for one day, had not challenged his conviction, had no criminal antecedents prior to the offence, had already deposited the fine of Rs. 15,000, and had diligently participated in the trial without causing any delay or disruption throughout the lengthy legal proceedings. 
  • The Court observed that considering the mitigating circumstances, including Kumar's advanced age, deteriorating health condition, inordinate delay in proceedings, clean antecedents, and the fact that he had already served one day in custody, this was a fit case for reducing the quantum of sentence under the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, ultimately reducing Kumar's sentence to the time already served, demonstrating judicial compassion balanced with legal propriety. 

What is Commutation of Sentence and Violation of Right to Speedy Trial? 

Commutation of Sentence: 

  • Section 5 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) establishes the foundational provision for commutation of sentence, empowering the "Appropriate Government" to commute punishment under the Sanhita to any other punishment without requiring the consent of the offender, and this commutation power must be exercised in accordance with Section 474 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
  • The term "Appropriate Government" carries distinct meanings depending on the nature and jurisdiction of the offence, where the Central Government holds authority for death sentences or offences against Union laws, while State Governments exercise commutation powers for offences within their executive jurisdiction. 
  • Section 474 of BNSS grants extensive powers to the Appropriate Government to commute sentences without requiring consent, including commuting death sentences to life imprisonment, life imprisonment to terms not less than seven years, and imprisonment of seven years or more to terms not less than three years. 
  • Section 475 of BNSS establishes crucial restrictions ensuring that persons sentenced to life imprisonment for offences where death is a prescribed punishment, or whose death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, must serve at least 14 years before being eligible for release. 
  • The commutation framework includes concurrent jurisdictional powers where Section 476 of BNSS allows the Central Government to exercise commutation powers in death sentence cases alongside State Governments, while Section 477 requires coordination between different levels of government in sensitive commutation decisions. 
  • The comprehensive commutation hierarchy allows for the reduction of rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment of any term, imprisonment for less than seven years to fine, and provides a structured framework for sentence reduction that balances mercy provisions with public safety considerations. 
  • These statutory provisions reflect the legislative intent to maintain the federal structure of executive clemency powers while preventing jurisdictional conflicts and ensuring that serious offenders serve adequate prison terms commensurate with the gravity of their offences. 

Violation of Right to Speedy Trial 

  • The right to speedy trial is an integral component of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which encompasses not merely the right to a fair trial but also the right to have that trial conducted without unreasonable delay that can cause irreparable harm including psychological trauma, social stigma, and financial hardship. 
  • The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly emphasized that unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings violates the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, with landmark judgments establishing that such delays can constitute grounds for quashing criminal proceedings or reducing sentences due to the 'Sword of Damocles' effect of prolonged litigation. 
  • Unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings is determined by examining multiple factors including the length of delay, reasons for delay, prejudice to the accused, and the overall impact on the administration of justice, with delays caused by prosecutorial negligence or administrative inefficiency being viewed more seriously than those caused by legitimate procedural complexities. 
  • Courts consider whether the accused has been prejudiced by the delay through loss of evidence, fading of witness memory, or personal hardship including health deterioration, financial loss, or social consequences, recognizing that prolonged criminal proceedings can cause continuous mental agony and uncertainty to the accused. 
  • When courts identify violations of the right to speedy trial, they may grant various remedies including quashing of criminal proceedings, reduction of sentence, or directions to expedite the trial process, with the Supreme Court establishing that prolonged trial periods may be considered as significant mitigating factors in sentencing. 
  • The enforcement of the right to speedy trial requires courts to balance the interests of justice, public safety, and individual rights, ensuring that the remedy does not compromise the integrity of the criminal justice system while adequately addressing the violation of constitutional rights. 
  • The judicial approach recognizes that while the right to speedy trial is fundamental and cannot be used to escape legitimate prosecution, the remedy must be proportionate to the nature of the violation and the circumstances of the case, serving both the interests of the accused and the broader public interest in maintaining an efficient criminal justice system. 
  • In extreme cases of delay, courts may consider the time already spent under the uncertainty of criminal proceedings as equivalent to punishment, justifying the reduction of sentence to the period already undergone, thereby acknowledging that the process of law should not become a punishment in itself.