List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice MM Sundresh and Justice NK Singh held that summons under Section 35 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) cannot be served through electronic means like WhatsApp, as such service is not expressly permitted and may infringe upon the personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2025). 

What was the Background of Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2025) Case ? 

• The present case arose from an application filed by the State of Haryana seeking modification of a Supreme Court order dated 21st January 2025. The original order had directed all States and Union Territories to issue Standing Orders to their police machinery regarding the service of notices under Section 41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). 
• The Supreme Court had previously mandated that notices under the aforementioned provisions could only be served through the prescribed modes of service as recognised under the CrPC, 1973 and BNSS, 2023. The Court had categorically held that service through WhatsApp or other electronic communication platforms could not be considered as an alternative or substitute to the statutorily prescribed modes of service. 
• The original order required strict compliance with guidelines established by the Delhi High Court in two landmark cases: Rakesh Kumar v. Vijayanta Arya (DCP) & Others (2021) and Amandeep Singh Johar v. State (NCT Delhi) (2018). These guidelines had been subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Another (2022) 10 SCC 51. 
• The State of Haryana approached the Supreme Court contending that the prohibition on electronic service was impractical and resource-intensive. They argued that notices under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023 were merely informational, directing persons to join investigations without immediate liability for arrest. The State emphasised that electronic service would prevent evasion of service and conserve precious state resources. 
• The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the CrPC, 1973, introduced several provisions recognising electronic communication. Section 64(2) permits electronic service of court summons bearing the court's seal, while Section 71 allows electronic service of witness summons. Section 530 enables trials, inquiries, and proceedings to be conducted electronically. 
• The fundamental issue before the Court was whether the legislative recognition of electronic communication in certain provisions of BNSS, 2023 could be extended to notices issued by investigating agencies under Section 35, particularly given the potential consequences of non-compliance, including arrest and deprivation of liberty. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Legislature, in enacting BNSS 2023, has consciously and deliberately excluded the service of notices under Section 35 from the ambit of procedures permissible through electronic communication as delineated under Section 530, and this conscious omission constitutes a clear manifestation of legislative intent. 
• Service of a notice under Section 35 of BNSS 2023 needs to be carried out in a manner that protects the substantive right to liberty, as non-compliance with the notice can have a drastic effect on the liberty of an individual under Section 35(6). 
• A summons issued by a Court under Sections 63 or 71 of BNSS 2023 constitutes a judicial act, whereas a notice issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 constitutes an executive act, and hence the procedure prescribed for a judicial act cannot be read into the procedure prescribed for an executive act. 
• The Legislature has particularly specified circumstances in which usage of modes of electronic communication is permissible, being circumstances which do not have a bearing on the liberty of an individual, thereby safeguarding the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
• While BNSS 2023 does not entirely preclude the use of electronic communication by the Investigating Agency, such usage has only been provided for under Sections 94(1) and 193(3), and none of these procedures have any bearing on the liberty of an individual. 
• The essence of Article 21 of the Constitution imbues the BNSS 2023, which reflects the laudable objective of safeguarding the liberty of an individual while facilitating the investigation into and adjudication of offences. 
• Introducing a procedure into Section 35 of BNSS 2023 that has not been specifically provided for by the Legislature would be violative of legislative intent and contrary to the purposive interpretation of the statutory scheme. 

What is Section 35  of BNSS ? 

About: 

• Section 35 of the BNSS 2023 is a provision that empowers police officers to arrest any person without obtaining a warrant from a Magistrate in specific circumstances involving cognizable offences. 

Grounds for Arrest Without Warrant: 

Immediate Arrest Situations: 

• When a person commits a cognizable offence in the presence of a police officer. 
• When credible information is received that a person has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for more than seven years, with or without fine, or with death sentence. 
• When a person has been proclaimed as an offender under BNSS or by State Government order. 
• When stolen property is found in someone's possession and they are reasonably suspected of committing an offence related to it. 
• When a person obstructs a police officer in execution of duty or has escaped or attempts to escape from lawful custody. 
• When a person is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from the Armed Forces. 
• When a person is involved in an act committed outside India which would be punishable as an offence if committed in India. 
• When a released convict breaches rules made under Section 394(5). 
• When a requisition for arrest is received from another police officer. 

Conditional Arrest for Offences Up to Seven Years:  

• For cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment for less than seven years or extending up to seven years, arrest is permitted only if specific conditions are satisfied: 
  • The police officer has reason to believe the person committed the offence based on reasonable complaint, credible information, or reasonable suspicion. 
  • The police officer is satisfied that arrest is necessary for preventing further offences, proper investigation, preventing evidence tampering, preventing inducement or threats to witnesses, or ensuring court appearance. 
  • The police officer must record reasons in writing while making the arrest. 
• Notice Procedure (Alternative to Arrest):  
  • When arrest is not required under the above provisions, the police officer must issue a notice directing the person to appear before him or at a specified place.  
  • The person has a duty to comply with the notice terms, and as long as they comply, they cannot be arrested unless the police officer records specific reasons for arrest necessity. 
• Consequences and Safeguards:  
  • If a person fails to comply with the notice or is unwilling to identify themselves, the police officer may arrest them for the offence mentioned in the notice, subject to any orders passed by a competent court.  
  • For offences punishable with imprisonment of less than three years, prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police is required before arresting infirm persons or those above sixty years of age. 
  • The provision includes a mandatory safeguard requiring police officers to record reasons in writing when arrest is not made, ensuring accountability and preventing arbitrary arrests while balancing law enforcement needs with protection of individual liberty. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan held that the right to safe, well-maintained, and motorable roads is an essential facet of the right to life under Article 21, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility by outsourcing road development and maintenance to private entities. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another (2025). 

What was the Background of Umri Pooph Pratappur (Upp) Tollways Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Road Development Corporation and Another. (2025) Case? 

• In 2012, Umri Pooph Pratappur Tollways Private Limited (a private company) entered into a concession agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation (MPRDC), a state-owned entity, for developing the Umari-Pooph-Pratappur Road. 
• The project was structured as a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) arrangement with both toll collection and annuity payments, valued at Rs. 73.68 crores initially. 
• The private company provided a performance security of Rs. 3.68 crores through a bank guarantee and began work after the appointed date was fixed as 20th June, 2012.  
• However, complications arose when a new Independent Engineer was appointed who rejected the previously approved designs and drawings, forcing the company to dismantle and re-execute substantial portions of work. 
• Due to these changes and delays allegedly caused by the state corporation's actions, the project cost escalated to Rs. 99.80 crores.  
• The private company raised 19 claims totaling Rs. 280.15 crores before the Independent Engineer, seeking compensation for various issues including additional work, delays, loss of toll revenue, idling charges, and loss of future business opportunities. 
• When most claims were rejected, the private company initially filed Reference Case No. 61 of 2018 before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal (established under state law).  
• While this case was still pending, the company simultaneously invoked the arbitration clause in their contract and approached the International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ICADR) in New Delhi under the national Arbitration Act. 
• MPRDC objected to this parallel arbitration, arguing that under Madhya Pradesh's special state law (the 1983 Act), all disputes arising from works contracts with state entities must be exclusively decided by the state arbitration tribunal, regardless of any arbitration clauses in the contract.  
• They filed a writ petition in the High Court to stop the private arbitration proceedings. 
• The private company then withdrew its case from the state tribunal and continued with the private arbitration.  
• The High Court sided with MPRDC and quashed the private arbitration proceedings, leading to the current Supreme Court appeal. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that road development and maintenance is fundamentally a State responsibility, observing that "the right to safe, well-maintained, and motorable roads is recognized as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is the responsibility of the State to develop and maintain the roads directly under its control." 
• The Court clarified that writ petitions can be maintained against private entities when they perform public functions, stating: "The contract for laying of a State Highway/District Road, when assigned by the Corporation owned and run by the government, assumes the character of a public function – even if performed by a private party – and would satisfy the functionality test to sustain the writ petition." 
• The Court reaffirmed that State legislation creating special tribunals for works contracts takes precedence over general arbitration laws, noting: "the 1983 Act, being a special law, has an overriding effect and mandates that disputes arising out of such works contracts must be adjudicated exclusively by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal." 
• The Court deprecated the practice of pursuing parallel remedies, observing: "the appellant's conduct in withdrawing the reference petition before the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal, without seeking liberty to re-agitate the claims, and simultaneously initiating proceedings under the 1996 Act, constitutes forum shopping.  
  • This conduct, aimed at circumventing the statutory mechanism and reviving abandoned claims, is tainted with mala fides." 
• The Court held that private agreements cannot override statutory requirements, stating: "parties cannot contract out of a statutory obligation enacted in furtherance of public interest" and that "Clause 44.3.1 of the Concession Agreement to the extent it purports to permit private arbitration, is inoperative insofar as it seeks to override the statutory mandate of the 1983 Act." 
• The Court noted that the appellant's claims were time-barred, observing: "the appellant's claims – which arise from events dating back to 2013-2015 – are also barred by limitation under Section 43 of the 1996 Act read with the Limitation Act, 1963. The belated invocation of arbitration in 2022, and its continuation in 2025, is thus clearly time-barred and legally unsustainable." 

What Is the Scope of Article 21? 

• Article 21 provides that "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law," establishing fundamental protection for every person, including both citizens and foreigners, within Indian territory. 
• The provision encompasses two interconnected rights - the right to life and the right to personal liberty - which the Supreme Court has described as the "heart of fundamental rights" in India's constitutional structure. 
• State Obligation and Constraint Article 21 operates as a binding constraint on all state entities, including government departments, local bodies, and legislatures, requiring them to follow established legal procedures before depriving any person of life or liberty. 
• Expanded Interpretation of Right to Life the Supreme Court has established that the right to life extends beyond mere survival to include "being able to live a complete life of dignity and meaning," encompassing quality of life and human dignity aspects. 
• Procedural Fairness Standard Following the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978), the Court mandated that "any procedure under law for the deprivation of life or liberty of a person must not be unfair, unreasonable or arbitrary," establishing substantive due process requirements. 
• Derivative Rights Under Article 21 The provision has been judicially expanded to include numerous specific rights such as right to privacy, shelter, health, education, pollution-free environment, cultural heritage protection, and protection against custodial violence. 
• Constitutional Integration Article 21 intersects with Article 19 freedoms to provide "additional protection" where personal liberty overlaps with specific constitutional freedoms, creating a comprehensive framework for individual rights protection.

How Does the Supreme Court Interpret Road Safety as a Fundamental Right Under Article 21? 

• Constitutional Foundation for Road Safety Rights : 
  • The Supreme Court established that Article 21 of the Constitution encompasses the right to safe and well-maintained roads, stating: "the right to safe, well-maintained, and motorable roads is recognized as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India." 
• Linkage with Freedom of Movement: 
  • The Court connected road infrastructure rights with fundamental freedoms, observing: "Since the right to access any part of the country, with certain exceptions and restrictions under certain circumstances, is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, and the right to safe, well-maintained, and motorable roads is recognized as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India." 
• State's Constitutional Obligation: 
  • Drawing from Article 21's mandate, the Court emphasized the state's duty: "it is the responsibility of the State to develop and maintain the roads directly under its control" as this falls within the broader protection of life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. 
• Public Function Character under Article 21: 
  • The Court recognized that road construction assumes constitutional significance when performed for the state, noting: "The contract for laying of a State Highway/District Road, when assigned by the Corporation owned and run by the government, assumes the character of a public function – even if performed by a private party" thereby bringing it within the constitutional framework of Article 21. 
• Expansive Interpretation of Right to Life: 
  • The judgment reflects the Supreme Court's established jurisprudence that Article 21's "right to life" extends beyond mere survival to include quality of life aspects, with safe and accessible road infrastructure being recognized as an essential component of dignified living and the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. 

Source: Supreme Court 

Why in News?

The bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi in the case of Federation of Leprosy Organization (FOLO) and Another v. Union of India and Ors. (2025) urged the Union of India and States/Union Territories to take urgent remedial action against discriminatory laws targeting leprosy-affected or cured persons.  

What was the Background of Federation of Leprosy Organization (FOLO) and Another v. Union of India and Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The petition was filed by the Federation of Leprosy Organization (FOLO) in 2010 as a public interest litigation.  
• Initially, leprosy was considered a dreaded, incurable, highly contagious and infectious disease. 
• The Indian Lepers Act, 1898 was enacted to segregate leprosy patients from society, containing draconian provisions such as arrest without warrant, confinement in leprosy asylums, and restrictions on property and voting rights. 
• In 1979, Multi-Drug Therapy (MDT) was developed as a complete cure for leprosy at any stage. 
• Post-1981, MDT was extensively used in India to completely cure leprosy. 
• The World Health Organization declared leprosy as fully curable and not contagious, leading to the repeal of the 1898 Act. 
• In 2004, the petitioner wrote to State governments requesting removal of discriminatory provisions against the leprosy-affected or cured persons from their laws, orders, etc., but they continued to exist. 
• The petitioner informed that while 4 Central Acts were amended in 2019, more than 100 Central legislations still contained discriminatory provisions. 
• States were found to have 145 legislations with discriminatory provisions against leprosy-affected persons. 
• In 2019, the Central Government notified the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act 2019 to remove leprosy as a ground for divorce, amending five Acts including the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. 

Court's Observations 

• The bench expressed concern about the embarrassing nature of having leprosy as grounds for divorce, stating "The most serious...we don't want to use the word, but how embarrassing it is...you have created a ground for taking divorce.” 
• The Court advised States that they need not wait for particular Assembly sessions to carry out necessary changes in their laws and noted that some states had filed compliance affidavits regarding constitution of Committees, while others remained non-compliant 
• The Court granted 2 weeks' further time to non-compliant States to comply with the Court's earlier direction and ordered Chief Secretaries of State governments to file status reports on follow-up action taken pursuant to their respective Committees' recommendations.  
• Directed that the Secretary of NHRC shall furnish details to the Court after getting approval from NHRC Chairman, noting that NHRC had independently examined the issue.  
• The Court emphasized the constitutional obligation to eliminate discriminatory provisions against leprosy-affected or cured persons.

What is Leprosy?

About:  

• Leprosy was initially considered a dreaded disease because it was incurable, highly contagious, and infectious. 
• Historically, leprosy was highly stigmatized, and those affected were often socially marginalized. 
• In 1979, Multi-Drug Therapy (MDT) was developed as a cure for leprosy at any stage. 
• Following 1981, MDT was extensively used in India to completely cure leprosy. 
• The World Health Organization declared leprosy as fully curable and not at all contagious. 
• With advancements in medical science, leprosy is now treatable, and cases of permanent disability from the disease have significantly declined. 

Leprosy as Ground for Divorce under Hindu Law: 

• Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955(HMA), leprosy was originally recognized as a ground for divorce in Section 13(1)(iv). 
• According to this section, a spouse could file for divorce if their partner suffered from "a virulent and incurable form of leprosy". 
• This provision stemmed from the belief that leprosy, as a chronic and contagious disease, could pose health risks to the unaffected spouse and family. 
• The law aimed to address concerns by allowing the healthy spouse an option for legal separation. 
• Only cases where leprosy was considered "virulent" (highly infectious) and "incurable" qualified as grounds for divorce. 
• Leprosy could be cited in divorce petitions as well as petitions for judicial separation, where spouses live separately without dissolving the marriage. 
• This provision reflected the social stigma and fear associated with leprosy at the time, as the disease was often misunderstood and heavily stigmatized in Indian society. 

Removal of Leprosy as Ground for Divorce: 

• Recognizing the medical changes that made leprosy treatable, the Indian Parliament passed the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act in 2019. 
• This amendment removed leprosy as a valid ground for divorce. 
• The amendment aligned with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
• It acknowledged that the previous law reinforced social stigma against individuals with leprosy, despite it being a treatable condition.