List of Current Affairs

Source: Rajasthan High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand set aside the ex parte decree, holding that service of summons under Order V Rule 17 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) without a verifying witness's signature is invalid. 

The Rajasthan High Court held this in the matter of Ram Kishan v Ram Dai & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Ram Kishan v Ram Dai & Ors., (2025) Case? 

• Ram Dai filed a suit against Ram Kishan for declaration and permanent injunction under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Ram Kishan initially filed his written statement in response. 
• The case faced multiple dismissals - first when Ram Dai failed to appear (July 1999), then when she couldn't pay costs or produce evidence (March 2000). However, Ram Dai successfully appealed, and the Revenue Appellate Authority remanded the case back to trial court in November 2001. 
• When fresh notices were issued to Ram Kishan, the process server could not find him at home and affixed the summons on his house. Critically, the process server failed to obtain witness signatures to verify the house identity, violating Order V Rule 17 CPC requirements. 
• Based on this defective service, the Assistant Collector conducted ex-parte proceedings and ruled in favour of Ram Dai in May 2002.  
• Ram Kishan's subsequent appeals to the Revenue Appellate Authority (rejected July 2004) and Board of Revenue (rejected September 2020) were unsuccessful. 
• Ram Kishan finally approached the Rajasthan High Court through a writ petition, challenging all adverse orders based on the fundamental defect in service of summons and violation of natural justice principles. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court clarified that defendants have two options when facing an ex-parte decree: they can either file an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the decree, or file a regular appeal under Section 96(2) CPC challenging the decree on merits. 
• The Court emphasised that the right to appeal under Section 96(2) CPC is a substantive statutory right, not just a procedural formality. Defendants cannot be denied this right merely because they did not first attempt to set aside the ex-parte decree through Order 9 Rule 13. 
• The Court found that the service of summons was legally incomplete because the process server failed to obtain the signature of any witness who could identify Ram Kishan's house.  
  • This violated the mandatory requirements of Order V Rule 17 CPC, which requires witness verification when summons are affixed at a residence. 
• Since the service was defective, the Court held that the ex-parte proceedings should never have been initiated. The trial court incorrectly treated the service as complete based on an unverified report. 
• The Court rejected the argument that Ram Kishan's appeal was not maintainable, finding that the appeal memorandum did challenge the ex-parte judgment on its merits, making it a proper appeal under Section 96(2) CPC. 
• The Court determined that Ram Kishan was deprived of his fundamental right to be heard, which violated the basic principles of natural justice. No adverse order should be passed against a person without giving them a proper opportunity to present their case. 
• The Court noted that the appellate court made a factual error by stating that Ram Kishan had not filed a written statement after remand. The record clearly showed that a written statement was already on file, indicating that the appellate court failed to properly verify the facts before deciding. 
• Based on these findings, the High Court concluded that all three lower court judgments were fundamentally flawed due to procedural violations and factual errors. The Court ordered that the matter be remanded for fresh adjudication with proper adherence to due process and natural justice principles. 

What is Order V Rule 17 in CPC,1908 ? 

• Order V Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the legal framework for serving summons when normal service cannot be accomplished, specifically covering situations where the defendant refuses to accept the summons or cannot be located at his residence despite the serving officer making all due and reasonable efforts to find him. 
• The rule establishes strict preconditions that must be satisfied before alternative service can be adopted, requiring that there must be no agent empowered to accept service on the defendant's behalf, no other authorised person available for service, and no reasonable likelihood of finding the defendant at his residence within a reasonable timeframe. 
• When these preconditions are met, the serving officer is legally authorised to affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or any other conspicuous and easily visible part of the house where the defendant ordinarily resides, conducts his business operations, or personally works for monetary gain. 
• The rule mandates that after affixing the summons copy, the serving officer must immediately return the original summons to the issuing court along with a comprehensive report that can either be endorsed directly on the original summons or attached as a separate document containing all required details. 
• The report must include three mandatory elements: a clear statement confirming that the copy has been affixed as prescribed by law, a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances that necessitated this alternative method of service, and most crucially, the complete name and address of any person who helped identify the defendant's house. 
• Additionally, the report must contain the name and address of any person who was present as a witness when the summons copy was actually affixed to the house, serving as independent verification that the service was conducted at the correct address belonging to the intended defendant. 
• This witness identification and verification requirement serves as a fundamental safeguard designed to prevent misuse of the substituted service provision and ensures that the defendant's constitutional right to proper notice of legal proceedings is adequately protected even when personal service cannot be effected. 
• Failure to comply with any of these mandatory requirements, particularly the witness identification and verification aspects, renders the entire service legally incomplete and ineffective, thereby invalidating any subsequent ex-parte proceedings or judgments that may be based on such defective service of summons. 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran  have referred to a larger bench the question of whether legal heirs of vehicle owners who die in self-accidents can claim compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act (MVA) due to conflicting precedents. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Wakia Afrin (Minor) v. M/S National Insurance Co. Ltd.(2025). 

What was the Background of Wakia Afrin (Minor) v. M/S National Insurance Co. Ltd., Case ? 

• Two-year-old Wakia Afrin lost both parents when their vehicle crashed into a roadside building after going out of control due to a tyre burst, killing all four occupants including her father who was driving his own insured vehicle. 
• Wakia's aunt represented the orphaned child in filing compensation claims under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking no-fault liability compensation for both parents' deaths. 
• The vehicle was insured with National Insurance Company Limited under a valid policy in the father's name, with owner-driver coverage limited to Rs. 2 lakhs. 
• The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,08,000/- for the mother's death and Rs. 4,53,339/- for the father's death. 
• The Orissa High Court overturned the award, ruling the claims were not maintainable because a dead person cannot be made a defendant. 
• Whether family members of a deceased vehicle owner can claim compensation under Section 163A's no-fault liability provision, or if such claims are restricted only to third-party victims. 
• Wakia, as sole heir inheriting her father's estate, cannot simultaneously bear liability for compensation and receive it. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court found the High Court's reasoning fundamentally flawed, observing that Section 155 of the Motor Vehicles Act ensures claims survive against insurers even after the insured's death, as the liability shifts to the deceased's estate which the insurer must indemnify. 
• The Court critically observed that Section 163A covers every claim when a valid policy exists and is not restricted to third-party claims only, without requiring proof of negligence if death or permanent disability results from a motor accident. 
• The Court observed that Section 163A's non-obstante clause overrides all provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, other laws, and insurance policy terms, having a superseding effect over insurance laws and contractual limitations. 
• The Court observed Section 163A as beneficial social security legislation designed for comprehensive no-fault liability coverage due to increasing motor accidents and difficulties in proving negligent driving on overcrowded roads. 
• The Court respectfully disagreed with various two-judge bench decisions that restricted Section 163A to third-party risks, noting considerable variance in observations but acknowledging the established principle limiting coverage to third-party risks under Sections 147 and 149. 
• The Court clearly observed that the claim for the mother's death must be admitted and the Tribunal's Section 163A award restored, as there was no dispute regarding this aspect. 
• The Court observed that while the policy limited owner-driver coverage to Rs. 2 lakhs, the question remained whether insurer liability could be confined to policy terms or determined under Section 163A's broader provisions. 
• The Court observed that the conflicting interpretations regarding insurer liability under Section 163A for owner/insured claims required authoritative pronouncement from a larger bench, expressing doubt about the correctness of coordinate bench decisions restricting the provision's scope. 

What is Section 163A of MVA ? 

• About  
  • Section 163A is a special provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, that provides compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents based on a fixed formula, without requiring them to prove anyone's fault or negligence. 
• Key Features 
  • No-Fault Liability: This section creates a "no-fault liability" system, meaning victims or their families can claim compensation even without proving that the accident was caused by someone's mistake, carelessness, or wrongdoing. 
  • Fixed Compensation Formula: The compensation amounts are predetermined and listed in the Second Schedule of the Act, creating a structured payment system rather than leaving amounts to be decided case by case. 
  • Overriding Provision: Section 163A overrides all other provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act and any other existing laws or legal instruments, making it a superior provision that takes precedence over conflicting rules. 
• Who Can Claim? 
  • In Case of Death: Legal heirs of the deceased person can claim compensation In Case of Permanent Disability: The injured victim themselves can claim compensation 
• Who Must Pay? 
  • Vehicle Owner: The owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident Insurance Company: The authorised insurer of the vehicle (if properly insured) 
• What Accidents Are Covered? 
  • The section applies to accidents that arise "out of the use of motor vehicle," which includes any accident involving a motor vehicle during its normal use on roads. 
• Types of Injuries Covered 
  • Death: Complete compensation as per the Second Schedule  
  • Permanent Disablement: Compensation based on the degree of disability as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 
• What Victims Don't Need to Prove 
  • Under Section 163A, claimants are NOT required to prove: 
  • That the accident was caused by wrongful act 
  • That someone was negligent or careless 
  • That there was any default by the vehicle owner 
  • That any other person was at fault 
• Government's Power to Update 
  • The Central Government can modify the compensation amounts mentioned in the Second Schedule from time to time, considering changes in the cost of living and inflation. 
• Why This Section Exists 
  • Social Security: It acts as a social security measure for accident victims and their families  
  • Quick Relief: Provides faster compensation without lengthy legal battles over fault  
  • Reduced Burden: Eliminates the difficult task of proving negligence in court 
  • Comprehensive Coverage: Ensures victims get compensation regardless of who caused the accident 

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices PS Narasimha and Manoj Misra upheld that Pollution Control Boards are empowered to impose environmental compensation under Sections 33A of the Water Act and 31A of the Air Act for actual or imminent environmental harm.  

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd. Etc. (2025). 

What was the Background of Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd. Etc, Case ? 

• Following directions from the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, DPCC issued show cause notices to multiple commercial complexes, shopping malls, and residential properties for operating without mandatory "consent to establish" and "consent to operate" under Water Act Section 25 and Air Act Sections 21-22. As enforcement measures, DPCC demanded fixed monetary compensation and bank guarantees as preconditions for granting environmental consent certificates.  
• The affected entities filed 38 writ petitions before Delhi High Court challenging DPCC's statutory authority to impose such monetary requirements. 
• The Single Judge in Splendor Landbase Ltd. v. DPCC (2010) ruled that DPCC lacked statutory power to levy compensatory damages, holding that penalty imposition constituted penal action exclusively within court jurisdiction under prescribed procedures in penalty chapters.  
• Similar decisions in Bharti Realty Ltd. v. DPCC and Anush Finlease cases (2011) consistently held that Boards possessed no authority to collect compensatory damages. 
• The Division Bench (2012) upheld these findings, confirming that Sections 33A and 31A conferred no penalty-levying powers, declaring DPCC's monetary demands ultra vires and ordering refund of collected amounts while prohibiting further enforcement of the challenged notices. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• Supreme Court observed that Pollution Control Boards possess extensive statutory mandates under Water and Air Acts, with Section 17 conferring broad responsibilities including pollution control planning, advisory functions, inspection powers, and preventive measures implementation. 
• The 1988 amendments introducing Sections 33A and 31A specifically empowered Boards with significant directive authority, including explicit powers to order industry closure, prohibition, regulation, and essential service stoppage, thereby strengthening enforcement capabilities against environmental violations. 
• The Court established a fundamental legal distinction between punitive actions involving fines or imprisonment for statutory offences requiring strict judicial procedures, and compensatory or restitutionary actions focusing on environmental restoration, remedial measures, and future harm prevention without mandatory court intervention. Court emphasized that constitutional provisions under Article 48A (environmental protection) and Article 51A (fundamental duties) create binding imperatives for environmental regulators, noting that State's constitutional obligation to protect environment remains incomplete without corresponding institutional duty to secure environmental restitution. 
• The Court ruled that Sections 33A and 31A require expansive judicial interpretation to enable effective environmental protection, stating that restrictive interpretation would significantly encumber Boards' ability to discharge statutory duties and constitutional environmental protection obligations. Court noted that recent 2024 amendments including decriminalization and Adjudicating Officer introduction don't conflict with Boards' compensatory powers, maintaining clear distinction between restoration measures and penalty procedures.  
• While affirming compensatory powers, Court mandated procedural safeguards including non-arbitrary decision-making, natural justice incorporation, transparent damage assessment criteria, and proper subordinate legislation framework for power exercise. 

Which landmark cases did the Supreme Court uphold to affirm the authority of Pollution Control Boards to impose environmental compensation? 

• Supreme Court upheld Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996), which established Polluter Pays principle as fundamental component of Indian environmental jurisprudence, recognizing that responsibility for environmental damage repair rests with offending industry and that Central Government possesses power to impose remedial costs on polluting entities under Environment Protection Act provisions. 
• Court relied upon Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996), which expanded environmental liability to encompass both compensatory aspects for pollution victims and restorative aspects for environmental degradation reversal, establishing remediation as integral component of sustainable development and confirming polluter liability for both individual compensation and ecological restoration costs. 
• Court endorsed National Green Tribunal's decision in State Pollution Control Board, Odisha v. M/s Swastik Ispat Pvt Ltd (2014), which correctly distinguished between punitive penal actions and compensatory environmental measures, specifically recognizing bank guarantee requirements for environmental compliance as compensatory rather than punitive regulatory tools, thereby validating Board authority for such enforcement mechanisms. 
• Court referenced Research Foundation for Science v. Union of India (2005), which comprehensively expanded Polluter Pays principle beyond damage remediation to include pollution prevention costs, environmental risk avoidance expenses, and full environmental cost internalization, establishing that principle encompasses both reactive damage response and proactive harm prevention measures. 
• Court upheld T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2025), which clearly separated legal proceedings against environmental law violators from distinct measures required for environmental damage restoration, emphasizing that violation prosecution and ecosystem restoration constitute independent legal processes requiring different approaches and remedies, ultimately supporting the appeals while establishing Board authority for environmental compensation under statutory mandate. 

How does the Polluter Pays Principle Apply under Indian environmental law? 

• Principle I - Two Different Types of Legal Actions  
  • Environmental law separates two kinds of actions:  
    (1) making polluters pay to fix damage or prevent future harm (compensatory), and  
    (2) punishing violators with fines or jail time (punitive). These are handled differently - compensation doesn't require the same strict court procedures as criminal punishment, but both protect the environment effectively. 
• Principle II - Compensation is Not Punishment  
  • When environmental authorities order companies to pay for environmental restoration or compensation, this is considered fixing a problem, not punishing a crime.  
  • Real punishment can only happen through formal court processes with proper legal procedures, while compensation orders work separately from the criminal justice system. 
• Principle III - "Polluter Pays" Rule  
  • Indian environmental law follows the international rule that polluters must pay for environmental harm in three situations:  
    (1) when they exceed pollution limits and cause measurable damage, 
    (2) when damage occurs even if they stayed within limits, and  
    (3) when there's a reasonable risk of future environmental harm, allowing authorities to act before damage happens. 
• Principle IV - Duty to Prevent Harm  
  • Environmental regulators must take action to prevent environmental damage - they don't have to wait for actual harm to occur.  
  • They can and should act proactively under the law to address potential threats before they become real problems, protecting public health and the environment. 
• Principle V - Equal Powers at All Levels  
  • State Pollution Control Boards have the same legal authority as the Central Government when it comes to environmental protection.  
  • Both can issue binding orders requiring polluting industries to pay money for environmental remedial measures, ensuring consistent environmental protection regardless of which level of government is involved.