List of Current Affairs

Source: Delhi High Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Ravinder Dudeja held that mere celebration of bail on social media cannot be a ground for its cancellation unless it involves specific threats or intimidation to the complainant, while refusing to cancel bail in a house trespass case. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the matter of Zafeer Alam v. State NCT Of Delhi and Anr (2025). 

What was the Background of Zafeer Alam v. State NCT Of Delhi and Anr. (2025) Case? 

• The complainant, Zafeer Alam, filed a petition under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking cancellation of bail granted to the accused, Manish, by the Sessions Court in Bail Application No. 891/2025. 
• The case pertains to FIR No. 193/2025 registered at Police Station Narela Industrial Area for offences punishable under Sections 436, 457, 380 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
• The Sessions Court had granted bail to the accused after noting that the investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed. The accused had been in custody since 13 March 2025. The bail was granted subject to conditions, including that the accused shall not threaten prosecution witnesses, tamper with evidence, or indulge in any criminal activity in future. 
• The complainant alleged that the accused violated the bail conditions. It was contended that after his release, the accused and his co-accused created an atmosphere of fear in the colony by issuing threats to the complainant through posting pictures with weapons on social media. It was further alleged that one co-accused, Gaurav, was witnessed in front of the complainant's residence on 12 June 2025. 
• The complainant submitted that the accused continuously intimidated her and her family with knives and other deadly weapons, thereby endangering their safety. It was stated that the accused had a strong motive and personal animosity against the complainant, as a close associate of the accused was killed in an incident wherein the complainant's son and his friends were attacked by the associates of the accused. This background of enmity was cited as a reason for the accused to seek vengeance against the complainant and her family. 
• The complainant further contended that the accused and his henchmen celebrated their release on bail by uploading videos and status messages on social media, flaunting lethal weapons and issuing veiled threats to the complainant in brazen disregard for the rule of law. 
• The State opposed the application, submitting that the complainant neither filed any application before the Sessions Court for cancellation of bail nor made any complaint of threat or criminal intimidation after the grant of bail. Therefore, it was contended that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court observed that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at an initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of bail already granted. 
• The Court noted that generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with due course of administration of justice, evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice, or abuse of concession granted to the accused in any manner. 
• The Court held that the argument that the accused or his associates celebrated their release on bail by uploading videos and status messages on social media platform cannot be the ground for cancellation of bail without there being any specific threat or intimidation extended to the complainant. 
• The Court observed that screenshots posted on social media were placed on record, but it was not visible from the said screenshots as to whether they were posted by the accused with a view to intimidate the complainant. The Court held that the bail of the accused cannot be cancelled merely because one of the co-accused was witnessed in front of the residence of the complainant on 12 June 2025. 
• The Court noted that admittedly, no complaint had been made to the police regarding any threats having been extended by the accused. The Court observed that in the absence of any complaint being made to the police, the allegations of threat were not substantiated. 
• The Court held that there was no material on record to substantiate the allegations of threats extended by the accused. The Court thus found no justified reason for cancellation of bail of the accused. 
• Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for cancellation of bail, finding no merit in the same. 

What are the Guidelines for Cancellation of Bail? 

• The power to cancel bail under Section 480(5) and Section 483(3) of the BNSS should be exercised cautiously, as cancellation infringes upon an individual's liberty. 
• Cancellation of bail differs from refusal of bail at the initial stage. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancellation of bail already granted. 
• The general grounds for cancellation broadly include interference with the due course of administration of justice, evasion of the due course of justice, or abuse of concession granted to the accused. 
• Bail may be cancelled where the accused abuses the freedom granted, obstructs the investigation, or hampers the progress of investigation. 
• Cancellation is warranted where the accused tampers with evidence, interferes with witnesses, or threatens and intimidates prosecution witnesses. 
• The accused's attempt to escape, evade justice, flee the country, or abscond from the Court's jurisdiction constitutes a ground for cancellation. 
• Bail may be cancelled where the accused engages in similar illegal activities or indulges in criminal activities after release on bail. 
• Bail granted without proper consideration or in violation of substantive or procedural law may be cancelled where the order is wholly irrational, unjustified, or perverse. 
• The Court of Session and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction to cancel bail under Section 483(3) of the BNSS.

Case Laws 

• In S.S. Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010): 
  • The Supreme Court held that striking a delicate balance between individual liberty and societal interests is crucial in matters of bail. 
  • It was observed that every criminal offence is viewed as an offence against the society, and therefore bail holds significant importance for society. 
• In Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022):  
  • The Supreme Court emphasized that the norm is to grant bail, making rejection an exception. 
• In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia and another (2019): 
  • The Supreme Court clarified that if the bail decision is wholly irrational and unjustified, Section 439(2) of the CrPC can be invoked to revoke the granted bail. 
  • It was held that the power for bail cancellation may be exercised based on the merits of the case, misuse of liberty, or other supervening circumstances. 
  • The Supreme Court outlined that supervening factors for bail cancellation include the accused engaging in similar illegal activities, hampering the investigation's progress, or attempting to flee the country. 
• In Rubina Zahir Ansari v. Sharif Altaf Furniturewala (2014): 
  • The Supreme Court affirmed that submitting a bail cancellation petition directly to the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Session would not violate judicial decorum. 
  • It was recognized that the aggrieved party has the right to approach higher courts for cancellation of bail granted by lower courts. 

Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court 

Why in News? 

The bench of Justices Vivek Singh Thakur and Sushil Kukreja in the case of Rishita Kapur and Another v. Vijay Kapur and Another (2025) partially allowed a criminal revision petition concerning enhancement of maintenance for major children, clarifying that maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) is available only until a child attains majority, except in cases of physical or mental disability.  

• Importantly, the Court held that fathers cannot claim refund of maintenance already paid to children after they attain majority, as they have a moral obligation to support their education. 

What was the Background of Rishita Kapur and Another v. Vijay Kapur and Another (2025) Case? 

• The petitioners were children of respondent Vijay Kapur and proforma respondent Neelam Kumari, born on 01.08.1998 (daughter Rishita) and 17.03.2002 (son Suchet), attaining majority on 01.08.2016 and 17.03.2020 respectively. 
• The daughter was pursuing Ph.D from H.P. Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Palampur, while the son was doing B.Tech from Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. 
• Initially, in 2012, the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sarkaghat awarded Rs.2,000/- per month maintenance to the mother and each child. 
• In 2015, the Additional Sessions Judge enhanced the maintenance from Rs.2,000/- to Rs.3,000/- per month. 
• In 2017, through Lok Adalat, the maintenance was further enhanced to Rs.4,000/- per month. 
• On 02.07.2018, an application under Section 127 CrPC was filed seeking further enhancement of maintenance. 
• The Family Court enhanced the mother's maintenance from Rs.4,000/- to Rs.8,000/- per month but dismissed the children's claim on the ground that they had attained majority. 
• The children approached the High Court challenging the dismissal of their enhancement application. 

What were the Court's Observations? 

• The Court examined the provisions of Section 125 CrPC (Section 144 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)), which provide maintenance entitlement to minor children and major children only if they suffer from physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering them unable to maintain themselves. 
• The Court observed that at the time of filing the enhancement application on 02.07.2018, the daughter had already attained majority on 01.08.2016, while the son was still a minor until 17.03.2020. 
• The Court held that the Family Court committed an error by rejecting the son's claim for enhancement entirely, instead of allowing it until he attained majority on 17.03.2020. 
• The Court found no infirmity in denying maintenance to the major daughter, as Section 125 CrPC does not provide for maintenance to major daughters even if unmarried, unlike Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
• The Court directed that the son was entitled to enhanced maintenance of Rs.8,000/- per month from 02.07.2018 to 17.03.2020 and ordered arrears payment by 15.10.2025 if unpaid. 
• The Court ruled that even if the father had voluntarily paid maintenance to his children after they attained majority, he would not be entitled to recover or adjust such amounts, citing his moral obligation as a father to support children completing their education. 
• The Court clarified that rejection of maintenance claims under Section 125 CrPC after attaining majority shall not bar the children from claiming maintenance or rights in their father's estate under other provisions of law. 

What is Section 144 of BNSS? 

About: 

• Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is a social justice provision aimed at preventing destitution and financial hardship of a neglected spouse and children. It empowers a Magistrate of the First Class to grant monthly maintenance, interim maintenance, and proceeding expenses to the wife, legitimate or illegitimate child, who is unable to maintain themselves, from a person who has sufficient means but refuses or neglects to do so. 

Key statutory Features: 

• Section 144(1): Empowers the Magistrate to order monthly maintenance to wife and children. 
• Second Proviso to Section 144(1): Allows the Magistrate to grant interim maintenance and expenses during the pendency of proceedings. 
• Third Proviso to Section 144(1): Directs that interim maintenance applications should ideally be disposed of within 60 days from the date of service of notice. 
• Section 144(2): Maintenance may be payable either from the date of application or order, as the Magistrate deems fit. 
• Section 144(3): Non-payment of maintenance can attract warrant proceedings and imprisonment up to one month. 
• Section 144(4): Disqualifies the wife from receiving maintenance in cases of adultery, refusal to live with husband without sufficient cause, or mutual consent to live separately. 
• Further procedural clarity is offered under Section 145(2), which mandates that evidence must be recorded in the presence of the respondent or their advocate, with a provision for ex parte proceedings and setting aside such orders upon showing sufficient cause within three months. 

Source:  Delhi High Court 

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Tejas Karia held that Shankeshwar Utensils & Appliances Pvt. Ltd. cannot manufacture, sell, or advertise products under the mark “Maggisun” or any mark similar to Nestlé’s “Maggi,” and must also cancel its trademark and destroy existing goods bearing the infringing mark. 

• The Delhi High Court held this in the matter of Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A & ANR V. M/S Shree Shankeshwar Utensils & Appliances Pvt. Ltd. (2025). 

What was the Background of Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A & ANR V. M/S Shree Shankeshwar Utensils & Appliances Pvt. Ltd. (2025) Case? 

• The plaintiffs, Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A. and another, are the registered proprietors of the internationally recognized trademark "MAGGI," acquired by Nestlé in 1947. The MAGGI brand constitutes a cornerstone of Nestlé's global food and beverage operations, representing decades of continuous commercial use, substantial marketing investments, and significant consumer goodwill across multiple jurisdictions.  
• The plaintiffs maintain numerous trademark registrations for MAGGI across various classes of goods and services, establishing their exclusive proprietary rights in the mark. 
• The defendant, M/s Shree Shankeshwar Utensils & Appliances Private Limited, represented by Sh. Dilip Jain, operates in the manufacturing and distribution of kitchen utensils and appliances, with particular emphasis on pressure cookers and related cookware products. 
• The commercial suit CS(COMM) 106/2018 was instituted before the Delhi High Court in 2018, alleging trademark infringement and passing off.  
• The plaintiffs discovered that the defendant had commenced manufacturing, marketing, and selling pressure cookers under the trademark "MAGGISUN," which was substantially and deceptively similar to the protected MAGGI mark. 
• The plaintiffs contended that the defendant's adoption of "MAGGISUN" constituted a deliberate attempt to capitalize upon the reputation and commercial magnetism of the MAGGI brand.  
• Such unauthorized use created the likelihood of confusion among consumers, who might erroneously associate the defendant's products with the plaintiffs' brand. This conduct amounted to an offence of trademark infringement under the Trademarks Act, 1999, and the tort of passing off. 
• The defendant had obtained Trademark Registration No. 1163623 for "MAGGISUN," lending apparent legitimacy to their operations. However, the plaintiffs challenged this registration through cancellation proceedings vide Petition No. C.O. (COMM. IPD-TM) NO. 318 of 2022.  
• The defendant actively promoted their products through print media, electronic media, social media platforms, and e-commerce portals, amplifying potential consumer confusion and dilution of the plaintiffs' intellectual property rights. 
• Subsequently, both parties engaged in good faith negotiations and arrived at a mutually acceptable settlement, filing a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia examined the joint settlement application dated 22.09.2025 and heard comprehensive submissions from learned counsel representing both parties.  
• The Court observed that the parties had voluntarily reached a comprehensive settlement without coercion, effectively resolving all contentious issues in the litigation. 
• The Court noted with approval the defendant's unequivocal acknowledgment of the plaintiffs as legitimate and exclusive proprietors of the MAGGI trademark, including recognition of the validity of all trademark registrations enumerated in the plaint. This acknowledgment represented clear vindication of the plaintiffs' intellectual property rights and eliminated future disputes regarding ownership or validity. 
• The Court recorded the defendant's comprehensive undertaking to permanently cease manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or dealing in pressure cookers or any goods under "MAGGISUN" or any mark identical or similar to MAGGI. This undertaking extended to all commercial exploitation and promotional activities across print, electronic, social media, and e-commerce platforms, ensuring complete protection both presently and in perpetuity. 
• The Court noted the defendant's commitment to destroy all infringing materials, including finished goods, labels, stickers, printed materials, printing equipment, cylinders, blocks, negatives, and dyes, with photographic evidence to be furnished within two weeks. The defendant consented to cancellation of Trademark Registration No. 1163623 for "MAGGISUN," and the Court accordingly allowed the pending cancellation petition. 
• The Court emphasized that the undertaking tendered by Sh. Dilip Jain remained perpetually binding upon the defendant company, its servants, agents, franchisees, assigns, dealers, stockists, successors-in-interest, and any person acting on its behalf, preventing future offence or violation through related entities. 
• Upon the plaintiffs' counsel confirming that remaining prayers would not be pressed, the Court disposed of the application and decreed the suit according to settlement terms. The Court directed preparation of the Decree Sheet and mandated strict compliance by both parties. All pending applications, including I.A. 21780/2025, were disposed of, bringing the litigation to conclusive resolution. 

What are the Legal Provisions Referred to ? 

• Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 
  • Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded.  
  • The Court shall pass a decree in accordance therewith, so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit.  
  • The provision further stipulates that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question, but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. 
  • The Explanation to the Rule clarifies that an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule. 
• Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: 
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confers inherent powers upon the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 
• Trademarks Act, 1999: 
  • The Trademarks Act, 1999 governs the registration, protection, and enforcement of trademark rights in India. 
• Section 29 of the Trademarks Act, 1999: 
  • Section 29 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 defines the scope of trademark infringement and provides that a registered trademark is infringed when a person uses an identical or deceptively similar mark in the course of trade in relation to goods or services for which the trademark is registered. 
• Common Law Action of Passing Off: 
  • The common law action of passing off protects unregistered trademark rights and goodwill associated with a mark. The tort of passing off prevents one trader from representing their goods or services as those of another, thereby causing confusion and deception among consumers. The essential elements of passing off include goodwill or reputation, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage to the plaintiff's business interests. 
• Section 57 of the Trademarks Act, 1999: 
  • Section 57 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 provides grounds for rectification or cancellation of trademark registrations from the Register of Trademarks, including cases where registration was obtained without sufficient cause or where the mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion.