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Criminal Law
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 Applies Retrospectively
10-Oct-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih ordered the release of a murder convict who was a juvenile in 1981, holding that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 applies retrospectively. The Court ruled that his detention beyond the three-year limit under the Act violated his fundamental right to life and liberty.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Hansraj v. State Of U.P. (2025).
What was the Background of Hansraj v. State of U.P. (2025) ?
- The petitioner, Hansraj, was born on June 10, 1969.
- On November 2, 1981, when the petitioner was 12 years and 5 months old, an FIR was registered against him and five co-accused under Sections 302/149, 147, and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, alleging assault on the first informant's father with a knife and lathis.
- The victim succumbed to his injuries on November 3, 1981.
- The petitioner was arrested on November 6, 1981, and granted bail on December 8, 1981, after spending 1 month and 3 days in custody as an undertrial.
- The petitioner and co-accused were tried in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 1983 before the Special Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur.
- On August 14, 1984, the Sessions Court found the petitioner and co-accused guilty of murder, with sentencing ordered on August 16, 1984.
- While co-accused received life imprisonment, the Sessions Court noted the petitioner was approximately 16 years old and entitled to benefit under the Children's Act, 1960, directing him to be kept in a children's home for reformation instead of prison.
- All convicts filed Criminal Appeal No. 631 of 1984 before the Allahabad High Court under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- On April 7, 2000, the High Court acquitted all appellants.
- The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 276 of 2002.
- On May 8, 2009, the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal and restored the Sessions Court's conviction and sentence.
- Following this order, the petitioner absconded and was finally arrested on May 19, 2022, after evading arrest for approximately 13 years.
- As per the custody certificate dated August 14, 2025, the petitioner had been in continuous custody for 3 years, 10 months, and 28 days.
- The petitioner invoked the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking immediate release, contending he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and entitled to benefit under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
- The petitioner argued his detention exceeded the maximum three-year period under Section 15(1)(g) of the JJ Act, 2000, violating his fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Court held that the central question was whether the petitioner was entitled to benefit under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, particularly Section 7-A inserted by Act 33 of 2006, which permits juvenility claims at any stage, even after final disposal of cases.
- The Court rejected the State's contention that the Children's Act, 1960, should apply merely because the offense occurred in 1981.
- Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 and Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344, the Court observed that all persons below 18 years on the date of commission of the offense, even prior to April 1, 2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim was raised after attaining 18 years or after conviction.
- The Court observed it was undisputed that the petitioner was 12 years and 5 months old on the date of the incident, a fact acknowledged by the Supreme Court itself in its May 8, 2009 order.
- The Court noted the Sessions Court had convicted the petitioner under Section 149 IPC as a member of an unlawful assembly, without attributing any specific role to him.
- The Court observed the petitioner had suffered incarceration exceeding the period permissible in law, and the Sessions Court's original purpose of keeping him in a children's home was no longer feasible.
- The Court held that no provision in the 1960 Act created any legal impediment to granting relief, and legislative developments in juvenile justice could not be overlooked.
- The Court emphasized that Section 7-A obligates courts to consider juvenility pleas and grant appropriate relief, even after final disposal of special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution.
- The Court held that since the petitioner was indisputably a child at the time of the offense and had been detained for over three years, his liberty was curtailed not in accordance with procedure established by law, constituting a writ large breach of Article 21 rights.
- The Court ordered the petitioner's immediate release from Central Jail, Varanasi, directing authorities to act on a downloaded copy of the judgment without insisting on a certified copy.
How Does the JJ Act, 2000, Retrospectively Protect Juveniles?
- Retrospective Application of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000
- The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, applies retrospectively to offences committed before its enactment on April 1, 2001.
- Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000, inserted by Act 33 of 2006, permits a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage before any court, even after final disposal of the case.
- The proviso to Section 7-A mandates recognition and determination of juvenility claims even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the commencement of the JJ Act, 2000.
- All persons below 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offense, even prior to April 1, 2001, are entitled to treatment as juveniles under the JJ Act, 2000.
- The JJ Act, 2000, applies to proceedings pending before any court initiated under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, or the Children's Act, 1960.
- Determination of Juvenility
- Courts have a mandatory obligation to inquire into and determine the age of an accused when a juvenility claim is raised.
- Where date of birth and age on the date of offense are undisputed, no formal inquiry is required to ascertain juvenility.
- Juvenility determination is made with reference to the date of commission of the offense, not the date of arrest, trial, conviction, or sentencing.
- Once juvenility is established under Section 7-A(2) of the JJ Act, 2000, the conviction and sentence are deemed to have no effect.
- Maximum Period of Detention
- The maximum detention period permissible for a juvenile under Section 15(1)(g) of the JJ Act, 2000, is three years.
- Detention beyond three years constitutes illegal detention and violates Article 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing life and personal liberty.
- Detention exceeding the permissible period warrants immediate release as a constitutional right.
- Legislative Framework
- The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, succeeds Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000, continuing the policy of recognizing juvenility claims at any stage.
- Legislative developments in juvenile justice demonstrate Parliament's consistent intent to provide protective benefits to persons who were juveniles at the time of offences.
- Absence of legal impediment in the Children's Act, 1960, does not bar application of beneficial provisions of the JJ Act, 2000.
- Nature of Offense and Juvenility
- Where a juvenile is convicted under Section 149 IPC as a member of an unlawful assembly without specific overt act attribution, juvenile justice provisions apply with equal force.
- The nature or gravity of the offense, including heinous offences like murder, does not disentitle a juvenile from claiming protective benefits under the JJ Act, 2000.
- Procedural Safeguards
- Section 24 of the Children's Act, 1960, prohibits joint trial of a child with a person who is not a child.
- Breach of mandatory procedural safeguards under the Children's Act, 1960, strengthens the case for granting relief to a juvenile convict.
- Constitutional Rights
- Curtailment of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law breaches the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Article 32 writ jurisdiction can be invoked by a convict to secure release where detention has become illegal due to expiry of the maximum permissible period under juvenile justice legislation.
- Conduct of the accused, including absconding or evading arrest, does not disentitle a juvenile from claiming statutory benefits under the JJ Act, 2000, once juvenility is established.
Mercantile Law
Cheque Dishonour Complaint Against Trustee Maintainable
10-Oct-2025
Source: Supreme Court
Why in News?
Recently, Justices Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra held that a cheque dishonour complaint under the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 NI Act is maintainable against a trustee who signed the cheque on behalf of a trust, even if the trust itself is not made an accused, since a trust is not a juristic person and liability rests on the signing trustee.
- The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (2025).
What was the Background of Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal (2025) ?
- William Carey University, owned by the Agriculture Crafts Trades and Studies Group of Institutions (ACTS Group), was facing a severe financial crisis. The ACTS Group entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Orion Education Trust (Orion) on 12th October 2017 to hand over the University's management and administration to Orion.
- The Respondent was the Chairman of Orion Education Trust. As Chairman, he authorized the Appellant to liaise with governmental authorities and facilitate the administrative transition of the University from ACTS Group to Orion.
- Pursuant to this arrangement, the Respondent, as authorized signatory of Orion, issued a cheque dated 13th October 2018 for Rs. 5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores) in favour of the Appellant for services rendered. The cheque was drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank, Vadodara Branch.
- When the Appellant presented the cheque at his ICICI Bank Branch, Shillong on 7th December 2018, it was dishonoured with the endorsement "insufficient funds".
- The Appellant issued a legal notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on 19th December 2018, which the Respondent received on 27th December 2018. Subsequently, the Appellant filed complaint case No. 44(S)/2019 before the Trial Court against the Respondent personally for offences under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
- The Respondent challenged the complaint's maintainability on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties, arguing that Orion Education Trust, being a juristic entity and the principal accused, had not been added as a party. He contended that without the Trust being named as an accused, no vicarious liability could be placed on him.
- The High Court of Meghalaya allowed the Respondent's petition and quashed the complaint and summoning order dated 11th February 2019, holding that the Trust must be made an accused. The Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
What were the Court’s Observations?
- The Supreme Court held that a Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is an obligation and not a legal entity or juristic person. Unlike a company, a Trust does not have a separate legal existence and cannot sue or be sued in its own name. Section 13 of the Trusts Act places the obligation to maintain and defend suits on the Trustees, not the Trust itself. A Trust operates only through its Trustees, who are the legal entities responsible for managing Trust property.
- The Court reiterated the principles from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) and K K Ahuja v V K Vora (2009), holding that the signatory of a dishonoured cheque is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and is covered under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. When a person holds a position such as Chairman or Managing Director and signs a cheque, he is prima facie responsible for the day-to-day business and can be prosecuted without making substantive averments about his specific responsibilities.
- The Court concluded that when a cause of action arises due to dishonour of a cheque and a complaint is initiated under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint is maintainable against the Trustee who signed the cheque, without the requirement to array the Trust as an accused. Since only Trustees are liable and answerable for acts done on behalf of the Trust, there is no legal requirement for the Trust to be made a party in proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the criminal proceedings against the Respondent to the Trial Court. The Court overruled several contrary High Court decisions that had held a Trust to be a juristic person capable of prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, clarifying that such decisions wrongly equated a Trust with a company.
What is Section 138 and 141 of NI Act ?
- Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
- Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with the offence of dishonour of cheques for insufficiency of funds.
- This provision, inserted in Chapter 17 of the Act in 1988, specifically addresses situations where a cheque drawn to discharge a debt is returned unpaid by the bank.
- Essential Elements: The offence is established when a cheque is dishonoured due to insufficient funds or if the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. The drawer becomes criminally liable irrespective of the nature of the underlying transaction. Essential conditions include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, issuance of a cheque in discharge of that debt, and subsequent dishonour of the cheque.
- Procedure for Prosecution: Upon dishonour, the payee must issue a written notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving information about the dishonour. The drawer then has fifteen days from receipt of notice to make payment. If payment is not made within this period, a complaint must be filed within one month of the expiry of the fifteen-day notice period. The complaint can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the payee's bank is situated.
- Punishment: Conviction under Section 138 can result in imprisonment extending up to two years and/or a fine extending up to twice the amount of the cheque or debt.
- Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
- Section 141 establishes the principle of vicarious liability when offences under the Act are committed by companies. This provision holds individuals associated with a company personally liable for the company's actions.
- Scope of Liability: If an offence under Section 138 is committed by a company, every person who was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed guilty. The Explanation defines "company" to include any body corporate, firm, or other association of individuals.
- Proof of Liability: Establishing liability requires proving active involvement in the company's business and a direct link to the offence. Mere designation as director or nominal head is insufficient. The complaint must specifically spell out how the accused was in charge of or responsible for the company's business.
- Sub-section (2) provides that if the offence was committed with the consent, connivance, or due to neglect of any director, manager, secretary, or other officer, such person shall also be deemed guilty.
- Defences Available: An accused can escape liability by proving the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent it. However, the burden of proof lies on the accused. Government nominees as directors are exempted from prosecution under this provision.