List of Current Affairs

Source: Supreme Court  

Why in News? 

Recently, the bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra has held that clarified that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be based solely on the plaint’s averments, without considering the defendant’s defence or external evidence. It emphasized that whether a suit is barred by law should be determined from the plaint alone, not from facts raised by the defendant. 

• The Supreme Court held this in the matter of Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh & Ors. (2025).

What was the Background of Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh & Ors. (2025) Case ? 

• The appellant, along with Dilbag Singh, filed a civil suit seeking declaration of ownership over agricultural land, possession thereof, mesne profits, and permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents. 
• The original owner of the suit land was Ronak Singh alias Ronaki, who died intestate on 5th October 1924, leaving behind his widow Kartar Kaur. 
• A succession dispute arose between Kartar Kaur and Chinki and Nikki, who were sisters of Ronak Singh and predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. 
• During the pendency of the succession dispute, Kartar Kaur allegedly executed a gift deed in favour of one Harchand in respect of the suit property. 
• The sisters of Ronak Singh challenged the validity of the gift deed before the civil court. 
• On 22nd March 1935, the civil court declared the gift deed as invalid on the ground that Kartar Kaur possessed only limited rights over the property. 
• By decree dated 11th September 1975, the gift deed was set aside and Kartar Kaur was declared as the owner in possession of the suit land. 
• Consequent upon the decree, mutation was sanctioned and entered in favour of Kartar Kaur on 13th May 1976. 
• During the pendency of the mutation proceedings, Kartar Kaur died on 28th December 1983. 
• After her death, the defendants produced a registered Will dated 15th December 1976, allegedly executed by Kartar Kaur in their favour, and claimed mutation on the basis thereof. 
• By order dated 29th April 1984, the revenue authorities ordered mutation in favour of the legal representatives of Ronak Singh's sister based on natural succession, rejecting the defendants' claim based on the Will. 
• An appeal filed by the respondents was dismissed by the Collector vide order dated 15th April 1985. 
• The respondents carried the mutation matter to higher courts through successive rounds of litigation. 
• The litigation arising out of the mutation proceedings finally concluded against the plaintiffs on 20th July 2017. 
• Thereafter, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit on 31st May 2019, claiming themselves to be natural heirs of Kartar Kaur through the sisters of Ronak Singh. 
• The plaintiffs challenged the Will dated 15th December 1976 as null and void and an act of fraud, and sought declaration of their ownership. 
• The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. 
• The defendants contended that since the Will was set up in 1983 and the plaintiffs were fully aware of its existence during mutation proceedings, the suit for declaration challenging the Will was barred by three years' limitation. 
• The defendants also alleged concealment of material facts regarding Civil Suit No.648/2012 filed by the father of plaintiff no.1, wherein the mutation order was challenged without challenging the Will, and the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC vide order dated 17th May 2013. 
• The defendants claimed that the present suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC on account of the earlier suit. 
• The trial court rejected the defendants' application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC vide order dated 7th January 2020, holding that the suit was not ex facie barred by limitation and that the question of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact. 
• Aggrieved, the defendants preferred a civil revision before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 
• The High Court allowed the revision vide ex parte order dated 27th January 2022 and rejected the plaint. 
• The recall application filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed vide order dated 4th July 2022.

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Supreme Court observed that while considering rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, only the averments made in the plaint are to be considered to find out whether the suit is barred by any law, and the defence is not to be taken into account at this stage. 
• The Court noted that neither the plaint nor any document on record indicated that the Will allegedly executed by Kartar Kaur was probated or its validity was tested and upheld in regular civil proceedings. 
• Mutation entries do not confer title and serve merely a fiscal purpose to realise tax from the person whose name is recorded in the revenue records. 
• The plaint averments indicated that the mutation proceedings culminated in 2017 and the suit was instituted within three years thereafter. 
• The suit was not merely for declaration of the Will being null and void but also for possession based on title. 
• Where a suit is for possession of immovable property based on title, the limitation period is twelve years when the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiff, as per Article 65 of the Limitation Act. 
• Whether the defendants perfected their title by adverse possession would be a mixed question of law and fact and can be addressed only after evidence is led, and cannot be made the basis to reject the plaint at the threshold. 
• Where several reliefs are sought in a suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 
• Though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title is three years, for recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation is twelve years from the date the possession becomes adverse. 
• Since the first suit filed by the predecessor-in-interest was not tried and the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, a fresh suit with appropriate relief cannot be prima facie barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC. 
• The High Court failed to consider the plaint averments in their entirety and was swayed only by the fact that the Will was thirty-six years old, overlooking that the validity of the Will was questioned throughout in mutation proceedings which settled in 2017. 
• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the trial court's order, directing the trial court to proceed with the suit and clarifying that its observations shall not be taken as an opinion on the merits of the issues.

What is Order VII Rule 11 CPC - Rejection of Plaint?

• Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for rejection of plaint in specific circumstances enumerated thereunder. 
  • Clause (a) mandates rejection of plaint where it does not disclose a cause of action. 
  • Clause (b) provides for rejection where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the time fixed by the Court. 
  • Clause (c) deals with cases where the relief is properly valued but the plaint is insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff fails to supply requisite stamp-paper within the time fixed. 
  • Clause (d) mandates rejection where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. 
  • Clause (e) provides for rejection where the plaint is not filed in duplicate. 
  • Clause (f) stipulates rejection where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 of Order VII. 
• The proviso stipulates that time for correction of valuation or supplying stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by exceptional cause and refusal would cause grave injustice. 
• The power to reject a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is an extraordinary power and must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. 
• Under clause (d), the Court must determine from the averments in the plaint itself whether the suit is barred by any law, including the law of limitation. 
• The scope of enquiry under Order VII Rule 11(d) is limited to the face of the plaint and the documents annexed thereto or referred to therein. 
• The defence set up by the defendant cannot be considered while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
• The power should be exercised only in clear and manifest cases where the plaint is ex facie barred. 
• Where determination of limitation requires examination of evidence or consideration of mixed questions of law and fact, the plaint cannot be rejected under clause (d). 
• The Court cannot travel beyond the four corners of the plaint while considering an application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11. 
• Where several reliefs are claimed and even one relief is within limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety as barred by law. 
• The provision should not be used to shut out genuine claims merely on technical grounds without full adjudication on merits. 

Source: Bombay High Court 

Why in News? 

Justice Arun R. Pedneker of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, in the case of Adarsh Gautam Pimpare v. State of Maharashtra (2025) upheld the denial of GST return information under the Right to Information Act, 2005  (RTI Act), ruling that such information is protected both as third party confidential information under Section 11 of the RTI Act and as statutorily prohibited disclosure under Section 158 of the GST Act. 

What was the Background of Adarsh Gautam Pimpare v. State of Maharashtra (2025) Case? 

• The petitioner, Adarsh Gautam Pimpare, filed an RTI application on 13.02.2023 with the Jan Mahiti Adhikari/Assistant State Tax Commissioner seeking information regarding GST submissions from financial year 2008 to 2023 of six different industries from Udgir, District Latur. 
• The six industries were: M/s. Vyankateshwara Mahila Audyogik Utpadak Sahakari Sanstha, M/s. Aniket Trading Company, M/s. Mayureshwar Trading Company, M/s. New Prasad Products and Agencies, M/s. Kalyani Trading, and M/s. Prasad Industries. 
• The Information Officer issued notices to the concerned industries seeking their response on the application as per Section 11 of the RTI Act. 
• The concerned industries responded with objections to providing information to the petitioner. 
• Based on the industries' objections, the Information Officer rejected the petitioner's application. 
• The petitioner filed an appeal under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act before the First Appellate Officer/Deputy State Tax Commissioner, which was rejected on the ground that the firms had denied consent to provide information to a third party. 
• The petitioner then filed a second appeal under Section 19(3) before the State Information Commissioner, which was dismissed by order dated 30.12.2024, upholding the orders of the lower authorities. 
• The petitioner challenged all three orders through this writ petition before the Bombay High Court. 
• The petitioner contended that the six firms had obtained government tenders by manipulating documents and not submitting GST, thereby committing huge fraud with public money, and that the information was needed to substantiate this grievance. 
• The petitioner argued that GST returns are public documents and not personal or third party information requiring consent under Section 11 of the RTI Act.

What were the Court's Observations?

On Mandatory Notice to Third Parties: 

• The Court relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020), which held that when personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act is sought, the procedure under Section 11 must be mandatorily complied with. 
• The Court held that third party information must be prima facie treated as confidential, and affected parties must be given an opportunity to contest disclosure under Section 11. Section 8 and Section 11 must be read together, with disclosure permitted only when public interest outweighs potential harm. 
• The Court rejected the petitioner's objection that no notice should have been given to the industries, holding that the Information Officer correctly followed the mandatory procedure under Section 11. 

On GST Returns as Protected Information: 

• The Court analyzed Section 158 of the GST Act, which specifically prohibits disclosure of GST returns, statements, and documents except as provided in its sub-section (3). 
• The Court applied the principle that the GST Act, being a special and later enactment, would override the RTI Act (a general enactment). Therefore, information prohibited under Section 158 of the GST Act cannot be disclosed under the RTI Act. 

On Public Interest Exception: 

• The Court noted that the petitioner's allegation of large-scale fraud was bald in nature with no prima facie evidence. The authorities correctly determined that no larger public interest was involved that would justify disclosure under the proviso to Section 8(1)(j). 

Final Ruling: 

• The Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding all three orders passed by the Jan Mahiti Adhikari/Assistant State Tax Commissioner, the First Appellate Officer/Deputy State Tax Commissioner, and the State Information Commissioner. 

What is the RTI Act? 

About:  

• It is an act of the Parliament of India which sets out the rules and procedures regarding citizens' right to information.  
• Under the provisions of RTI Act, any citizen of India may request information from a public authority which is required to reply expeditiously or within thirty days.  
• The RTI Bill was passed by Parliament of India on 15 June 2005 and came into force with effect from 12th October 2005.   

Objectives:  

• To empower the citizens. 
• To promote transparency and accountability 
• To deal with corruption.  
• To enhance people’s participation in the democratic process.

Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019: 

• It provided that the Chief Information Commissioner and an Information Commissioner (of Centre as well as States) shall hold office for such term as prescribed by the Central Government. Before this amendment, their term was fixed for 5 years. 
• It provided that the salary, allowances and other service conditions of the Chief Information Commissioner and an Information Commissioner (of Centre as well as States) shall be such as prescribed by the Central Government.

Important Provision under RTI Act: 

• Right to Information (Section 3):  
  • All citizens have the right to information, subject to the provisions of this Act. 
• Obligations of Public Authorities (Section 4):  
  • Maintain and catalog records. 
  • Computerize records within a reasonable time. 
  • Publish various details about the organization within 120 days of enactment. 
  • Provide reasons for administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons. 
• Designation of Public Information Officers (Section 5):  
  • Every public authority must designate Central or State Public Information Officers. 
  • Assistant Public Information Officers to be designated at sub-divisional or sub-district levels. 
• Request for Obtaining Information (Section 6):  
  • Requests can be made in writing, electronically, or orally. 
  • Applicants not required to give reasons for requesting information. 
• Disposal of Request (Section 7):  
  • Information to be provided within 30 days of request. 
  • If information concerns life or liberty, it must be provided within 48 hours. 
  • Fees may be charged for providing information. 
• Exemption from Disclosure of Information (Section 8):  
  • Lists various grounds for exemption, including national security, commercial confidence, and personal information. 
  • Public interest disclosure possible despite exemptions. 
• Grounds for Rejection to Access in Certain Cases (Section 9):  
  • Requests can be rejected if they would infringe on copyright. 
• Severability (Section 10):  
  • Access may be provided to part of a record if the exempt information can be reasonably severed. 
• Third Party Information (Section 11):  
  • Procedure for handling information related to or supplied by a third party. 
• Constitution of Information Commissions (Sections 12-15):  
  • Establishes Central and State Information Commissions. 
  • Appointment process for Information Commissioners. 
• Term of Office and Conditions of Service (Sections 13 and 16):  
  • Details terms, salaries, and conditions of service for Information Commissioners. 
• Removal of Information Commissioners (Sections 14 and 17):  
  • States grounds and process for removal of Information Commissioners. 
• Powers and Functions of Information Commissions (Section 18):  
  • Commissions can inquire into complaints and have powers of a civil court. 
• Appeal Process (Section 19):  
  • Deals first and second appeal processes. 
  • Decisions of Information Commissions are binding. 
• Penalties (Section 20):  
  • Penalties for Public Information Officers for unreasonable refusal, delay, or obstruction. 
  • Recommends disciplinary action for persistent violations. 

Source: Chhattisgarh High Court   

Why in News? 

Recently, Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas held that under the Mitakshara law, a daughter cannot inherit her Hindu father’s property if he died before 1956, provided a son is alive. The Court clarified that in the absence of a male heir, a daughter may claim the property, but the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act does not apply retrospectively to cases governed by pre-1956 law. 

• The Chhattisgarh High Court held this in the matter of Smt. Ragmania (Dead) through LRs v. Jagmet & Ors. (2025). 

What was the Background of Smt. Ragmania (Dead) through LRs v. Jagmet & Ors. (2025) Case? 

• The appellant Smt. Ragmania was the sister of Baigadas, both being children of Sudhinram. 
• After Ragmania's death, her legal heir Kariman Das was substituted as the appellant. 
• The respondents included Jagmet (son of Baigadas), Budhiyaro (widow of Baigadas), and the State of Chhattisgarh. 
• The family followed Hindu religion and was governed by Hindu Law. 
• The disputed property comprised agricultural lands at village Puhputra, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh. 
• The lands were initially recorded jointly in names of Sudhinram and his brother Budhau. 
• Sudhinram died in approximately 1950-51, prior to enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
• At the time of Sudhinram's death, the appellant was approximately 10 years old. 
• After Sudhinram's death, Baigadas came into possession of the entire suit property. 
• Baigadas got his name mutated in the revenue records. 
• The appellant's marriage was arranged by Baigadas after their father's death. 
• Baigadas filed an application before the Naib Tahsildar for mutation of property in favour of his daughter Jagmet. 
• The appellant learned about the mutation application through newspaper publication. 
• The appellant filed objections in Revenue Case No. 13-A-27/2002-03, claiming her rightful share. 
• Baigadas admitted the appellant was his sister but contended she had no right after marriage. 
• The Tahsildar rejected the appellant's objection on 23rd August 2003. 
• The appellant instituted Civil Suit No. 181-A/2005 on 6th October 2005 seeking declaration of title and partition. 
• The respondents pleaded that Sudhinram died in 1950-51, prior to commencement of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
• The respondents contended succession would be governed by old Mitakshara Law. 
• The respondents argued that under Mitakshara Law, a married daughter had no right when a male heir was alive. 
• The appellant failed to specifically plead when Sudhinram died in her plaint. 
• Witness PW-3 admitted in cross-examination that Sudhin expired 60 years prior to 17th October 2008. 
• This admission established that Sudhin died around 1948-49. 
• The Trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 26th December 2008. 
• The Trial Court held that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was not applicable as death occurred before 1956. 
• The First Appellate Court affirmed the decision on 23rd January 2014. 
• The appellant filed Second Appeal No. 178 of 2014 before the Chhattisgarh High Court. 
• The appellant argued that courts below ignored the 2005 Amendment to Hindu Succession Act. 

What were the Court’s Observations? 

• The Court held that since the plaintiff failed to plead when Sudhin expired and did not rebut the defendant's specific plea that death occurred in 1950-51, coupled with PW-3's admission that Sudhin died 60 years before 2008, it was conclusively established that Sudhin died around 1948-49, prior to enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
• The Court observed that since Sudhin expired before 1956, the succession opened under Old Hindu Law and the parties would be governed by Mitakshara Law, rendering the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and its 2005 Amendment completely inapplicable to the case. 
• The Court held it as well-settled law that under Mitakshara Law applicable to persons who died before 1956, a daughter is not entitled to inherit her father's property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, as such property devolved exclusively upon male issue, and only in absence of male child could wife or daughter inherit. 
• The Court concluded that the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 did not modify fundamental concepts of Shastric Hindu law or affect the son's absolute right to inherit his father's property, but merely enlarged the circle of heirs who could succeed in default of male issue by introducing certain female heirs. 
• The Court extensively relied upon Supreme Court judgments in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur (2020) and Arunachala Gounder v. Ponnusamy (2022), holding that if succession opened under old Hindu law prior to 1956, parties would be governed by Mitakshara law wherein female child could claim right only in absence of male child. 
• The Court definitively held that when a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law died before 1956, his separate property would completely devolve upon his son, and accordingly, on Sudhin's death his property devolved entirely upon Baigadas who rightly conveyed his rights to the defendants. 
• The Court found no illegality in the mutation orders in favour of defendants and held that the property was not partible, answering all three substantial questions of law against the plaintiff-appellant, and consequently dismissed the Second Appeal with no order as to costs. 

What Did Impart Regarding Mitakshara Law and Daughters’ Inheritance Rights? 

• Mitakshara School of Hindu Law: 
  • Mitakshara Law is the pristine school of Hindu law governing succession before 1956, based on ancient Shastric texts and Smritis. 
  • Under Mitakshara Law, sons, grandsons and great-grandsons acquire rights in ancestral property at birth, creating coparcenary rights. 
  • A son gets a share in his father's property by birth itself, not upon the father's death or by inheritance. 
  • When a male inherits property from paternal ancestors up to three degrees, his male heirs up to three degrees below automatically get equal coparcenary rights. 
• Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929: 
  • The 1929 Act was the earliest statutory legislation bringing Hindu females into the inheritance scheme by introducing certain female heirs. 
  • Section 1 of the 1929 Act applies only to property of males not held in coparcenary and not disposed of by will. 
  • Section 2 introduced son's daughter, daughter's daughter, sister and sister's son in succession order after father's father, but did not grant daughters equal status with sons. 
  • Section 3 provides that the 1929 Act shall not vest in females an estate larger than that possessed by females under Mitakshara law. 
  • The 1929 Act changed classification of certain female heirs from 'bandhus' to 'gotra sapindas' without changing inheritance rights. 
• Hindu Succession Act, 1956: 
  • The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 brought revolutionary change by codifying and reforming intestate succession laws among Hindus. 
  • Section 8 changed the old position whereby post-1956, inherited self-acquired property does not become coparcenary property. 
  • The 1956 Act applies only to successions opening after its commencement, i.e., where deceased died on or after 17th June 1956. 
  • Section 6 was amended in 2005 granting daughters equal coparcenary rights, but applies only prospectively, not to pre-1956 successions. 
  • Section 14 converted widows' limited interest into full ownership but applies only where the widow survived after the Act's commencement. 
  • Applicability of the 1956 Act depends on when succession opened (date of death), not the date of claiming rights or filing suit. 
• Hindu Women's Rights and Proprietary Rights Act, 1937: 
  • Section 3 of the 1937 Act provided widows only limited interest in husband's property, not absolute ownership. 
  • A widow's limited right converts into full right as Bhumiswami under Section 14 if she continued possession after 1956. 
• Distinction Between Pre-1956 and Post-1956 Law: 
  • Property inherited from paternal male ancestors remained coparcenary property under pre-1956 law, giving rights to male descendants. 
  • Post-1956, inherited self-acquired property from paternal ancestors becomes self-acquired property, not coparcenary property. 
  • Property nature and succession rights are determined by law applicable when succession opens, not by subsequent legislative changes. 
• Daughter's Rights Under Different Legal Regimes: 
  • Under Mitakshara Law before 1956, a daughter had no inheritance right if a son was alive, as property devolved exclusively on male issue. 
  • A daughter could inherit father's separate property only in complete absence of a male child, ranking fifth in succession order. 
  • Even after the 1929 Act, daughters did not acquire equal rights with sons when the father died before 1956. 
  • Daughters' rights were enhanced after 1956 and strengthened by the 2005 Amendment, but these apply only to successions opening after respective enactment dates.